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SADC and Zimbabwe: Can they guarantee a free and fair election
Idasa
June 30, 2011

As Zimbabwe's political arrangement continues to be tested and in the wake of a strong SADC stand in Livingstone, this briefing focuses on Zimbabwean reactions to the emerging regional dynamics and the challenges that remain in terms of the nation completing a suc-cessful and peaceful transition to democracy.

The SADC meetings in Sandton, despite intimations to the contrary, endorsed the resolutions of Livingstone (March 2011). This is evident in the continued insistence on the elaboration of the roadmap to elections. If they had not wanted to endorse Livingstone, they would have had to sideline the roadmap. Instead, South African President Jacob Zuma has requested that timeframes be added to the roadmap before the SADC Summit in Luanda (August - Angola takes over as chair of SADC and South Africa takes over as chair of the SADC Troika).

The initial communiqué following the Sandton meetings was silent on the resolutions of Livingstone. When it was circulated, the MDC requested that mention of the outcomes of Livingstone be included. There has been much debate about the use of the term "noted" in the final communiqué. SADC Executive Secretary Tomaz Salomao, at a press briefing, said noted means endorsed and that Troika decisions cannot be reversed. Despite arguments based on the choice of words, Zimbabwe and the international community should treat the commu-niqué as an endorsement of Livingstone and support it as such in order to prevent Zanu-PF using the ambiguities of the word "noted" to push for re-negotiation of the road map.

Further, while they may not have stated it explicitly, the endorsement of the roadmap delays elections in Zimbabwe. At the earliest, we are now looking at the completion of the reforms outlined in the roadmap by September 2012 and an election within 90 days of that, possibly as late as the first quarter of 2013. A more specific date could be announced at the August Summit. This timetable would only change if Mugabe pulls out, but that is unlikely. If he flies in the face of SADC at this point, it will leave him vulnerable to internal and external pressures.
The roadmap is a progressive document, if implemented. For example, the principals have agreed to allow for a Diaspora vote, though the intricacies of that remain under discussion. It is, however, dogged by ongoing "outstanding issues" that the principals are charged with resolving, in conjunction with President Zuma and the facilitation team, before the Summit in Angola.

Zanu-PF

Since April, Zanu-PF has had one sole objective - to undo the resolutions at Livingstone. In pursuit of this, and given the concern sparked by the stronger SADC stance, they ran a regional campaign to change hearts and minds. President Mugabe even spoke to President Zuma about Livingstone, complaining that the report had not been show to him. The Living-stone communiqué and the roadmap have also exacerbated factional divisions in the party. The Mujuru faction remains happy with the status quo but the roadmap is problematic for the Mnangagwa faction. This contest will influence the resolution of the "outstanding issues" within the roadmap.

Security sector reform remains contentious and pivotal given the possibility of the actual transfer of power in the wake of a free and fair election. The issue will likely produce a sepa-rate deal going forward. There are key stakeholders within Zanu-PF and the security machin-ery who do fear prosecution and guarantees will need to be offered to them. The discourse has thus begun to incorporate mention of the need for "security realignment" and needs to be given adequate attention.

Regional and international considerations

Prior to the Sandton Summit, President Zuma appears to have done a reasonable amount of regional lobbying such that all of the countries represented were behind his push to ensure that elections are not held in Zimbabwe this year. This unprecedented unity of purpose on the Zimbabwe question marks the present as a time to influence events in Zimbabwe using South Africa as leverage.

It remains important that the international community line up and empower President Zuma from behind - both strategically and in the form of public statements welcoming SADC's stance and continued endorsement of the Livingstone resolutions. It may also be strategic to mobilise resources for the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) via the SADC secretariat. Further, the eventual electoral outcome could be significantly strengthened by encouraging SADC to second an election committee to work with and provide technical assistance to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC).

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