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There
are many villains to blame for Zimbabwe's decade of horror
Chris
McGreal, Guardian (UK)
March 13, 2008
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/13/zimbabwe?gusrc=rss&feed=networkfront
It is more than a decade since Clare Short wrote
the extraordinary letter that some have characterised as 'the spark'
that set off Robert Mugabe. Zimbabwe's President was pressing Britain
to fulfil a commitment to pay for land redistribution from white
farmers to poor black people, which he regarded as a pillar of the
deal that brought an end to Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of
Rhodesian independence and the birth of a free nation in 1980.
Taking back
the land was a key platform of the liberation war and, Mugabe said,
the time had come for London to honour its commitment. Short, in
the letter to Zimbabwe's Agriculture and Land Minister, Kumbirai
Kangai, in late 1997, repudiated the claim. 'I should make it clear
that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility
to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new government
from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests.
My own origins are Irish and, as you know, we were colonised, not
colonisers,' she wrote.
Short, then International Development Secretary,
said that Britain would help pay for long-term redistribution only
as part of an agreed poverty alleviation programme, but added that
it would be 'impossible' to support rapid land acquisition because
of the damage it would cause to agriculture.
Given how things have turned out, that might seem
a reasonable position. But Short was in essence saying that the
past was done with, because Britain was no longer an imperial power
and that Zimbabwe's liberation war was history. Her letter laid
bare a fundamental misunderstanding of Mugabe and the nature of
the regime he leads, a mistake that others - including Zimbabwe's
whites and a rising black opposition - were to repeat as they struggled
to prise him from office and that has, arguably, helped him cling
to power.
Britain did have a special responsibility, not only
as the former coloniser but also because it had failed to act against
Smith's illegal regime - making necessary a liberation war that
cost tens of thousands of lives, most of them black - on the grounds
that it could not move against its 'kith and kin' in Rhodesia, in
Harold Wilson's phrase. It was those kith and kin who made the same
mistake as Short in thinking the past was history.
When the farm invasions began eight years ago, it
would have taken a particularly hard heart not to be moved by the
sight of people forced from their homes at machete point, sometimes
losing everything but their lives, desperately fearful for the safety
of their children.
But looking around those farms as the white families
fled, it was also apparent that independence had not done much for
the daily lives of their workers. Often they still lived in rows
of cramped, bare accommodation, sometimes all too reminiscent of
prison cells, built in colonial days. Liberation had not changed
the fundamental link between being white and rich and being black
and poor.
Zimbabwe's whites were not only complacent; they
also misjudged how Mugabe saw their place and the unwritten pact
that allowed them to stay on. In the cities they kept their houses
and their pools and their servants. Life went on as before, but
without the war.
The white farmers had it even better. With crop
prices soaring, they bought boats on Lake Kariba and built airstrips
on their farms for newly acquired planes. Not much of that trickled
down to the poor, and not many of the farmers reflected on the essence
of the liberation war and its cry not only for freedom but also
for land. Instead Zimbabwe's whites reached an implicit compact
with Zanu-PF; they could go on as before, so long as they kept out
of politics and did not criticise publicly.
That is the way it stayed for 20 years, but then
quite a number of whites - some of them farmers - made a misjudgment.
They thought they had the same rights as everyone else.
It began with the visible and extensive white opposition
to Mugabe in a constitutional referendum in 2000, which he was shocked
to lose. Mugabe went on television to concede defeat. Emboldened
whites stuck their heads above the political parapet, imagined that
the old man could be driven from power and threw their support behind
the fledgling Movement for Democratic Change under Morgan Tsvangirai
at the parliamentary elections a few months later.
White people accounted for only a small proportion
of the party, but they were highly visible and had clout in part
because they were the ones with the money and the cars. They could
be seen delivering party propaganda and running its offices. White
farmers appeared on stage with Tsvangirai, handing over fat cheques
to party coffers.
The MDC and its white activists regarded all that
as everyday politics in a normal society; Mugabe and the Zanu-PF
old guard saw an attempt to refight the liberation war by other
means. Their fears were not entirely unfounded.
A man called 'Monty' Montgomery was heading the
MDC's campaign in the Hurungwe and Kariba regions in the 2000 election.
His family lineage in Zimbabwe went back to the 1890s. His parents
were teachers in Bulawayo, at a school once attended by Hendrik
Verwoerd, the architect of South Africa's apartheid. Montgomery
was conscripted into the Rhodesian police and rose to become an
officer in the notorious special branch responsible for the interrogation
of political prisoners and 'terrorists' - men like Mugabe.
By the time I met him, Montgomery was running an
agricultural supply business that had fallen on hard times. He had
not taken much interest in democracy until his pocket was hit, but
talking to him, and to other older whites, there was a sense that
this was payback time, an opportunity to 'get' Mugabe.
When 5,000 black
MDC delegates elected the party's executive in January 2000, three
out of the top four were whites. The head of the party's campaign
in Mashonaland West, Duke du Coudray, explained it this way: 'There's
only one reason we whites are so visible. The mass of this party
is black, but the black bourgeoisie is afraid to take a public stand.
