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, Part 2
Transcript
of 'Hot Seat' with Brian Kagoro and George Ayittey
(Part 1)
Violet
Gonda, SW Radio Africa
October 03, 2006
This programme was broadcast on
October 03, 2006
Violet: We continue
to discuss the unfolding crisis in Zimbabwe and joining me on this
discussion is Dr.
George Ayittey, a Ghanaian academic who teaches at the American
University in Washington DC and Brian Kagoro an expert on human
rights in Southern Africa. Brian Kagoro is the founding member of
the National Constitutional Assembly and a former Chairperson of
the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. Dr Ayittey is a prominent Ghanaian
economist and President of the Free Africa Foundation in DC.
The Foundation criticises corruption,
oppression and mismanagement in African governments and advocates
for democratic reform. Dr Ayittey has written several books on Africa
and recently wrote an article headlined ‘Protests Marches against
Mugabe a Waste of Time’. Welcome on the programme Dr Ayittey and
Brian Kagoro.
George: Thank you
for having me
Brian: Thank you Violet
Violet: Now, I’ll
start with Dr. Ayittey. You said in your commentary that it is extremely
difficult to criticise opposition forces in Zimbabwe because of
the atrocious brutalities unleashed on them by the Mugabe regime.
And, you also said criticism may sound like condoning the brutalities
or rubbing salt into their wounds but that the opposition in Zimbabwe
needs a good talking to and you described the aborted ZCTU protest
march as ‘dumb’. Now, some may say pretty harsh words. Why do you
say this?
George: Well, you
know, the reason why I’m saying this is because first of all let
me reiterate my position that it is exceedingly difficult to criticise
the opposition leaders. I have met many of them and I know there
hearts are in the right people, there is suffering in Zimbabwe as
far as the people are concerned, there are shortages of essential
commodities, inflation has hit 1200%, we all know about all this.
But, at the same time you know we have to fight smart. Fight smart
in the sense that you know, those who seek to bring freedom in to
the people of Zimbabwe need not compound the problem. Look, we have
been here before and the reason why some people might say they are
harsh words is because we have to look at the experiences of other
African countries.
I personally was involved in the struggle
against the Rawlings regime. It took us something like twenty years
before we could remove Rawlings and I could see that the same mistakes
were being repeated in Zimbabwe and I thought that I had an obligation
to help my brothers and sisters in Zimbabwe so that, you know, they
don’t repeat the same mistakes that we made, not just in Ghana,
but also in other African countries. So it is, I mean, sometimes
some of the mistakes that we make, if I may use the words, are somewhat
unimaginative and also somewhat very foolish and when we make foolish
mistakes like that it compounds the suffering and the misery of
Zimbabwean people. Now, let me put it this way, I have no political
agenda in Zimbabwe. All that I care about is the welfare of the
Zimbabwean people; it is the people that I would stress. Now, quite
often you know we can blame, you know, of course, I wouldn’t waste
my time in blaming Mugabe. We all know that he’s the cause; he’s
the major problem in Zimbabwe but criticising Mugabe alone is not
going to bring about change to the lives of the people in Zimbabwe.
Violet: But what are
the mistakes exactly that are being repeated?
George: Well, the
mistakes that are being repeated, and this is what I wrote in the
article, the mistakes that are being repeated is the choice of poor
tactics OK? Look, in the opposition; opposition leaders need to
have vision. It’s just not enough to criticise you know Mugabe.
It be hoofs the opposition leaders to lay down their vision, their
plan for the future, just not criticising Mugabe. We all know Mugabe
is the problem, so tell the Zimbabwean people why do you want to
lead a country, OK, but you’re not hearing this. And, also, the
other mistake is the choice of poor tactics. Poor tactics in the
sense that, look, we all know that Mugabe’s is a brutally vicious
regime, so you have to fight that regime intelligently. You don’t
fight the regime on the turf on which it is strongest. You have
to fight the regime on the turf on which it is weakest. But you
ask the opposition leaders in Zimbabwe, what are the weaknesses
of Mugabe and you will draw a blank. This is what I mean that we
have to fight intelligently. We don’t want to lose lives, we don’t
want our opposition leaders to be thrown in jail or killed and that’s
why I thought that I had the responsibility to speak out.
