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Do parliaments matter: African legislatures and the advance of democracy
Heinrich Böll Foundation
August 07, 2012

http://za.boell.org/web/governance-and-institutions-857.html

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The single greatest obstacle to democratic governance in most African countries has been the existence of neo-patrimonial leaders, or "big men", who dominate their political systems via a toxic mix of patronage, corrupt practice and, ultimately, repression. This combination centralises all power in the person of the president and, in the process, undermines the state.

Thus, while elections are a necessary element of democracy, they are insufficient to break up this concentration of power. Successful democratisation also requires building institutions of countervailing power, including courts, ombudsmen, anticorruption authorities, human rights and/or truth and reconciliation commissions, electoral commissions, public services commissions, judicial services commissions, auditors general and inspectors general. Institutions of countervailing power keep in check the pathologies of "big man" rule and reduce the power of "the imperial presidency", by substituting them for forms of democratic governance where the rulers are held accountable to the ruled.

However, legislatures occupy a privileged position amongst institutions of countervailing power: they are the sine qua non of representative democracy. All democracies have legislatures whose members perform, with some measure of effectiveness, four core functions. The first and most obvious function is law making, or legislating in the broad sense; that is to say, the engagement by the legislature in the policy making process, in contrast to being a rubber stamp of bills proposed by the executive. The second function, oversight, insures that the executive faithfully implements the law on a day-to-day basis over extended periods. Legislatures also play a central role in representation, or the "re-presentation" of societal interests at the locus of government decision making. Finally, legislators conduct constituency service, bringing back government outputs and services to the citizens who elected them. The first two functions are performed by members of the legislature acting collectively and within the institution, either in plenary sessions or in sessions of the committees that deal with various areas of public policy or parliamentary business. In contrast, members of legislature perform the third and fourth functions individually by articulating the specific concerns of their constituents in the legislature, or by discussing these concerns with constituents outside the legislature. In countries that elect the members of the legislature from single member districts - which is the practice in most African countries - this means spending considerable time back "home" in their districts.

Most African legislatures have been historically weak institutions because of a combination of factors that are a major disincentive for members to perform the core and collective functions of the legislature. This particular configuration of factors is unique to Sub-Saharan Africa, though components of it are found elsewhere, and consist of two principal elements. The first is Africa's demographics and particularly the fact that most African societies are poor, agrarian, plural, and unevenly developed societies. The second is the colonial legacy, especially the formal rules (e.g. constitutions, standing orders) that established the basis for today's legislatures in the run-up to independence. This legacy usually imposed constraints on the legislature by limiting the constitutional powers of the legislature, especially with respect to the budgetary process. It also left these legislatures poorly resourced, including low salaries for members, limited physical infrastructure, and few professional staff to support members in their work. Thirdly, colonial legislatures, like their "parent" legislatures in Western Europe, also had limited provisions for a system of parliamentary committees, especially "sectoral" or "portfolio" committees with the expertise to shadow ministries, departments and agencies of the executive branch. Finally, most countries upon independence elected their members of Parliament from single member districts or small multi-member districts rather than by proportional representation from large multimember districts.

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