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What are the options for Zimbabwe? Dealing with the obvious
Research and Advocacy Unit Zimbabwe
May 04, 2010

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Since the election in March 2008, Zimbabwe has been in a wholly new political space. The clear victories for MDC-T in the Presidential, House of Assembly, and Local Government elections in 2008 demonstrated to all that ZANU PF no longer ruled with the consent of a majority of the population, and finally demonstrated to all what happened in 2000.

At this point, in 2008, SADC and the AU had a very good opportunity to enforce the political transition, demanded continuously, by the Zimbabwean citizenry. By applying exceptionally strong political pressure upon ZANU PF to accept the results, insisting that no re-run for the Presidency was necessary, and, if such re-run was necessary, that it took place under carefully supervised conditions, all the subsequent events might have been unnecessary - and certainly the extreme violence that took place between April and June 2008 could have been avoided.

SADC and the AU, however, baulked at such action, and opted, under the dubious direction of Thabo Mbeki, for dialogue towards a power sharing arrangement, as had been serendipitously the case in Kenya. The subtext to this dialogue was a clear demonstration to ZANU PF that flawed elections will not draw the same kind of political pressure as coups and being in violation of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. An alarming precedent for any future election in Zimbabwe has thus been set. Simply put, any de facto government that emerges from even the most unacceptable election, so long as there is an election of some kind - has a high probability of being accepted as de jure by governments in the region. This is the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the fact that despite SADC's rejection of the June, 2008 poll, two days later Robert Mugabe was accepted at an AU Summit as the President of Zimbabwe, and, later, as such at the next SADC meeting.

Setting another worrying precedent, Zimbabwe's opposition nonetheless yielded to SADC pressure, negotiated and signed a Global Political Agreement [GPA], agreed to amend Zimbabwe's Constitution to give legal effect to the GPA, and put in place an Inclusive Government [IG]. Throughout these processes many indicators of ZANU PF's lack of good will were manifest - from the attempts to doctor the GPA prior to signing; the many ambiguities in the drafting and passing of Constitutional Amendment 19; and the unresolved issues around government appointments. It is clear to all that ZANU PF does not regard the IG as a "power-sharing" arrangement. The ZANU PF leadership has bluntly stated as much on numerous occasions, and has held the process to ransom on the spurious issue of the restrictive measures, such as travel bans, placed upon their leadership. They have managed, furthermore, to translate "restrictive measures" into a dead-locked debate over "sanctions", dragging even the MDCs into arguing about "sanctions".

In fairness, the GPA is such a poorly drafted agreement that it would lead to many difficulties even if there was good will on the part of ZANU PF. When the considerable difficulties in interpreting the GPA are added to the patent lack of good will by ZANU PF, the situation is ripe for conflict and confusion: this was an agreement ostensibly designed to lead to a solution. The GPA was not a solution in itself. The obviously inherent problems in the GPA have been are exacerbated by the general response (and lack thereof) by SADC and the AU to the GPA and its implementation.

Firstly, the AU now takes the position that, in the absence of any progress by the Zimbabwe parties themselves to effectively implement the GPA, it is SADC's primary responsibility to mediate, and that the AU will only become involved where SADC fails to resolve the difficulties. And effectively they have passed the baton to South Africa in SADC. Secondly, SADC, in dissimulating fashion, takes the position that the primary responsibility for dealing with all difficulties lies with the Zimbabwean parties, and, when pushed to intervene, continually refers the problems back to them. This is notwithstanding the fact that SADC agreed that it would be a "Guarantor" of the GPA and is referred to as such in the agreement. In so doing, both SADC and the AU have disregarded evidence that ZANU PF has a well-documented propensity for both reneging on agreements, and a tendency to use violence as solution to challenges to its power, and that it is evident, not least from the repeated pronouncements of Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF generally, that there is no intention to share power or to allow a situation in which MDC-T will come to power.

Furthermore, it is also evident from the monitoring of all the different sets of bench marks used to assess compliance with the GPA, whether those set down by the EU, the US, or Zimbabwean political parties and civil society organisations, that there has been little compliance with fundamental aspects of the GPA relating to democracy and the rule of law, and, furthermore, that the GPA is honoured more by the breach than observance. This point requires no further elucidation.

Thus, it is probable that the current stalemate will persist until the only process capable of resolving the crisis in political power, new national elections, takes place. It is RAU's view, in common with others such as the Botswana Government (and possibly the South African government), that, whether or not such elections are preceded by constitutional reform or not (and probably not), these elections will be only vehicle capable of moving Zimbabwe towards political transition. This seems more probable by the day, with even Jacob Zuma urging elections, Robert Mugabe stating that elections will take place with or without a new constitution, and, most recently, Mugabe re-assigning all legislation related to elections back into the hands of ZANU PF.

It is not possible to set any certain time scale for this inevitable event, but it is most likely that the timing will be decided by ZANU PF unilaterally at a moment most suitable to itself. Given the evidence of its lack of popularity emerging from recent opinion polls, ZANU PF would be very unwise not to take a proactive attitude towards elections.

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