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Zimbabwe:
An end to the stalemate?
International Crisis Group (ICG)
Africa Report N°122
March 05, 2007
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4682&l=1
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Executive
Summary
After years of political deadlock and continued economic and humanitarian
decline, a realistic chance has at last begun to appear in the past
few months to resolve the Zimbabwe crisis, by retirement of President
Robert Mugabe, a power-sharing transitional government, a new constitution
and elections. Both factions of the divided Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) opposition and powerful elements of the Zimbabwe African
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party support the concept
in outline. Although many of his party's leaders are pressing
him to retire in twelve months, when his term expires, Mugabe seeks
to extend his tenure to 2010 by a constitutional amendment to harmonise
presidential and legislative elections in that year. Increased pressure
and intervention including from the regional organisation, the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), and the West, in the run-up
to the mid-year parliamentary session, could lead to a new political
order, but concessions to ZANU-PF should only be made in exchange
for true restoration of democracy.
The economic meltdown, as well as the bite of European Union (EU)
and U.S. targeted sanctions, is pushing ZANU-PF towards change,
since business interests of key officials are suffering. The party
is split over the succession issue but Mugabe's long successful
divide-and-rule tactics have started to backfire as the two main
factions are coming together to try to prevent him from staying
beyond the expiration of his present term in March 2008. They showed
their strength by blocking his proposed constitutional amendment
at the party's annual conference in December 2006 and will
seek to do so again at the central committee in March so they can
explore a deal resulting in his retirement to make way for moderate
leaders who could negotiate with the MDC and civil society on transitional
mechanisms, seek SADC endorsement and reengage with the West and
foreign investors.
A deal that merely removed Mugabe while in effect maintaining the
political status quo by keeping ZANU-PF in power would be no change
at all. The situation is reminiscent of the last stages of Mobutu's
reign in the Congo. The IMF predicts that inflation - already
the world's highest - could pass 4,000 per cent by year's
end, while foreign exchange is being wasted or stolen and smuggled
abroad. Peaceful protests are repressed, and a new round of home
and business demolitions similar to Operation Murambatsvina that
displaced 700,000 in 2005 is being planned. Salaries of the security
services and civil servants alike are mostly below the poverty line.
Economic issues, discontent among underpaid police and troops and
the increasing willingness of opposition parties and civil society
to protest in the streets all increase the risk of sudden major
violence.
The desire to remove Mugabe within the year provides a rare rallying
point that cuts across partisan affiliations, and ethnic and regional
identities. Opposition party leaders are keeping lines of communication
open with the ZANU-PF dissidents while preparing for a non-violent
campaign to demand immediate constitutional reform. The MDC's
credibility and effectiveness, however, will be severely compromised
unless efforts underway to reconcile its competing factions led
by Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara succeed.
SADC (including South Africa) and the wider international community
can make a vital contribution to resolving the crisis. SADC governments,
who for long have been extremely reluctant to press Mugabe, now
privately acknowledge they want him out to pave the way for a moderate
ZANU-PF government. Without applying public pressure, the SADC troika
is quietly beginning to explore ways to negotiate a retirement package
for the president while persuading the West to relax its pressures.
Mugabe's exit, however, should be only the starting point.
Zimbabwe needs a more radical change to get back on its feet.
The West should both maintain pressure at this crucial point and
increase support for democratic forces but also be more precise
about the conditions for lifting sanctions and ending isolation.
SADC, the EU and the U.S. should adopt a joint strategy with a clear
sequence of benchmarks leading to a genuinely democratic process
for which removal of sanctions and resumption of international aid
to government institutions could be used at the appropriate time
as incentives. Consultations are needed now to get such a strategy
in place by July when the parliament will be expected to take crucial
decisions either on Mugabe's harmonisation scheme or on plans
for transition.
Recommendations
To the
Government of Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF:
1. Abandon plans to extend President Mugabe's term beyond
its expiration in March 2008 and support SADC-led negotiations to
implement an exit strategy for him no later than that date.
2. Negotiate with the MDC on a constitutional framework, power-sharing
agreement, detailed agenda and benchmarks for a two-year political
transition, beginning in March 2008, including:
(a) adoption
of a constitutional amendment in the July 2007 parliamentary session
providing for nomination in March 2008, by two-thirds majority,
of a non-executive president, an executive prime minister and
de-linking of government and ZANU-PF party positions;
(b) a power-sharing agreement leading in early 2008 to a transitional
government, including ZANU-PF and the MDC, tasked with producing
a new draft constitution, repealing repressive laws, drawing up
a new voters roll and demilitarising and depoliticising state
institutions in accordance with agreed timelines and benchmarks,
and leading to internationally supervised elections in 2010; and
(c) implementation of an emergency economic recovery plan to curb
inflation, restore donor and foreign investor confidence and boost
mining and agricultural production, including establishment of
a Land Commission with a strong technocratic base and wide representation
of Zimbabwean stakeholders to recommend policies aimed at ending
the land crisis.
