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Zimbabwe's
2005 Elections: Overture or finale?
Chris Maroleng1, Institute
for Security Studies
March 10, 2005
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Introduction
There are now some three weeks to go before Zimbabweans go to the
polls to elect a new parliament on 31 March, and most observers
agree that the outcome is almost certain to be a comfortable victory
for the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF). There is also general consensus among the majority
of commentators that whatever the official position taken by such
observers as are permitted to view the process, “free and fair”
elections in the current context are impossible.
These conclusions
are based on a number of factors. The organisational weaknesses
of the main opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which
has been exacerbated by the party’s delays in deciding whether
to participate in the elections, is surely an important factor.2
The existence of legislation placing severe restrictions upon the
political activities of opposition campaigners — such as the
Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information
and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) — ensure that the electoral
process is heavily weighted in favour of ZANU-PF before a single
ballot is cast. Even more significant have been increasing reports
of political violence and human rights violations perpetrated largely
by members or supporters of the ruling party.
This is not
to argue that all is well within the ruling party, however. The
period leading up to the elections has been marked by open controversy
about the future leadership of ZANU-PF, and by public revelations
of factional rifts in its ranks. Though such disputes have long
been a feature of ZANU-PF’s history, their latest manifestations
surfaced clearly when President Robert Mugabe was persuaded to adopt
the principle that the vacant second vice-presidency should go to
a woman, a decision that triggered public reaction from several
party bosses. The subsequent selection of Joyce Mujuru to the vice-presidency
was widely interpreted as signalling a victory for a party faction
led by her husband, retired general Solomon Mujuru, sometime head
of the Zimbabwean Defence Force, and a defeat for Emmerson Mnungagwa,
who had long been touted as the man most likely to succeed Mugabe
in the presidency.
Sources close
to the ZANU-PF have reported the infighting to be the worst to have
occurred in this party since it came into government and Zimbabwe
attained its independence in 1980. One other consideration, which
is particularly pertinent to this paper, is how the outcome at the
polls will affect the balance of power within the governing party.
The trajectory of events within ZANU-PF will undoubtedly have more
of a direct impact on the path Zimbabwe will hopefully take towards
recovery or, worse still, further turmoil and decline, than the
outcome at the polls in March.
1. Chris Maroleng
is a researcher at the African Security Analysis Programme, Institute
for Security Studies.
2. For a summary description of the various ideologically oriented
policy perspectives within the MDC see C
Maroleng. Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change: Briefing
Notes, Situation Report, African Security
Analysis Programme, Institute for Security Studies, 3 May 2004. And
C Maroleng, Zimbabwe: The MDC’s
Electoral Boycott, in African Security Review, Vol 13 No 3, 2004.
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