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Ruling
on Michael Campbell case
Southern
African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal
December 13, 2007
http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/2007/1.html
Case
No: SADCT:2/07
In the matter
between:
Mike Campbell
(Pvt) Limited First Applicant
and
William Michael
Campbell Second Applicant
versus
The Republic
Of Zimbabwe Respondent
Coram:
Hon. Justice
Dr Mondlane - President
Hon. Justice Mtambo, Sc - Member
Hon. Justice Dr Tshosa - Member
Applicants'
agents - Adrian Phillip De Bourbon and Elize M. Angula
Respondent's
agents - Fatima C. Maxwell and Nelson Mutsonzwa
Hon. Justice
M.C.C. Mkandawire - Registrar
Mr Dennis Shivangulula - Court Clerk
Ruling
Hon. Justice
Dr Luis Antonio Mondlane delivered the Ruling:
On 11 October
2007 the applicants filed a case with the Tribunal challenging the
acquisition of an agricultural land known as Mount Carmell in the
District of Chegutu in the Republic of Zimbabwe by the respondent.
An application was simultaneously filed pursuant to Article 28 of
the Protocol on Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Protocol)
as read with Rule 61 sub-rules (2) - (5) of the Rules of Procedure
(hereinafter referred to as the Rules) for an interim measure restraining
the respondent from removing, or allowing the removal of, the applicants
from the agricultural land mentioned above and mandating the respondent
to take all necessary and reasonable steps to protect the occupation
by the applicants of the said land until the dispute has been finally
adjudicated. In essence, the applicants are asking the Tribunal
to order that the status quo in the agricultural land be preserved
until the final decision is made in relation to the case.
Before dealing
with the application, there are preliminary issues that should be
determined. Firstly, whether the parties in the case are those that
are envisaged by Article 15(1) of the Protocol. The article provides:
"The
Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over disputes between States,
and between natural or legal persons and States."
This is indeed
a dispute between a natural and a legal person and a State. We hold
that Article 15(1) of the Protocol has been met and therefore that
the matter is properly before the Tribunal.
Secondly, there
is the issue relating to jurisdiction. Article 14 of the Protocol
provides:
"The
Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over all disputes and all applications
referred to it in accordance with the Treaty and this Protocol
which relate to; (a) the interpretation and application of the
Treaty."
The interpretation
and application of the SADC Treaty and the Protocol is therefore
one of the bases of jurisdiction. For purposes of this application,
the relevant provision of the Treaty which requires interpretation
and application is Article 4, which in the relevant part provides:
"SADC
and Member States are required to act in accordance with the following
principles - (c) human rights, democracy and the rule of
law."
This means that
SADC as a collectivity and as individual member States are under
a legal obligation to respect and protect human rights of SADC citizens.
They also have to ensure that there is democracy and the rule of
law within the region. The matter before the Tribunal involves an
agricultural land, which the applicants allege that it has been
acquired and that their property rights over that piece of land
have thereby been infringed. This is a matter that requires interpretation
and application of the Treaty thus conferring jurisdiction on the
Tribunal.
Thirdly, as
indicated earlier, the application is brought pursuant to Article
28 of the Protocol. The Article provides:
"The
Tribunal or the President may, on good cause, order the suspension
of an act challenged before the Tribunal and may take other interim
measures as necessary."
This clause
is complemented by Rule 61 (2) - (5). The Rule requires the
application for an interim measure to be made by a party to a case
during the course of the proceedings, stating the subject matter
of the proceedings, the reasons for the application, the possible
consequences if the application is not granted and the interim measure
requested, and finally that the application for an interim measure
shall take priority over all other cases. These provisions empower
the Tribunal or the President of the Tribunal to make an appropriate
interim order upon good cause being shown.
During the hearing the agents of the parties raised other preliminary
issues. The applicants' agent raised the issue of the respondent's
failure to file some documents within the timelines set by the Tribunal
as required by Rule 36(2) of the Rules. These documents are the
"Notice of Opposition" and an "Application for
Condonation for Late Filing of Opposing Papers", which were
filed on the morning of the date of the hearing, 11 December 2007,
according to the official date stamp of the Registry. The agent
argued that there is no basis for the documents in question to be
considered by the Tribunal. He, however, submitted that in the interest
of progress he could not insist on the point except that it should
be placed on record that the respondent disregarded the Rules.
