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Zimbabwe's sanctions standoff
International
Crisis Group
February 06, 2012
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Overview
Zimbabwe must
hold elections before the end of June 2013, but the reforms needed
to ensure appropriate conditions are critically wanting. The regional
organisation - the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) - calls for the removal of sanctions, claiming they
are a serious political impediment to reform. Those who have imposed
the measures - in particular, the European Union (EU) and
the U.S. - argue the reform deficits justify their continuation,
though they have been more symbolic than drivers of change. The
sanctions gridlock now reflects the broader paralysis that characterises
Zimbabwean politics. Opportunity for a calibrated, full removal
of sanctions before the next elections, geared to broad progress
on reform, such as perhaps existed three years ago when the Global
Political Agreement (GPA) was fresh and the Inclusive
Government formed, has probably passed. But a chance to promote
progress and break the current deadlock still exists through a coordinated
approach that distinguishes types of sanctions and focuses on specific
reforms needed for those elections. It should be seized.
The political
situation is fragile, with growing fears the country may be heading
toward new repression and conflict as the era dominated by the 88-year
old President Robert Mugabe comes inevitably closer to an end, and
elections draw nearer. Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National
Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) claims the GPA and subsequent negotiated
reform process have run their course, and conditions are conducive
to a free and fair vote. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
formations disagree but do not specify what they consider to be
the minimum necessary reforms. SADC and most international observers
believe the foundation for free and fair elections has not yet been
laid. There has been some economic and social progress, but major
deficits and deadlock persist on core reforms and implementation
of some already agreed matters. Most significantly, ZANU-PF retains
full control of the security apparatus, raising legitimate fears
elections could lead to a repeat of the 2008 violence
and refusal to accept the democratic will of the people.
In response
to human rights and election-related abuses perpetrated between
2001 and 2008, the U.S. and EU adopted a variety of measures designed
to promote reform. Some are targeted at specific individuals (eg,
asset freezes and travel bans); others involve policies that relate
to the international financial institutions (IFIs) and government-to-government
relations (eg, restrictions on loans, credit and developmental assistance
and arms embargoes). While there are exceptions within and distinctions
between many of these measures, including for humanitarian aid and
basic development cooperation, this briefing applies the generic
term "sanctions" to them for the sake of simplicity,
but also because this is how Zimbabwean and southern African political
dialogue commonly addresses the concept. Those who have imposed
and maintained them have not communicated their concept effectively,
as linked to specific reforms or the broader struggle for democracy,
and have never gained regional support for them.
ZANU-PF manipulates
the issue politically and propagandises it as part of its efforts
to frustrate reform and mobilise against perceived internal and
external threats to national sovereignty. It argues that reform
is contingent on the removal of sanctions and accuses the MDC wing
led by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) of reneging on GPA
commitments to facilitate this. MDC-T argues it has no control over
sanctions, and there would be a stronger basis for their removal
if GPA violations ended, and ZANU-PF did not block reforms. Mugabe's
party conflates the various measures, including restrictions
from multilateral institutions, arguing "sanctions"
are centrally responsible for the poor economy. MDC-T contends that
the measures are relatively narrow and targeted, and it is ZANU-PF
that has destroyed the economy.
SADC maintains
that sanctions exacerbate already difficult conditions; do not contribute
to constructive solutions; and their removal would recognise progress
made and be an important confidence-building measure. There are
no agreed indicators let alone guarantees, however, for how removal
might enable it to resolve negotiation deadlocks and enforce implementation
of agreements more effectively. MDC-T has hedged, and ZANU-PF has
adopted an absolutist position, together scotching prospects for
constructive compromise. It is unlikely that the GPA signatories
can agree on a realistic formula linking full removal of sanctions
to the reform agenda, especially as they are deadlocked on the draft
election roadmap. It also seems unlikely SADC could impose such
a proposal. This in turn makes it improbable the EU or U.S. would
take the domestically difficult step of unilaterally lifting all
sanctions.
Only bold action
offers a chance to break the impasse, but the issue should not be
addressed either separately from the reform agenda, particularly
as it relates to the fast-approaching, potentially disastrous election
season, or as an all-or-nothing matter. Any approach must proceed
from a foundation - currently missing - that can provide
a more substantive and nuanced basis for moving forward. The EU,
U.S. and others imposing sanctions should make clear distinctions
between the several categories of measures. In particular, they
should:
- undertake
a comprehensive review of targeted measures and their impact;
make public additional detailed reasons for including specific
individuals and entities; and, where appropriate, consider extending
these measures to include (as several already do) adult family
members;
- display
greater flexibility to give targeted individuals opportunity to
apply for visas for official travel, thus addressing criticism
that legitimate Zimbabwe government business is hampered;
- maintain
the arms embargoes but make greater efforts to engage the security
sector in order to promote dialogue about its responsibilities
in a democratic order and about conditions for eventual professional
training; and
- initiate
a comprehensive study of the impact of restrictions on government-to-government
development cooperation and seek to negotiate with SADC a strategy
for (a) suspension of the ban linked to implementation of key
election-related reforms and (b) more vigorous SADC facilitation
within an agreed timeframe.
The GPA signatories
and the facilitators - SADC and especially South Africa, the
lead country - must also act:
- ZANU-PF
should desist from absolutist posturing, while the MDC formations
(in particular MDC-T), as parties and participants in the Inclusive
Government, should present a coherent plan of action for relaxation
and eventual removal of sanctions.
- ZANU-PF and
the MDC formations, in conjunction with the facilitators, should
put realistic options on the table tying the relaxation and eventual
removal of sanctions to a realistic time-bound reform agenda,
as set out in the draft election roadmap; agreements must be backed
by a monitored implementation framework.
- The facilitators
should engage more vigorously in order to finalise the election
roadmap and its implementation framework, including by exerting
more pressure on GPA signatories that obstruct reform and violate
existing agreements.
- SADC should
help Zimbabwe and international financial institutions (IFIs)
find common ground and sustainable solutions on debt resolution
so as to permit renewed access to credit lines and budget support.
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