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Constitutional cases - Court Watch 6/2012
Veritas
March 30, 2012
Constitutional
Appeals to Supreme Court
Prosecutions
Which Have Taken Too Long
Freedom
of Expression Appeals
Compensation
for Torture
1. Prosecutions
which have Taken too Long
Comment: A disturbing
trend has become apparent i n which the police or prosecutors revive
what some lawyers are labelling “archive cases” –
criminal cases dating back several years but previously dropped
by police or prosecutors for various reasons. Available figures
show that this happens more frequently when the accused person is
an MDC-T supporter.
Bringing an
archive case before the court again is legally possible because
in such a case the proceedings were stopped before plea –
i.e. before the charge was formally put to the accused in court
and his or her plea recorded by the judge or magistrate. In such
a case the accused is merely discharged, not acquitted – which
means that he or she can legally be prosecuted at a later date.
Only an acquittal after plea prevents a person from being brought
to court again for the same offence. This means that although discharged
from custody or released from remand, the accused person in an archive
case is on paper liable to find himself back in court at any time
for 20 years from the date of the alleged offence – or, where
the charge is murder, indefinitely [the statutory limitation period
for all offences, except murder, is 20 years – Criminal
Procedure and Evidence Act, section 26]. That is why a magistrate
discharging an accused person before plea often warns him or her
that the State retains the right to revive the case.
Bringing up
an old case can, however, be unfair to the accused, depending on
the circumstances. Which is why the Constitution
gives everyone charged with a criminal offence the right to be tried
“within a reasonable time” [Constitution, section 18].
A recent
example: State v Tongai Matutu
In late July
2005 Tongai Matutu, now MDC-T MP for Masvingo Urban and Deputy Minister
of Youth Empowerment, Indigenisation and Empowerment, was arrested
on allegations that he had insulted and undermined President Mugabe
by likening him to a dog and had incited people to turn against
the government during a MDC party rally in Zaka, on 25th June 2005.
The charges were under POSA
[this was before the Criminal Law Code came into force in 2006 and
the POSA provisions were replaced by similar provisions in the Code].
Mr Matutu was released and the charges were not pursued.
It was nearly
6 years later, in May 2011, that police served Mr Matutu with a
summons repeating the old charges and the case came up in the Gweru
magistrates court in July 2011. As all the State witnesses failed
to show up, the magistrate postponed the case indefinitely. In February
2012, Mr Matutu applied to the magistrate in terms of section 24(2)
of the Constitution, asking for the case to be referred to the Supreme
Court for a ruling that his constitutional right to trial within
a reasonable time has been infringed and for a permanent stay of
prosecution – which would mean that the State could never
again resuscitate the case.
On 24th February
the magistrate granted Mr Matutu’s application, so the case
now stands referred to the Supreme Court. It is unlikely to be heard
by that court for some time, as it cannot be set down for hearing
until the Supreme Court has received the transcript of the proceedings
in the magistrates court.
Comment: This
is only one of many constitutional cases which have been referred
to the Supreme Court but have not been dealt with because the necessary
transcripts have not yet reached the Supreme Court.
2. Freedom
of Expression Cases: A Growing List
The MMPZ 3
This case –
involving Media
Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe personnel Gilbert Mabusa, Fadzai
December and Molly Chimhanda – first hit the headlines in
early December 2011 when they were arrested
in Gwanda on allegations of spreading falsehoods undermining the
President in contravention of section 33 of the Criminal Law Code,
and convening a gathering contrary to POSA. They were allowed bail
of $50 by the magistrate, but the prosecutor immediately invoked
section 121(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act and they
remained in custody while the Attorney-General appealed to the High
Court in Bulawayo against the magistrate’s decision. Hearing
the appeal commendably swiftly, Justice Mathonsi dismissed it as
“spectacularly devoid of merit” and the three were released.
But, they were still obliged to return to Gwanda every two weeks
for remand. In due course the State dropped the other charges, leaving
only the charge of undermining the President. On 8th February the
magistrate granted an application by their lawyer Kossam Ncube for
the issue of the constitutionality of section 33 of the Criminal
Law Code to be referred to the Supreme Court for a ruling. Mr Ncube
argued that the section infringes the constitutional rights to freedom
of expression and protection of the law, being couched in such wide
and vague terms that it has a chilling effect on freedom of expression
because it is not clear to people what they can and cannot say without
courting arrest and prosecution. The accused were then remanded,
still on bail, to 30th April, by which date the magistrate, perhaps
optimistically, said she expected to know the Supreme Court’s
decision.
