THE NGO NETWORK ALLIANCE PROJECT - an online community for Zimbabwean activists  
 View archive by sector
 
 
    HOME THE PROJECT DIRECTORYJOINARCHIVESEARCH E:ACTIVISMBLOGSMSFREEDOM FONELINKS CONTACT US
 

 


Back to Index
, Article Index, « Previous Page, Next Page »

Who should be sanctioned?
A P Reeler
Former Director, Amani Trust
Executive Committee Member, The International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims

January 31, 2003

Increasing pressure on those responsible: targeting the "middle managers"
Robert Mugabe has an uncanny ability, seen recurringly over the past 20 years, to hold together an unruly party. He may well be able to retain sufficient control over the internal politics of Zimbabwe to head off the pressure to expedite the election petition, and to quash all moves to support an independent judiciary. If this is the case, then there is only one other route to change, and that is to make it clear to his own party that there will be costs to continuing to support Robert Mugabe. It is clear that we know who these supporters are, and many of the more senior supporters are already on the lists of the United States and the EU for personal sanctions. However, there are many others equally deserving of sanctions who are not so senior in the ZanuPF hierarchy, but are crucial to maintaining ZanuPF in its state of illegitimacy.

This latter group is not invisible. Indeed, they are known through the many reports of the human rights groups in Zimbabwe; they are known to the communities in which they operate; and they are protected by the impunity offered by the state, both formal and informal. It is no secret who are these "middle managers"; they are names in a number of reports produced by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, and these reports have been in the public domain for some time now. Three reports, in particular, are important for understanding the "middle managers":

What follows is an analysis of these reports, supported by a large number of additional reports. Using this publicly available information, the data has been examined to see who are the most frequent offenders mentioned in the reports, and who might be the most culpable of these offenders. It also attempts to look at patterns, and the implications of those patterns.

Table 5 shows the 20 worst constituencies for the Parliamentary and Presidential elections combined. The total picture is shown in Appendix 3, but the "top twenty" are shown for illustrative purposes.

As can be seen from Table 5, some constituencies show consistent patterns for both elections; for example, Gokwe, Harare, and Murehwa North had relatively consistent patterns for both elections. Hurungwe, Mberengwa East Mudzi, and Zvishavane show higher violence for the Parliamentary elections, whilst Bindura, Buhera, Guruve, and UMP show much higher violence for the Presidential Elections.

There is obviously an association between the worst constituencies and the worst Provinces, and also between both of these and the officials involved. For example, most of the MPs mentioned are those from constituencies in Mashonaland Central, East and West, whilst the remainder come from constituencies where the reported violence and torture was high. In Mashonaland Central, Border Gezi, Mark Madiro, Elliot Manyika, and Saviour Kasukawere were all frequently mentioned: it takes no rocket science to discern the pattern, nor to conclude that this was not random but organized, and organized with the connivance of the government.

Please credit www.kubatana.net if you make use of material from this website. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License unless stated otherwise.

TOP