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New deal for Zimbabwe: A framework for change?
Amanda Hammar, Nordic Africa Institute
November 12, 2008

http://www.nai.uu.se/policy_activities/comments/new_deal/new_deal_for_zimbabwe.pdf

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From new deal to dead deal

The title for this panel was formulated over a month ago in a slightly more hopeful moment. Certainly, it was a moment when the so-called new deal signed in mid- September between Zanu (PF) and both MDC parties was already in doubt. But it was before the backtracking of SADC leaders in Johannesburg a few days ago resulted in a de facto dead deal.

Initially, the signing of the Global Agreement in September between the contesting parties, after difficult and sustained negotiations, provided what we all thought might be a basic framework for change (as the title suggests). At the very least, it was an important mutual gesture of non-partisan good will that, even if fragile, appeared momentarily to put the well being and democratic rights of Zimbabweans - rather than partisan power - first.

But the very glue that would have ensured a real binding agreement, that would have sealed the deal and forced a commitment from both sides, but in particular from Zanu (PF); that would have been signed and witnessed in full view of SADC and AU leaders, and in front of the eyes of the world; was not included. This glue was the specified, fair and actual distribution of real power amongst the parties as part of the signed agreement. The failure to allocate and agree publicly on the key ministries - such as Defense, Home Affairs, Justice, Finance, Information, and Local Government, among others - in the Global agreement, was a crucial opportunity squandered by the mediators who may have rushed too quickly and pushed too hard to embrace the form of the agreement without due consideration for its substance (or lack of substance) and its implications.

The consequences of that lost opportunity have been in evidence for almost two months now, culminating in the current political impasse, in the face of which Zimbabwe's wounds deepen and bleed more extensively by the day.

The blame for the impasse is itself part of the present politics of positioning in Zimbabwe and the region, in which each side is using whatever muscle and resources it has at its disposal to claim control over the crucial centres of governmental power in a future Zimbabwe. Mugabe and Zanu (PF) are drawing on the fact that they have direct (if illegal) control over the mechanisms of state security, public media, the judiciary, public finance, local government and so on, as well as historical support from African leaders in the region. The MDC is trying to draw on its moral high ground, its local political legitimacy - including an election victory - and international/western credibility, and a slight shift in support amongst some regional leaders such as Botswana and Tanzania. Yet it seems from the recent SADC meeting that none of the latter is enough, leaving Tsvangiari being cast as the spoiler, and Mugabe once again winning perhaps one of the last serious political battles of his long career. Indeed, he may soon form his own unilateral cabinet, the consequences of which are likely to be disastrous for Zimbabwe.

In this present atmosphere of blaming, however, I would suggest that the refusal of the Tsvangirai faction to accept Mugabe's (and now one could add SADC's) proposed distorted division of ministries and hence power, is not merely a matter of the MDC insisting petulantly on its democratic dues, which in fact it is entitled to after winning the March elections. Rather, it might be read as Tsvangirai's astute realization that without shifting the real balance of power in running the government, which means changing the guard especially at the key disputed ministries, little if anything will change in Zimbabwe. And by accepting such terms, he would be betraying not only those supporters who have suffered directly by daring to campaign or vote for the MDC, but all the millions of displaced, struggling and starving Zimbabweans who are desperate for change.

The evidence from the past eight years would suggest that it is Zanu (PF)'s profound de-professionalisation of the bureaucracy - its politicization and indeed militarization - and its use not only for suppressing and brutalizing all forms of opposition, but as a channel for patronage at all levels and widespread accumulation amongst a political elite, is a key reason for the sustained crisis in Zimbabwe.

So, we are unfortunately - but not surprisingly - again dealing with our own dashed hopes for a new start at this moment in time.

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