Back to Index

This article participates on the following special index pages:

Losing focus: Zimbabwe's power-sharing agreement
Derek Matyszak, Idasa Research and Advocacy Unit
October 23, 2008

Download this document
- Word 97 version (102KB)
- Adobe PDF version (244KB)
If you do not have the free Acrobat reader on your computer, download it from the Adobe website by clicking here.

Introduction

The brutal campaign instigated by Mugabe's supporters to reverse his electoral defeat in the 29th March 2008 presidential election resulted in a pyrrhic victory. Violating all democratic requirements for a free and fair election, even the ZANU PF government's invited observers (limited to those considered friendly and which included the SADC observers) were constrained to report that the run off presidential election of the 27th June, 2008 did not reflect the will of the people. This created a crisis of legitimacy for Mugabe and an embarrassing difficulty for SADC. Botswana unequivocally refused to recognise Mugabe as head of state, and even the Mbeki led government of South Africa, noted within Zimbabwe for its support for Mugabe, prevaricated.

To resolve the problem, Mbeki was mandated to try to gain an accommodation between the two parties. The process was regarded as a continuation of the negotiations between the opposition MDC and ZANU PF that Mbeki had been facilitating since March 2007. While the power sharing arrangement which followed Kenya's elections was uppermost in many people's minds at this point, the MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, said of the post election negotiations: "This is not about power sharing. It is about a return to democracy." Thus phrased, Mbeki faced an intractable problem. Essential support from the Bretton Woods institutions and the donor community to revive Zimbabwe's collapsed economy would not be forthcoming if the negotiation did not result in a return to democracy in Zimbabwe. The MDC thus could not agree anything which did not restore democracy and the rule of law. Mugabe could not agree anything which did. The relatively free, if not totally fair, elections of 29th March had shown conclusively that ZANU PF could not remain in power under democratic conditions. This "either/or" situation did not allow for compromise.

There could only be one winner. As a result, the signing of an Agreement between the political parties on 15th September 2008 led to a peculiar situation. Tsvangirai had stated that: "No deal is better than a bad deal". His supporters were thus entitled to believe that a good deal had been reached, or at least one which opened the democratic door wide enough to allow the entry of donor and balance of payments support and international investment. As the reality of the Agreement began to intrude, the euphoria that had ensued after the signing morphed into a view that Mugabe was reneging on the agreement. The Agreement came to be considered as less than perfect as it gave Mugabe the space to do this, but nonetheless still considered as a way out of Zimbabwe's political impasse. In the face of continued MDC sanguinity, ZANU PF supporters became uncertain as to the content of the Agreement and began to believe the various optimistic versions MDC supporters touted. They cautiously lowered their profiles in areas where they had been wielding what now seemed a hubristic power. This response of ZANU PF supporters provided affirmation for MDC supporters that the Agreement was intrinsically good, that a change had been effected in the political terrain and the Agreement "must be made to work."

Mugabe must have been dismayed by this unnuanced response of his followers. He had not in fact conceded any real power and had emerged the winner. The only concession he had made in exchange for the retention of his extensive powers and recognition of his legitimacy (Article 20.1.6 states that he shall continue as President) was the lessening of his powers of patronage by the reduction in the number of Ministerial posts he could allocate. Yet he could hardly brag about this unequal bargain when the Agreement was presented as one of "power sharing". His enforced silence led to growing dissention in his ranks, further fuelled by those who felt they would be excluded from Ministerial positions.

Eventually, Mugabe was compelled to point out to his supporters that he "remained in the driving seat". Unfortunately, misled by Mugabe's propaganda machinery several times too often, ZANU PF supporters were sceptical. Without an awareness of this background, Mugabe's decision, in mid October unilaterally to allocate 30 of 31 Ministries, in the midst of deadlocked negotiations on this issue, appears strange. Mugabe divided the portfolios between ZANU PF and the MDC as the Agreement required, but allotted what are considered to be key portfolios exclusively to ZANU PF and formally Gazetted notice of this allotment on the very eve of the return of Mbeki to Zimbabwe. Mbeki had been asked to return to Zimbabwe specifically to resolve the deadlock between the parties over the allotment of Ministries. Mugabe politely left the Ministry of Finance unallocated so that Mbeki did not arrive to a perfect fait accompli.

In this fashion, Mugabe gave a dramatic demonstration to his supporters of the truth of the statement that he remained in charge. The power to allocate Ministerial portfolios remains that of Mugabe under the Agreement. All he is required to do is "consult" with the MDC formations. And that, he pointed out, he had done. Outraged detractors suggested that the action was not in accord with the "spirit" of the agreement.

Unfortunately, "the spirit of the Agreement" is a highly subjective concept and the interpretation arrived at by MDC supporters is largely a chimera born of deliberately ambiguous drafting and their belief that Tsvangirai would not have signed an Agreement which leaves Mugabe's powers unfettered. But that is precisely what he did. Whether the door to democracy is opened thus depends entirely on the positive exercise of these unrestrained powers and Mugabe's goodwill - an inclination and attribute which have been notably lacking in the past. An examination of what is actually in the Agreement, rather than what is hoped or thought ought to be there, proves the point.

Download full document

Please credit www.kubatana.net if you make use of material from this website. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License unless stated otherwise.

TOP