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This article participates on the following special index pages:
2008 harmonised elections - Index of articles
Post-election violence 2008 - Index of articles & images
Media
Update 2008/11
Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ)
May 11, 2008
General
comment
MMPZ condemns ZANU PF's efforts to position the state media
as exclusive campaign tools for President Mugabe ahead of his contest
with MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai in the presidential election run-off
set to be held by July 31st this year. Both the official and private
media reported Information Minister Sikhanyiso Ndlovu demanding
total monopoly by government of Zimbabwe's only state radios
and TV station during a meeting with the ZBH board.
Reportedly, Ndlovu tasked
the board to review all programming to include more content discrediting
the opposition and extolling Mugabe and ZANU PF. He also implored
Zimbabweans to listen to the government-run propagandist news radio
station, Voice of Zimbabwe, based in Gweru, rather than alternative
independent radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe from abroad.
This crude attempt to
impose a tyranny of thought upon the nation has been reinforced
by the recent arrest of private and international media workers
and members of civil society. Such action represents yet another
assault on Zimbabweans' constitutionally guaranteed rights
to freedom of expression and choice, and illustrates the authorities'
blatant contempt for the country's electoral laws that demand
equitable media coverage of all contestants during an election.
As the main instruments of the authorities' attempts to brainwash
the nation, the government controlled media have forsaken any claim
they may once have had to being media outlets, substituting news
for unadulterated propaganda that promotes intolerance, hatred,
fear and confusion.
In this context, Spot
FM (6/5, 1pm) reported Ndlovu distorting the role of the public
broadcaster, saying its mandate was to "defend the country
and remind citizens of where they are coming from". The minister
claimed ZBC should "tell the true Zimbabwean story by having
more programmes on the liberation war . . . to remind people that
so much blood was lost in order for them to enjoy today's
independence". The station made no attempt to view this "advice"
as aimed at indoctrinating Zimbabweans with ZANU PF dogma ahead
of the run-off. Although ZTV and Radio Zimbabwe ignored Ndlovu's
comments, they coincided with an intensification of documentaries
and movies based on the liberation struggle screened on ZTV.
Ndlovu was also reported
expressing a sinister interest in supporting Zimpapers, publishers
of government's print empire that includes the country's
only two daily papers, The Herald and Chronicle.
The Herald (8/5)
passively reported Ndlovu promising to help the publishing group
acquire adequate newsprint to enable it to "print more newspapers
and increase its reach to the people", adding that Zimpapers
"must reciprocate government support". It also reported
Ndlovu hinting at the authorities' plans to monopolise the
publishing concern when he said that since government had "realised"
the importance of newspapers in "projecting the national and
international image of Zimbabwe", it had decided to "interface
with Zimpapers management".
Only the private media interpreted this as gross editorial interference
and an abuse of state institutions.
The Zimbabwe Independent's
Editor's Memo (9/5) for example, regarded Ndlovu's action
as "deplorable", saying his thinking was "worrying",
especially in view of the widespread reports of post-election violence.
Drawing parallels with the Rwanda genocide in 1994 where radio stations
were used to promote killings through hate speech, it warned that
although radios and newspapers "don't kill people",
they provide the fertile ground of "hatred for people to act
on".
In another story,
the paper reported ZANU PF Politburo member Emmerson Mnangagwa and
party hardliners directing President Mugabe's election campaign
as having met state media editors where they gave them the "editorial . . . and
political guidelines to be followed during the run-off". Similarly,
ZimOnline reported Ndlovu as having given the ZBH board a "blank
cheque" to dismiss any worker who refused to "conform,
or showed questionable loyalty to Mugabe and ZANU PF" after
accusing some ZBC officials of sabotaging the ruling party's
campaign.
Incidentally, as this report went to print, The Herald (15/5) reported
the board as having fired the broadcaster's chief executive,
Henry Muradzikwa.
Only the private
media reported the arrests and detention of The Standard Editor,
Davison
Maruziva, and Reuters
photographer Howard Burditt, as intimidation of the media, while
the official media passively reported them as normal.
Post-election
focus
The government media gave a sanitised picture of Zimbabwe's
post-election crisis despite devoting 122 reports to the matter.
Of these, 26 appeared on ZBC and 96 in government papers. They selectively
reported on escalating incidents of politically motivated violence
in the country, attributing them to the MDC (Tsvangirai) while absolving
ZANU PF of any culpability. In addition, the official Press carried
propagandist editorials portraying the MDC, white commercial farmers,
Western countries and other perceived government opponents, as collaborating
to effect "illegal regime change" in Zimbabwe without
providing any credible evidence.
