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Famine in Zimbabwe
Zimconsult, for Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Harare
April 2004

http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000783/index.php

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Introduction
Since the Zimbabwe Government embarked on its fast track land resettlement programme, the food situation, particularly in respect of the staple maize, has been getting worse every year. Initially people were talking of food shortage, but "famine" would now seem a more appropriate term to apply to the situation the country now faces. "Famine" has been used to describe situations of extreme food scarcity and starvation in countries such as Ethiopia and Eritrea. Nobody ever contemplated that Zimbabwe, formerly the bread-basket of southern Africa, would come to be referred to in terms of famine.

The fast track resettlement programme was officially completed in August 2002. Theoretically, it should therefore have been possible to properly plan for the 2003/4 agriculture season, at least in respect of ensuring that enough maize would be planted. As will become evident in this report, there was no such planning. The certain consequences are going to be severe shortages of food, although just how severe is unclear due to lack of information. In the past, information about the food supply situation in the country was given to anybody interested, but in the current situation of policy-induced food scarcity and the militarization of the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), the public is deliberately denied access to information. Independent observers who monitor food demand and supply trends are concerned about the spectre of famine. The donors, who must be thanked for saving the lives of well over 6 million people over the past three years, are exasperated by the lack of information.

On its part, the government is content to manipulate food for political gain, and appears quite unconcerned about the plight of the people. This lack of care by the government is evident, for example, in the government's unwillingness to approach UNDP for food assistance in a timely fashion. The World Food Programme (WFP) cannot begin to approach donors until an official request has been received. Last year, as the well documented concerns voiced by the opposition party and the donor community became more insistent, the government request was finally made in July 2003. This year, with an election in prospect and control over food therefore more important than ever to a self-interested government, it is remains in doubt whether any official request will be submitted at all.

It is against this background that it was considered important to carry out an independent study of the food situation in the country.

Conclusion
When the government embarked on its fast track land reform, it was obvious to all that the programme was driven by political expediency. On paper and for the purpose of mollifying countries in the southern African region, the policy was presented as an overdue response to the national land question. However, the land policy, which on paper was made to appear reasonable, was belied by the reality on the ground of mayhem characterised by murder, assaults, rape, theft, and wanton destruction of infrastructure. More than 250 000 farm workers lost their jobs and livelihoods and in turn a mere 134 400 families were resettled on more than 11m ha.

It is the complete lack of planning, accompanied by the destruction of agricultural infrastructure, and the cynical award of farms to people unable or unwilling to make use of them, that has put the country into a situation of perennial food deficits or famine. The dismissive attitude of the government to the food crisis which it has itself inflicted on the country is amply demonstrated by the response of Minister Joseph Made to the 17th December 2003 report of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Lands and Agriculture. The Committee made the following recommendations:

The Hon. Renson Gasela, MP of Gweru Rural and Shadow Minister for the MDC, seconded the Portfolio Committee's motion and read the above recommendations in Parliament. Minister Made, in his response stated:

What Hon. Gasela read in Parliament is exactly what is recorded as the recommendations in the Committee's report. The Minister claimed to believe that Hon. Gasela was reading from his own notes and thereby avoided addressing the substantive issues raised. It is quite clear that the government has no intention of addressing the food situation. Plans for the 2004/05 summer crop should by March 2004 have been at an advanced stage as per the Committee's recommendations. It is common knowledge that nothing is being done at the moment.

The issue is not just the government's failure to move to restoring food security, but its use of food as a political weapon. The mechanisms used are blatant. The government has forced all village heads (kraal heads) to be chairpersons of ZANU PF. They have now been put on a monthly salary. During the September 2002 Rural District Council Elections and also the Insiza Parliamentary By-election, village heads drew up lists of their people and told them openly that if they did not vote for ZANU PF candidates, they were not going to access food. These village heads were seen camped outside the statutory 100 meters from polling stations ticking names of those who had come to vote. The same thing happened in Gutu North by election recently. Such vote buying and rigging is now done openly and publicly by this regime.

The Zimbabwe Government has never disclosed how much maize was produced in the 2002/03 season, nor how much GMB bought. However, investigations have revealed that GMB bought 250 000 tonnes last year. It has also come to light that all that maize is being kept in storage, mainly in Mashonaland West and Central. This maize was not released into the market despite the fact that there were severe shortages of mealie-meal in much of the country until recently. Through GMB the government supplement these stocks by buying as much as possible of this season's maize production. However, given the limited size of the crop and the subsistence needs of the farming communities, it is not expected that total stocks of maize will be more than 400 000 tonnes. The government will use padded figures of food production in order to create an impression of self-sufficiency.

It is clear that the government, despite being fully aware of the impending food shortage, has no intention of approaching UNDP for food aid. The 400 000 tonnes of maize will be used for general election campaign purposes.

The estimated food supply situation in the country for this year will be as follows:

SCENARIO 1

SCENARIO 2

The above scenarios exclude any strategic reserves which should be 500 000 tonnes. Whichever way one looks at the situation, there will be a huge shortage of food in the country, caused by a potent combination of chaotic land reform and destructive macro-economic policies. According to the World Food Programme report as at November 18 2003, the target for food aid was to rise to 4 500 000 people by March 2004. It is common cause that WFP's appeal to donors last year only resulted in 44 % of the necessary resources being raised. Not all the Zimbabweans in need get food aid from the donors, for various reasons including lack of resources. This year, the number of people in need of food will be more than 8 000 000 or about three quarters of the population during the course of the upcoming year. Of these people WFP estimates that 2 500 000 people will be in the urban areas.

As regards future cropping seasons, the adverse legacy of the chaotic land reform will continue to depress the average yield. This implies that the area that would be needed for self-sufficiency in maize and small grains would be much larger than in the past, and correspondingly higher levels of inputs would be required. Even with a change of government and the introduction of consistent, growth-oriented economic policies, it will not be immediately possible to provide the finance, seeds, fertilisers, draught power and tractors to meet these very large requirements. It needs also to be noted that the HIV/AIDS pandemic has decimated the working population, making it much more difficult for rural communities to meet production targets, while also raising the importance of providing a proper diet to those afflicted with the HIV virus.

Zimbabwe is thus likely to be in need of assistance in providing basic foodstuffs for some years to come. Food self-sufficiency will only be restored when the land question has properly and finally resolved and coherent economic policies have been put in place.

In 2004/05, the suffering of the people will be increased by the fact that the government, through Statutory Instrument 235A of 2001, has criminalized the selling of maize among and between people. In terms of the Statutory Instrument, all the maize that is available must by-pass starving people and be sold to GMB. GMB then sells that maize to those carrying ZANU PF cards. In urban areas, which are strongholds of the MDC, the sale of maize by GMB has been stopped and maize is instead sold through ZANU-PF Councillors. A further example of the political manipulation of maize in the urban areas is provided by the case of Mutare. In March 2004, the MDC Mayor of Mutare tried to use money collected by his Christmas Cheer Fund to buy maize from the GMB for distribution to the destitute. GMB refused to sell maize to the Mayor, an unacceptable position that was upheld on appeal by the Governor of Manicaland.

The plight of the Zimbabwean people will only be resolved when all the governance issues have been addressed.

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