They are intimidated away from public support. They are pushing
us to the fore, saying we support you, but we can't do it in public.'
What the whites did not understand was that they could not do it
either. They might have had a legal right, but the history was too
recent and they soon found themselves exploited by Mugabe as targets
and scapegoats. Far from bringing him down, they had helped to strengthen
him.
Tsvangirai welcomed whites for sound reasons, but
it proved to be a misjudgment to allow them such a public role while
maintaining an equivocal policy on land redistribution that fed
Mugabe's claim that the MDC would give the farms back to their former
owners.
The opposition
leader made other political misjudgments that Mugabe exploited.
Tsvangirai was paralysed by indecision after Zanu-PF stole the 2002
election and failed to mobilise the mass of MDC supporters in the
crucial days following the vote, when many were ready to take to
the streets. The opposition had again failed to appreciate the measure
of Mugabe, imagining that, if he lost the election, he would simply
step aside - and so it had no Plan B.
Tsvangirai also failed to appreciate how well Mugabe
would exploit his liberation credentials in the rest of southern
Africa. He portrayed the MDC as a neo-colonial conspiracy in which
blacks were a front for unreconstructed Rhodesians. When the farm
seizures began, the region's leaders threw their weight behind Mugabe,
accusing his detractors of ignoring history. Joachim Chissano, then
President of Mozambique, defended Mugabe by saying that there was
a tendency to 'put a blanket' over the history of the independence
struggles in Africa. He condemned those who would portray 'former
heroes of the freedom struggle' as 'anti-democratic and even dictators'.
A couple of years later, as Mugabe bludgeoned and
murdered his way to a rigged election victory, Chissano said: 'There's
nothing the world has to teach Robert Mugabe about the rule of law.'
Britain didn't help by wading in with loud denunciations.
Peter Hain, then Africa minister, called Mugabe's government 'uncivilised'.
Hain might have given more thought to how other African leaders
would view a minister of a former colonial power, who was also the
product of an apartheid-era whites-only school in Pretoria, describing
one of their number that way.
Thabo Mbeki had not long before become South Africa's
President. He views politics and much else besides through a racial
prism in a way that Nelson Mandela does not. Rainbow nation man
had given way to Zebra man. The highly visible white involvement
in the MDC made Mbeki twitchy. The region's leaders decided to put
him in charge of dealing with the Zimbabwe problem and Mbeki embarked
on his 'quiet diplomacy' that had one aim - to ease Mugabe from
power with dignity, but keep Zanu-PF in control. Quiet diplomacy
did not mean remaining silent in public; it meant refraining from
criticism. Mbeki frequently justified actions by Mugabe.
So it was that, last Sunday, at a dinner at the
South African High Commission in London, he endorsed the recent
election whose result we are still awaiting. 'We have been very
pleased with the manner in which the elections were conducted: the
opposition had access to every part of the country, there was no
violence, no one was beaten up; it's gone very well. You have a
very serious effort by the people of Zimbabwe to resolve their problems,
we could see there was a common spirit among them and that's the
sense we got. And in the conduct of the election none of the parties
came back to us to intervene to say something was going wrong,'
he said.
Mbeki's yardstick for a fair election was that no
one was murdered or beaten, as occurred in the previous three presidential
and parliamentary ballots. But by almost every other measure, it
was far from free. Most of the opposition media, including the main
daily newspaper, have been banned for years, while the state-run
press ran a vitriolic hate campaign against the opposition. Parliamentary
constituencies were gerrymandered to diminish the power of opposition
voters. The electoral roll contained hundreds of thousands of ghost
voters.
By the time Mbeki gave his speech, the opposition
was saying something was very wrong.
South Africa's Deputy Foreign Minister, Aziz Pahad,
publicly bought the line that the result of the presidential election
was not being released for logistical reasons, and said that sceptical
reporters were 'instruments of conspiracy and destabilisation'.
Mbeki said much the same in accepting that the election commission
was 'verifying' the results. The practical effect was to give Mugabe
time to unleash his forces to terrorise Zimbabweans to ensure they
do not again vote against him in the second round of elections that
the election commission was trying to engineer. Mbeki flew into
Harare yesterday to meet Mugabe and emerged from their talks again
saying there is 'no crisis' and once again appealing for patience
until the results are released. Mbeki's principal contribution over
recent days has been to try to arrange what he always wanted - Mugabe
out, but Zanu-PF still in power. He is also insisting that, if Mugabe
goes, it must be without humiliation. To Mbeki, the pipe-smoking,
urbane intellectual, the dignity of an African leader is more important
than the indignity of Africans scrabbling on rubbish dumps for food,
dying in hospitals for want of drugs, or forced to crawl through
barbed wire into a foreign country to find work.
The region's leaders have spent years indulging
Mugabe. Now he is snubbing them by refusing to attend their summit
in Zambia to discuss his country's crisis.The coming days will show
whether Mugabe's useful idiots will finally do right by the people
of Zimbabwe.
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