Violet. Now, Brian
Kagoro do you agree with Dr. Ayittey’s observations where he says
the ZCTU tactics and the opposition tactics, have been, to put it
mildly, have made stupid mistakes. And, my question is can the ZCTU
ask for more than the human issues, haven’t their plans and objectives
been consistent with the mandate that comes from their members?
Brian: Let me just
start off with reference to a historical fact which is looking at
the repertoire of actions that have been employed to date starting
with the 1997 general strike against the three taxes: the War Veterans
Levy, the increase on Service Tax and the result in 1998 when the
three taxes were scrapped. And then you go to the strategy of stay-aways
that was employed in 1998/9 and by the end of 1999 you could tell
it had become exhausted, so that by 2000 there was very little success.
We came to 1999 and we employed mass rallies, and other forms; peace
marches, prayer vigils and stuff like that around the draft Constitution,
and we won that debate around the draft Constitution. And, clearly,
when the ruling party responded with violence, the opposition was
not prepared for the strategy of violence. This was not violence
being meted out against marchers and demonstrators on streets, this
was violence being visited against women in their homes, against
peasants in their fields; it was violence being visited against
workers and factories, and so, it was a violence that demanded a
defence strategy.
The response by the oppositional forces
was to then put a strategy of containment. Deal with the consequences
of cadres that had been injured, those who were being wantonly prosecuted
arrested and tortured. So, the weakness of the regime at the time
was its international image based on the human rights factor, but,
clearly, the internationalisation of the advocacy for change in
Zimbabwe created a fatal weakness. The fatal weakness that it created
was it fed into the myth that Mugabe propounded; that the opposition
was not rooted, that the opposition spends all its time lobbying
in Western capitals and elsewhere outside the country other than
building a constituency base internally. And, internally, when you
are talking about building a constituency base in a highly polarised
society, it would have been a constituency base that would be seen
as Mugabe characterised it, sponsored by the British trying to unseat
and effect regime change.
Clearly, the articulation of the crisis
internally as a bilateral crisis between Britain and Zimbabwe, between
foreign agents trying to impose land reform and internal proxies;
meaning the opposition; pandering to the interests of the West,
problematised the thinking and even the articulation of the oppositional
agenda because it resonated with a lot of the potential solidarity
centres within Southern Africa and the broader Africa. So, the first
disadvantage that the Zimbabwean opposition had which the South
African Anti-Apartheid movement, for example, did not have, which
many other liberationary processes did not have, is that it suffered
from mis-characterisation, mis-perception. So, it spent a lot of
time trying to clear its name and clear its main image within the
region and clearly, internally the government was intensifying the
strategy of violence. So, the weakness of the opposition is not
just a failure of coherence or an absence or lack of coherence.
There is a much more fundamental issue
to it, that simply the whittling down by sheer violence, and also
displacement of some of the critical thinkers within that opposition.
So can the ZCTU articulate and ask for anything more than its constituents?
Perhaps not at this stage, particularly because the ZCTU went through
a difficult time in the last two years. When significant portions
of its membership or constituent units were pulling out, envisaging
a disadvantage in being seen as aligned to the Movement for Democratic
Change, which is what ZCTU was. So, there’s an attempt to redeem
and consolidate internally and the only way to do it would be to
base it on what would be seen as a purely labour agenda. So, there’s
an internal politics that’s being responded to, but, there would
be merit in criticising the main opposition political party for
its weaknesses which perhaps are largely self-authored. It has been
victim of violence, yes, but some of the split that we see in the
Movement for Democratic Change are largely self-authored. They arise
out of selfishness; they also arise out of sheer lack of national
perspective.
Violet: Now, what
if we go back to the issue of the ZCTU, and this is a question for
Dr. Ayittey. What should they actually do now, because you say the
ZCTU appears to be acting on it’s own without collaborating or consulting
with other opposition groups like the political parties, the Churches
and the student organisation, but, is that really the objective
of the workers body, can they really go beyond the mandate of their
Unions?
George: Well, I wasn’t
particularly addressing the Unions per se and I appreciate that
the opposition in Zimbabwe has gone through a lot since the 1990’s
in terms of the strikes that they have staged successfully and so
forth. But look, I don’t want this to be an academic debate. People
are suffering, ok. For the past 10 years there hasn’t been any change.
The situation has deteriorated and it’s going down, but at some
point we have to stop and take stock, OK. Look, let me put this
thing bluntly. The international community is not going to help,
we have seen this, in fact, in Ghana, we didn’t get any help from
the international community. We did this on our own. We should also
note the tactics of the regime. The regime will always seek to polarise
the country, the society. Its main tactic is divide and conquer
and it will play one group against another. We should know all this,
OK. We should also recognise that first of all, if you want to defeat
the regime, you have to choose the turf on which to defeat the regime.
