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This article participates on the following special index pages:
2008 harmonised elections - Index of articles
Electoral
issues
Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ)
Extracted from Weekly Media Update 2008-3
Monday January 21st - Sunday January 27th 2008
The government
media’s coverage of the harmonised council, general and presidential
elections that President Mugabe has announced will be held on March
29, remained gravely uninformative. Almost all their 80 reports
on the matter (ZBC [32] and government papers [48]) failed to provide
information on important aspects of the elections, such as the authorities’
readiness to stage them, the transparency and fairness of the electoral
procedures and how the parties and the public will be affected by
them. Only the private media attempted to address these issues in
66 reports: private electronic (48) and Print (18).
a) Political
Rallies
The
government media continued to deprive the electorate access to the
views of all competing parties through inequitable coverage of the
contestants’ activities. They gave heavily favourable coverage to
ZANU PF and paid scant attention to the preparations of its opponents,
especially the Morgan Tsvangirai-led MDC, which they portrayed in
negative light. This was reflected in 73 reports they published
on the parties’ campaigns, 25 of which were aired on ZBC and 48
in the official papers. For example, of ZBC’s 25 monitored stories
on the parties’ campaigns, 24 were on the electoral preparations
of the ruling party and only one on MDC activities. None were on
other opposition parties. Although the government papers gave the
appearance of some balance, covering ZANU PF activities in 24 stories,
MDC (12) and alternative opposition [seven]), none of their stories
gave even a neutral perspective of the MDC.
This unprofessional
stance was epitomised by the official media’s prejudiced coverage
of the MDC’s banned "Freedom March". They neither fairly
informed their readers on the objectives of the march nor critically
assessed the credibility of the police’s reasons for banning it
despite initially giving it the go-ahead. Radio Zimbabwe (21/1,1pm),
ZTV (21/1,6pm) and The Herald and Chronicle (22/1) simply quoted
police spokesperson Wayne Bvudzijena saying they had barred the
MDC march because they feared it "might cause mayhem"
after "some exasperating statements"
from its leadership, particularly Tsvangirai.
Exactly how the
MDC leader’s comments about the delimitation process being "a
fraud"; and that his party was "opposed
to the polls…(and) wanted a new constitution, voters’ roll and an
independent electoral commission" were likely
to cause violence, as alleged by Bvudzijena, were never pursued.
The following
day, The Herald’s political editor Caesar Zvayi amplified
the police justification for the ban, arguing that the MDC, which
has "a culture of violence",
had "no cause to grandstand in the streets"
when "all (its) grievances fall under the purview
of the SADC-mediated dialogue" with ZANU PF.
No comment from the MDC was sought. The private media did not discriminate
against the MDC. They accorded space to both ZANU PF and opposition
parties’ preparations for the polls. They provided their audiences
with informed reportage on the MDC march, its objectives, the hypocritical
nature of the police ban, and its impact on the success of the SADC-mediated
dialogue.
For example,
ZimOnline and The Financial Gazette (24/1), reported
Tsvangirai saying the police ban and the subsequent crackdown on
MDC supporters demonstrated that Mugabe had "failed
the test on whether or not he was ready to tolerate opposition,
or to allow the forthcoming polls to be held under the SADC guidelines
on the conducting of free and fair elections".
The Zimbabwe Independent (25/1) made similar observations.
The paper’s Muckraker column questioned the credibility of the reasons
the police gave for banning the march, saying it exposed their "glaring
double standards" as just two months ago "they
allowed a ZANU PF march to go through the city centre with banners
and placards". Besides, it also argued that the
ban rendered amendments to POSA
"pointless".
b) Administration
The government media did not question the feasibility of staging
the elections on March 29 with the nomination of candidates on February
8 in view of the radical changes to the nature and number of parliamentary,
senatorial and ward constituencies, which had barely been made public.
This was just one among a number of unresolved controversies still
dogging the election preparations. Neither did they question the
viability of conducting the four elections in a day when previous
polls have shown this to be an impractical exercise. The Herald
(26/1), which carried the presidential proclamation, ignored
opposition and civic society concerns over the practicable ability
to effectively fulfil the electoral requirements by simply declaring
that the polls "will be held in accordance with
the SADC principles and guidelines governing democratic elections"
without even mentioning what these were. It also gave an entirely
false impression of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)’s "final"
delimitation report by restricting its coverage to
a ZANU Ndonga official endorsing it as "a job well
done".
The Sunday
Mail (27/1) also suppressed national concerns over whether
credible elections could be arranged in the time-frame announced
by Mugabe by claiming that "all but one of Zimbabwe’s
major political parties have confirmed their participation in the
polls". It reported that the Arthur Mutambara-led
MDC had said "it was ready for the polls"
leaving the Tsvangirai faction as "the only major
player still to pronounce itself on the election".
By comparison, the private media reported widespread doubts by opposition
parties and local and regional civic bodies that the country was
ready for the March 29 plebiscite. For example, The Standard
(27/1) reported Welshman Ncube, secretary-general of the Mutambara-led
MDC criticising Mugabe as having "repudiated"
the SADC dialogue by "unilaterally"
announcing the election date.
ZimOnline
(24/1) and The Standard cited the African Commission
on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) and the local election watchdog,
the Zimbabwe Election
Support Network (ZESN), expressing reservations over the electoral
process.
ZimOnline
quoted ZESN saying the country was not ready for the plebiscite,
citing "little time for ZEC to work on a credible
voters’ roll and for the public to analyse the delimitation report".
c) Political
Violence
The
government media ignored incidents of politically motivated violence,
rights abuses and electoral malpractices committed by state security
agents and ruling party activists, mainly against opposition supporters.
For example, while these media reported the assault of youths at
an MDC rally in Highfield (The Herald 21/1), they did not
view the arrest of 15 MDC supporters and officials during the party’s
banned march (The Herald 24/1) as a rights violation. Otherwise,
The Herald and Chronicle (24/1) and ZTV (24/1,
6pm) passively reported government dismissing the arrest of Tsvangirai
at 4am on the day of his party’s planned march as a "blatant
lie". They quoted police spokesman Wayne Bvudzijena
saying the police had merely "invited" Tsvangirai
and two other MDC officials for "a meeting early
yesterday morning to clarify statements made by opposition officials
threatening to engage in riots worse than those in Kenya".
The rationale
of "inviting" the MDC leader
to a pre-dawn meeting was never questioned. Neither did these media
seek comment from the MDC.
Only the private
media accurately reported Tsvangirai’s arrest and the violent manner
in which the police arrested 15 MDC activists walking from the city
centre to Glamis Sports Arena to attend the party’s court-sanctioned
rally. These incidents formed part of the five cases of human rights
abuses against opposition activists carried in the private media
in the week. The different manner in which the government and private
media handled the topic is reflected in the sampled sourcing patterns
of ZBC and the private electronic media as shown in Figs 1 and 2.
Fig 1:
Voice distribution on ZBC
| ZANU
PF |
ZRP |
War
Veteran |
| 20 |
9 |
1 |
Fig 2:
Voice distribution in the private media
| Alternative |
MDC |
Zanu
PF |
ZRP |
ZEC |
| 20 |
29 |
15 |
7 |
1 |
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