Neither were there any sensible explanations on the authorities'
delays in holding the presidential poll run-off. In contrast, the
private Press gave more informed coverage of the poisoned post-election
environment, which they argued made a free and fair run-off impossible.
This was reflected in their 88 reports on the topic: private electronic
media (15) and private papers (73).
Political
violence
The government media maintained a tight lid on widespread allegations
of state-sponsored post-election violence featuring prominently
in the private and international media. For example, although ZBC
carried 13 stories on the subject, recording one incident, none
of the reports articulated the causes and gravity of the problem.
Neither did the state broadcaster or its print counterparts assess
the damaging effects of the violence on the electoral climate in
the context of the pending presidential run-off. They also smothered
news of the widespread international outrage the violence has attracted.
It was against this background that these media hid the real reasons
behind visits from South African President Thabo Mbeki and a SADC
ministerial committee of the troika on Politics, Defence and Security
to the country: to investigate the worsening violence.
Radio Zimbabwe and Spot
FM (7/5, 1pm) merely reported the SADC ministerial group as being
here to "access the political situation" in preparation
for the run-off. ZTV (9/5, 8pm) shed no light on Mbeki's mission,
only saying he held talks with President Mugabe on an "undisclosed
topic".
Instead, the government
media parried public attention arising from the increasingly disturbing
reports of violence with mainly official comments dismissing these
as figments of opposition and Western propaganda designed to tarnish
Mugabe's government.
The government media
selectively covered the violence by only highlighting incidents
allegedly committed by the MDC and other perceived government opponents
whilst censoring those where ZANU PF activists were blamed. For
example, the only incident of political violence that ZBC recorded
was on the burning of eight houses belonging to ZANU PF supporters
by alleged MDC activists. Spot FM and ZTV (8/5, 1pm, 6pm) claimed
the arson attacks were carried out as punishment against ruling
party supporters for defecting from the MDC. No other details were
given, nor was the MDC accessed for comment.
The government papers
also portrayed white farmers as perpetrators of violence without
providing any credible evidence. The Herald and Chronicle (5/5)
merely reported the arrest of three white farmers "after they
were seen driving around in an allegedly unregistered vehicle"
without citing any charges against them. Instead, they tried to
link the farmers with white former farmers, whom they said were
allegedly invading farms belonging to black farmers and committing
violence against them.
The following day, the
official dailies passively reported the arrest of another white
farmer, Wayne Munro, for "using pepper spray to attack war
veterans who had visited his farm". They neither clarified
the purpose of the war veterans' "visit" nor interpreted
Munro's action as self-defence.
The government media
also failed to give the context in which the Zimbabwe National Army
had disassociated itself from allegations that its members were
responsible for some of the violence, saying the army "has
never and will never be responsible for violence" (ZTV, 6/5,
8pm). These media also made no attempt to explain the ZNA's
concerns about "ever increasing incidents" against some
of its members "being provoked, insulted, abused and even
attacked by some sections of our community for no good reason"
(The Herald [9/5]). They showed no interest in discovering the identities
of those people wearing army uniforms who were identified as being
responsible for the violence and why the army had suddenly become
targets of public hostility.
Worst of all, these media
suppressed news that MDC supporters had ever been attacked despite
the party's claims accusing government of purging its supporters
so as to immobilize them ahead of the run-off.
Only the private electronic
media gave wide-ranging exposure to the post-election violence.
They carried 53 reports and recorded 70 incidents of politically
motivated violence: private electronic media (44) and private papers
(26). The reports identified the victims as perceived government
opponents while the perpetrators were named as state security agents,
war veterans and ZANU PF militia. Of these cases, 27 were fatalities.
However, with the exception
of The Standard, the private media failed to conduct independent
investigation into the deaths, relying generally on MDC statements
as their sole source. SW Radio Africa (7/5), for example, reported
the MDC claiming that post-election violence had claimed the lives
of 25 supporters, but failed to confirm this figure with any independent
evidence, such as hospitals, eye-witnesses or the police.
It only confirmed
22 of the deaths through a
report by the Zimbabwe
Doctors for Human Rights.
However, a report in
the South African-based publication, The Sunday Tribune (11/5),
provided an insight into some of the difficulties journalists were
having in covering the violence. These ranged from poor telecommunications
in the communal areas to a lack of co-operation from the police
and hospital staff. As a result, said the article, journalists were
forced to rely on an "enormous network of informers countrywide".
SW Radio Africa and Studio 7 (9/5) reported the doctors' association
revealing that it had attended to 900 cases of torture and assault,
adding that it believed this was "only a fraction of those
injured".
