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This article participates on the following special index pages:
Post-election violence 2008 - Index of articles & images
Desperately
seeking sanity: What prospects for a new beginning in Zimbabwe?
Solidarity Peace Trust
July 28, 2008
http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/index.php?page=reports
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Executive
Summary
1. The Presidential
run-off election on the 27th June 2008 took place against the background
of the worst state- led violence that Zimbabweans have experienced
since the Gukurahundi massacres of the mid 1980's, and in
the context of a SADC mediation that had failed to ensure a generally
acceptable election process.
2. This report
draws upon 3320 formal interviews with victims of human rights abuses
over the last three months. This figure represents a fraction of
those directly affected by violence, the majority of whom are likely
to have failed to access appropriate medical assistance.
3. The violence
of May and June 2008 differs from previous phases of election violence
in that unlike previous elections the violence did not taper off
in the weeks leading to the election.
4. There have
been 106 confirmed murders in the last three months, with clear
indications that the number will grow as more information comes
to light.
5. The most
common form of murder in every month was abduction followed by death
with known activists being abducted from their homes, at road blocks
or elsewhere.
6. Many of
these abductions followed by slow or quick execution fit the criteria
for enforced disappearances, a particularly pernicious for of extra
judicial killing with severe long-term consequences for families
and communities. Families are left without closure, being thus deprived
of the basic human right to mourn their dead, and the possibility
of being forcibly 'disappeared' strikes terror into
the hearts of communities.
7. This pattern
of abduction followed by assassination has not been common in Zimbabwe
in the last ten years. However it was prevalent during the 1980s
Gukurahundi killings in Matabeleland.
8. The 100
year old pattern of impunity for state perpetrators in Zimbabwe
has unsurprisingly been maintained during the violence of 2008.
9. The youth
militia was the overwhelmingly most common perpetrators of violence,
while the Joint Operation Command (JOC) has continued to play key
roles in overseeing and orchestrating the violence.
10. The combined
ZANU PF paramilitary forces of militia, war vets and supports accounted
for 82% of the violence, while the MDC/other category accounted
for 1% of the violence.
11. Most of
the violence (77%) was reported in the three Mashonaland provinces
and Harare. In Mashonaland East and Central in particular, wards
and villages that had shown a high MDC vote were mercilessly targeted,
in what can be described as both a policy of punishment for 'betraying'
Zanu PF, and a pre-emptive strike ahead of the run-off, to turn
the tide against Morgan Tsvangirai.
12. 18% of
victims held leadership positions in their communities, while 43%
claimed MDC affiliation. 1% claimed Zanu PF affiliation. Moreover
Zanu PF had a recognizable policy of attacking not just key people
in the MDC leadership, but also targeting their families.
13. During May
and June there was a notable shift of the violence to Harare. Youth
militia bases were set up across the city, in both high and low
density suburbs.
14. 80% of the
victims were aged between 21 and 60, with 10% of the victims under
10 years old.
15. Reprisal
attacks by MDC members amounted to a fraction of the assaults, murders
and destruction of property by Zanu PF supporters.
1. Introduction
In its
report on the March 29th 2008 Harmonised Election the Solidarity
Peace Trust recorded the widespread state-led violence that followed
the Zanu PF's electoral loss in that plebiscite, in the context
of the SADC led mediation that failed to break the political deadlock
in the country. The lack of an outright winner in the Presidential
election, and the controversy surrounding the long delay in the
announcement of result of this election, resulted in the Presidential
run-off on the 27th June 2008 and after as this report shows. Whereas
the period preceding the March elections was relatively peaceful
the horrendous violence that marred the period leading up to the
June election, completely undermined the conditions for a free and
fair election. With little pretence at creating conditions for Zimbabweans
to practice their democratic right to vote for a candidate of their
choice, Zimbabwe's ruling party rolled out a campaign of violence,
the degree of which has not been witnessed in the country since
the Gukurahundi massacres in Matabeleland and the Midlands in the
mid 1980s. Through a combination of over 100 extra judicial murders,
systematic use of torture, widespread displacements, and a general
campaign of terror, the Zimbabwean state targeted the structures
and supporters of the MDC, including those who had formerly given
their support to the ruling party. The country's citizens
were left in little doubt that Robert Mugabe and the military cabal
in control of the Zimbabwean state had no intention of losing power
through the vote, stressing on several occasions the supremacy of
the gun in Zanu PF's statecraft.
As the electoral
crisis deepened, the broader regional and international aspects
of the Zimbabwean impasse were brought into greater relief, indicating
the complexity of the situation and the broad array of political
players involved in the Zimbabwe crisis. Even as the Mugabe regime
evoked more critical voices in SADC and the AU, the longstanding
binary between the West and Africa on the Zimbabwe problem re-asserted
itself, proving once again the importance of carefully negotiating
the relations between the national, regional and international dimensions
of the situation. As the country finally looks set to enter discussions
for a negotiated settlement, there are likely to be many obstacles
ahead in finding a solution to Zimbabwe's problems. Moreover
SADC and the AU must confront the longer-term problem of dealing
with incumbent regimes that continue to disrespect the electoral
process and use their control of state power to 'negotiate'
their way out of electoral losses, in the name of sovereignty and
liberation legacies. The enormous controversy surrounding President
Mbeki's mediation, and the challenges of presenting an alternative
to it, has raised more questions about conflict resolution mechanisms
on the continent. As much as any recent political challenge in Southern
Africa, the Zimbabwean crisis has asked very serious questions about
SADC, and the future of democratic challenges in the region. The
future of Zimbabwe is delicately balanced and it is hoped that whatever
political settlement emerges from the SADC
mediation, will lay the basis for long-term transformation of
the country's authoritarian political structures. However
the mere fact that major political parties have agreed to hold talks,
is an indicator that the combination of political and economic pressures
on the Mugabe regime, and the lack of an alternative route to power
for the MDC has necessitated the need for negotiation.
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