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Changing
perceptions in Zimbabwe: Nationwide survey of the political climate
in Zimbabwe, November 2010-January 2011
Susan Booysen, Freedom House
March 04, 2011
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Executive
Summary
The following
represent the main findings of the Freedom House Southern Africa
(FHSA) December 2010 survey of Zimbabwean politics:
I: Power,
power shifts and performance of the Inclusive Government
Zimbabwe circa
2010-11 was in many respects a different place from the Zimbabwe
of February 2009 (the time of formation of Inclusive Government,
IG), and even from the time of the previous Freedom House survey
of September 2009. Some power relations have been changing and living
conditions have improved. Simultaneously, much had remained the
same, including presidential and security force powers, and the
power to unleash violence and enforce compliance. To illustrate:
- Despite the
IG's incorporation of all three main political parties of the
time there is widespread recognition that power remains overwhelmingly
vested in the hands of ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe. There is little
doubt in this survey that Mugabe continuously relies on the back-up
of the state security forces to remain entrenched.
- Zimbabweans
report that their lives have been improving over a wide front
subsequent to the introduction of IG. The MDC-T is the political
party that receives, by far, the most credit for the positive
changes.
- Zimbabweans
are divided as to the general direction in which the country is
moving - 35% say the direction is right; 31% that it is wrong.
In line with the perception-recognition of ZANU-PF remaining in
charge (in effect), and Zimbabweans over a wide front enjoying
a better life, it is not surprising that ZANU-PF supporters are
more likely than MDC-T supporters to believe that the country
is heading in a right direction - 51% of ZANU-PF's compared to
26% of MDC-T supporters feel this way.
- Zimbabweans
in the past two years have experienced many improvements in their
economic conditions - but still believe that their personal conditions
have not quite improved as much as those of the country in general.
- In comparison
to the previous survey Zimbabweans are less optimistic about the
possibility that things will improve. In 2009, 65% felt that economic
conditions in the country would improve in the following 12 months
- the comparable percentage for 2010 was 49. In 2009, 63% of Zimbabweans
reckoned their own economic conditions would be better in 12 months
from then - in 2010 this percentage had shrunk to 48.
II:
Politics of violence and fear in Zimbabwe
Political violence
and intimidation have been widespread in Zimbabwe. Violence and
intimidation shape the context of constitution-making and elections.
Hence, the analysis places these phenomena in the foreground, showing
how a large proportion of Zimbabweans have been affected by violence
and fear of violence and intimidation - and many more of the supporters
of the MDC-T than of ZANU-PF have been affected.
The transition
might have been progressing, but there is little doubt that violence
and important political decisions hang together. 76% in the survey
believe that each time Zimbabwe comes to important political decisions,
violence and intimidation surface. The memories of violence and
retribution for dissidence from ZANU-PF also lie just below the
surface, and need very little to be rekindled.
One-third of
Zimbabweans in this survey report that they have been exposed personally
to intimidation and threat in the period since independence in 1980
- and 27% have witnessed politically inspired killing and injury.
These percentages rise even further when the political parties'
supporters are separated - with MDC-T supporters far more exposed
than their counterparts in ZANU-PF. Again on the general population
level, 58% of respondents reported that they had experienced violence
and intimidation in their communities in the past two years.
It is not surprising
therefore that there is an omnipresent awareness of the threat to
personal safety once Zimbabweans exit the zone of non-political
daily activities into the world of politics. In this political world
they do not feel free to express their views. 89% say they have
to be careful what they say politically. When probed in open-ended
questions about the reasons for violence and the identity of the
perpetrators, the survey respondents' experiences indicated ZANU-PF's
'misuse' of supporters and associates, in the context of greed for
political power and disregard of electoral verdicts. The bulk of
survey responses identify ZANU-PF associated persons and agencies
as by far the most prevalent amongst the perpetrators. The most
prominent responses in open-ended questions were 'ZANU-PF youths
and supporters' (26%), 'war veterans and youth militia' (9%), 'all
political parties or both ZANUPF and MDC-T supporters' (6%), 'youths
or idle youths' (3%) and 'MDC-T supporters' (3%).
