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Zimbabwe's
security sector
Stephanie Hanson, Council on Foreign Relations
June 09, 2008 http://www.cfr.org/publication/15793/zimbabwes_security_sector.html
Introduction
Zimbabwe's economic
crisis is so dire that the official inflation rate exceeds 100,000
percent and at least one-quarter of the population has fled the
country. As the economy has deteriorated, President Robert Mugabe
has given security groups, including the intelligence service and
the military, control over many political institutions. Experts
say these groups could play a decisive role in the June 27 presidential
runoff and are watching closely for signs of their political allegiances.
Splits within and between these groups have become more pronounced
in recent months, and many experts suggest a significant portion
of the security sector - particularly in the lower ranks - no longer
supports Mugabe. Analysts are divided on whether security groups
will assist or thwart a transition to a post-Mugabe government.
Some argue that in the aftermath of the March 2008 elections, there
are growing signs top security officers are asserting more control
in the country.
The
Security Sector's Role in Governing
As Zimbabwe's
economic crisis has deepened, Mugabe has ceded significant power
to the country's security forces - the Central Intelligence Organization,
the military, and the police. Above all else, the president seeks
to maintain his grip on power. "First rule of survival: You
keep the security forces happy and you pay them," says Knox
Chitiyo, a Zimbabwean researcher who heads the Africa program at
the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies
in London. The security sector reports directly to the president,
and is given funding from the president's office, the budget of
which does not appear in the finance minister's yearly budget statement.
Experts say
that since the 2002 presidential election, the state itself has
become increasingly militarized. Military figures, or "securocrats,"
occupy high-level positions in civilian institutions from the Grain
Marketing Board to the Electoral Supervisory Commission to the Reserve
Bank of Zimbabwe. The cabinet's authority has been superseded by
that of the Joint Operations Command, which is comprised of the
heads of the intelligence agency, military, and police. The command
makes policy, and according to a 2007 International Crisis Group
report, it also oversees the government's strategy regarding regional
attempts to mediate between the ruling party, ZANU-PF, and Zimbabwe's
opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).
The president's
dependence on security groups extends to the economy. In 2006, Mugabe
created the Zimbabwe National Security Council, a body of high-level
security officials charged with overseeing economic and food security
matters. In June 2007, the Economist Intelligence Unit reported
that the "day-to-day running of the country is increasingly
carried out by the National Security Council rather than the cabinet."
For instance, in 2006, military officers ordered farmers to plough
up their crops to grow maize (IWPR).
In an April
2007 speech, Mugabe lauded the security forces as "the vanguard
of our revolution and national integrity" and praised their
"critical role in buttressing our economic activities."
Yet experts say the military's role in the economy has been destructive.
Price cuts suggested by the Joint Operations Command in July 2007
led to massive hoarding and acute shortages of basic goods.
There have been
widespread reports that top military officials launched a campaign
of intimidation against MDC party member and supporters following
March 2008 elections, in which MDC presidential candidate Morgan
Tsvangirai outpolled Mugabe and the MDC won a large number of local
and parliamentary races. The MDC suggests that the electoral board
(which is run by the military) manipulated poll results to force
a runoff between Tsvangirai and Mugabe.
Transitioning
to a Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe
Experts are
divided on whether the security sector can help usher in a new government
in Zimbabwe, and what role it might play in that government. Some
suggest the military is too occupied with its own divisions to facilitate
reform. "Theirs is a battle for survival, by fair means or
foul," writes Martin Rupiya, program director at the Institute
for Security Studies in Pretoria and a former lieutenant colonel
in the Zimbabwe National Army. "There is paralysis within the
security establishment," says Sydney Masamvu, an analyst for
the International Crisis Group who is based in South Africa. In
previous elections, security groups have been instrumental in rigging
the vote, and given their current divisions and the opposition's
strong showing in March 2008 elections, it's unclear whether they
will attempt to rig the June 27 runoff. A May 2008 International
Crisis Group policy briefing suggests there is a growing risk of
a military coup.
Regardless of
the runoff's outcome, many analysts think the current political
situation is unsustainable. Because the state has become so militarized,
they say security-sector reform will need to be addressed immediately.
"You can talk all you want about the economy, but if the security
sector people are not on board and they become spoilers, you are
back to square one," says Chitiyo. CFR Adjunct Fellow Michelle
D. Gavin argues that aside from a small group of Mugabe loyalists,
most military officers would like their institution to become more
professional and less politicized. In a Council Special Report on
Zimbabwe, she suggests that in the event of a political transition,
the international community should prioritize paying the security
sector in a timely fashion. "Professional police and military
services will be vital to building a stable Zimbabwe in the future,"
she writes.
Experts say
international actors could help with the reform process. First,
many government functions will need to be demilitarized. Youth militias
and war veterans, who are concerned they will face legal retribution
for acts of violence committed under Mugabe's government, will need
to be demobilized. In a paper on planning for a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe,
Todd Moss of the Center for Global Development and CFR Senior Fellow
Stewart Patrick suggest international donors should assist with
restructuring the intelligence organization, military, and police;
training officials in civilian policing; institutionalizing human
rights; and vetting officials for past abuses. Gavin says parliamentarians
should be trained to effectively oversee the military.
