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Inadequate detail in government media coverage of March 2008 elections
Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ)
Extracted from Weekly Media Update 2008-5
February 4th - Sunday February 10th 2008

The government media continues to give grossly inadequate information on Zimbabwe 's readiness for the March 29 "harmonized" elections. They failed to report on pertinent electoral issues, such as the organisation and management of the election process, and ignored allegations of electoral irregularities. Nor did they provide equitable and neutral coverage to contesting parties. The official media's superficial and biased handling of the topic dominated their 138 reports on the issue, 70 of which appeared on ZBC and 68 in the government papers. Only the private media attempted to address these issues in 121 stories. Of these 65 were carried in the private electronic media and 56 in print.

A new challenge
The government media deliberately trivialised the significance of the decision by ZANU PF politburo member, Simba Makoni, to challenge the ruling party's candidate, Robert Mugabe, for the presidency. This was epitomised by the fact that although Makoni's rebellion was undoubtedly the most newsworthy event of the election story, ZTV (5/2, 8pm) treated this news as a non-event, burying it in a minor article announcing the formation of the Zimbabwe Development Party by little known Kisnot Mukwezha. Instead, ZTV led with the routine news of President Mugabe's return from an African Union summit in Ethiopia . The Herald (6/2) followed suit, relegating Makoni's candidature to the bottom of its front page while leading with "news" of Mugabe's return from the summit.

The government media's determination to diminish the implications of Makoni's revolt was illustrated in a so-called political analysis by Caesar Zvayi in The Herald (6/2), who mockingly likened it to "the loud fart all silently agree never happened".

As a result the paper did not provide a shred of sensible insight or analysis into Makoni's declaration, focussing instead, on linking him to alleged British and American conspiracies to unseat Mugabe. No proof was provided. For example, all ZBC stations (5/2, 8pm) claimed "an invisible" Anglo-American hand in Makoni's breakaway from ZANU PF simply because "British and American diplomats" had attended the Press conference at which he announced his decision.

The official media also gave the impression that by challenging President Mugabe, Makoni had automatically expelled himself from ZANU PF without citing the sections of the party constitution he had allegedly breached. The official media restricted themselves to passively reporting the observations of ruling party officials and supporters denigrating or threatening Makoni. The Herald (6/2), for example, cited war veterans leader Joseph Chinotimba threatening Makoni with unspecified action for "selling out" and "rebelling " against ZANU PF. These reports formed part of the 39 stories the official media carried on the subject (ZBC [20] and government papers [19]).

Only the private media dispassionately examined Makoni's decision and highlighted the mixed reactions it had sparked in the country. They also gave him the chance to articulate his reasons for breaking away, which these media blamed on Mugabe's authoritarian grip on the ruling party.

This was reflected in all 45 reports they carried on the topic: private electronic media (27) and private papers (18). For example, SW Radio Africa and New Zimbabwe (5/2) reported unnamed analysts as being distrustful of Makoni. They argued that his decision followed a meeting with Mugabe, raising fears that he could be on a mission to split votes in the MDC's urban strongholds. New Zimbabwe, for instance, cited one analyst dismissing the former finance minister as a "coward and very much part of the ZANU PF political fabric". Others, such as Geoff Hill, John Makumbe and the Morgan Tsvangirai-led MDC viewed Makoni's rebellion as indicative of divisions in ZANU PF. The Financial Gazette (7/2), for example, reported MDC's Tendai Biti arguing that Makoni's move "was a clear sign" that Mugabe had "failed to camouflage and bridge rifts" in ZANU PF.

Earlier New Zimbabwe (5/2) reported suspended ZANU PF official and a Makoni campaigner, Kudzai Mbudzi, dismissing speculation that Makoni was a mole. Said Mbudzi: "This is no time for playing games. This is a serious operation aimed at reclaiming Zimbabwe . Forget about this belief that this is an intelligence project." Other alleged Makoni allies identified by the private media included former army commanders Solomon Mujuru and Vitalis Zvinavashe, vice-presidents Joseph Msika and Joice Mujuru and ZANU PF Politburo member and former Home Affairs Minister, Dumiso Dabengwa. Notably, the Zimbabwe Independent (8/2) openly campaigned for Makoni in at least five editorials. In one of these its owner, Trevor Ncube, wrote: "I would be proud to call him my president any day. He is intelligent, very articulate . . . And I have never caught any whiff of corruption about him."

Party politics/campaigns
As in previous weeks, ZANU PF's electoral preparations continued to receive most attention in the government media than all its opponents combined. For example, of the 48 stories ZBC carried on the subject, 43 were on ruling party activities and only five on the opposition. However, this extensive coverage was not informative. Instead, the stories simply papered over the widespread discontent characterising ZANU PF's primary elections. For instance, ZTV (7/2, 8pm) reported ZANU PF political commissar, Elliot Manyika, saying the party was "handling every appeal" as a sign that "it was in keeping with its democratic principles", without viewing this as an admission of the chaos surrounding the party's selection of candidates.