Studio 7 reported
that the Zimbabwe
Peace Project had documented 4 331 cases of political violence
and 10 deaths in April and cited soldiers, war veterans and youth
militia as being responsible. The private media also carried several
incidents on government's crackdown against dissent. These
included the arrest of journalists, lawyers, labour leaders and
activists from the human rights organisation, Women
of Zimbabwe Arise.
They also highlighted
growing regional and international indignation at the violence.For
instance, they linked visits by Mbeki, his emissaries and SADC delegations
to the escalating post-election violence. However, despite reporting
the groups as having met President Mugabe, the Zimbabwe Electoral
Commission, the MDC and civil society leaders, the private media
did not reveal the details of what they discussed.
Electoral
administration
The official media maintained their indifference towards ZEC's
mismanagement of the electoral process. This was characterised by
their failure to question the commission's reluctance to announce
the presidential run-off date, which according to the country's
electoral laws, must be held within 21 days from the announcement
of the result of the initial poll. Likewise, the official media
appeared disinterested in questioning ZEC's silence on the
results of five of the 23 constituencies where it conducted recounts
following ZANU PF complaints of ballot tampering.They also suppressed
news of the municipal election results, which the government papers
merely carried as ZEC advertisements, leaving readers to interpret
the results on their own. This shameful offence against journalistic
practice effectively suffocated news of widespread gains by the
MDC in the country's towns and cities, and even in some rural
areas.
Only the Sunday
News (11/5) belatedly reported ZEC's comments on the run-off
dates, which appeared in the private and international media, saying
it was considering extending the 21-day period due to lack of financial
resources, among others. It cited ZEC's deputy elections officer,
Utloile Silaigwana, saying that his commission was legally empowered
by the law to extend the run-off period to "allow for adequate
preparations for the poll". However, the paper did not pin
down ZEC on when exactly it would hold the poll. The paper also
failed to reconcile Silaigwana's denial of foreign media reports
that ZEC was "broke and could not hold elections on time"
with the comments from his boss George Chiweshe in the same report
that the commission was "awaiting funds from Treasury".
ZBC only reported ZEC's
position through a third party: SADC Executive Secretary Tomaz Salomao's
statement saying the commission had assured the SADC team that it
would announce the date as soon as all logistics were in place (Spot
FM [7/5, 1pm]).
Instead, the government
papers devoted their editorials, cartoons and letters-to-the-editor
column to a propaganda blitz against the MDC and their perceived
Western allies for their alleged plots to oust government and reverse
the gains of independence.
The papers carried 23
editorials that discredited the MDC, portraying it as a stooge of
British and American neo-colonial interests without providing any
evidence, while simultaneously campaigning for President Mugabe
and his party in the impending run-off.
The private
media also failed to pressure ZEC on the outstanding results of
the remaining five House of Assembly constituencies where recounts
had been held. And only the Gazette responded to the first release
by ZEC (in the form of adverts in all papers) of the municipal election
results with a small story reporting an MDC-T victory in Bulawayo.
The party won 23 of the 29 seats with the remainder going to its
breakaway faction, MDC (Mutambara). However, unlike the government
media, they reported observers doubting Zimbabwe's readiness
to hold a free and fair run-off in view of the severity of the post-election
violence. They reported the AU and SADC as having made representations
to government to ensure the run-off ballot was conducted in an favourable
environment. Studio 7 (7/5), for example, reported that Foreign
Ministers of the AU gathered in Tanzania in the week and urged all
participants to ensure that the run-off was "free, transparent
and non-violent".
The private media also reported on the authorities' planned
extension of the run-off date.
Figs 1-4 show
the sourcing patterns in the official and private media on election
related issues.
Fig
1: Voice distribution on ZBC
| Govt |
ZANU PF
|
ZRP |
ZDF |
Foreign
Diplomats |
Ordinary
People |
5 |
4 |
8 |
5 |
15 |
2 |
Fig
2: Voice distribution in the government papers
| Govt |
ZANU PF |
MDC |
Other Parties
|
ZEC |
Alternative |
Foreign
Diplomats |
Judiciary |
Police |
Unnamed |
15 |
17 |
6 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
14 |
12 |
15 |
5 |
Fig
3: Voice distribution in the private electronic media
| Govt |
ZANU PF |
MDC |
ZEC |
ZRP |
ZDF |
Alternative |
Foreign
Diplomats |
Farmers
Organisations |
Lawyers |
9 |
1 |
27 |
5 |
3 |
2 |
28 |
24 |
3 |
6 |
Fig
4: Voice distribution in the private Press
| Govt |
ZANU PF
|
MDC |
Other Parties
|
ZEC |
Alternative |
Foreign
Diplomats |
Ordinary
People |
Unnamed |
9 |
6 |
28 |
1 |
2 |
35 |
27 |
9 |
8 |
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