Back to Index

This article participates on the following special index pages:

Creating the crisis that Zimbabwe needs
Zimbabwe Crisis Platform
February 18, 2008

http://www.africanews.com/site/list_messages/15847

It is clear that Zimbabwe needs a political crisis in order for SADC to act. Whilst Zimbabwe is obviously in a state of economic, political and social collapse, it has yet to generate a serious enough political crisis for SADC.

That crisis lies in the fact that Zanu PF remains in clear control, albeit under a dubious mandate due to the three highly disputed elections in 2000, 2002, and 2005. These elections have resulted, amongst other things, in the withdrawal of bi-lateral and multi-lateral financial support, the withdrawal of development assistance, and targeted personal sanctions by a significant portion of the world. Zimbabwe is reviled by a substantial proportion of global civil society, including all the most important human rights organizations.

However, despite all this, and, most importantly for the MDC, the disputed elections, the MDC has continued in Parliament, giving the Zanu PF government the facade of legitimacy. It was more than the facade of democracy when the MDC had a blocking minority in Parliament. This facade was tested in the Zimbabwe Courts, but very few of the election petitions were completed before the next election in 2005, and the petition on the 2002 Presidential election will very probably not be completed before the elections in March 2008. The courts were not the independent organ that Zimbabwe might have hoped for, and this has been tested in many ways.

The election petitions, if anyone still remembers them, and remembers the startling disclosures about the 2000 elections: treating, bribery, coercion, torture, murder, terror, and endless hate speech were all revealed in the petitions, and a number of the MDC's petitions were successful. All decisions were appealed, but by the end of the 5-year parliamentary period, only one had been heard by the Supreme Court. Rule by law has proved impossible for the MDC and the civics to overcome.

Nonetheless, the de facto presence of the MDC in Parliament has to a large extent vitiated the effect of the election petitions, and the whole process of contesting the results of Zimbabwean elections seems futile given the subjugation of the Zimbabwe judiciary to the Executive. It is unwise to underestimate the significance of the MDC continuing to remain in Parliament. De Facto may not be the same as De Jure, but political power and law are uneasy bedfellows, and, in lying together, political power usually ends up on top. As it was with Smith, so it is with Mugabe.

The next stage has been the so-called "mediation", or, as it may be more properly termed, a "facilitation" by SADC. This was no mediation, as there was no binding agreement between the parties for a mediation, and the mediator quite clearly had no power to rule on any of the difficulties; the facilitator kept stoically organizing meetings and keeping the process going, while all the time telling the watchers that it is really an internal problem of a sovereign state. This was apparent from the outset, when in the announcement of the "facilitation", the SADC presidents endorsed all three aspects of the Zimbabwe government policy: the validation of land reform, and the removal of sanctions were hardly impartial, nor reflective of what most Zimbabweans accept? Since it can scarcely have escaped the notice of any of the eminent president's that these were not only contested by the West, but also by at least half of Zimbabwe, a facilitation it could only be. No Zimbabwean group outside of Zanu PF believed that this was mediation, since the "mediator" was obviously partisan; no African country has maintained a principled criticism of the country's human rights record, and South Africa, the choice of mediator, has consistently blocked attempts at examining Zimbabwe's human rights record.

However, despite all the hype and the spin of the facilitator and the Zimbabwe government, it is now abundantly evident that this was yet another knight's move by Robert Mugabe, just as the so-called talks in 2004 were merely a tactic to waste time before the elections in 2005. All of Zimbabwe understands, as SADC most obviously does not, that Robert Mugabe and Zanu PF have no intention of relinquishing political power before their futures are assured, and the most crucial aspect of this intention is that, no matter how terrible elections may appear to be, they nonetheless provide the minimal conditions for democracy. They provide the rationale for holding political power, and avoiding interference by other states in the internal affairs of a country. No one understands this more clearly than Robert Mugabe, and the conditions have been set in place to ensure that Robert Mugabe and Zanu PF will win the March 2008 elections.

Furthermore, just as Zanu PF used the trivial adherence to the SADC Principles and Guidelines for the holding of Democratic Elections in 2005 to justify a wholly fraudulent election, they will use the trivial changes to the Constitution and a number of pieces of legislation - POSA, AIPPA, and the Broadcasting Service Act - to justify the coming election.

They will claim firstly that the MDC has agreed to all the changes now in place. The MDC supported Constitutional Amendment Number 18, which they did in order to obtain other changes. ZanuPF has then amended POSA, AIPPA, and the Broadcasting Services Act as was requested by the MDC and civil society. These amendments are far from satisfactory, and even then the Zimbabwe government demonstrates, as it has done over the proposed peace march by the MDC, that it will not be bound by the law.

