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Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Bill, 2006 (H.B. 3, 2006)
May 19, 2006
Published in Government Gazette Friday 19th May, 2006

View the earlier Bill gazetted in June 2004

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Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Bill, 2006

MEMORANDUM

This Bill seeks to amend the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] (the “principal Act”) in certain major respects. Firstly, it is proposed to abolish the obsolete procedure known as the “preparatory examination”. Secondly, flowing from the abolition of the “preparatory examination” procedure, it is necessary to re-enact certain provisions previously applicable to both preparatory examinations and to what are called “confirmation proceedings” so that they apply only to the latter. Thirdly, also flowing from the abolition of the “preparatory examination” procedure, it is necessary to provide for some form of verification of the evidence of certain witnesses gathered at the beginning of a criminal investigation to secure its admissibility at the trial in case those witnesses later die or otherwise become unavailable. Finally, the existing law relating to bail is sought to be comprehensively codified and reformed.

In more detail, the individual sections of the Bill provide as follows:

Clause 1
This sets out the Bill’s short title.

Clause 2
This clause seeks to insert the definitions of “sexual offence” and “suitably qualified nurse” in the interpretation section (section 2) of the principal Act. The purpose of these definitions is explained below in connection with clauses 23 and 25.

Clause 3
This clause seeks to repeal Part VII of the principal Act and to replace it by a new Part to the effect described below.

The present Part VII of the principal Act provides for “preparatory examinations”, as well as what are called “direct indict” proceedings. Some historical background is required to appreciate the meanings of these terms. Prior to 1962, no criminal trial could be held in the High Court until after a preparatory examination by a magistrate had established that there was sufficient reason to believe that an “indictable” offence had been committed, that is, an offence which was triable by the High Court. This proceeding involved the calling of witnesses and the examination of their evidence by the prosecutor and the accused and his or her legal practitioner. If the magistrate found sufficient reason to believe that an indictable offence had been committed by the accused, the magistrate would commit the accused for trial in the High Court and transmit the record of the preparatory examination to the Attorney-General, who might then, depending on the nature of the case and the evidence led, indict the accused for trial before the High Court or remit the case back to a magistrate for trial. At the trial the same witnesses were called and the same evidence was led as were called and led at the preparatory examination.

In 1962, the principal Act was amended to give the Attorney-General power to bring any case to trial before the High Court without holding a preparatory examination. The idea was to avoid the expense of time and resources (to both the State and the accused) involved in holding a preparatory examination, especially in cases that were straightforward or where there was difficulty in securing the attendance of witnesses. This “direct indict” procedure, as it became known, was increasingly resorted to, until preparatory examinations practically ceased to be held (the last preparatory examination was completed in 1999).

Accordingly, the new Part VII provides only for “direct proceedings” in recognition of what has been the practice for some time.

Clauses 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8
These clauses amend Part VIII of the principal Act, which provides for “confirmation proceedings”. The nature of these proceedings is explained below.

Ordinarily, what are called “extra-curial statements”, that is to say statements, including confessions, made outside of the court to investigating police officers or other persons, are admissible by the court as evidence if the accused accepts that such statements were indeed made freely and voluntarily and without undue influence. Where, however, the accused disputes that any statements were made by him or her freely and voluntarily without undue influence, a “trial-within-a-trial” ensues to determine the issue. The State must then discharge its onus of proving that, notwithstanding the accused’s denial, the statements were made freely and voluntarily, otherwise the statements will not be admissible as evidence by the court.

In order to avoid these frequently lengthy “trials-within-a-trial” proceedings, a prosecutor may choose, before the trial of the accused, to “confirm” the extra-curial statements of the accused before a magistrate under Part VIII of the principal Act. If the accused does not deny that the statements were made freely and voluntarily, the statements are confirmed by the magistrate and become admissible at the trial of the accused. The accused may still challenge their admissibility at the trial, but the onus then rests on him or her to show that the statements were not made freely and voluntarily. If, on the other hand, the accused denies at the confirmation proceedings that the statements were made freely and voluntarily, the magistrate will ask particulars of the grounds upon which the accused bases his or her challenge so that the matter may be investigated and the State be put in a better position to inquire into and refute any allegations which have been made. In this way the State receives fair notice of any challenge to the extra-curial statements it may seek to have admitted into evidence at the trial of the accused, and is not taken by surprise at the trial by allegations of which it was not made aware before.

