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Restrictive measures in Zimbabwe: The way forward
Bryan M. Sims, Sydney Masamvu & Havi Mirell, Idasa
November 12, 2010

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The situation in Zimbabwe has changed since restrictive measures by many Western countries came into effect in the early 2000s. The signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) also opened a new chapter, establishing a measure of political and economic stability in Zimbabwe.

These initiatives beg the question - what sort of impact have these restrictive measures had in Zimbabwe?

Zimbabwe has been most affected by restrictions imposed by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and from a marked decrease in Official Development Aid (ODA) entering the country.

However major concerns remain, given the intransigence of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) over honouring its responsibilities outlined in the GPA.

Zanu-PF's unwillingness thus far to halt violent land occupations and continued control of certain key aspects of the economy and security sectors are signs that the party's obstinacy could hinder substantive progress.

The restrictive measures have also been undermined by the lack of coordination among the West, members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), particularly South Africa, and the internal Zimbabwean parties. In addition, sanctions busting by other members of the international community, namely China, has further undermined the restrictive measures as an instrument for change in this situation.

Re-examining the restrictive measures

The restrictive measures do need to be re-examined, to determine their relevance in seeking political and economic reforms for the way forward. This involves assessing the impact of the restrictive measures and the consequences of future options - viz. continuing the current scheme; a temporary lift; or an unconditional removal of the measures.

Since the signing of the GPA, South Africa has attempted to find a common position with the international community. However, South Africa has consistently stated that sanctions targeted at one half of the GNU engender internal divisions and have complicated problem-solving since members of the unity government are subject to different standards.

The international community has three options:

1. maintain the status quo
2. completely lift restrictive measures
3. the calibrated lifting of restrictive measures tied to six benchmarks

Let's consider these a litte more closely:

1. Maintain the status quo

Zanu-PF has successfully framed the restrictive measures debate within the context of Western neo-colonialism and imperialism. Maintaining the status quo would thus do little to encourage further concessions from Zanu-PF or achieve further gains within the GPA. This option is likely to prolong the stalemate between Zanu-PF, the Movement for Democratic Change - Mutambara (MDC-M) and the Movement for Democratic Change - Tsvangirai (MDC-T).

2. Completely lift restrictive measures

Similarly, removing restrictive measures would be premature. Even if restrictive measures are completely lifted, it is unlikely that international donors would trust the current situation enough to embark on significant re-engagement in the country.

3. Calibrated lifting of restrictive measures

The one point on which broad consensus may be possible is the calibrated lifting of restrictive measures tied to six benchmarks. These benchmarks would be:

1. a credible voters' roll
2. an independent electoral commission
3. media freedom
4. a constitutional reform process
5. a land audit and
6. security sector reform

These would all need to be accomplished in cooperation with the SADC.

Within the SADC, South Africa is the rational choice to head the initiative because of its own experience of political transition, its economic and political weight in Africa and its membership in the SADC, the African Union (AU) and the Commonwealth.

Donor countries and investors need to reach a common strategy in regard to restrictive measures. It is advisable that re-engagement between Zimbabwe and the West is coordinated with the GNU participants and with South Africa. Tying benchmarks to restrictive measures will reaffirm the international community's commitment to Zimbabwe's political and economic well-being.

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