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International
views of Zimbabwe
Stephen Chan, Solidarity Peace Trust
January 21, 2011
http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/928/international-views-of-zimbabwe/
There is no
single view of Zimbabwe internationally. As 2011 begins, the many
views fragment or develop internal variations almost as a parallel
to the fracturing of the Zimbabwean political landscape. The fissures
within ZANU-PF and MDC-Mutambara, the readvent of ZAPU, the lackluster
performance of Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister, and the self-seeking
demeanour of elected parliamentarians on all sides, have created
an international sense that there is neither predictability nor
governmental capacity in the present or near-future Zimbabwe.
Africa has long
had its own divided opinions about Zimbabwe and about Robert Mugabe.
There is still a surly endorsement among what might be loosely called
the 'African general public' of Mugabe's standing
up to the West, but this has always been matched by a huge disenchantment
with government leadership in all countries. Mugabe may have stood
up to the West, but he is as corrupt as any African President and
as untrustworthy. Times have marched on in any case. The power-sharing
deal brokered by Thabo Mbeki would not have been possible today
- and perhaps even yesterday - in West Africa. The somewhat more
robust - even if, at time of writing, rhetorical - reaction of ECOWAS
to the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire compared to that of SADC to
the stolen Zimbabwean election, is the case in point.
But the West
has also moved on. In 2010, elections were patently stolen in both
Rwanda and Ethiopia. Electoral majorities in the 90% range are just
not credible, especially when opposition leaders disappear and are
later found dead. But, for the West, stability and the assurance
of no immediate wars in Rwanda and Ethiopia, plus the clear sense
that the ruling elites are able to deliver discernible developmental
benefits, proved stronger emblems of acceptability than democracy.
When ruling elites do not and will not commit themselves seriously
to the benefit of citizens, democracy becomes in the second decade
of the millennium the scourge with which to whip chosen miscreants.
It is selective and Zimbabwe is selected for historical reasons
but also because ZANU-PF has clearly no interest in fiscal probity,
fiscal transparency, developmental equity, financial dissemination
or facilities for development except as acts of patronage and, of
course, purchasing of votes.
Even so, there
are two hugely countervailing forces. The first is the abject performance
of the MDC as part of government. The second is that the West is
itself in a fiscal crisis. Suddenly, all of Europe needs Zimbabwe
as a trading partner, as a business partner, as an investment partner,
as a customer and as a purchaser of European goods and services.
Europe, as a result, will start doing business with ZANU-PF in 2011.
There is much conjecture that the EU will contemplate some form
of lifting of sanctions. This will be for the two reasons listed
in this paragraph, but also because they have not worked in any
way to curtail or reduce the dominating capacity of ZANU-PF. The
concomitant is that, if isolation and sanctions have not worked,
some form of engagement might. The exact form and parameters of
that engagement have not yet been agreed.
But this leaves
the UK in a difficult position. It has been the most critical -
sometimes histrionically so - of the Mugabe regime. The UK cannot
be alone in Europe with sanctions in place. That would give every
other European country a clear run at reinvestment and trading opportunities.
The UK wants to have a part in those opportunities, so finds itself
on the horns of a dilemma. The US will certainly not move towards
a new regime of relations with Zimbabwe until the UK moves. For
the UK, the diplomatic search goes beyond devising a 'form
of words' to explain the about-face. The UK seeks a symbolic
moment and, at time of writing, Whitehall still has its heart set
on a rather grand symbol - and that is the (phased, if need be)
retirement of Robert Mugabe, with full dignities, even if a lifting
of the ICC indictment cannot at this stage be specified. As with
Sudan's Al Bashir, the indictment can die a quiet death by
way of being forgotten. But even this grand symbolic moment is a
grand climbdown from a position of obdurate opposition to Mugabe
and a wish to 'bring him to justice', strip him of his
corrupt gains, and end the hegemony of ZANU-PF. Basically, it allows
ZANU-PF to remain in the game - under new management to be sure,
but unpunished; not deconstructed but reconstructed. The UK would
accept, in some ways even welcome, the triumph of the technocratic
wing of ZANU-PF. The 'new' ZANU-PF would of course have
to fight elections honestly - but no one in Europe seriously anticipates
anything but some form of coalition for years into the Zimbabwean
future.
In a way, this
scenario seeks to match an aspirational vision of a compromised
Zimbabwe - but a compromise with which 'all' can live.
Whether events on the ground have far outstripped this vision, with
securocrats firmly in control and going nowhere, is an open question.
Nevertheless, there has been a modest increase in contacts between
British Governmental and other actors and senior ZANU-PF actors.
Even some figures named on the sanctions list, and normally thereby
off-limits, have been included in what are, at this stage, conversations
about conversations. The notion seems to be that ZANU-PF has to
put some sort of symbol on the table for the conversations to move
on. The UK Minister for Africa has spoken publicly about the desirability
of reinvestment in Zimbabwe. This is always couched in language
of progress and change occurring, but it is clear to his audiences
that the extent of this change has shrunk dramatically. The problem
at time of writing, the first part of January, is that nothing is
specified and that, of course, when conversations about specifics
begin, they will get bogged down.
