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Zimbabwe:
Another election chance
International
Crisis Group (ICG)
November 30, 2004
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Executive
summary and recommendations
Zimbabwe's crisis -- political as well as economic -- remains
as deep as ever, with widespread abuse of human rights and ever
harder lives for the average citizen. The ruling ZANU-PF party continues
to use repression and manipulate food aid unscrupulously for partisan
purposes. African institutions and above all South Africa need to
apply pressure to make the crucial elections scheduled for March
2005 free and fair in order to give the democratic opposition a
chance. Western friends of Zimbabwe like the U.S., UK and EU should
tone down rhetoric and get behind the African efforts if a vital
chance to resolve the crisis peacefully is not to be lost.
President Mugabe
has used economic bribery, bullying, and propaganda to stage something
of a comeback. While polling data in Zimbabwe is controversial,
a recent finding suggests his support may have increased from a
2000 low of 20 per cent to as much as 46 per cent, and his job approval
from 21 per cent to 58 per cent. It is just possible ZANU-PF could
win those elections in a relatively straightforward way now that
it has used so many unfair advantages to tilt the electoral playing
field.
As the party
prepares for its annual Congress in the first week of December,
however, it is riven by bitter ethnic, generational and even gender
disputes. Important decisions foreshadowing an eventual successor
to Mugabe are due but he may well continue to keep the key contenders
guessing. ZANU-PF seeks a sweeping victory in the parliamentary
elections so it can amend the constitution at will, perhaps to create
a new executive structure and an honorary position into which Mugabe
might step before his term expires in 2008.
In recent months,
Zimbabwe has come under African scrutiny in regard to those elections.
In July 2004 the executive council of the African Union's (AU) foreign
ministers adopted a report severely critical of the government's
poor human rights record. AU heads of state deferred early action,
but the following month the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) adopted a protocol setting out principles and guidelines
for democratic elections in the region.
Partly out of
his renewed sense of confidence, partly in reaction to the pressure
from African quarters he cannot afford to dismiss and has thus far
always been able to work an accommodation with, Mugabe endorsed
the SADC principles and guidelines. The specific legislative steps
he indicates he will take to implement them, however, are flawed,
such as a new electoral commission whose independence will be doubtful
because he and his party are to have overwhelming influence on selection
of members.
As matters now
stand parliamentary elections would clearly not be free and fair.
If the technical reforms now under discussion are taken but are
not matched by other measures -- repeal of repressive laws and an
end to political violence such as that widely practiced by state-sponsored
youth militias -- the best prospect in sight is a C-minus election
that is fairly clean on election day but deeply flawed by months
of non-democratic practices. There are no signs that the government
is yet prepared to take those essential additional steps.
The opposition
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) must revive itself quickly
and develop a unified strategy if it is to make the most of the
March elections. Its leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, has at least been
acquitted of one set of trumped up treason charges but a second
such case still hangs over his head, the party remains persecuted
in numerous ways, and its leadership is uncertain over how to respond.
The decision taken in August 2004 by the MDC leadership group to
boycott the March 2005 elections unless there can be a guarantee
in advance that they will be free and fair will be reviewed in the
coming weeks. A last minute decision to boycott can always be made
if circumstances compel it, but it is critical for the MDC's credibility
and effectiveness as a political force that it participate now in
the political and electoral process to the greatest possible extent.
At the same time, it should seek to maximise understanding from
SADC and other observers of the need for genuine electoral reforms
to be implemented before the elections.
If something
is to be made of the electoral opening, small and problematic as
it is, it will need to be those with the greatest leverage -- Mugabe's
fellow Africans -- who make most of the running. South Africa, the
state with by far the most influence on its neighbour, remains committed
to quiet diplomacy, and other African states strongly prefer to
emphasise gradual change -- a "restoration" of at least better governance
-- rather than sudden, and as they tend to see it, destabilising
"regime change". If they are to be effective in the next few months,
London, Washington and other Western capitals, whose own rhetoric
has at times been considerably more forceful, need to harmonise
policies and support the Africans.
Specifically,
efforts should focus on holding the Mugabe regime to its commitment
on the SADC Protocol and getting observation missions into the country
immediately so they can monitor and raise warnings about the broader
environment in which the election process unfolds. If ZANU-PF does
not undertake major reforms in the coming weeks, and most particularly
if a genuinely independent electoral commission is not operational
at least two months before the scheduled date of the elections,
those missions should press for rescheduling at least to June, when
the term of the present parliament expires. The MDC should conduct
a full campaign.