The Zimbabwe government has put in place, ahead of any agreement from the "facilitation" process, all the pieces of the election jigsaw puzzle that it needs to get the picture it wants. The Electoral Commission is wholly partisan, delimitation has already been completed, the controversial voters roll remains in place, and voter registration has been a laughable charade. Of course, this is exactly the machinery that was in place in 2005, and SADC and the AU gave that election a passing grade: Zanu PF is thus in a very good position to answer any SADC criticism of the current electoral set-up by reference to 2005. If it was good enough for SADC and the AU in 2005, why is it no longer good enough in 2008?

So it seems clear that elections will happen in March; that Zanu PF will win in an election that will not pass the minimum standards of modern democracy; that minimal conditions for sovereignty will be assured; and the chronic problems will persist, perhaps right into 2010. Elections in the present context cannot solve Zimbabwe's problems. Thus, any reasonable future for Zimbabwe in the short term depends on possibilities outside of a purely electoral solution, and neither of the two obvious candidates is very likely.

The first is that Zanu PF will get rid of Robert Mugabe themselves. Mugabe has illegitimately and unconstitutionally forced himself on the party as the candidate of choice for the Presidency, with no apparent dissent from the party. There are rumors of dissent, and alternative party candidates have been touted, but to date this is all smoke and mirrors, and usually turns out to be smoke and mirrors. There are also rumors of an attempted assassination, blandly called a coup, but, in the climate of secrecy that is contemporary Zimbabwe, the truth of this cannot be known.

However, it is clear that the party will not even challenge blatant disregard of its own constitution, and no one has the courage to criticize Mugabe. Mugabe rides roughshod over the constitution of his own party, and this evokes mere murmurings. ZanuPF has proved weaker at challenging Mugabe than the MDC, and it is also outrageous that no other liberation movement questions the unconstitutionality of Mugabe's candidature, and the manifestly undemocratic manner in which Zanu PF operates!

Thus, it is improbable that Zanu PF will find an internal way to maneuver Mugabe from power, and especially in a manner that will retain the party in power, which is obviously critical for those who fear any process of accountability; for the rampant corruption and gross human rights violations of the past 9 years do require an answer, and this is a common sentiment amongst ordinary Zimbabweans.

There is the possibility of a split within Zanu PF, but this is a risky business if the aim is to ensure that some form of Zanu PF remains in power. Splitting is an unpredictable business. Consider the three-way contest for the Presidency of Mugabe, Makoni, and Tsvangirai. Would Makoni take votes away from Mugabe or Tsvangirai? If the former and this led to an MDC presidency, consider the implications of Morgan Tsvangirai having Mugabe's presidential powers and the likelihood of Zanu PF surviving as a majority parliamentary party or even remaining a credible opposition.

There is also the very remote possibility of an alliance between the MDC and the disaffected of Zanu PF. This could lead to a two horse race for both the presidency and parliament, and, certainly with Tsvangirai as presidential candidate, a good chance of beating Zanu PF at the polls. However, there is not much in the way of positive examples of Zanu PF members leaving the party and surviving as plausible political figures. Here think about Tekere and Kombayi.

However, all these options will depend on a moderately level playing field, and this is as unlikely as a bumper harvest in 2008. Only the most incurable optimist can believe that Mugabe will allow open campaigning, free access to the media, a genuinely independent electoral commission, and postal votes. That this will not happen has already been demonstrated by the banning of the peace march.

Less than a week after the amendments were passed into law, the ZRP have violated the act. The new amendments to POSA allow for the police and a civic group or political party to agree on the terms of a meeting or a march, and this happened; both parties were happy with the arrangements. Then the march was banned, and, under the new POSA, this can only happen following an appeal to the courts. This is clearly to allow an independent arbitration in event of a dispute, usually by the non-state party; but there was no dispute, merely the sudden realization by the government that, once they allowed marches to take place, the flood would overwhelm them. This is masked by the claim that there was new information of a "sinister" purpose behind the march.

Of course, this is what courts are for, and, fortunately for the police, the court did agree with them; it supported the ban on the march, but allowed the meeting. The ZRP banning should only have come after the court decision, not before, but, so that all are clear that the government will not be bound by its own laws, the ZRP then arrested and assaulted marchers trying to get to the meeting. However, the ZRP are right: there is a sinister purpose behind people wishing to march. It is their extreme frustration at the lives they are living, and it is an explosive frustration. When the CIO and the military warned the government in 2005 that feelings were seething, they can have had no idea about how deep and wide seething could still get. Hunger is a very serious motivation for action, as Bob Marley said.

