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The numbers game: What could come after March 29th?
Idasa
March 13, 2008

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The forthcoming elections are provoking considerable excitement, mainly over whether Robert Mugabe will survive the most serious challenge yet to his political hegemony over Zimbabwe. However, it seems very difficult to anticipate what outcomes there could be in early April. In part this is because the electoral laws need some clarification, particularly the apparent conflict between Section 110(3) and Paragraph 3 of the Second Schedule of the Electoral Act, and in part because of the very complicated political situation in Zimbabwe and the apparent splits within ZANU PF over whether Mugabe should remain in power.

Dealing with the first issue, Section 110(3) of the Electoral Act states that the winner in the first round of a Presidential election must have an absolute majority of the valid votes cast, however Paragraph 3 suggests that the Chief Election Officer has the power to declare as the winner the candidate with the "greater" or the "greatest" number of votes. Paragraph 3 of the Second Schedule is a hangover from the previous Electoral Act, and, if the principles of good legislative interpretation are followed - which may not be the case - then the substantive clause, Section 110(3), should prevail.

The relevance for this discussion is that Mugabe may fall back on what one commentator has called the "sophisticated" Kibaki strategy if he fails to get the absolute majority he needs. He gets the Chief Election Officer to declare him the winner, even if he only gets 49% or less of the vote - as long as he has more than the others - and then argues the toss in the courts, if the losing candidates feel that they can take this option. He can avoid the "crude" Kibaki strategy - of just getting himself declared the winner - by using the contradiction in the Electoral Act between Section 110(3) and Paragraph 3 of the Second Schedule. However, elections are complex processes, and, whilst they are evidently about the transfer or maintenance of political power between parties, they are also about popularity, and it is popularity that gives credibility to the transfer or maintenance of political power. In the current "harmonized" elections, this means that credibility for the various political parties will come from having won both the presidential and the parliamentary elections, and with what kind of majority they obtain this win.

So, for Mugabe, it is essential that he and ZANU PF win both the presidential and the parliamentary elections with clear majorities. This will allow him to be sworn in by the Chief Justice, to demand the allegiance of the armed services and chiefs and to continue to claim sovereignty and forestall any external interference. If he were to win the presidency, but lose the parliament or have the opposition get a blocking third of the seats, as they did in 2000, he will have considerable difficulty governing, let alone convincing the world at large that he remains a popular leader.

Now, for the first time in Zimbabwe's history, it is not a forgone conclusion that ZANU PF will win, and we are faced with a multiplicity of contenders of real substance. We have four candidates for the presidential election, with three very substantial and plausible candidates. We have two major parties, ZANU PF and MDC, contending for the parliamentary, senate, and local government elections, but we also have a large number of "independents"; some of whom are genuine independents, and some of whom are supporters of Simba Makoni (a presidential contender) but probably owe their allegiance to ZANU PF. We also have many indicators of severe dissatisfaction with Mugabe within ZANU PF, but it is impossible to know how extensive this is and how this will affect the presidential election.

Whilst the dissatisfaction with Mugabe can have very powerful effects on the presidential election, it would seem probable that this will not translate into dissatisfaction by the electorate with the party. ZANU PF "dissidents", whether public or not, will want the party to win, but probably not want Mugabe to continue as President. All of this suggests a large number of possible outcomes, which are dependent on a wide range of factors; the effectiveness of all the current vote buying, the success of rigging, the control of the electoral machinery, and, of course, the ways in which the electorate will vote. After all, elections are empirical events, and numbers count in the final analysis. So whatever the flaws, it will matter what the turnout looks like, and whether the numbers are plausibly distributed. Focusing on all the factors that make up a free or flawed election is important, but if we focus on what can happen with the numbers, irrespective of the validity of the process, it is possible to see that these elections can have many different results. The table below summarizes the possible outcomes, both presidential and parliamentary, and looks at these with regard to the major interest in these elections: will Mugabe stay or go?

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