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On the nature of war and Zimbabwe
A. P. Reeler, Research and Advocacy Unit Zimbabwe
October 07, 2009

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"For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace." Thomas Hobbes. (Leviathan. 1667)

How little things change? Hobbes' observation holds as true today in Zimbabwe as it did in England in the seventeenth century: peace and war are distinguished not only by active violence, but the propensity to advocate and prepare for violence as opposed to the propensity to peace. The state of affairs is judged also by the words used by those engaged in politics: it makes a world of difference whether one describes those with whom we differ as opponents or enemies. And herein lies the dilemma of Zimbabwe currently.

It is not only a current problem, however, and also not a problem peculiar to Zimbabwe. As Moeletsi Mbeki pointed out in 2003, and several times subsequently, one of the fundamental problems of Southern Africa - and Africa generally - is the failure of liberation movements to transform themselves into modern political parties. The legacy of commandist, centralised power is hard to shake off, as is the easy means-end recourse to violent solutions and the use of military and quasi-military force.

Zimbabwe is by no means unique here, but the accumulating evidence suggests that Zimbabwe is considerably more sophisticated in the maintenance of struggle strategy and tactics than most African countries to date. Indeed, Zimbabwe is probably the most sophisticated example of what Thomas Carothers has termed "dominant power politics"1, with the entrenchment of an elite, limited space for opposition political parties, and the maintenance of power by the elite through manipulated elections.

However, in Zimbabwe, it is the continual adherence to the philosophy and methodology of liberation (and armed struggle) that epitomises ZANU PF's approach to politics. As Chenjerai Hove once facetiously put it, "you can take ZANU PF out of the bush, but you can't take the bush out of ZANU PF". However, this is no joking matter, and especially when the GPA is limping into oblivion (mainly due to ZANU PF obduracy), and the nation must face the prospect of an election sooner rather than later: whether Zimbabwe gets a new constitution or not, the political crisis will have to be solved by an election, with all the attendant fears of yet another violent replay of 2008, 2002, and 2000. Thus, the process since the signing of the GPA and the setting in place of the GNU is highly instructive when set against the events of the past nine years, and certainly the past nine years must be considered as relevant, for it is politically naive in the extreme to assume that the situation in Zimbabwe is de novo since the signing of the GPA. The GPA was in fact supposed to address all the problems that have emerged since 2000.

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