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The role of militia groups in maintaining ZanuPF's political power - Excerpts
A P Reeler, Former Director, Amani Trust
Member of Executive Committee, International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims
March 2003

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Background
The violence that has afflicted Zimbabwe since the Constitutional referendum has received considerable international attention, mainly due to remarkable documentation from the press, the media and human rights groups. The findings of the human rights groups, and particularly the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, have additionally been corroborated by a number of the reports from international human rights groups. Finally, there has also been corroboration from a large number of election observer groups. However, despite sustained international pressure, organised violence and torture continues in Zimbabwe, and the violence associated with militia groups continues today: there are very recent reports of the youth militia – the "green bombers¹" – operating with apparent impunity in Kuwadzana in Harare², as well as in Bulawayo³. The problem of the militia is however beginning to cause concern, as is evidenced by the recent statement of the South African Catholic Bishops Conference urging President Thabo Mbeki to intervene in Zimbabwe over the militia, as well a recent story in the London Sunday Times⁴.

The President and Government have made no credible attempt to end the violence, with the only defence being that this is either violence provoked by the original violence of the MDC and other groups, such as white commercial farmers, or that the violence is due to the frustrations expressed by ordinary Zimbabweans in their quest to acquire land that is rightfully theirs. At best the President and the government condone lawlessness and violence, but at worst they are guilty of planning, orchestrating, and implementing this violence against their own people⁵. It is relevant to point out that the situation today is little different to that pertained in May 2000 when a group of ZanuPF militia attacked the "Peace March" in the middle of Harare. And that the same comments could be made today as were made by the Human Rights Forum in its report on the violence that day:

The violence began with the use of militia, both against the peaceful demonstrators in Harare and in the invasions of the commercial farms, and militia continued to be deployed in the 2000 Parliamentary Elections, the various by-elections in 2001, and the Presidential Election in 2002. The militia continues to be a significant factor in the violence to date, with reports from Zimbabwe continuously demonstrating the many ways in which militia are involved in both the violence and the ordinary lives of Zimbabweans. For example, a report in the Zimbabwe Independent recently shows militia imposing dusk to dawn curfew on the residents of Kuwadzana, the latest constituency to face a by-election⁶. This curfew is imposed by a group that has no power to do this, in the absence of any declaration of martial law or the imposition of emergency powers, and without any interference by the police.

The use of militia has been a cornerstone of the campaign by Robert Mugabe and ZanuPF to maintain political power, but has to date this not been carefully investigated against the background of an enormous amount of documentary material. As will be seen from the following analysis, the evidence suggests a well-worked out strategy on behalf of the State, and this strategy has involved the use of both militia and the State security agencies, mainly the CIO and the Zimbabwe Republic Police, in complementary roles. Against this onslaught, the supporters of the MDC and the ordinary people of Zimbabwe have been victims on a very large scale. This is a factual assertion based on the evidence, which quite clearly shows who have been the primary targets, but this evidence cannot show the scale. However, some inferences can be drawn regarding scale, and one estimate put the number of victims of torture in 2000 alone somewhere in the range of 200,000 persons⁷.

The present analysis draws upon all the publicly available reports on the organised violence and torture over the past three years. It also draws upon a number of private sources and interviews that will remain anonymous for obvious reasons.

Conclusions and Recommendations
It is evident that a strong case can be made, albeit on the partial information available, that the militia area significant threat to peace and security in Zimbabwe, and furthermore that a strong prima facie case can be made for the militia’s deployment being state-condoned and state-controlled.

A strong case can be made that ZanuPF and Robert Mugabe have been using militia groups to influence elections and maintain political power. It is argued that land reform was and is a pretext for a variety of unlawful activities, but most importantly as a cover for the moving around the country of militia groups. This strategy can be seen most clearly during the two major elections that have taken place since February 2000, but it is evident that the recourse to using land reform has had to be maintained outside of elections. This is mainly due to the fact that the strategies for winning elections have been very qualified successes, resulting in a strong parliamentary opposition, and continued legal threat through election petitions in the Zimbabwean courts, international repudiation, and the near melt-down of the economy due to massive misappropriation of the fiscus in the efforts to maintain power. The only strategy remaining to ZanuPF is the use of the land issue internationally and the continuance of the policy of forced compliance via the militia internally.

Sophisticated as this strategy has been, and it continues to befuddle senior African political leaders even today, there is sufficient evidence to confront all with an alternative hypothesis: this is not about land, but about political power, and the use of militia is the crucial component in the strategy to hold onto political power. However, the strategy is dangerous in the extreme, and there are many signs that the beast is no longer leashed.

Since there is no evidence that the Mugabe regime has taken any credible steps to deal with the militia, it is therefore a matter of urgency that the international community take strong steps to act upon this situation. The following would seem to be the minimum steps required from the international community:

• Demand the immediate removal by the government of Zimbabwe of all statutes of impunity in order to give the strongest signal that organised violence and torture shall be repudiated, and to signal commitment to the rule of law;
• Demand the immediate disbanding of all militia groups – the youth militia, the "war veterans", and ZanuPF youth;
• Demand that the Zimbabwe Republic Police take immediate action to take control of the civilian situation in order to ensure that all violence ceases, that all cases of public violence are immediately investigated, and that all investigations into organised violence and torture take place with urgency;
• Demand the setting up of an international commission of inquiry into the operations of the militia;
• Demand the setting up of another international commission of inquiry into the allegations of widespread sexual violence against women, and this commission should be women-driven;
• Failing any response from the government of Zimbabwe to these demands that the international community insist that the matter be placed before the forthcoming session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, meeting in Geneva.

To delay now, especially in the face of the massive humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe, will be a dereliction of international responsibility, and a total abrogation of the duties required by responsible nations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide to mention but a few. The presence of outlaw bands is always a significant threat to peace, not merely within a nation, but for all the surrounding nations. Sovereignty must always be respected in responsible nations, but there are times when the international community must seriously question the limits of national sovereignty: sometimes good neighbours do and must complain.

1 The term "Green Bombers", as they are colloquially known in Zimbabwe, is both a reference to the characteristic green uniforms that the youth militia wear and, reportedly, also a derogatory reference to the militia as a type of large fly - a bluebottle - that is frequently seen flying around ordure.
2 See the statement from the Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust (ZIMCET), Peace disturbed in Kuwadzana, January 20, 2003.
3 See the statement from Christians Together for Justice and Peace, The corrupting of Zimbabwe's youth, January 14, 2003.
4 See the Sunday Times, 9 February 2003; Mugabe bends minds in hatred camps.
5 See Reeler, A.P (2003), Who should be sanctioned?, [www.zwnews.net] for a report on the involvement of government officials and others in the organised violence and torture.
6 See Zimbabwe Independent, 31 January 2003, Militia impose curfew in Kuwadzana,.
7 See Reeler, A.P (2001), State Sponsored Violence in Zimbabwe, Paper presented to "Crisis in Zimbabwe: Implications for South Africa and Southern Africa", South African Institute of International Affairs, 14 February 2001, Johannesburg, South Africa.

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