The proposed abolition of the “preparatory examination” procedure involves the re-enactment and modification of certain provisions previously applicable to both preparatory examinations and confirmation proceedings, so that they apply only to the latter. One of these provisions empowers the presiding magistrate to order a parent or guardian to be present at confirmation proceedings where the accused is a juvenile. Another provision requires the presiding magistrate to ensure that an accused is in his or her sound and sober senses during confirmation proceedings. There are also provisions for securing the attendance of witnesses at confirmation proceedings (however, the provision excluding the public from confirmation proceedings will not be re-enacted, with the result that such proceedings will be conducted in open court).

Clause 8
This clause seeks to insert a new section (115A) in Part VIII that is designed to compensate for certain advantages of the preparatory examination procedure which, as discussed above, will be abolished. These advantages were, firstly, that preparatory examinations were often held when the evidence was still fresh, that is, not long after the investigation of the case by the police was completed; secondly, that the evidence led at preparatory examinations could, under certain conditions, be admissible at a subsequent trial where the witness who originally gave it was no longer available. The new section 115A provides a procedure whereby the prosecution is enabled to verify the depositions of witnesses obtained at the early stages of an investigation of an offence, so that such depositions can be used later at the trial in the event that the witnesses who gave it are no longer available to give the evidence personally. This new provision will also go some way towards resolving the problem of securing the admission of evidence by expert witnesses at a trial. Many of these experts (such as pathologists) have now to be invited from abroad, and their attendance on the trial day is therefore highly problematic. The verification procedure provided under the new section 115A will enable the evidence of such experts to be tested by the defence in the presence of a magistrate before the day of the actual trial.

The new section 115B also inserted by this clause provides that the record of verification proceedings under section 115A, as well as the record of confirmation proceedings under section 113, will be admissible as evidence on its mere production before any court.

Clauses 9 and 27
These clauses seek to repeal and replace the existing bail provisions of the principal Act by other provisions which comprehensively codify and reform the existing law on the granting and withholding of bail by the courts. The circumstances under which the law recognises that it is or is not in the interests of justice to release on bail an accused person have been canvassed by the courts on many occasions in the past. It is now desirable to spell out these circumstances clearly for the benefit of judicial officers, prosecutors, defence counsel and the accused, and to make reforms where necessary.

The bail regime as codified and modified by these clauses specifies the broad grounds on which the refusal to grant bail may justified in the interests of justice (section 117(2)). Section 117(3) sets out the considerations to be taken into account by a court where a prosecutor argues that bail should be denied on the grounds that:

· the accused, if released, is likely to endanger the safety of the public or any particular person, or commit an offence referred to in the First Schedule (117(3)(a));

  • the accused, if released, is likely not to stand his or her trial or appear to receive sentence (117(3)(b));
  • the accused, if released, is likely to attempt to influence or intimidate witnesses or to conceal or destroy evidence (117(3)(c));
  • the accused, if released, is likely to undermine or jeopardise the objectives or proper functioning of the criminal justice system, including the bail system (117(3)(d))
  • the release of the accused will likely disturb the public order or undermine public peace or security (117(3)(e)).

In taking into account the aforementioned considerations, the court is enjoined to weigh the interests of justice against the right of the accused to his or her personal freedom (117(4)).

Even where the prosecution does not oppose the granting of bail, the court has the duty to weigh up the personal interests of the accused against the interests of justice (117(5)).

Where the accused is charged with any of the very serious offences specified in the Third Schedule, then the onus is on the accused to satisfy the court that it is the interests of justice for him or her to be released on bail. The Third Schedule is divided into two Parts, relating to serious crimes of a higher and lesser gravity respectively. In a case where the accused is charged with a crime of the first category, he or she must satisfy the court that there are exceptional circumstances which in the interests of justice permit his or her release (117(6)).

