|
Back to Index
This article participates on the following special index pages:
Talks, dialogue, negotiations and GNU - Post June 2008 "elections" - Index of articles
Analysis
of Zim agreement
IDASA
October 16, 2008
Download
this document
- Adobe
PDF version (304KB)
If you do not have the free Acrobat reader
on your computer, download it from the Adobe website by clicking
here.
Background
On 28 March 2008, elections were held for the presidency as well
as parliamentary and local government seats. For the first time
since independence in 1980, the two MDC formations together won
more seats in the House of Assembly than ZANU PF. The MDC thus became
the majority party in the lower House. The MDC also won the Presidential
election, but its candidate did not obtain the required absolute
majority of the votes and there had to be a second presidential
vote. In the lead up to this second vote for the presidency, ZANU
PF engaged in extensive violence and intimidation to force people
to vote for its candidate. The violence was so intense that the
MDC felt obliged to protect its supporters by withdrawing from this
election. The ballot nonetheless went ahead and Mugabe won overwhelmingly.
However, the
second presidential election was widely condemned as not being a
free and fair election in which the outcome reflected the democratic
will of the people. Thus, on the basis of the March election, the
MDC had a legitimate claim to being the governing party in Zimbabwe.
However, the Mugabe regime did not see it that way and continued
to act as if it was the government of Zimbabwe.
The situation
in Zimbabwe continued to worsen and it was decided that the only
way to address the crisis was for there to be negotiations between
ZANU PF and the two formations of the MDC. Mr Mbeki, then President
of South Africa, was given the continued mandate by SADC to be the
mediator in this political dialogue.
After protracted
discussions, the parties finally reached an agreement.
The parties formally signed this agreement at a public ceremony
on 15 September 2008. However, since the signing of the agreement,
a government has yet to be formed as the parties continue to wrangle
over the allocation of ministerial portfolios, and more recently
have recalled the mediator to Harare to assist in this process.
The agreement
does not result in the handing over of power to the party that won
the parliamentary and presidential elections in March 2008. Rather
it results in a complex power sharing arrangement in which Mr Mugabe
remains in the dominant position in the so-called inclusive government.
Mr Mugabe retains the post of President, he will chair the Cabinet,
he is still the Commander in Chief of the army and he will be chair
of what will be called the National Security Council. Mr Tsvangirai,
on the other hand will be the Prime Minister, but he will only be
deputy chair of the Cabinet and will chair a new Council of Ministers.
The Cabinet
will formulate government policy, although the Prime Minister is
supposed to have a role in the formulation of government policy.
1.1
Underwriting of agreement (article 22)
Article 22.6
provides that "the implementation of this agreement shall
be guaranteed and underwritten by the Facilitator, SADC and the
AU." Given the inherent vagueness of many of the provisions
of the agreement it is difficult to see how this guarantee will
work. However, the parties should be able to refer disputes over
the interpretation and implementation of the agreement to the
guarantors.
1.2
Implementation mechanism (article 22)
There will
be a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee consisting
of four senior members drawn from the ZANU PF and four from each
of the formations of the MDC. This committee will be co-chaired
by persons from the parties. Its main function will be to ensure
that the agreement is implemented in its letter and spirit.
1. The
Agreement
The agreement
does have positive features. It contains many general statements
calling for the restoration of democracy and adherence to the
rule of law. It has provisions intended to strengthen democratic
institutions and to restore economic stability. It also contains
a commitment to create a new people driven constitution within
a period of eighteen months.
However, the
extent to which these aspirations are realized remains under Mugabe's
control. On the other hand, there are considerable problems attached
to the power sharing arrangements, and there is considerable doubt
that these arrangements will be workable and will produce the
necessary changes that will restore democracy and the rule of
law in Zimbabwe.
Overall, the pivotal issue is whether Mugabe is prepared to work
with his bitter antagonists in the national interest to implement
the spirit of the agreement and extricate the country from the
terrible crisis into which it has been plunged.
2.1
The Preamble
The Preamble
appears to place far more emphasis on the concerns of ZANU-PF
than on those of the MDC. The second, third, and arguably the
sixth and eleventh paragraphs are concerned solely with ZANU-PF
issues: national independence, the memories of the liberation
war and respect for "national institutions, symbols and
national events". The tenth paragraph recognizes that the
land question "has been at the core of the contestation
in Zimbabwe", which is a ZANU-PF mantra, while the 14th
paragraph recognises the need for African problems to be solved
by African institutions, which is a contention frequently raised
by ZANU-PF and Mr Mbeki to deflect western criticism. The prominence
given to these paragraphs suggests either that the ZANU-PF negotiators
were able to dominate their MDC counterparts, or (more reassuringly)
that the mediators were anxious to reassure ZANU-PF that if they
gave up some power their concerns would not be ignored.
Download
full document
Please credit www.kubatana.net if you make use of material from this website.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License unless stated otherwise.
TOP
|