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Delimitation of electoral boundaries
Khabele Matlosa
Extracted from the EISA Election newsletter No. 19
March 08, 2005

Introduction
Delimitation of electoral zones is one of the most important pre-election activities. On the technical side of the electoral process, it is as important as the voter registration and the maintenance of the voter’s register. It is therefore one of the important aspects for monitoring and observation of the pre-election activities. In a word, monitoring of the pre-election stage of an election among other things needs to focus upon delimitation of constituencies, voter registration and election campaign, just to mention some of the key issues. Delimitation process involves demarcation of constituencies with relatively equal number of voters registered in the same area for purposes of voting. For purposes of general elections, Zimbabwe is divided into one hundred and twenty (120) electoral zones commonly referred to as constituencies in line with section 60 (2) of the country’s constitution. This article considers the technical process as well as the hard politics of constituency delimitation in Zimbabwe.

Technical and political considerations for delimitation
The process of delimitation is better understood as both a straightforward technical demarcation of boundaries meant to facilitate smooth voting and an arena of political contestation by various political actors for state power in particular political parties. From a technical perspective, both the constitution and the electoral law stipulate how the delimitation process unfolds. The country is divided into various electoral zones by the four-person Delimitation Commission (DC) appointed by the president in consultation with Judicial Service Commission. For the purposes of the upcoming parliamentary election in March 2005, President Robert Mugabe appointed the Delimitation Commission on 14 September 2004. The DC comprised the following:

  • Justice George Chiweshe: Chairperson
  • Dr. Maclean Bhala: Member
  • Dr. Charles Mukora: Member; and
  • Dr. Job Whabira: member

The mere fact that the appointment of the DC is not the responsibility of an independent body and that the President plays a direct role in its establishment is bound to raise dust around the elections. After the DC completed its work, its chairperson was appointed by the President as the chairperson of the newly established Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). The Delimitation Commission, like the Electoral Commission itself, is supposed to enjoy the moral confidence and political trust of all the contestants and other election stakeholders. This does not seem to be the case with the DC in Zimbabwe where the Commission is not perceived to be sufficiently insulated from undue political influence from the ruling party and thus politically tainted as it were. Once a perception like this (whether real or imagined) persists and becomes pervasive then the integrity of the Commission becomes compromised and its impartiality questionable: the closer the proximity of the Delimitation Commission to the ruling party, the higher the probability for the political manipulation of the electoral boundaries to the disadvantage of opposition parties. This is a truism of electoral politics. It is often termed gerrymandering. It is the stark reality of realpolitik.

Making sense of the new election boundaries
The Chiweshe Delimitation Commission decreased urban constituencies and increased rural constituencies. Three (3) constituencies were deducted from urbanized Harare, Bulawayo and Matebeleland South Provinces, while rural provinces of Manicaland, Mashonaland East and Mashonaland West gained one constituency each (, 2005:8). The technical rationale provided by the DC is that there has been a massive urban-rural migration in the past that justifies the adjustment of the election boundaries. While this demographic justification may not, in and of itself, be a contestable argumentation, it is important however to appreciate the politics of the adjustments. It is worth noting that the ruling ZANU-PF has experienced progressively diminishing political returns in almost all urban constituencies since the 1999 constitutional referendum and the 2000 parliamentary election. Conversely, the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has grown largely on the basis of the socio-economic disaffection of the urban populace. In a nutshell, the political chess game in Zimbabwe ahead of the March 2005 elections is such that ZANU-PF’s political stronghold is in the rural constituencies while that of the MDC is in the urban constituencies. It is therefore in the interest of the ruling party for rural constituencies to increase. It is also to the disadvantage of the opposition parties for rural constituencies to increase. Consider the following table for the political significance of these observations:

Province

No. of RegisteredVoters

No. of Constituencies

Bulawayo

339 990

7

Harare

832 571

18

Manicaland

686 767

15

Mashonaland Central

490 181

10

Mashonaland East

610 715

13

Mashonaland West

593 354

13

Masvingo

675 234

14

Matebeleland North

342 745

7

Matebeleland South

341 258

7

Midlands

745 822

16

Source: 2005:8-9

According to Choice Ndoro, of the University of Zimbabwe, there are about 5.6 million registered voters in Zimbabwe of which "the majority reside in the rural areas" (2005:4).

Conclusion
Zimbabwe’s electoral reform process has to ensure that critical pre-election preparations such as voter registration, maintenance of the voter’s roll and constituency delimitation becomes the responsibility of an impartial and independent election management body. In fact, the current reform measures underway in Zimbabwe do not seem to have addressed this issue at all. Drawing of election boundaries should not be the responsibility of central government, but that of the election management body with the requisite public trust and confidence of the key political actors. Besides just the critical issue of confidence and trust which could be derived from one single body entrusted with this responsibility, it does seem that even with the current reforms, still a multiplicity of institutions including the Registrar-general, the Electoral Supervisory Commission, the DC and the new Electoral Commission run elections with dire consequences for the credibility and integrity of the process and its outcome indeed.

References
Ndoro, C. 2005. Election Update 2005: Zimbabwe, Eisa, 2 March.. 2005.
March 2005 Parliamentary Elections: Preliminary Report, Harare, Zimbabwe (mimeo).

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