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Zimbabwe: Elections and succession on hold, intimidation not
Zimbabwe Europe Network (ZEN)
July 19, 2012

The Zimbabwe Europe Network, a coalition of the main European non-state actors involved with Zimbabwe, has followed the debate on the situation in Zimbabwe with keen interest. Following consultations with key Zimbabwean civil society stakeholders earlier this month ZEN is issuing this briefing paper which while it recognises and encourages the positive trend of increased engagement from all sides, cautions over impressions given in some media and governmental quarters that the situation in the country is improving seamlessly.

Introduction

Key unresolved issues are the need for elections under free(ish) and fair(ish) conditions with an autonomous electoral commission (ZEC) and reform of the degraded voters roll. There needs to be a referendum on the new constitution before then. Commentators see the situation as moving quickly to a new Global Political Agreement (GPA), as the problems of succession in ZANU PF are nearly insurmountable. 'It is clear that the problems are not merely with Zimbabwe's constitution, but with ZANU PF's constitution too' - human rights activist.

There is continuing battle over indigenisation, and abuses of diamond resources, the post-Mugabe agenda, SADC engagement including security sector 'governance'. Regional leaders receiving churches and NGOs lobbying on these issues expressed greater reservations about Mugabe and ZANU-PF, including worries over the vacuum expected on Mugabe's death. Churches see their task as peace building in a situation of divided communities, but worry that if senior politicians/ military get more involved, semi-controlled violence will re-ignite.

Security/ violence

Most believe that ZANU-PF is gearing up for elections using their favoured tactics of repression, denial of political space, intimidation and misinformation - 'disenfranchisement through voter roll chicanery, gerrymandering of constituencies and manipulation of polling stations.' With no movement on security sector 'governance', there are concerns that 'retrenched' soldiers are still on the payroll, busy organising structures of violence. Alleged military demands for 30% of seats for 'retired' service chiefs are deeply unpopular with ZANU PFs MPs and members. ZANU-PF 'moderates' do not want an early election despite the Mugabe calls for one in 2012 and are waiting for Mugabe's demise.

Constitution

Before any election can be held there must be a new constitution, as almost everyone now agrees. As a sign of transparency and openness COPAC co-chair Paul Mwonzora reported to civil society earlier this month on the final draft having been agreed. This draft of the constitution has reportedly some progressive elements, however the process for implementing these is unclear. It contains measures for devolution, dual citizenship, limited terms for presidential office, two vice presidents and a women's quota through proportional elections to the senate with 'zebra' gender obligations on the political parties on their lists to those elections. The worry is that if recurring delays are not technical ones, then the anticipated referendum date of 30 September might again be moved further into the future.

Appropriate/ Targeted Measures 'Sanctions'

A civil society round-table on 14 July in Harare attended by over 30 civil society representatives and addressed by the EU ambassador saw some participants argue for some form of suspension of the appropriate measures, while others argued for retention unless there is significant change in key areas for reform as described above. The feeling was not to touch the targeted measures for now. No-one argued for removal of the measures as called for by the political parties. However, many, arguing that these measures were introduced by the EU and others without civil society having called for them, did not take a strong stance on retaining or removing.

South Africa and the region have become irritated by both ZANU-PF and by the EU continuing 'sanctions', even if the Council of Ministers did remove one third - mostly business people - from the list in February 2012. It seems likely that following sustained calls from SADC, MDCs and lately the UN Human Rights High Commissioner Ms Pillay, that there is pressure on the `sanctions hardliners' - UK, Germany and Netherlands for full suspension of the appropriate measures (to please SADC) and some suspensions of the targeted measures (to please "moderate" forces in ZANU PF). Measures are due for consideration before 18 February 2013, but there was a special provision in the last decision from February 2012 where the appropriate measures (those related to aid - Article 96 related-measures) must be reviewed within the following six months. This has led to an intense debate in Brussels ahead of the decision expected at the Council meeting on the 23rd July. Activists are essentially saying that unless there are very "hard" benchmarks (see recommendations), any suspension will be meaningless.

Food security

'No-one calls for an election in a drought'. Less than one third of cereal crop requirements were planted with an estimated third lost to weather. The Cabinet has designated five disaster provinces (of a total of 10 provinces). 50% of maize food requirements and 75% of wheat requirements need importing - with funding and politicised distribution being problems.