ZANU-PF - for
the MDC makes no serious movements in the international arena; its
diplomatic outreach is either cursory or ham-fisted or non-existent
- relies upon Europe and, of course, China, to outflank and force
the hand of the British and, through them, the Americans. But its
own diplomacy is often maladroit in Europe. What is driving the
process slowly forward is the need for economic remodelling within
Europe itself. This has been a very serious recession. And ZANU-PF
relies upon China. Let me now to turn to a word about China.
Like Britain,
China has historical reasons for its actions in Zimbabwe. There
really was a version of the 'kith and kin' mythology
in the British response to the farm invasions that began in 2000.
The eviction of black farmers would simply not have aroused such
a response, either in shrillness or extent. There would have been
a strong response - let me make that clear - but different in its
quality. The Chinese supported both ZANU and ZANLA in the war of
liberation. They feel a genuine kinship which stems from that historical
moment, but which has also been overladen three decades on by nostalgia
and romance. The Chinese understand that romance is not cost-effective,
and that is why -despite significant liquidity flows - there has
never been, and never will be, a Chinese alternative to all that
the West can provide. The Chinese need the West more than it needs
any part or every part of Africa. They are more prepared to rescue
the United States, drowning in its toxic debt swamp, than to bail
out Zimbabwe. The Chinese have staved off recession only by playing
fiscal brinksmanship with the West over currency rates and balance
of trade ratios. The Chinese are prepared to do some 'queering
of the pitch' in Zimbabwe to make it harder for Western reinvestment
to dominate the scene as it did before - the new scene will have
far greater plurality - but the Chinese will not put themselves
out on a financial limb for Zimbabwe.
The reason for
this is simple. It didn't take me long to uncover the figures
in Beijing. I was simply surprised that no one in the Zimbabwean
Embassy had bothered. Even ZANU-PF diplomats, it turns out, are
simply amateurs. The reason is that the Chinese financial intelligence
simply rates Zimbabwe as a disaster zone. It is a disaster zone
with peripheral opportunities and bridgeheads for future investment,
but it is not a zone where serious good money should be thrown into
bad situations. In the Chinese balance sheets, there have to be
concrete and immediate returns. Not full returns all at once - the
Chinese really are extraordinarily patient - but there has to be
a properly costed expectation of phased returns that are reliable.
This analysis
is of course now changing. But it is changing at the same moment
that European outlooks are also changing. So the Chinese will be
an important part of the pack, but only one part of the pack.
What the West
would like to see is of course an MDC government. It would like
this in the full anticipation that it will be an incompetent government
which will become corrupt quite quickly. The corruption template
is established and not difficult to board. What the West could live
with, and what the Chinese could easily adjust to - so no conflict
of interests here - is another coalition government, preferably
fairly elected and, if not fully fairly elected, cleanly elected,
i.e. without violence and naked rigging. Within that coalition,
the preference would be for greater MDC power and influence, but
ZANU-PF ministers, especially of a technocratic sort, would not
be unwelcome. The MDC, after all, still doesn't have a technocratic
front bench. A variation of the coalition theme, one with a ZANU-PF
domination, would be plausibly acceptable if it were technocratic,
if the securocrats were marginalised, if Mugabe were retired or
made ceremonial.
To a very real
extent, the personality of Mugabe still looms large over how much
progress can be made in terms of the international arena and Zimbabwe.
Were he to step down - and a richly-endowed immunities formula is
pretty much already on the table for both him and the securocrats
- there would be a rush to reinvest that would leave everyone breathless.
A bit of naked global capitalism would briefly swagger into what
has become an isolated, parochial and financially provincial and
peripheral town. But no one fully anticipates he will step down
any time very soon, and nature doesn't seem to be taking its
natural course - even if the embassies in Harare all report on every
health rumour concerning the President, and how far the President
can walk in a straight line, how many steps he can climb up or even
down. Mugabe-watching has replaced the old Kremlim-watching for
its sense of fascination and mortality. And, after all, they all
thought Brezhnev was embalmed even while he was still (just) alive.
In a very real way this trivialises what could once again be a serious
country. But perhaps, at this moment in history, the international
view of Zimbabwe is not misplaced. It is a country which has lost
its way - whether for good or bad reasons, or a curious mixture
of both - it is a country which has all manner of reinvestment possibilities,
but all these are contingent on a number of political as well as
financial conditions. The political conditions could be ameliorated
with a symbol or two. Perhaps, curiously if not actually tragically,
a country's fate depends on an old man, his vanity, the need
of his most oligarchic followers, and an agenda which may not translate
well in a new millennium of global toxicity and opportunisms.
*Stephen Chan a Professor
of International Relations at the School of Oriental and African
Studies in the University of London
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