| |
Back to Index
This article participates on the following special index pages:
2008 harmonised elections - Index of articles
Post-election violence 2008 - Index of articles & images
Truth, justice, reconciliation and national healing - Index of articles
Justice
and peace in a new Zimbabwe - Transitional justice options
Max
du Plessis & Jolyon Ford, The Institute for Security Studies
June 01, 2008
http://www.iss.co.za/static/templates/tmpl_html.php?node_id=3516&slink_id=6431&slink_type=12&link_id=24
Download
this document
- Word
97 version (134KB)
- Acrobat
PDF version (229KB)
If you do not have the free Acrobat reader
on your computer, download it from the Adobe website by clicking
here.
Introduction
The second round
of Zimbabwe's presidential election is scheduled for the end
of June 2008. There has been a sharp increase in state sponsored
violence since the first round in March (ICG May 2008), coming after
almost a decade marked by violence, intimidation and impunity for
which the state itself has been primarily responsible. One of the
principal issues for any future political transition will be whether
- and how - to formally and publicly deal with past
systematic and widespread human rights abuses. This is moreover
a core political issue now, not simply a collateral legal or moral
one to be left until later.
Part of the
challenge is to map a way between sheer moral and legal principle
and mere political pragmatism (Emmanuel 2007). One transitional
justice option is to now flag, and then later establish, a truth
and reconciliation commission which might give incentives to people
at various levels to denounce violence and cooperate in peacebuilding,
but which need not rule out criminal prosecutions where appropriate.
Against the backdrop of an international legal and normative framework
which may shape justice options, the first part of this paper addresses
the question 'why a truth commission?' We suggest that
Zimbabwe's particular experiences necessitate a national truth
commission as a viable or necessary option in providing sure conditions
and foundations for a peaceable future. The second part of the paper
then addresses some considerations relating to how to establish
such a formal process, drawing on others' experience. Of course,
the question 'how might a commission look?' is (or should
be) inextricably linked with the question 'why have a commission
anyway - what exactly is it for?'
Engagement on
this topic raises a host of difficult questions: in any interim
phase, how will negotiations on 'transitional justice'
persuade the powerful and prosecutable that it is safe to cooperate?
Does a 'restorative justice' approach have stronger
credentials than the moral claims for criminal accountability and
punishment? If there is 'no peace without justice',
who gets to decide what constitutes justice? How far back does 'the
past' really go: should any commission deal with abuse allegations
arising from the 1980s violence in Matabeleland or restrict itself
to the period after 2000? What is the legal and political status
of various presidential pardons and amnesties? What is the relevance,
utility or propriety of calls for international prosecutions? What
is the best role for local civil society? Does the international
community have a role to play in transitional justice, or should
this be wholly 'locally owned'? How would such a process
deal - if at all - with any process on land claims or
property disputes: can many of the acts of violence be separated
from an enquiry into such questions? With an economy in freefall,
what priority of resources and national attention should a backward-looking
process have? Overall, in going forward (if and when they can),
to what extent should Zimbabweans be concerned with looking back?
The International
Crisis Group's view in their most recent report is that while
'Zimbabwe will need a transitional justice mechanism at some
stage,' the practical necessities of the immediate crisis
(and indeed longer term reconciliation) require that 'guarantees'
be given to political leaders and the security forces ('modalities
for ensuring military loyalty' and promises of non-retribution)
(ICG May 2008:2). This may well be so, and to some extent the subject
of the present paper perhaps presupposes a certain quality of 'transition',
or relates to matters that lie only on the other side of difficult
negotiations, confrontations and compromises immediately ahead.
However, it is clear that these issues will be directly shaping
political negotiations now in the interim period - questions
about what kind of justice strategy can secure the conditions for
a transition to take place at all, and then to take place peacefully.
The ICG report seems to suggest that justice issues are not of immediate
significance. But it is difficult to see how 'justice'
issues can be separated from 'political' issues during
this stalemate, since fear of prosecution partly explains hardliners'
resistance: the thrust of the ICG report is indeed an acknowledgment
of this fact.
In this light, this paper is intended to stimulate more explicit
discussion on transitional justice issues and options. Its contribution
is at a certain level of abstraction, since the authors are not
privy to ongoing discussions between various players on these issues.
However, the fact that events and power balances are presently fluid
suggests that this rather more general, thematic and dispassionate
approach might be preferable.
The
context: Violence and impunity in Zimbabwe
The suggestion that a truth commission may be one valuable ingredient
in facilitating a sustainable national peace for Zimbabweans proceeds
from two related premises:
- That human
rights abuses in Zimbabwe's modern history have been serious,
widespread, persistent, deliberate, systemic, and conducted largely
with impunity
- That it
is both right in principle and prudent for peacebuilding prospects
that these issues and events be formally and publicly acknowledged
and addressed in a way that arrests the pattern of impunity, enables
a measure of justice and affords victims due redress, but that
does not threaten the possibility that a legitimate transition
may occur without serious resistance and conflict now or at a
later date.
Download
full document
Please credit www.kubatana.net if you make use of material from this website.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License unless stated otherwise.
TOP
|