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SADC mediated talks between ZANU (PF) and MDC - Index of articles
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SADC facilitation and the Zimbabwe crisis
Brian Raftopoulos
Extracted from Pambazuka News 356
March 26, 2008
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/46870
The 2007 SADC
mandate to South Africa to broker an agreement between Zanu PF and
the MDC should be seen as an extension of the "quiet diplomacy"
that has been the hallmark of the South African and SADC approach
to the Zimbabwe crisis since 2000. It took on an added urgency after
the brutal public beating, arrest and torture of opposition and
civic leaders in March 2007 and the widespread attacks on the MDC
structures that followed thereafter. A combination of international
pressure and the obligation by SADC to be seen to be taking action
on the Zimbabwe question, led to an Extra-Ordinary SADC Heads of
State Summit in Tanzania at the end of March 2007 at which South
Africa was given the facilitation mandate on Zimbabwe.
There was widespread
cynicism in many quarters both within and outside of Zimbabwe about
the possibility of success of such an intervention, given the history
of SADC's supine position on Mugabe's authoritarian
regime. However it also presented an opportunity for national, regional
and international forces to navigate a common approach out of the
Zimbabwean debacle by reaching a political agreement that would
be broadly acceptable to all sides.
For the MDC,
weakened by the split in the organization since 2005, there was
little alternative to such talks, as other methods of confronting
the Mugabe regime had hitherto been handled with characteristic
intolerance and repression by Zimbabwe's ruling party. Mugabe,
under strong pressure from SADC to enter the dialogue, had little
option but to at least be seen to be willing to talk to the opposition.
The South Africans, always keen not to make any interventions on
Zimbabwe without regional support, saw this as an opportunity to
push their "quiet diplomacy" agenda, and perhaps end
up with their longstanding hope for a reasonably free and far election
that would result in a Government of National Unity led by a reformed
Zanu PF. The EU and the US, long frustrated by Mugabe's intransigence
and the regional and continental solidarity he continued to receive,
also had little alternative but to allow the "point man"
Mbeki the time to play his hand.
Mbeki started
out with the intention that the dialogue between Zanu PF should
achieve three objectives. Firstly both parties should endorse the
decision to hold parliamentary elections in 2008. Secondly they
should agree on the steps that should be taken to ensure that all
concerned accept the elections as being truly representative of
the "will" of the Zimbabwean people. Thirdly, that there
should be agreement by all political parties and "other social
forces" on the measures that should be implemented and respected
in order to facilitate a legitimate election. The "other social
forces" referred to the civil society groups who were cast
in a more or less supporting role in the whole play.
Towards the
end of 2007 the facilitation had, in the words of the MDC, reached
"significant but not full consensus" on a number of
areas in a political agreement covering issues of violence, sanctions,
land, abuse of traditional leaders and food aid. The talks themselves,
begun in an atmosphere of enormous distrust, appeared to have made
some progress, with Zanu PF swallowing the bitter pill of negotiating
with an opposition party that it had since 1999 labeled a foreign
construction.
The dialogue
also provided the divided MDC with an opportunity to work together
as joint negotiating partners, even as attempts to re-unite the
two formations were continuing parallel to the SADC facilitation.
Discussions on the various aspects of the SADC dialogue added to
the urgency of the need for the two MDC's to at last work
towards an election pact that would allow them to fight the 2008
Presidential and general elections together. Moreover it was clear
to the MDC negotiators that if the talks were to break down with
Zanu PF it had to be seen to be the fault of Mugabe's party,
and not due to any obstructiveness on the part of the opposition.
As matters transpired
it was precisely the intransigence of Zanu PF and the unwillingness
of Zanu PF to allow for a significant opening up of political spaces
in the country, that lead to an impasse in the negotiations at the
end of 2007. Notwithstanding some small changes to the media and
public order legislation, the ruling party proved unwilling to make
substantive changes on the issues that would affect the transitional
political arrangements that would precede the 2008 elections. At
the centre of the political deadlock that emerged in December 2007
were three areas: the date of the election; the timeframe for the
implementation of the agreed reforms; and the process and modality
of the making and enactment of a new constitution. Mugabe's
unilateral proclamation of the election date for 2008, outside of
an agreement of these substantive issues, effectively put an end
to the SADC facilitation process.
The SADC announcement
on the 4th February 2008 that Mbeki's facilitation had resulted
in the political parties reaching an "agreement on all substantive
matters relating to the political situation in Zimbabwe" and
that the matters outstanding were merely procedural, was the worst
kind of political dishonesty. What might have been a principled
stand by the outgoing President Mbeki turned into another disgraceful
endorsement of the politics of a repressive regime.
The SADC has
once again demonstrated its inability to distinguish between Africa's
concern for imperialist interventions, and its commitment to the
democratic and human rights of the region's citizens. It has
subordinated the latter to a grubby solidarity with a repressive
political regime that has transformed a lofty Pan Africanist discourse
into a spurious attempt to legitimize a authoritarian political
project. The regional organization had an opportunity to send an
unambiguous message to Mugabe that unless he fulfilled the objective
of establishing the conditions for a broadly acceptable free and
fair election, he could not expect the customary solidarity of SADC.
Such a position could have changed the dynamic of Zimbabwean politics
decisively and helped to ensure that further intransigence on Mugabe's
part would be met with stronger censure in the region.
That SADC once
again took the line of least resistance has demonstrated its lack
of commitment to questions of democratic principle, and its priority
of protecting libration leaders who have long failed their citizens.
However perhaps a Makoni victory in the forthcoming elections will
satisfy the need by some SADC members for a reformed Zanu PF solution,
for a long time the real objective of "quiet diplomacy."
*Brian
Raftopoulos, Director of Research, Solidarity Peace Trust. This
article first appeared in the Mail and Guardian
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