3. Abandon
plans for a new urban displacement program and act to redress the
damage done by Operation Murambatsvina by:
(a) providing
shelter to its homeless victims; and
(b) implementing the recommendations of the Tibaijuka Report,
including compensation for those whose property was destroyed,
unhindered access for humanitarian workers and aid and creation
of an environment for effective reconstruction and resettlement.
To
the Movement for Democratic Change:
4. Proceed with internal efforts to establish minimum unity within
the party and a common front for dealing with the government and
ZANU-PF and contesting presidential and parliamentary elections,
while retaining reunification as the ultimate goal.
5. Hold internal consultations between faction leaders to adopt
a joint strategy aiming at:
(a) finalising
negotiations with ZANU-PF over constitutional reforms, a power-sharing
agreement and formation of a transitional government in March
2008; and
(b) preparing for a March 2008 presidential election if negotiations
with ZANU-PF fail, and President Mugabe retains power.
To
Zimbabwean and South African Civil Society Organisations:
6. Initiate legal proceedings in South African courts to attach
any assets stolen from the Zimbabwean government and transferred
to or invested in South Africa and to obtain the arrest and prosecution
of egregious Zimbabwean human rights abusers visiting South Africa.
To SADC and South Africa:
7. Engage with the U.S. and the EU to adopt a joint strategy for
resolving the crisis that includes:
(a) mediation
by SADC of negotiations for an exit deal on expiration of President
Mugabe's term in 2008 and of an agreement between ZANU-PF
and the MDC on a power-sharing transitional government to oversee
development of a new constitution, repeal repressive laws and
hold internationally supervised presidential and parliamentary
elections in 2010; and
(b) understandings on the use by the U.S. and EU of incentives
and disincentives to support the strategy in regard to targeted
sanctions, political relations with the transitional government
and resumption of assistance.
8. Engage with
the Zimbabwe government to facilitate talks between ZANU-PF and
the MDC leading to the above steps.
9. Convene an urgent meeting of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence
and Security Co-operation to consider the regional consequences
of the economic meltdown in Zimbabwe and recommend action by the
Heads of State summit to deal with the situation.
To
the United States and the European Union:
10. Engage with SADC countries to adopt the above-mentioned joint
strategy, including understandings on timelines and benchmarks to
be met by the Zimbabwean authorities in restoring and implementing
a democratic process.
11. Increase pressure on President Mugabe and other ZANU-PF leaders
if they do not cooperate with efforts to begin a transition and
restore democracy, including by taking the following measures to
close loopholes in targeted personal sanctions:
(a) apply the sanctions also to family members and business associates
of those on the lists;
(b) cancel visas and residence permits of those on the lists and
their family members; and
(c) add Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono to the EU list.
12. Portugal, holding the EU Presidency in the second half of 2007,
should not invite President Mugabe and other members of the Zimbabwe
government or ZANU-PF on the EU targeted sanctions list to the EU-AU
summit unless significant reforms have already been undertaken.
13. Increase funding for training and other capacity-building assistance
to democratic forces in Zimbabwe.
To the United Nations Secretary-General:
14. Assign a senior official - a new Special Envoy to Zimbabwe,
the Special Adviser to the Secretary General on Africa or a high-level
member of the Department of Political Affairs - responsibility
for the Zimbabwe portfolio including to support the SADC-led initiative,
and monitor the situation for the Secretary General.
To the United Nations Security Council:
15. Begin discussions aimed at placing the situation in Zimbabwe
on the agenda as a threat to international peace and security.
To the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
or in the alternative the Human Rights Council:
16. Initiate a follow-up investigation on the Tibaijuka Report,
including plans for a new urban displacement campaign, arrests of
informal miners and political repression, and recommend actions
to the member states, the Security Council and the Secretariat.
To the Commonwealth Secretariat:
17. Encourage Commonwealth member countries in Southern Africa to
help mediate a political settlement for a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe,
setting benchmarks for a return of the country to the organisation.
18. Establish a group of Eminent Persons to engage with Zimbabwe,
using the good offices of its regional members to facilitate access.
19. Work through Commonwealth civil society organisations to build
up civil society capacity in Zimbabwe.
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