The new section 117A re-enacts section 117 of the principal Act (presently titled “Application for bail”) with the addition of provisions which elaborate upon the conduct of the bail proceedings themselves. It codifies the procedure which already prevails, namely that the rule against disclosure of previous convictions does not apply to bail proceedings as it applies to trials, and the accused may not (except with the consent of the Attorney-General) have access to any information, record or document which is contained in a police docket. The record of the bail proceedings will form part of the record of the trial (except for any part of the record of the bail proceedings relating to previous convictions). Moreover, if the accused elects to testify during bail proceedings, his or her testimony can be used against him or her at the subsequent trial, and he or she must be warned by the judicial officer accordingly.

Clauses 10 and 12
The amendments sought by these clauses are consequential to the one made by clause 3.

Clause 11
At present, the proviso to section 120 (“Excessive bail not to be required”) requires that a court should not demand “excessive bail”. The amendment sought by this clause will put a duty on the courts to ensure that amount or terms of bail are such as to deter an accused from evading his or her trial or not appearing to receive sentence, where such a possibility is not too remote. Accordingly, bail fixed in those circumstances will not be deemed to be “excessive”.

Clauses 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16
The amendments sought by these clauses are consequential to the abolition of the preparatory examination procedure.

Clause 17
Generally, in criminal proceedings, a husband or wife is not competent to give evidence for the prosecution against the other spouse without the latter’s consent. Section 247 of the Act specifies certain types of cases to which this rule does not apply, that is to say, it specifies certain offences in the prosecution of which a spouse can be compelled to give evidence against the other spouse.

The Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] (“the Criminal Law Code”) that was passed by Parliament last year comprehensively codified or abolished common law offences, and replaced or repealed certain statutory offences. Consequently, there is a need to amend section 247 of the principal Act so that the names of the offences there specified are the same as the names given to those offences by the Criminal Law Code.

Clause 18
This clause seeks to replace section 255 of the principal Act, which provided, among other things, for the admissibility of the evidence of any witness given at a preparatory examination, in circumstances where the witness was no longer available to give evidence personally at the subsequent trial of the accused. Since it is proposed to formally abolish the preparatory examination procedure, the new section 255 will permit the depositions of absent witnesses to be admitted if the depositions were verified under the new section 115A (see clause 8 above). The depositions of absent witnesses that were not so verified may still be admitted, but only at the discretion of the court (as is presently the case under section 255 (3) of the principal Act with respect to the depositions of absent witnesses generally).

Clauses 19, 20, 21 and 22
The amendments sought by these clauses are consequential to the abolition of the preparatory examination procedure.

Clause 23
The amendments sought by this clause was recommended by the Task Force on Child Sexual Abuse established by the Ministry of Health.

At present, affidavit evidence in the form of a Medical Report Form completed by a medical practitioner is admissible as evidence at a criminal trial on its mere production by the prosecutor; in other words, if the contents of the Form are undisputed, it is not necessary to summon to court the medical practitioner who completed the Form (“the deponent medical practitioner”) in order for him or her to give formal evidence on matters referred to in the Form.
(In cases where the evidence contained in such Medical Report Forms is challenged, the court has a discretion to call the deponent medical practitioner so that his or her testimony can be heard in court. The court may do so of its own motion or at the request of the prosecutor or the accused).

The Task Force on Child Sexual Abuse requested that suitably qualified nurses should also be enabled to complete Medical Report Forms in relation to victims of child sexual abuse who have been examined or treated by such nurses. This is because medical practitioners are not always available at Rural and District hospitals.
The effect of this clause is to enable suitably qualified nurses to complete Medical Report Forms in relation to all victims of sexual crimes who have been examined or treated by them, in addition to child victims of sexual crimes.

Clause 24
The amendment sought by this clause is consequential to the abolition of the preparatory examination procedure.

Clause 25
Under section 17 of the Sexual Offences Act a court that convicts a person of a sexual offence has the power to order that the convicted person be tested for HIV infection. Any such test is compulsory, and reasonable force may be used to take any sample for testing. The results of the test have a bearing on the sentence imposable upon the convicted person, who is liable to a heavier penalty if the results are positive.

Section 17 of the Sexual Offences Act was later incorporated, with some changes, as section 302A of the principal Act by the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] (Act No. 23 of 2004). The principal change is that the court convicting a person of a sexual offence must in every such case order that the convicted person be tested for HIV infection.