If these things
can be done, it may just be possible for the 2005 elections, whether
in March or slightly later, to be free and fair enough to mark an
important turn back toward genuine politics as the means for resolving
Zimbabwe's crisis. Out of that might come a division of power based
on genuine election results, perhaps followed for the first time
by productive inter-party discussion on the country's future.
It must be said
frankly that the odds against such a relatively optimistic scenario
are substantial. Because the international community appears to
lack the will or the means to formulate and implement a more comprehensive
and forceful strategy at this time, however, it is worth dedicating
the next few months to even a small chance. The alternative is a
continued slide toward national and regional chaos, which would
ultimately require the international community to consider much
graver measures in even less promising circumstances.
Recommendations
To the Zimbabwe
Government and ZANU-PF:
1. Implement
by 1 January 2005 as preparation for the parliamentary elections
scheduled for March 2005 the SADC principles and guidelines governing
democratic elections in letter and spirit, including by:
(a) working
with the opposition MDC to develop consensus on technical electoral
reforms and their implementation, including appointments to a
new, independent electoral commission;
(b) revising
or repealing laws such as the Preservation of Public Security
Act (POSA), the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy
Act (AIPPA), the Private Voluntary Organisations Act (PVO) and
the new NGO Bill so as to restore rule of law and political freedoms
necessary for the conduct of truly free and fair elections;
(c) ending
political violence by disbanding youth militias and desisting
from using the military to repress political opponents;
(d) ceasing
manipulation of food aid for political purposes; and
(e) desisting
from messages of hate in public rallies, state events and the
press, and tacit approval of violence.
To the MDC:
2. Decide to
contest the parliamentary elections, and campaign accordingly, even
if it is not possible to obtain at this stage absolute guarantees
that they will be conducted in a fully free and fair manner.
To the South African Government:
3. Press the
Zimbabwe government bilaterally and within SADC to:
(a) adhere
to the SADC principles and guidelines;
(b) repeal
repressive laws so that truly free and fair parliamentary elections
can be held in March 2005; and
(c) cooperate
within SADC and the AU to ensure a robust monitoring presence
is in country by 1 January 2005.
To SADC:
4. Pursue implementation
of the protocol on principles and guidelines for democratic elections
vigorously with Zimbabwe in connection with the parliamentary elections
now scheduled for March 2005, including by:
(a) setting
specific timelines for incorporation of those principles and guidelines
into national law, regulations and procedures and for the establishment
of a genuinely independent electoral commission;
(b) sending
a team by 1 January 2005 first to work with ZANU-PF and the MDC
on implementation of the protocol's principles and guidelines,
in letter and spirit, and then to monitor the elections;
(c) announcing
publicly that SADC will call for postponement of the elections
at least to June 2005, when the parliamentary term expires, if
the necessary preliminary steps, including establishment of a
genuinely independent electoral commission, are not in place at
least two months before the scheduled date of those elections;
and
(d) announcing
publicly that SADC will not endorse the results of elections unless
its monitoring team is satisfied that the entire election process
was in conformity with the letter and spirit of the protocol's
principles and guidelines.
To the Nigerian
Government:
5. Use the chairmanships
of the Commonwealth and the African Union to intensify pressure
on the Zimbabwe government to create a level playing field for the
2005 parliamentary elections.
To the African
Union:
6. Maintain
a watchful eye on the human rights situation before the 2005 parliamentary
elections, including by sending a team of experts by 1 January 2005
to assess the electoral environment, and support implementation
of the SADC principles and guidelines by the Zimbabwe government.
To the Wider
International Community, especially the European Union and the United
States:
7. Support the
efforts of African states and institutions to achieve free and fair
parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe in 2005, in conformity with
the letter and spirit of the SADC Protocol, including by:
(a) helping
finance and train monitoring teams;
(b) urging
deployment of a UN election monitoring team by 1 January 2005;
and
(c) assisting
Zimbabwean civil society voter education efforts.
8. Deliver clear
messages to the Zimbabwe government through diplomatic channels
that it cannot expect any development assistance or positive political
relations, including relaxation of existing targeted sanctions unless
a clear consensus exists among monitoring teams that the parliamentary
elections have been free and fair, within the letter and spirit
of the SADC Protocol.
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