Are we going to defeat…? What are we telling the Zimbabwean people?
That they should go to the polls and vote or what? Even when it
goes to the polls, the opposition is divided. The MDC for example,
some factions say ‘don’t go and vote’, some factions say ‘yes let’s
go and vote’. What is all this? This just adds to the confusion.
People don’t where they stand because the opposition is not giving
them clear direction. Right now we don’t know where we are going;
are we going to go for it? You know, Mugabe says you know right
now there are calls that the elections should be postponed to give
more time for Mugabe to retire before 2010 or something, you know,
what’s going on? You see when people are confused and they don’t
get any alternative clear direction or plan from the opposition
that’s when they become vote less.
Violet: But still,
I’ll go back to my earlier question, what would you suggest or how
did you do it in Ghana, because in Zimbabwe they have tried mass
action which failed, they have tried elections; they failed. So
what are your suggestions?
George: My suggestions
is first of all we have to bank all the opposition forces, the leaders
of the opposition forces, and I’m talking about the Trades Unions;
leaders of the Trades Unions, leaders of the political parties,
leaders of the Church groups for example , leaders of the Student
groups, Teachers, if you can get, you know, as many leaders in Civil
Society as possible so that you can forge a strategy and the basis
of the strategy should be what the people should - what needs to
be done. Look, we need regime change not reform. This regime, the
Mugabe regime, is not going to implement any real reform. The Mugabe
regime is not going to hand over power on a silver platter to the
opposition leaders; this is what needs to be understood. You have
to plan your strategy from there and this is one of the reasons
I’m saying this. One faction is not going to accomplish this. Once
you get all these groups together and you have to agree, we’ll form
an alliance. All these leaders of the opposition forces need to
speak with one voice, OK? And they have to – I’m not going to prescribe,
I can only tell you what worked in Ghana. Maybe they might be able
to learn lessons from it. But, they need to speak with one voice,
and if they don’t speak with one voice their people are going to
get confused.
Violet: Now, in terms
of examples from Ghana what can you give us?
George: Now, we had
exactly the same. The Rawlings regime polarised the society, and
as a matter of fact, took over a lot, in fact, intimidated the journalists.
I can cite examples. In 1992 there was a newspaper called ‘The Free
Press’ when it wrote articles critical of the Rawlings regime, security
agents went and dumped human waste in its offices. This also happened
to ‘The Ghanaian Chronicle’ in 1994. It also happened to ‘The Crusading
Guide’ in 2000. And, people were brutalised. The Rawlings regime
had a militia called ‘Macho Men’; exactly the same type as the Green
Bombers that Mugabe has; they go around, they intimidate and beat
up people. We had all this in Ghana and yet, you see, we managed.
What we managed to do was to push for the establishment of independent
FM stations, the government couldn’t control that. And the independent
FM stations people could call in and they could say whatever they
had on their minds; nobody could touch them. And, these independent
FM stations, for example, played a very critical role in Ghana’s
independent elections, the 2000 elections. As well as that, we didn’t
wait for the international community to send election observers
to Ghana. The independent FM stations sent their own reporters to
every polling station, the moment they saw they any shenanigans
they reported that right on the air and people rushed to that particular
polling station and resolved the problem right there and then! So,
it made it impossible for the Rawlings regime to steal the elections!
Now, I’m not saying that the same model
should be applied in Zimbabwe, but, the point which I’m trying to
say is when the regime takes control over the media; in Ghana, Rawlings
had control over the election machinery, he had control over the
judges, for example. You see, when the regime has control it’s very,
very difficult so what we have to do is the leaders of the opposition
groups have to think very hard and see how they can wrest the control
of certain key institutions out of the grip of the tyrant in power.
And, when I talk about key institutions you know, I’m talking about
the judiciary for example, the media for example, the security forces
for example. In other words we have to think imaginatively.