Corruption

Leading Zimbabwean economist Eric Bloch recently wrote that this was the major problem facing the economy. According to Transparency International, Zimbabwe in 2011 ranked 154 out of 182 countries in terms of its level of corruption. The police (ZRP) topped the list as the institution perceived to be most corrupt and stood out as the biggest recipient of bribes among service providers. ZANU PF rank and file members express open resentment over the leadership's continuing unchecked corruption such as blatant stealing of resources like fertiliser intended for small farmers and the elite running up huge unpaid electricity bills, while ZESA cuts power for the poor. There is little trickle down from farm seizures and indigenisation. There is also all-party rifling of the $50,000 constituency funds. Mugabe might sack a token blatantly corrupt MP or two as a populist move.

Diamonds

(See also recent ROAPE briefing on this). ZANU PF has apparently decided it is more lucrative to seem to cooperate with the Kimberley Process, since on the legal market diamonds fetch up to $70 per carat versus as low as $5 -10 illegally. If Finance Minister Biti gets even 10% of the diamond income it will have an effect on the economy. The military is alleged to control the biggest of the four mine companies in operation, the Chinese company Anjin (which has paid nothing to the fiscus so far). This company is not on the EU measures list. The other three are through their part ownership by ZMDC. Civil society was allowed a visit to the Marange diamond fields under strictly-controlled conditions excluding 'political' questions such as where the revenues were going and who controlled or were shareholders in the companies. The company unconvincingly said they did not know how many diamonds they processed. Allegedly, the elite pick up funds from illegal diamond sales in Mauritius. Civil society has been in dialogue with the ministries of finance and of mines (at the latter's instigation) around the proposed Diamonds Bill and is currently looking at an international expert group to assist in the drafting.

Post-Mugabe scenarios

Who will inherit the post-Mugabe future? ZANU-PF lacks domestic and international legitimacy and has declining regional support. It also has decrepit party structures, massive unpopularity, and constant battle between factions as Mugabe refuses to nominate a successor. MDC (T) appears to have its own similar problems that might weaken its ability to mobilise in the run up to elections, with Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai appearing disengaged, while being at loggerheads with the party's Secretary General, Finance Minister Tendai Biti. As MDC (T) lacks the ability to overcome the military there are rumours of secret talks going on between Tsvangirai and some of ZANU-PF's leaders, notably the faction recently on the rise led by Vice-President Joice Mujuru, and the until recently rising faction of Emmerson Mnangagwa plus Sydney Sekeramayi. The factions were coming closer last year under Joice's late husband Solomon Mujuru shown by the agreement that Mujuru would tell Mugabe it was time to go. Mujuru's death in August 2011 in a fire at his (seized) farm remains unexplained, with the inquest proceedings widely criticised. The succession question is not just who succeeds Mugabe but whether ZANU PF can survive as a party. No parties have policies (perhaps excluding the Finance Minister) to overcome multiple crises. Some wait for Mugabe to die as the game changer; others are even vaguer in terms of expecting the unexpected. International solidarity needs to continue especially in this complex and to some extent contradictory situation.

The Region

In spite of Mugabe's attack on SADC at the ZANU PF party conference in December, the South African foreign minister and the rest of SADC has continued to say no elections before a constitutional referendum and that they would have to be credible. A Zimbabwe negotiators delegation talked to the EU in May about removing the EU measures. Although SADC is pushing harder, with greater access to it by churches and civil society, there is perhaps a dangerous reliance on it.

Recommendations:

SADC (with international backing)

• There is need for SADC to push for action to stop continuing intimidation and violence, the security forces' control of rural areas, and total state control of the broadcast media
• Continue to insist for the constitution to be finalised and new electoral arrangements to be put in place before any election
• A commitment to a genuine free broadcast media (including both community and alternative national voice, not just equal access to national state/party broadcaster), updated voters roll, and regional accompaniment and supervision of police.
• Longer term the need to ensure the neutrality of National Security Council, military, police, traditional leaders, Attorney-General's office and the media. Such reforms would seem acceptable to SADC, can be easily monitored by JOMIC, and would provide very serious measures of ZANU PF's commitment.

Donors/ International Community

• Donor support for mobilising people to vote in elections with IDs, voter education and working to reform the voters roll.
• Donor support to civil society to increase voter turnout through building mutual support networks and use of mobile phones and social media. Minimum electoral conditions, focusing on who counts the vote.
• To listen to civil society calls for non-removal of measures even if some suspension is being considered. Suspension against hard indicators 'seems the right way to go' - human rights activist. 'Suspension against finally free[ish] and fair[ish] elections will be the end state, but prior to this there must be concrete benchmarks.' - human rights activist.
• Given that escalating violence at elections could be seen as a structural necessity for the securocrats to cling on to their wealth, planning for the most secure election monitoring based on a worst case scenario of violence similar to the 2008 elections
• Support activities towards greater transparency in the economy and supporting those working towards international best standards, including in the diamond industry.

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