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Policing
the State
Solidarity Peace Trust & Institute of Justice and Reconciliation
December 14, 2006
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Summary
"Policing the State" highlights the growth of police
brutality in Zimbabwe since 2000, which has coincided with the rise
of the democratic challenge to the State. During the 1990s, peaceful
protest by the student movement and trades unions was tolerated
to some degree, but after the forming of the Movement for Democratic
Change and the loss of the February constitutional referendum in
2000, State repression escalated in all respects. The Zimbabwe government
has reverted to patterns of State control established under colonialism,
including mass arrests in terms of repressive legislation, combined
with brutality against civilians.
The findings
of this report are based on lawyers' records from 38 legal
firms in Zimbabwe, who submitted data relating to 1,981 arrests
that they considered to be primarily political in motivation. These
records indicate that police routinely pick up activists ahead of
planned actions, knowing that they neither need, nor intend, to
prove that the arrestee has committed a crime. Almost 90% of politically
motivated arrests do not result in a trial, and in the few instances
when cases go to trial, the State has obtained convictions in only
1,5% of cases! Laws such as POSA
are not there to enforce law and order, but to undermine the rights
of citizens to freedom of association, expression and movement.
Police brutality is routine, with torture of arrestees occurring
in 33% of cases. Cell conditions are shocking, and defending lawyers
run the risk of assault, harassment or incarceration.
Political arrests peaked
in 2003, when the ability of the opposition to organise was at its
zenith, and arrests have declined since then, coinciding with the
demise of the democratic movement's ability to mobilise cohesively.
This pattern of declining arrests is an indicator of the cumulative
effects of state repression on the capacity of the opposition to
confront the state, rather than an indicator of less oppression.
The effectiveness of the MDC has also been severely compromised
by the use of violence within its own structures in resolving internal
political struggles.
Whereas in the
1990s it was possible to mass thousands of people on the streets
for peaceful marches, State reaction to any such attempts is now
swift and vicious. The September 2006 attempt by the ZCTU
to march on the streets of Harare lasted less than two minutes,
and the few activists who took part were brutally tortured. By the
end of 2005, the democratic movement was in serious disarray and
without an effective response to State oppression. The mass protest
action threatened by the MDC never took place and the only public
protests that have occurred have been small scale public demonstrations
mounted by a few civic groups. The possibility of using a mass action
strategy to confront the Mugabe regime will require serious reorganisation
of the political opposition and coordination between the political
opposition and the civic groups. One-dimensional forms of struggle
will not suffice effectively to confront Zimbabwe's ruling
party and protest strategy will have to be combined with broader
strategies including more effective electoral battles, and lobbying
strategies that are more clearly articulated at regional and international
levels.
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