In reply, the
respondent's agent denied that the respondent has disregarded
the Rules concerning filing of papers. He said that failure to file
the opposing papers on time was caused by administrative matters
and consultations in the Republic of Zimbabwe. However, the agent
argued that the respondent has substantially complied with the Rules
and implored the Tribunal to use its inherent powers in terms of
Rule 2(2) to condone the late filing of the opposing papers to ensure
that the ends of justice are met. The agent further argued that,
in any case, the applicants have not shown that they have suffered
any prejudice due to the late filing of the opposing papers. It
should be noted that the agent of the applicants indicated that
he did not wish to insist on the matter and that in the interest
of progress the hearing could proceed. It was also the position
of the Tribunal that in the interest of justice the application
should proceed and therefore the Tribunal accepted the application
for condonation for late filing of opposing papers by the respondent.
As regards the
present application, the applicants' agent submitted that
the applicants wanted protection pending the final determination
of the dispute between them and the respondent. He argued that the
Tribunal was set up to protect the interests of SADC citizens, and
that in terms of Article 21 of the Protocol, it has the powers not
only to apply the Treaty and the protocols thereunder, but also
to develop the Community jurisprudence having regard to applicable
treaties, general principles and rules of public international law
and any rules and principles of the law of States. He further argued
that for the Tribunal to be effective it should be seen to be protecting
the rights and interests of the SADC citizens. According to the
applicants' agent, the Tribunal should adopt the criteria
that are used in other jurisdictions when deciding whether or not
to grant an interim measure. He said the criteria are the following:
a) a prima
facie right that is sought to be protected;
b) an anticipated or threatened interference with that right;
c) an absence of any alternative remedy;
d) the balance of convenience in favour of the applicant, or a
discretionary decision in favour of the applicant that an interdict
is the appropriate relief in the circumstances.
The applicants'
agent therefore argued that the application meets these criteria
and that the balance of convenience tilts in favour of the applicants
because they stand to suffer prejudice if the interim relief is
not granted. Moreover, the agent argued that the respondent would
not be prejudiced by the granting of the relief sought. This point
was conceded by the agent of the respondent during the hearing of
the application. Regarding the application, it is observed that
the respondent's agent did not oppose it. He only concentrated
on the issue relating to exhaustion of local remedies. He submitted
that in terms of Article 15(2) of the Protocol, the applicants have
not exhausted local remedies. The text provides:
"No
natural or legal person shall bring an action against a State
unless he or she has exhausted all available remedies or is unable
to proceed under the domestic jurisdiction."
According to
the respondent, it was argued, the applicants have not complied
with this provision. The agent submitted that the applicants have
a matter pending before the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in which the
relief sought is similar to the one that they are seeking from the
Tribunal. The respondent's agent said that the matter referred
to is awaiting judgment by the Supreme Court. The applicants'
agent does not disagree. The respondent's agent therefore
argued that the application cannot be brought before the Tribunal.
The respondent's
agent also argued that if the applicants wanted protection pending
the decision of the Supreme Court, they should have approached the
domestic courts but they have not done so. Regarding the latter
point, the applicants' agent contended that Section 16B (3)
(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe oust the jurisdiction of the
courts in matters concerning land acquisition.
Referring to
the issue of failure to exhaust local remedies by the applicants,
we are of the view that the issue is not of relevance to the present
application but that it may only be raised in the main case. It
may not be raised in the present case in which the applicants are
seeking an interim measure of protection pending the final determination
of the matter. Thus the Tribunal need not consider the issue of
whether or not the applicants have exhausted local remedies. In
the circumstances, the contention relating to exhaustion of local
remedies is unsuccessful.
We have observed
above that the respondent did not oppose the present application.
We have also alluded to the criteria advanced by the applicants'
agent which should be applied in determining applications of this
nature. We agree with the criteria. In the present application there
is a prima facie right that is sought to be protected, which involves
the right to peaceful occupation and use of the land; and there
is anticipated or threatened interference with that right; and the
applicants do not appear to have any alternative remedy thereby
tilting the balance of convenience in their favour.
Accordingly,
the Tribunal grants the application pending the determination of
the main case and orders that the Republic of Zimbabwe shall take
no steps, or permit no steps to be taken, directly or indirectly,
whether by its agents or by orders, to evict from or interfere with
the peaceful residence on and beneficial use of the farm known as
Mount Carmell of Railway 19, measuring 1200.6484 hectares held under
Deed of Transfer No. 10301/99, in the District of Chegutu in the
Republic of Zimbabwe, by Mike Campbell (PvT) Limited and William
Michael Campbell, their employees and the families of such employees
and of William Michael Campbell.
The Tribunal
makes no order as to costs.
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