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Love in a time of cholera: Mbeki's relationship with Robert Mugabe (2000 - 2008)
Derek Matyszak, Research and Advocacy Unit, Idasa
December 05, 2008

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The MDC has long been suspicious of any claim by Thabo Mbeki to be an honest broker in the Zimbabwe crisis, having raised concerns in this regard from the moment South Africa showed itself willing to endorse the fraudulent elections of 2000. Recently, calls by the MDC for Mbeki to recuse himself as a facilitator to an accord between the parties have grown louder. Given the track record of the Mbeki administration towards Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe, the only cause for any surprise is that Mbeki should have been allowed to occupy the position of facilitator at all.

Three clear policy determinations have characterised the Mbeki administration's approach to Zimbabwe:

a) The policy of "quiet diplomacy", the hallmark of which was a refusal to condemn human rights abuses and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Mugabe regime and its supporters, no matter how egregious. In terms of this policy the strongest criticism ever levelled by the Mbeki administration in relation to human rights abuses has been to call on "all parties" to refrain from violence even when there is clear documentation showing that the violence is perpetrated almost exclusively by ZANU PF supporters. This approach reached its most bizarre point when the call for "all parties" to refrain from violence was repeated after the MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, along with several supporters, was brutally beaten in police custody on 11th March 2007 and images of his injuries and those of others were broadcast around the world.

b) The policy of blocking any criticism or proposed actions on Zimbabwe in international fora. This policy was articulated in the Mbeki Administration's refrain that Zimbabwean issue must be resolved "by Zimbabweans". (See below for details on this)

c) The policy of deflecting pressure for action on Zimbabwe by claiming that talks or negotiations between the contesting parties in Zimbabwe are in progress and nothing should be done while these talks are underway.

An overview of Mbeki and his administration's policies since 2000, illustrate this quite clearly.

In 2000, ZANU PF's complacent hold on power was shaken when a government sponsored new constitution for Zimbabwe was rejected in a February referendum. Given that parliamentary elections were scheduled for June, 2000 and that the Constitutional Referendum had been interpreted more as a vote of no confidence in Mugabe's rule, drastic action was required by ZANU PF if it was to regain its previously unwavering support in rural areas. Widespread invasions of white owned farms began within days, accompanied by extreme state sponsored violence which left many farm workers and white farmers dead, women raped, labourers tortured and hundreds of thousands of workers displaced and rendered jobless. The clear intention was to destroy the support white farmers were providing to the recently formed MDC opposition and to eliminate opposition to ZANU PF emanating from farm labour. As much of the world watched aghast while atrocities took place on the farms, the Mbeki government implemented an economic "rescue package" for the Mugabe regime of close to R1 billion which had been announced a few weeks earlier. The "rescue package" included more than twenty joint investment projects in Zimbabwe, that would benefit ANC supporting Black Economic Empowerment partners and South Africa's state-owned corporations, such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the Industrial Development Corporation. Other beneficiaries were South Africa's power and fuel giants ESKOM and SASOL, to whom the Mugabe regime was heavily indebted.

Opinion on Zimbabwe, particularly in relation to the land invasions, became divided along racial lines. Some regarded Mugabe's land policies as representing a genuine attempt to address "one of the enduring legacies of colonialism", namely large-scale white ownership of land at the expense of the black majority. Others, and particularly governments in the West viewed the land invasions as a cynical ploy to maintain power by destroying the base of the opposition. Addressing concerns by the (largely white supported) opposition Democratic Alliance over rights abuses in Zimbabwe Mbeki made clear his position on the issue stating that the "clamour over Zimbabwe reveals [the] continuing racial prejudice in South Africa." He also commented "We are engaging this issue. We are in favour of land redistribution in Zimbabwe. You couldn't sustain a colonial legacy and let it be".

The violence and chaos of the land invasions in the period 2000 - 2002 spilled into the electoral process with endemic and brutal attacks on those opposed to ZANU PF, particularly in areas where opposition support was the strongest. In early May 2000, in the month before the June elections, Mbeki flew to Bulawayo. A photograph taken of Mbeki walking hand-in-hand with Mugabe on arrival was soon too become an all too familiar image of Mbeki and Mugabe together. Mbeki's public displays of affection for Mugabe contrast strongly with his studious avoidance of opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. During this visit Mbeki blamed the violence in Zimbabwe on the fact that the land question was still "unresolved." A few weeks later Mbeki travelled to the United States where he declared, despite the continuing rampant violence, that there was no reason to think the elections in Zimbabwe would not be free and fair - "If you stand there a month before the elections and already discredit them, I don't think that is correct".

Despite the widespread and systemic violence and intimidation, the Mbeki regime's observer missions for the parliamentary election of 2000 and presidential election of 2002 disingenuously tried to give these elections a clean bill of health. The observer group of 2000 led by now convicted fraudster, Tony Yengeni, pronounced the elections "free and fair" because the two days of voting had been marked by "tranquility", thus quietly and diplomatically ignoring the months of mayhem, oppression and violations of human rights that had preceded the voting. On return to South Africa the report was amended in an attempt to avoid the farcical and "free and fair" was replaced. The result of the election was instead held to be "credible".

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