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Zimbabwe's Elections 2013 - Index of Articles
The unintended consequences of Zanu PF hardliners’ plot
Pedzisai
Ruhanya, Zimbabwe Democracy Institute
June 21, 2013
The ruling
of Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Court that an election
should be called by 31 July 2013 has sparked bitter disputes
over the judicial interpretation of the constitution.
My aim here is not to address these legal debates, but to analyze
and interpret the unintended political consequences of this decision
in the context of the robust Southern Africa Development Community
(SADC) communiqué issued during the Maputo
summit this weekend.
The message
of this communiqué was simple: SADC would support democratic
progress, not dictatorial practice. Its directives hit hard against
the strategies that Mugabe and Zanu-PF have used to maintain their
political dominance, and this will exacerbate tensions within the
party. Equally as encouraging, however, was the united front that
opposition parties demonstrated against Mugabe’s political
maneuvering. This unity is the stuff that electoral victories are
made of.
Ironically,
it was the urgency with which Mugabe embraced
the Constitutional Court’s decision last week that critics
found so suspicious. The more that the President tried to frantically
position himself as a faithful adherent to the rule of law, the
more his critics concluded that they were witnessing a clear case
judicial subversion under the cloak of legality.
Given his glaring
disregard for the rule of law throughout his 33-years of authoritarian
administration, this skepticism was hardly surprising. Attempts
by Zanu-PF and Mugabe to evade the courts stretch back to the 1980s,
when they failed to implement court decisions regarding the violent
Gukurahundi massacres and the illegal detention of ZAPU supporters.
Things did not improve over the years that followed, as the regime
pardoned politically aligned criminals, failed to protect the independence
of lawyers and, most recently, failed to bring-to-book the Zanu-PF-aligned
actors associated with the 2008
electoral violence.
With this record
behind him, the idea that Mugabe was, in any way, slavishly tied
to court rulings was clearly fallacious. On the contrary, it was
apparent that the leader had, over the years, become a master of
selective application, using the law as a weapon to persecute his
political adversaries. Recognizing this, SADC’s communiqué
ordered Mugabe to approach the court to reverse its ruling and return
to Parliament
with his coalition partners to amend the Electoral
Act, which he had passed by decree, calling the July elections.
The communiqué
also made several other core demands, including a call for the immediate
deployment of election observers into the country. The political
ramifications of this move are twofold. Firstly, this international
presence would leave little room for Zanu-PF to co-ordinate and
mount organized state-sponsored violence. Secondly, electoral registration
would be vastly improved. Currently, would-be voters within the
country are being systematically disenfranchised by employees within
the Registrar-General’s office, who are manipulating voter
registration to Zanu-PF’s advantage. The immediate deployment
of SADC observers could expose this attempt to deny thousands of
citizens, especially those previously regarded as aliens and urban
residents, their constitutional and democratic right to vote in
the coming elections. This, in turn, could have important repercussions
for the structure of the electoral landscape.
However, SADC’s
ability to shape the elections will not be limited to the deployment
of observers: in the same communiqué, the regional body compelled
the coalition government to have SADC participants on its Joint
Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), the multiparty
panel that was established in 2009 to oversee the implementation
of the Global Political Agreement. Previously, SADC members were
only granted observer status on the committee. This shift, in conjunction
with the presence of observers, enables SADC to contribute to substantive
decision-making in the coming elections. Their presence could be
decisive in fostering credible, free, fair and legitimate elections
in the country. It will also make the group’s findings on
Zimbabwe’s electoral processes and outcomes more solid than
ever.
Equally as important
were calls in the Maputo communiqué for an end to the military’s
partisan role in Zimbabwe’s political and electoral processes
and push to amend repressive laws such as the Public
Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access
to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). These
acts, together with a plethora of other repressive laws, hugely
impinge on the civil and political liberties of the country’s
citizens. During the election period in particular, they become
flexible and forceful weapons in the incumbent’s arsenal,
which can be used to undermine opposition parties and influence
electoral outcomes.
In all, the
Maputo communiqué should be seen as a powerful rejection
of Mugabe’s authoritarian practices, and Zanu-PF’s hold
on the state. SADC’s position will have great ramifications
for Mugabe’s presidential candidature and the internal stability
of Zanu-PF.
It is crucial
to remember that these decisions by SADC may not have been taken
had hardliners within ZANU PF not encouraged Mugabe to unilaterally
announce the upcoming election dates. It is now clear that the manipulation
of the Constitutional Court attracted a good deal of international
scrutiny that ultimately worked in the favour of those it supposedly
outfoxed; Morgan Tsvangirai and Welshman Ncube.
Those in Zanu-PF
who were not consulted about the decision to embroil the Constitutional
Court in the regime’s political maneuvers are likely to be
angered as they realize the degree to which Mugabe’s power
play has unwittingly given diplomatic leverage to their regional
opponents. Nor will it have escaped their attention that SADC’s
decisions have increased the political capital of their domestic
opponents. MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC-M leader Welshman
Ncube appear, in contrast to Mugabe, as reasonable and law-abiding
figures who are victims of a choreographed political strategy to
subvert the democratic process under a judicial guise. These political
losses for Zanu-PF will undoubtedly exacerbate faction fights within
the party, which could be highly destabilizing ahead of elections.
But not only
have Zanu-PF’s blunders provided Tsvangirai and Ncube valuable
political capital, they have also provided them with common political
ground. After the Constitutional Court ruling, the MDC formations
and other parties called an urgent meeting in which they agreed
to mount a combined onslaught against what they saw as a political,
not a legal, judgment.
What followed
was an apparent division of labor between Tsvangirai and Ncube in
Maputo. The former clearly and coherently attacked and exposed the
role of Zanu-PF behind the court ruling. The latter, a sharp legal
mind, explored the technicalities of the court’s decision
and tore it to pieces. Should the MDC formations continue to unite
around areas of critical national democratic interest, the electoral
pact needed to dislodge ZANU PF at the upcoming polls might slowly
start to become a reality.
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