Mugabe is not going to co-operate with
his own downfall, he’s going to put every obstacle in the way of
the opposition. We had the same problem in Ghana for a long, long
time, the opposition leaders were asleep; when Rawlings hit them
they wake up, they cry foul - ohhh ye ye ye - and then they go back
to sleep. And, I said look, if you are going to fight a boxing match,
you learn about the tactics of your opponent. If your opponent has
a devastating left hook for example, you practice with your left
hook for example, the moment he raises his right arm you hit him
with your left hook. In other words, you have to strategise and
take counter measures; anticipate what your enemy is going to unleash
on you and you take counter measures appropriately. You don’t just
sit there and wait to be hit and then cry foul.
Violet: Now Brian,
it’s said that mass action is a situational and that the kind of
national politics in Zimbabwe is different than in other African
countries and that this is one of the reasons why many Africans
have not understood the situation in Zimbabwe. Do you agree with
this?
Brian: Ya, Zimbabwe
is a residual settler state. Residual settler state and in a sense
I think I would urge those that are critiquing the Zimbabwean opposition
to do so mindful of the role that powerful regional interlocutors
play, that the general regional mood, political mood, plays. So
I’m not even talking about the international, I’m talking about
the region. And, the deployment of a Pan African anti imperial rhetoric
by Mugabe and its resonance for the majority in South Africa and
elsewhere that have seen their liberation not deliver. That’s one.
But, if you look at the Zimbabwean crisis itself, and say what is
it? It is first and foremost a structural crisis. The economic development
model that we have kept since 1964 is unlikely to deliver for an
expanded client base. Once liberation came, there were greater mouths
to feed, a greater degree of the population required jobs, a greater
degree of the population required social services.
So, the failure in integration, the
failure in transition to take cognisance of the limitations of the,
if we want to put it crudely, of the existing capitalist structure
to deal with that particular point. And, also, the pretentious Marxist
rhetoric that was adopted. Number two, Zimbabwe has suffered from
an enduring constitutional crisis since 1890 and 1979 actually mortified
the race relations and the inequity and if you think about these
things and you ask yourself what should a democratic opposition
do, and, I’ve already narrated how, throughout the 90’s we were
demanding a new constitution as a basis of articulating or re-constituting
Zimbabwean society and it’s governance. And, that agenda is still
on the table, it’s still being articulated. It’s a common position
between the opposition political parties, civil society and even
the Churches. Number Three, how do you get to a democratic resolution,
the issue of voting or not voting?
Clearly, if you read some of the stuff
that we wrote and the advice we gave is, if you chose not to go
to elections, not to participate in elections because they are rigged
anyway before hand, the reality is, you must answer the second question
to the masses; what next? Because, if their commitment as Dr. Ayittey
said, is the dislodgement of the incumbent, then you must proffer
an alternative and I do not see an alternative beyond this mass
action of dislodging the dictatorship. How else would you realistically
capture the imaginations of the masses? And, on another note, if
you say to people ‘go and participate in elections’, and you build
a pattern or a habit of being beaten in pre-rigged elections anyway,
of course, you accentuate apathy.
And, perhaps Dr. Ayittey may not know
this, but on the 5th of June, the Crisis Coalition convened all
oppositional players in what was called ‘The Dialogue on Transition’
Conference, where we discussed the economy, we discussed agriculture
and several other things, and there is a report which I’m sure the
Crisis Coalition would happily share on these issues. So, there’s
been reflection on a lot of these issues beyond just the constitutional
question, beyond even the mere removal of the Mugabe regime. There
has been discussion on what would be the appropriate model and policies;
how would we re-engage the international community, how would we
re-engage and re-invigorate the agricultural sector, how would we
deal with the urban question, the factory question, and, how would
we deal with several other questions.
But, let me touch a little, Violet,
on the issue of the Broad Alliance, because it is something that
we worked on over several years; trying to bring all oppositional
forces together. And, let me tell you the point of collapse; it
is exactly on the prescription that Dr. Ayittey makes. Firstly,
when you are talking, Civil Society would be interested in knowing
what a prospective government would put on the table by way of policy.
They were also interested in the ideological frame from which the
opposition was proceeding and whether this was consistent with their
aspirations of a much more inclusive social and political order.
Political parties on the other hand
were saying ‘let’s resolve these things in stages; let’s resolve
the governance issue first. Remove the dictatorship and then negotiate
the space around the economic model; don’t put the cart before the
horse.’ So, of course the collapse was Civil Society did not want
to be led or hoodwinked, because we have previous – Mugabe had come
in through a coalition government, the Unity government of 1987
had also been backed by Civil Society and other progressive forces
in the belief that what surfaced as a much more united front would
result in development. And so, this repeated sense of betrayal by
political elites is what has created the scepticism and why the
Broad Alliance didn’t take off because, it was not quibbling over
personal ambition, but it was a much more fundamental question what
is the ideological marker, what is the premise around which we are
aligning. Is it simply the removal of the Dictator, is it consensus
around a post Mugabe socio economic and political development agenda,
is it just the new constitution. So of course, those issues are
much more difficult to resolve in real politic.