III:
Constitution-making and constitutional expectations
Zimbabweans
appear to have been confused by the on-off
constitutional debates and proceedings of the past decade, combined
with a partial transition that brought mixed signals of improved
economic conditions (yet, continuous hardships), and apparent entrenchment
of ZANU-PF in power.
On the one hand,
they hold out hope that the emerging constitution will change politics
and their lives for the better. They are impatient for the new constitution
to take shape and replace the old one. 38% want the existing constitution
repealed and another 28% want it amended. 62% reckon that the COPAC
constitutional outreach process was meaningful. They also say they
are tired of being consulted on constitutions, and want to see the
job done. They definitely want to see the constitution going to
referendum before a next round of elections.
On the other
hand, only 42% reckon that citizens' views will be reflected in
a new constitution. Only 30% believe that a constitution will be
produced that will be good for democracy and human rights.
Simultaneously,
they are certain as to what they want from a new constitution -
a limitation of presidential terms, no appointed members of parliament,
restriction of the role of traditional leaders to local government,
independent courts and an independent election management body.
The Zimbabweans
in the survey speak positively of the COPAC constitutional outreach
process - but only 24% had attended a meeting. They observed relatively
limited violence around the process - although about 1 in 7 of the
attendees report that they had seen political parties use violence
to get their way in constitutional deliberations. Spokespersons
had been appointed by political parties, mostly at local level,
and speeches and prayers had their political content. Generally,
however, they believe that the deliberations were fine, and participants
say they did not feel intimidated articulating their constitutional
wishes.
IV:
Party support and declaring vote intention
The survey delivers
the result that the MDC-T has suffered a substantial drop of support
in the time since the previous September 2009 Freedom House survey
- from 55% to 38%. ZANU-PF appears to have grown its support by
5 percentage points from 12% to 17%. The MDC-M has effectively disappeared,
with an indicated support level of below 1%. ZAPU-Dabengwa remains
in the sub-1% zone.
Simultaneously,
42% of respondents chose not to declare their vote preference -
a percentage that was substantially up from the previous, September
2009, Freedom House survey's 31%. Given the violence structure of
Zimbabwean society it is probably not surprising that so many chose
not to declare. It remains possible that the MDC-T retains substantial
levels of hidden support in the ranks of the 42% of non-declarants.
The MDC-T drop
is not entirely explained through the rest of the survey data. The
survey indicates that the Inclusive Government is widely credited
with good performances. The MDC-T is receiving substantial credit
for the performance. Simultaneously, the MDC-T in the time since
the 2009 survey has been confirmed to be the subject partner in
the IG, with effective power remaining in the hands of Mugabe and
the security forces. This is likely to have dented the MDC-T image.
In the political context it has also been evident that the MDC-T
has been less able to be simultaneously effective as party and as
government partner.
The current
survey contained items which can be used as 'parallel indicators'
of party support (besides directly asking respondents who they would
support in an election). These measures were included in the questionnaire
design, given the expected low level of declaration. They cover
issues of political trust and political statements that differentiate
between the supporters of the main political parties. The measures
show that the survey's party support levels probably indicate the
core minimum support for ZANU-PF, and a level of MDC-T support that
is seemingly lower than the support the MDC-T enjoys on a range
of parallel measures:
ZANU-PF parallel
support indicators: 16% of the respondents want a government body
to run elections; 17% deny that violence and intimidation affect
the party vote in elections; 16% believe that the youth militia
look after the best interests of Zimbabweans. In addition, 16% say
they trust ZANU-PF 'a lot' (a further 20% reckon they 'somewhat'
trust ZANU-PF) - for a total of 36% compared with the MDC-T total
of 66%. A higher percentage of 43% said that they trust the Presidency
of the country.