The
Central Intelligence Organization
Experts say
the most powerful arm of Zimbabwe's security apparatus is the Central
Intelligence Organization (CIO). It is the "brains behind the
regime," says Masamvu, and deeply feared by Zimbabweans inside
and outside the country. There is no public record of the CIO's
size, but it is thought to have thousands of operatives. Many Zimbabweans
think the organization has a network of informers that extends into
the Zimbabwean diaspora. Within Zimbabwe, CIO agents have infiltrated
the MDC, and are believed to have covertly taken over two newspapers
in 2006. Organizations such as Human Rights Watch have documented
systematic acts of violence and intimidation committed by the CIO
and the police against opposition members or individuals suspected
of allegiance to the opposition.
Some analysts
think the CIO's ability to generate fear among Zimbabweans might
exceed its true power. "The extent to which they are actually
predators is debatable," Chitiyo says. The demands Mugabe places
on them are so substantial that it's possible they don't have sufficient
resources to cope, he suggests. The CIO receives a large proportion
of the security budget, but most of that money goes to the group's
top officials, which means low-level operatives are subject to the
economic woes the rest of the population faces.
Ahead of March
2008 elections, there were signs of a divide within the CIO, with
some top officials reportedly backing Simba Makoni, a former ZANU-PF
member who was expelled from the party when he announced his presidential
candidacy. The long-time head of the CIO, Happyton Bonyongwe, is
rumored to have links to Makoni. In an interview with Zimbabwe's
Herald, Bonyongwe denied reports of such ties. Whether or not Bonyongwe
remains loyal to Mugabe, the president no longer trusts the leaders
of the CIO, according to a Zimbabwean reporter at the Institute
for War and Peace Reporting who asked not to be named for security
reasons.
The
Military and Its Role in the Economy
The military's
influence extends throughout the country's political and economic
institutions, and it is nominally responsible for running the security
sector. Analysts say that in practice, the CIO trumps the military.
There is "headbutting" between the army and the CIO, says
Chitiyo. Yet the military has historically been Mugabe's bedrock
of support. "That is what has kept him firmly in power up to
now," a senior ZANU-PF official told the International Crisis
Group in 2007. The president has gone to great lengths to ensure
the military's continued loyalty, including distributing land, housing,
and prominent political positions to high-level military officials.
The army is also responsible for the distribution and production
of food.
The government
does not release current defense budget figures, but news reports
suggest the military receives priority in government spending. According
to a 2007 Congressional Research Service report, the defense budget
submitted in parliament in 2006 was four times higher (PDF) than
that of 2005. The SIPRI military expenditure database says Zimbabwe
spent $132 million on defense in 2005, but warns that due to hyperinflation,
that figure may not be accurate. In 2006, at the suggestion of the
Joint Operations Command, the government reportedly spent more than
$20 million to purchase new cars for police, military, and intelligence
officers. It regularly hikes military salaries, but rampant inflation
quickly makes these raises largely symbolic. In February 2008, salaries
for the lowest-ranked soldiers were raised to ZW$1.5 billion per
month from ZW$300 million.
Despite Mugabe's
efforts to retain their loyalty, the military is now widely thought
to be deeply divided. In February 2007, the army chief of staff
told his ranks that deserters would be hanged, and any future leave
requests would have to be approved by the president. The army had
fifty-two thousand soldiers in 2000, according to the Economist
Intelligence Unit, and estimates of its current force levels range
from below thirty thousand to roughly forty thousand troops. Further,
there are serious questions about how much longer the government
can afford to shore up the military. In March 2008, the army announced
it would reduce recruitment due to budget constraints. Following
the March 2008 elections, the MDC distributed fliers to army members
claiming that under an MDC government, the army would be equally
compensated and treated as national heroes, according to the UK-based
newsletter Africa Confidential. It suggests the strategy met with
some success.
There are signs
that the military's fissures extend to senior levels. Reports of
various coup attempts led by senior military figures surfaced in
2007, and several top officials were found dead under mysterious
circumstances. Yet some analysts say Mugabe retains loyalty at the
highest levels. As veterans of the 1970s liberation war against
white rule, many top military officials are steadfast in their allegiance
to ZANU-PF. The commander of the defense forces, General Constantine
Chiwenga, remains loyal to the president, and following the March
2008 elections was critical in convincing Mugabe to have a runoff
election instead of conceding. Chiwenga chairs the Joint Operations
Command.
Police
and Militias
The police execute
the orders of the Joint Operations Command and are viewed by the
public as an untrustworthy, politicized body. "Mugabe uses
the police as technicians of public order, rather than as managers
or administrators," writes Alice Hill in the Journal of Modern
African Studies. In 2005, the police were deployed to clear Zimbabwe's
urban slum areas in Operation Murambatsvina, a government-sponsored
demolition that further crippled the country's economy by destroying
existing marketplaces.
The intelligence
organization has been known to intimidate the police into executing
its orders. "The police are not strategic heavyweights within
Zimbabwe," says Chitiyo. While experts believe many policemen
dislike how politicized the force has become, the head of the force
is loyal to Mugabe. In March 2008, the police commissioner said
"Police will never treat perpetrators of political violence
with kid gloves. Please be warned" (BosGlobe).
Militias of
war veterans and youth also have been implicated in violence against
the general population. The youth militia, also known as the Green
Bombers, is part of Zimbabwe's National Youth Service, a program
started in 2000. They loot land owned by white farmers, beat opposition
members, and rape women and girls linked to opposition groups (NYT).
Ahead of elections, they are charged with distributing food aid
and intimidating voters. In April 2008, veterans and youth militias
began targeting MDC members and supporters in a campaign of violence
and oppression that included a network of illegal detention centers.
A group of South African generals who conducted a fact-finding mission
in early May found "shocking levels" of state-sponsored
violence, according to the International Crisis Group.
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