And, on independent radio stations,
I’m glad that Dr. Ayittey is on Short Wave Radio Africa. This was
part of the response of progressive forces or oppositional forces
in the country when we realised that all radio stations were monopolised
by ZANU PF. There’s also Radio Voice of the People which is operating
out of Zimbabwe and there’s several other attempts by Civic and
other players to have alternative media. Clearly the stringent licensing
requirements and the viciousness with which the Mugabe regime has
responded even to these attempts explains why Short Wave Radio Africa
is broadcasting out of London, when it was originally based in Harare.
It explains why Capital Radio’s assets were seized and even the
Court Orders that were issued could not help. It explains a whole
array of reasons why the responses, and there have been responses
and thinking through these issues, have not helped.
But, the last point, Violet is, I’m
not sure, I am familiar with the brutality of Sony Abacha, the brutality
of Rawlings, and I am aware that the Ghanaians spent more than ten
years trying to remove their dictator. The significant efforts that
we are describing now to remove Mugabe from office only began in
2000, or, you could say in 1999, because ‘97/’98 the agenda was
clearly simply to reform or review the Constitution. 1999 is when
the decision was made to remove the dictator. It’s only been six
years is it not unduly harsh?
George: Brian, I am
not trying to dispute the fact that you have done something, or
achieved something. Look, one more year for Mugabe in power is just
too long for the Zimbabwean people, they have suffered enough, alright.
Yes, there have been attempts in the past, the Crisis Coalition
has done wonderfully well, but their objectives have not been achieved.
What I’m trying to relate to you was our experience; we had exactly
the same problems, so how we managed to overcome them. And so, it’s
something that I’m trying to share with you and the opposition leaders
and to help. The objective is to help end the suffering of the Zimbabwean
people. So, an academic debate really wouldn’t help us. Look, we
had exactly the same thing, each time you bring together a coalition
of opposition forces there will always be arguments over who should
replace the tyrant in power and what sort of alternative economic
model. All these things are not particularly relevant at the moment.
The main thing, what we did in Ghana,
we formed a small group of people who were above politics, and that
group was called the Alliance for Change and it only had eight members.
The members of the Alliance for Change all swore that they had no
political ambitions; they were not interested in the Presidency.
I was one of those and in fact, I publicly stated that I am not
interested in the Presidency of Ghana. And, we also swore that nobody
was going to use that Alliance for Change to advance political interests
of any political party or any individual. All this had to be stated
so that the people would believe in the credibility of these members.
Quite often in country after country in Africa what we see is that
people who try to bring these people together, they themselves have
their own particular political ambition and it casts a great suspicion.
That’s part of the reasons why I’m saying that lessons need to be
learnt.
In the case of Zimbabwe, for example,
where you have now we don’t know where we are going and we can argue
whether we should have an alternative political system or whether
we should have a constitutional reform; people are somewhat confused.
But, listen, the model that was instituted in post-colonial Africa,
I agree with you, that there might be regional differences as far
as the settler economy is concerned in Zimbabwe. But, if you look
across Africa, most of the post-colonial leaders adopted one same
political model, and that one same political model was simply a
concentration of both economic and political power in the hands
of the ruling regime. And, that power was utilised.
In other words, what you have in Zimbabwe
is some kind of a political apartheid system. If you don’t belong
to ZANU PF you are totally excluded. Ask the blacks who were in
South Africa. This model, the one party state model was the same
one that you had in Tanzania, the same one even in my own country
Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah established a one party socialist state; it’s
the same model. So, even though we are in different geographical
regions you can see that it’s the same model. The real source of
the problem is the monopolisation of power, it could be by one political
party, it could be one race like a white in South Africa or even
the Hutu’s in Rwanda, for example, it’s the same. So, yes, there
are regional differences but the disease is still the same.
Violet: And we will
pause here for this week but don’t miss the discussion with Dr.
Ayittey and Brian Kagoro next Tuesday where they will continue to
raise pertinent and contentious issues.
Part
2
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