MDC-T parallel
support indicators: 45% credit the MDC-T with good performance in
the IG. In the domain of trust, 66% say that they trust the MDC-T
'somewhat' or 'a lot'; and 67% trust the Office of the Prime Minister
(occupied by the MDC-T's Tsvangirai) 'somewhat' or 'a lot' (compared
with the 43% of the Presidency gets).
V: Elections
- expectations, experiences and electoral violence-fear-coercion
The contradictions
of contemporary Zimbabwe are nowhere more evident than in Zimbabweans'
expectations and experiences of elections. None of the Zimbabwean
presidential and parliamentary elections of the 11 years since February
2000 has been less than traumatic for large proportions of Zimbabweans.
The continued practice of violence signals that 'Election 2011/12'
will be no less disturbing. Zimbabweans in this survey expect violence
again to prevail - whilst they also believe new elections would
be 'more free and fair' than those of 2008. Zimbabweans believe
that violence will impact on the vote proportions that parties get
in the elections - 74% think that people sometimes vote for those
they don't support, due to fear. They expect that rights of freedom
of expression will be compromised. 55% think that fear of violence
might make Zimbabweans abstain from voting - substantially more
than the 33% that reckon that on the day of elections Zimbabweans
will bury fear of violence and intimidation and go and vote.
Yet, they are
impatient to get elections. When the survey was conducted in December
2010, 11% declared that elections should be held 'immediately' (in
2009 31% wanted elections 'immediately'). Another 46% in the 2010
survey chose '2011', which in effect means that 57% want elections
in 2011. Almost the same percentage as in 2009 (56% in 2009) thus
wanted elections within one year. However, this is not a carte blanche
insistence on immediate elections. The respondents clearly stated
that the constitution needs to be drafted and subjected to referendum
before they go to elections. Their desired date for elections confirms
this - it is more than a year since the previous survey and still
in the 2010 survey they wanted elections 'within a year'. The prerequisite
of a new constitution clearly has to fall into place. Lawmakers
and constitutional drafters are expected to waste no time in getting
a new constitutional dispensation in place.
It is not entirely
clear from the survey what the tipping point is, where Zimbabweans
might decide that the catalyst factor of another election is needed,
flaws and all, in order to propel Zimbabwe out of both a vaguely
defined timeline for delivery of a new constitution, a slow pace
of change, governance shortfalls, and poor economic conditions.
VI:
Political interest and media use
Zimbabweans'
interest in public and political affairs is reasonably high, albeit
on levels somewhat lower than in the comparable 2009 Freedom House
survey, which was done seven months after institution of the IG.
Interest in public and political matters may have declined, given
the more confused and doubtful days of late 2010. Some of the differences
are within the margin-of-error range, but the lowering is consistent
over a series of items. Nevertheless, only 20% report that they
are 'not interested in public affairs at all' or that they 'never'
discuss political matters when they get together with friends. 42%
of Zimbabweans are 'somewhat' or 'very' interested in public affairs,
and 74% in this survey reported that they 'sometimes' or 'often'
discuss politics when they get together with their friends. MDC-T
supporters reported a lower interest in public affairs than their
ZANU-PF counterparts.
Radio remains
the predominant news source for Zimbabweans, with 52% reporting
that they get their news from radio at least a few times a week.
Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) has the widest reach. Television
is largely the domain of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC),
although channels 1, 2 and 3 of the South African Broadcasting Corporation
(SABC) enjoy substantial penetration. 23% of Zimbabweans report
that they get their news from the papers 'a few times a week' or
'every day'. Another 17% occasionally access the newspapers for
public affairs news. Internet, according to this survey, is used
regularly by 6% of Zimbabweans for political news (almost all from
the MDC-T). The analysis shows significant media use differences
across the provincial rural-urban divides.
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