Like the Matutu
case, this case has not yet been set down for hearing. It joins
a growing list of waiting Supreme Court cases raising the constitutional
issue of freedom of expression, for example:
- Standard
editor Nevanji Madanhire and reporter Patience Nyangove
- a second
Standard case involving Mr Madanhire and reporter Nqaba Matshazi
- MDC-T MP
Lynette Karenyi [charge: insulting the President contrary to section
33 of the Criminal Law Code]
Comment: Apart
from record transcription problems, another factor contributing
to delay could be that the Supreme Court would prefer not to hear
these cases until it has delivered its long-awaited decision in
the case in which Vincent Kahiya and Constantine Chimakure, who
at the time were editor and political editor of the Independent,
appealed on a similar constitutional issue of freedom of information.
This case has already been argued before a five-judge Supreme Court
bench in June 2010.
Pishai Muchauraya
MP Hon Muchauraya also has an application waiting for attention
by the Supreme Court. In 2010 he was summoned to Murambinda magistrates
court to answer a charge of undermining the President’s authority,
contrary to section 33 of the Criminal
Law Code, by references to the President’s advanced age
and state of health. The magistrate in due course dismissed an application
for the case to be referred to the Supreme Court for a ruling on
the constitutionality of section 33. Feeling that the magistrate
had erred, his lawyers then lodged an application in the Supreme
Court for the reversal of the magistrate’s decision. The hearing
of that application has so far been delayed in deference to a State
request for more time, but Hon Muchauraya’s lawyers have said
they will now apply to have the matter set down for early hearing.
As the Supreme Court vacation is imminent, no hearing can be expected
before May at the earliest.
Comment: The
prolonged absence of an authoritative, up-to-date Supreme Court
pronouncement on these freedom of expression cases has an adverse
effect on this fundamental right. It means that, with elections
ahead, politicians and ordinary citizens remain uncertain about
what they can and cannot safely say about the leader of one of the
political parties, because he is also the head of State. As lawyer
Kossam Ncube explained when asking for the MMPZ 3 case to be referred
to the Supreme Court, in the present situation it is left to the
subjective evaluation of law enforcement agents to decide what statements
are acceptable, and this has “a chilling effect as it muzzles
even genuine hard hitting criticism of the President.” This
means that the section effectively shields the President from any
kind of scrutiny and seeks to create a situation whereby only good
things must be said about him lest someone invites the wrath of
the law.
3. Claim
for Compensation for Torture
A former soldier,
Wilfred Jaure, has brought a case in the Supreme Court seeking an
award of $1.5 million as compensation for unjust imprisonment and
torture he alleges he underwent during 277 days of confinement in
2008-2009 while he was held in an army detention barracks designated
for convicted offenders. The defendants cited are Minister of Defence
Emerson Mnangagwa, in his official capacity representing the Government,
and, in their personal capacities, Lieutenant Huni of Army Headquarters
and Warrant Officer Class 1 Muzira of the Army Counter-Intelligence
Unit, who, Mr Jaure says, both viciously tortured him during his
detention.
Mr Jaure, then
a sergeant in the Army’s Commando Regiment, was detained by
the Army Counter-Intelligence Unit in 2008 on suspicion of involvement
in providing classified information to an enemy – an accusation
he denies. He effectively became a “disappeared” person
until freed 277 days later, as his family did not know where he
was or even if he was still alive. He was never charged with or
tried by court-martial for any offence.
The Court papers
filed in the Supreme Court on 6th March on his behalf say he was
suddenly released without explanation on April 28, 2009 and demoted.
[Thereafter, he resigned from the force in September 2009.] In his
affidavit in the application, Mr Jaure explains the direct approach
to the Supreme Court as follows: “Torture is a very serious
transgression and cannot be equated to assault for which a victim
can claim normal delictual compensation ... serious enough to warrant
this honourable court to fashion the remedy of constitutional damages
in terms of its powers outlined in section 24 (4) of the Constitution.”
Comment: What
is different about this case is that it is a direct application
to the Supreme Court for compensation for conduct in breach of the
Declaration of Rights in the Constitution, probably the first of
its kind. This distinguishes it from the cases of other torture
claimants, who have taken action for damages in the High Court –
notably Jestina Mukoko, who only went to the Supreme Court for,
and was granted, a declaration confirming the unconstitutionality
of the mistreatment to which she was subjected when abducted and
detained in 2008. Subsequently she brought proceedings for compensation
in the High Court – proceedings which have not yet come to
trial.
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