The Herald and Chronicle (6/2) also passively reported that results from provinces "continued to trickle in" while polls in some constituencies had been "stalled to allow the party leadership to attend to complaints raised by some party supporters" without being categorical about these divisions. In contrast, the official media freely reported the problems in the MDC, which it presented as a merchant of confusion in the 14 stories they carried on the party's activities. Four of these reported on the collapse of efforts by the MDC factions to reunite and fight the elections on a united front.

The government media's biased coverage of the opposition party's preparations was also illustrated by the way ZTV (4/2, 8pm) attacked the "MDC's Nicodemus approach as witnessed by their invisibility". Only the newly formed Zimbabwe Development Party received 'friendly' coverage.

In contrast, the private media attempted to give fair coverage to the contesting parties in 38 stories they carried on the issue, 20 of which were in the electronic media and 18 in Print. Almost all their reports were critical of the parties' preparations. Not only did they examine the implications of the MDC factions' failure to form a coalition to fight the ruling party at the polls, they also exposed various electoral malpractices, such as vote buying and ZANU PF's imposition of candidates.

Apart from delays in holding the ZANU PF primaries, allegedly due to poor organisation, ZimOnline (8/2) attributed candidates' suspensions to the party's plans to ensure that only those loyal to President Mugabe would stand on the party's ticket following Makoni's rebellion. It quoted the party's secretary for administration Didymus Mutasa confirming this, saying they were "weeding out rebels".

Administrative issues
The government media carried precious little information on voter education.

Their 26 reports on the topic (ZBC [11] and Press [15]) were piecemeal and failed to critically assess Zimbabwe 's capacity to hold free and fair elections on March 29.

They also failed to give informative updates on the progress in the registration and inspection of the voters' rolls given the confusion created by the ward-based electoral system, and the adequacy of the Zimbabwe Election Commission's voter education campaign, among others.

For example, except for a brief reference to ZEC's extension of the registration and nomination periods at the end of the ZTV bulletin (7/2, 6pm), no other ZBC station publicised the issue. Moreover, while the story's headline implied that people were satisfied with the inspection of the voters' roll, not all the people interviewed confirmed this.

The station also failed to ask ZEC to explain whether the exercise had been successful as implied, or why it had not aired any advertisements on ZBC informing the public about its extension. The government Press continued to blur voter education reports with ZANU PF campaign stories. For example, The Herald (5/2) buried important news on the delays in the inspection of the voters' roll in Mashonaland Central owing to "impassable roads and bridges damaged by rains" in a report entitled, ZANU PF primaries produce shocks. The private media remained critical of the authorities' electoral preparations, which they described as flawed.

For example, not only did they report on how President Mugabe had violated the country's laws when he set the nomination date before publication of a final delimitation report in a Government Gazette, they also revealed how government was likely to breach the SADC election guidelines by using wooden ballot boxes instead of the recommended translucent ones. The Zimbabwe Times (6/2), for example, reported Registrar-General Tobaiwa Mudede downplaying the matter saying that "our wooden box is credible . . . we don't want to spend money unnecessarily". However, the private media also failed to measure the extent to which ZEC's chaotic voter registration and inspection exercise could have disenfranchised potential voters. Neither did they publicise the ward and constituency boundaries or explain their likely effects on the election despite the release of such information by local election watchdog ZESN.

Political violence/vote-buying
The government media continued to ignore cases of politically motivated violence and vote-buying. They only carried eight stories on the subject, based either on police warnings against political violence during the election, or on ruling party officials donating various goods to the electorate without interpreting this as vote-buying. For example, the Chronicle (4/2) passively reported ZANU PF senatorial candidate for Makokoba, Tshinga Dube, "donating" 10 billion dollars to assist the cash strapped Bulawayo City Council to improve service delivery in the constituency without viewing it as vote-buying. Only the private media categorically exposed such electoral malpractices. In addition, they recorded eight fresh incidents of politically motivated violence in the week, stemming from clashes between rival factions in ZANU PF over the selection of candidates for the March polls.

In one such incident, SW Radio Africa (5/2) reported the assault on Finance Minister Samuel Mumbengegwi by angry villagers unhappy that "ministers only came (for support) around elections" when he went to Chivi in Masvingo to contest in the ruling party's primaries. However, it did not identify the sources for its claim. The Standard reported on the court appearance of five party supporters accused of smashing the windscreen of the minister's car and "assaulting rival faction members in Masvingo".

The differences in the way the official and private media covered electoral issues were reflected in their sourcing patterns (Figs 1, 2, 3 and 4).

Fig 1: Voice distribution on ZBC

Fig 2: Voice distribution in the government Press

Fig 3: Voice distribution in private electronic media

Fig 4: Voice distribution in private press

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