The people of Zimbabwe have so much to complain about that they could march every day with legitimate grievances, but grievances that have obvious political connotations. As was once observed, the most dangerous time for any dictatorship or repressive government is when it has to liberalize, and that is undoubtedly what the Zimbabwe government understands might happen. Small wonder that the peace march was banned, and Zanu PF finds itself having to demonstrate its insincerity for creating a genuine open democratic space for legitimate elections.

So, there remains only one course of action open to the MDC and Zimbabwean civics: a total repudiation of the "facilitation" process and a boycott of the elections. The concessions by Zanu PF are not only trivial, but they will not even adhere to these minor concessions. The framework for the elections is wholly biased in favor of Zanu PF, and hence it makes no sense to run in a rigged race. It makes even less sense to run in a rigged election and then enter parliament. Invalidity must be exposed for the good of democracy, as the Kenyans are doing. However, when elections are manifestly rigged and unfair, then exposure can happen ahead of elections, and this can produce only one political response: boycott.

So boycott, and produce a crisis. SADC will then have to get off the fence and figure out how to solve the problem. Instead of all the SADC, countries making cheap profits from Zimbabweans misery, will have to work out how to subsidize the Zimbabwe collapse without the help of the West. Blaming the West for the failure of the "facilitation" or the obduracy of the MDC will not work: this was "own affairs", and the result was that Robert Mugabe gave SADC the big middle digit.

However, this will be hard for the MDC, for it has always believed that there was merit in having an opposition in parliament, although this was dubious after 2005 when they had lost the blocking third in parliament. The participation of the MDC after 2005 only served to give legitimacy to Zanu PF, and in no way acted as a restraint as it did between 2000 and 2005.

Furthermore, nobody, it seems, believes in boycotts, and there would be enormous pressure on the MDC to participate; certainly from all the SADC countries and the AU, and probably from many of the Western countries too. But, as was the case in 1995, when Sithole and Musarewa withdrew from the Presidential election, and left Robert Mugabe to be elected by a paltry percentage of the electorate, boycotts can have an effect: the boycott did damage Mugabe's reputation and legitimacy. Nobody was looking in 1995, but few would miss the meaning of a miserably low turnout, and since limited endorsement can act as a test of popularity of an important kind. Furthermore, on the purely psychological level, Robert Mugabe will scarcely enjoy an uncontested election; limited sovereignty needs an opposition at the polls!

However it is probable that the MDC will participate, albeit for wholly negative reasons, as was the case in 2002 and 2005, and the grinding misery of the Zimbabwe people will continue, for the limited mandate, and the ever-crucial claim to sovereignty will be maintained allowing Robert Mugabe to hold the international community at bay.

But what would happen if the MDC were to boycott now? Firstly, they could try to force SADC to test the veracity of their claims that the reforms are trivial, the electoral framework and conditions woefully short of normal democratic content, and that there have been systematic violations of human rights perpetrated in order to keep political power and to influence elections. It could force SADC out of facilitation into genuine mediation, and into accepting true regional responsibility as envisaged by the SADC Treaty under Articles 6 and 33. They could force SADC to stop treating both sides of the story as equally true, and investigate the claims. When civil society and the MDC claim that there are widespread and systematic violations of human rights, and ZanuPF denies these, SADC can try to find out independently whether either are telling the truth.

Secondly, the MDC would find itself in possible alliance with most of Zimbabwean civil society, and regain some of its former standing with its progenitors. The MDC would not be in parliament, but then parliament is not the only context in which a political party can exist, as the ANC itself knows only too well. Demands for a new constitution, the rule of law, observance of human rights, and social justice are common cause for the majority of Zimbabweans. When elections do not work, then there is only civic action as a route for change, and here the MDC would find willing allies, providing the party can engender respect for alliances. Most civics and social movements in Zimbabwe have already expressed reservations about the "facilitation", and the MDC, by adopting similar attitudes, would find that there is political life outside parliament.

Thirdly, the crisis produced by the boycott could provide an alternative test of political opinion and the real support for ZanuPF. A carefully thought through boycott strategy, such as a spoilt paper boycott, could make clear the extent of political support for ZanuPF in a way that no election could. This could severely damage the minimal claims to political power and sovereignty so desperately needed by Robert Mugabe. It is obvious that boycotts can be useful or not, but it is also clear that participating in transparently rigged elections is equally risky, especially in Zimbabwe, and this should now be abundantly evident to the MDC. However, can the MDC provide the political leadership to take Zimbabwe into a crisis that is capable of resolution, or will they continue to display the qualities of the perpetual opposition? Time will tell.

Please credit www.kubatana.net if you make use of material from this website. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License unless stated otherwise.

TOP