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This article participates on the following special index pages:

  • Talks, dialogue, negotiations and GNU - Post June 2008 "elections" - Index of articles


  • Analysis of Zim agreement
    IDASA
    October 16, 2008

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    Background

    On 28 March 2008, elections were held for the presidency as well as parliamentary and local government seats. For the first time since independence in 1980, the two MDC formations together won more seats in the House of Assembly than ZANU PF. The MDC thus became the majority party in the lower House. The MDC also won the Presidential election, but its candidate did not obtain the required absolute majority of the votes and there had to be a second presidential vote. In the lead up to this second vote for the presidency, ZANU PF engaged in extensive violence and intimidation to force people to vote for its candidate. The violence was so intense that the MDC felt obliged to protect its supporters by withdrawing from this election. The ballot nonetheless went ahead and Mugabe won overwhelmingly.

    However, the second presidential election was widely condemned as not being a free and fair election in which the outcome reflected the democratic will of the people. Thus, on the basis of the March election, the MDC had a legitimate claim to being the governing party in Zimbabwe. However, the Mugabe regime did not see it that way and continued to act as if it was the government of Zimbabwe.

    The situation in Zimbabwe continued to worsen and it was decided that the only way to address the crisis was for there to be negotiations between ZANU PF and the two formations of the MDC. Mr Mbeki, then President of South Africa, was given the continued mandate by SADC to be the mediator in this political dialogue.

    After protracted discussions, the parties finally reached an agreement. The parties formally signed this agreement at a public ceremony on 15 September 2008. However, since the signing of the agreement, a government has yet to be formed as the parties continue to wrangle over the allocation of ministerial portfolios, and more recently have recalled the mediator to Harare to assist in this process.

    The agreement does not result in the handing over of power to the party that won the parliamentary and presidential elections in March 2008. Rather it results in a complex power sharing arrangement in which Mr Mugabe remains in the dominant position in the so-called inclusive government. Mr Mugabe retains the post of President, he will chair the Cabinet, he is still the Commander in Chief of the army and he will be chair of what will be called the National Security Council. Mr Tsvangirai, on the other hand will be the Prime Minister, but he will only be deputy chair of the Cabinet and will chair a new Council of Ministers.

    The Cabinet will formulate government policy, although the Prime Minister is supposed to have a role in the formulation of government policy.

    1.1 Underwriting of agreement (article 22)

    Article 22.6 provides that "the implementation of this agreement shall be guaranteed and underwritten by the Facilitator, SADC and the AU." Given the inherent vagueness of many of the provisions of the agreement it is difficult to see how this guarantee will work. However, the parties should be able to refer disputes over the interpretation and implementation of the agreement to the guarantors.

    1.2 Implementation mechanism (article 22)

    There will be a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee consisting of four senior members drawn from the ZANU PF and four from each of the formations of the MDC. This committee will be co-chaired by persons from the parties. Its main function will be to ensure that the agreement is implemented in its letter and spirit.

    1. The Agreement

    The agreement does have positive features. It contains many general statements calling for the restoration of democracy and adherence to the rule of law. It has provisions intended to strengthen democratic institutions and to restore economic stability. It also contains a commitment to create a new people driven constitution within a period of eighteen months.

    However, the extent to which these aspirations are realized remains under Mugabe's control. On the other hand, there are considerable problems attached to the power sharing arrangements, and there is considerable doubt that these arrangements will be workable and will produce the necessary changes that will restore democracy and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.

    Overall, the pivotal issue is whether Mugabe is prepared to work with his bitter antagonists in the national interest to implement the spirit of the agreement and extricate the country from the terrible crisis into which it has been plunged.

    2.1 The Preamble

    The Preamble appears to place far more emphasis on the concerns of ZANU-PF than on those of the MDC. The second, third, and arguably the sixth and eleventh paragraphs are concerned solely with ZANU-PF issues: national independence, the memories of the liberation war and respect for "national institutions, symbols and national events". The tenth paragraph recognizes that the land question "has been at the core of the contestation in Zimbabwe", which is a ZANU-PF mantra, while the 14th paragraph recognises the need for African problems to be solved by African institutions, which is a contention frequently raised by ZANU-PF and Mr Mbeki to deflect western criticism. The prominence given to these paragraphs suggests either that the ZANU-PF negotiators were able to dominate their MDC counterparts, or (more reassuringly) that the mediators were anxious to reassure ZANU-PF that if they gave up some power their concerns would not be ignored.

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