The implementation of this mandatory provision is difficult for the reasons stated under clause 23 above, namely that because medical practitioners are not always available at Rural and District hospitals. And although the Minister responsible for health may, under section 302A(1), “designate” persons other than medical practitioners to conduct HIV tests, it was felt desirable in the interests of clarity that suitably qualified nurses should be specifically mentioned in section 302A of the principal Act as being competent to conduct these tests.

Clause 26
The amendment sought by this clause is consequential to the abolition of the preparatory examination procedure.

Clause 27 and Schedule
This clause and its related Schedule effect minor amendments to the principal Act, especially those amendments required by the abolition of the preparatory examination procedure.

Clause 29
The individual paragraphs of this clause amend the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] (No. 23 of 2004) ("the Code") in the following respects:

  1. this paragraph seeks to correct an error in section 1 of the Code;
  2. this paragraph seeks to correct an error in section 16 of the Code;
  3. where a mandatory penalty is involved, there must be a power for a court to find "special circumstances" in cases that warrant a lower penalty than the mandatory one; also, the mandatory penalty should not extend to cases where the crime is unfinalised. Section 80 of the Code ("Sentence for certain crimes where accused is infected with HIV") is wanting in both respects, and this paragraph seeks to improve it accordingly;
  4. the conduct and the mental element required to be proved for the "concurrent" charges mentioned in section 114(7)(c) of the Code are the same, that is:
    1. Stock theft involving the acquisition of livestock from another person without reasonable cause for believing that the livestock belonged to that person and receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen.
    2. Stock theft involving the possession of livestock in circumstances giving rise to the suspicion that it was stolen and possessing property reasonably suspected of being stolen.

Since this renders an accused person liable to double punishment, this paragraph seeks to amend section 114(7)(c) so that it will refer to "alternative" charges only.

  1. this paragraph seeks to employ the phrase "potentially prejudicial", which is already defined in section 135 of the Code, in the description of the crime of fraud in section 136;
  1. the present definition of "cannabis plant" in section 155 of the Code is too narrow. It is sought to improve it along the lines of the definition of "Indian hemp" contained in the present Dangerous Drugs Act;
  2. consequentially to paragraph (f), the reference to "other than cannabis" in section 156(2) should be deleted and substituted by "other than any cannabis plant, prepared cannabis, or cannabis resin"; also, for the same of consistency of wording with section 114(3) of the Code, the phrase "special circumstances in the particular case" in section 156(1)(i) and 156(3) should be replaced by "special circumstances peculiar to the case";
  3. the phrase "benefit or advantage" in section 170(2)(a) and (b) should be deleted in favour of the phrase "gift or consideration" for the sake of consistency with the rest of Chapter IX of the Code. The phrase "gift or consideration" is used in section 170(1) of the Code, and the word "consideration" is defined in section 160;
  4. "threats" to commit the offences of "indicating witches and wizards" and "hijacking" should be deleted from section 186(3) of the Code because threatening to do either of these things already constitutes a crime under section 99 of 151 of the Code;
  5. the amendment sought by this paragraph corrects an error in section 191 of the Code;
  6. this paragraph and paragraph (l) seek to make clear that persons who render assistance to the accomplices of a crime rather than to the actual perpetrators should be also liable as accessories to the crime;
  7. the defence of ignorance or mistake of the law should not extend to "advice" by judicial officers. Judicial officers do not give "advice" on the law but render judgments interpreting it.
  8. the amendment sought by this paragraph corrects an error in section 236 of the Code;
  9. this paragraph modifies section 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Code to bring it more into line with the existing common law.

Clause 30
The Legal Practitioners Act [Chapter 27:07] was amended by the General Laws Amendment Act, 2005 (No. 6 of 2005) to enable persons employed as legal practitioners by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority to have the right of audience before the Fiscal Appeal Court and Special Court for Income Tax Appeals. It is proposed to extend this right to any other court in any civil and (if authorised by the Attorney-General under section 6 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07]) criminal proceedings to which the Authority is a party or that involve any of the Acts specified in the First Schedule to the Revenue Authority Act.


PRESENTED BY THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

BILL

To amend the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 8:07], the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] (No. 23 of 2004) and section 92 of the Legal Practitioners Act [Chapter 27:07]; and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

ENACTED by the President and the Parliament of Zimbabwe.

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