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This article participates on the following special index pages:
Talks, dialogue, negotiations and GNU - Post June 2008 "elections" - Index of articles
Ending
Zimbabwe's nightmare: A possible way forward
International Crisis Group
December 16, 2008
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=5822
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Overview
The inter-party
negotiations that have sought to end Zimbabwe's political,
economic and now full-blown humanitarian crisis following the fraudulent
June 2008 presidential election run-off are hopelessly deadlocked.
Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF will not accept genuine power sharing,
and Morgan Tsvangirai and his Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)
are unwilling to join a ZANU-PF dominated administration as a junior
partner, responsible for ending international isolation but without
authority to implement needed reforms and emergency humanitarian
relief.
No new power-sharing
formula premised on Mugabe remaining president and Tsvangirai becoming
prime minister seems likely to produce a workable outcome. Nor does
it seem realistic to contemplate any non-negotiated solution to
the deadlock. Additional sanctions and other forms of external pressure
could be applied but seem unlikely to be productive in the absence
of a new approach. Despite the calls increasingly being made for
outright military intervention to resolve the crisis, this seems
a wholly unrealistic option, not least because regional resistance
to any such course remains intense.
There is a possible
negotiated way forward that could avoid Zimbabwe's complete
collapse. But it will need a radical shift in negotiating objectives
by the country's leaders and regional states, and the standing
aside of Thabo Mbeki as mediator in favour of someone perceived
as more neutral. The core idea is to establish a transitional administration,
run by non-partisan experts, in which neither Mugabe nor Tsvangirai
would have any position. It would be mandated to implement fundamental
political and economic reforms to stabilise the economy and prepare
new presidential elections in eighteen months.
The negotiation
process so far has produced a memorandum
of understanding on broad principles of a power-sharing arrangement
on 21 July and the signature on 11 September of a Global
Political Agreement (GPA) for a government of national unity
with Mugabe as president and Tsvangirai as prime minister. The GPA's
basic flaws, however, have blocked implementation. At the same time,
the ZANU-PF regime has repeatedly violated its premises, including
by resuming a campaign of violence against MDC supporters and reappointing
key stalwarts responsible for the economic meltdown, such as Reserve
Bank Governor Gideon Gono.
With the support
of renegade parliamentarians from ZANU-PF and a splinter group from
its own ranks, the MDC elected on 25 August its candidate as parliament
speaker, but the incentives for it to join a unity government have
withered. It considers, reasonably, that without control of the
ministries of home affairs - which oversees the police and
the electoral system - and treasury and a major share of senior
civil service and security posts, it would be reduced to legitimising
the status quo and facilitating Mugabe's plans to eventually
hand leadership to a ZANU-PF colleague of his choosing.
Even if the
parties find a compromise on ministry allocation and related issues,
the creation of two power centres by the GPA suggest that, in the
context of their intense mutual distrust, political paralysis would
prevent serious action to address the country's problems.
With the meltdown of vital social services, a cholera
epidemic that has claimed 1000 lives, the flight of a third
of the population to neighbouring countries where cholera is also
spreading, and a third of its remaining citizens facing starvation,
securing an end to Zimbabwe's nightmare is going to require
a fundamentally new approach.
All relevant
Zimbabwean and external actors should commit to a process with the
following key elements:
- The joint
mandating of a mediator to succeed Thabo Mbeki by the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU),
with the UN Secretary-General concurrently appointing a special
representative to mobilise international help in addressing the
humanitarian crisis.
- The negotiation
and passage of a constitutional amendment to create a non-partisan
transitional administration to govern for eighteen months, under
the leadership of a Chief Administrator - a neutral Zimbabwean
citizen (perhaps now in the private sector, civil society or an
international institution). This individual would be chosen by
a two-thirds parliamentary majority and be ineligible to stand
for president in the next election or serve as prime minister
after it. Robert Mugabe would stand down. The positions of president,
prime minister and all ministers would be left empty.
- The transitional
administration to prepare presidential elections in eighteen months
through a reconstituted Electoral Supervisory Commission; the
Chief Administrator to have authority, subject to a parliamentary
two-thirds confirmation vote, to appoint Administrators to lead
the ministries, as well as senior civil servants, the Reserve
Bank governor, provincial governors and departmental secretaries.
The Joint Operations Command would be dissolved and its members
retired, replaced by a National Security Council subject to parliament's
approval.
- Mugabe to
be given guarantees against domestic prosecution and extradition,
and a similar general amnesty to benefit members of the Joint
Operations Command if they accept retirement and do not participate
in activities threatening the country's stability.
- Donors to
commit to give the transitional administration substantial support
and, as the process consolidates, lift targeted sanctions.
- The UN,
AU, and SADC to identify senior officials to assist the transitional
government and monitor cooperation.
- If requested
by the transitional administration, SADC countries to deploy security
forces to Zimbabwe to promote stability.
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