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Another One Party State Effort: Zimbabwe’s Anticipated NGO legislation
Brian Kagoro, Chairperson, Crisis in Zimbabwe
July 28, 2004

The Legislative Prescription
As intimated above the current NGO legal and policy framework is incoherent if not chaotic. In fact, there is no consensually agreed national NGO policy. When debate concerning NGO legislation review started in the late 1990s the following justifications were offered:

• The need to harmonise both the process and criteria for NGO registration and operation. The understanding was that they would be pre and post-incorporation requirements. This – it was argued – would link strict legal status questions to operational ethics issues.
• There was need for increased governmental oversight over activities of NGOs and foreign aid agencies;
• External funding of local NGOs needed to be proscribed in the interests of national security and sovereignty;
• The nature, scope and focus of voluntary organisations needed to be statutorily prescribed

There are several factors that might motivate government to fast-track NGO Legislation through parliament such as:

• The perception that there is deviance amongst and by NGOs and that NGOs need to be subjected to supervision vis-à-vis their objectives and operations.
• Many queries have been raised regarding Trusts that do not confine themselves to their trust objectives;
• The perception that these bodies must be controlled and that current control mechanisms are slack
• The impression that organizations operating in an environment as fluid as Zimbabwe should remain parochially focused on their narrow terms of reference;
• The impression that all NGOs should be registered and that voluntary non-registration is an act of defiance;
• The notion that Trusts registered with the High Court and other Acts of parliament should compulsorily register as PVOs;
• The argument that the current PVO Act is obsolete, since it permitted for some non-state actors to operate with licensing under the law. The target groups for this query are the democracy and governance groups and those dealing with environmental and other socio-economic rights issues.

The following might be government’s likely prescription for dealing with CSOs:

1. Streamline legislation dealing with PVOs by creating a harmonized law;
2. Increase government’s regulatory, surveillance and supervisory responsibilities regarding the operation of CSOs. The harmonized law might be renamed in order to cover Trusts, international NGOs, social movements and DG advocacy groups;
3. Broaden the objectives that might oblige an organization to be registered to include advocacy, human rights, environment, special interests, etc. The definition of registrable groups might include everything doable by the non-state sector;
4. Exclusion of common law universitas and Trusts from exemption from registration
5. Mandatory disclosure of foreign funding within a specified period
6. Mandatory auditing requirements and possible annual or biannual certification. This might be related to a registration fee;
7. Mandatory certification might be accompanied with mandatory specifications regarding CSO board composition. There are indications that government might wish to limit the presence of foreigners and employees of foreign missions on CSO boards-even if such individuals are Zimbabwean citizens;
8. Given the parlous state of the economy, it would not be startling for government to include provisions that gives it claim to property and resources upon dissolution or winding up of an organization. This form of forfeiture to the state of financial resources and property seems to be the real motivation behind proposed stringent licensing requirements;
9. Concessions may be made enabling the formation of national representative NGO bodies, primarily because Zanu PF would want to set up rival bodies as happened within the trade union and student union sectors. This is a double-edged sword because it is likely to relate to the composition of the proposed NGO council. More specifically the minister can pick and choose from which organizations to seek nominations to the new council. This raises the spectre of voluntarism enacted from above and in the interest of the state.
10. There is a likelihood that government will want to control issues relating to remuneration and contracts within the non-state sector as well as the administration of funds.
11. Given the last Supreme court judgment in the Sekai Holland et al, case government might have no choice but to provide for some modicum of fair administrative action (especially the application of the rules of natural justice) in the determination of applications for registration by various groups.
12. The new NGO council might be trimmed to a number less that 15 but certainly more than 10 members. The practice is to have an odd number with government having one representative more than the CSOs. It is not clear – given the inclination towards a unitary registration - why government would still require that between 6 to 8 ministries be represented on the council. There may be a case for a council chaired by a retired judge and with three representatives from government and civil society respectively.
13. Because the primary motivation behind the proposed NGO legislation is supervision and surveillance, the new Council is likely to have expanded powers that include the following: disciplinary and investigatory power over CSO operations and drafting a code of ethics for CSOs.

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