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Zimbabwe: Increased securitisation of the state?
Chris Maroleng¹, Institute of Security Studies
September 07, 2005

http://www.iss.co.za/AF/current/2005/050907zim.pdf

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Introduction
More than four months have passed since Zimbabwe held its parliamentary polls and it still seems that the winner of these elections, the governing Zimbabwe African Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), still has no clear intention to end Zimbabwe’s political crisis or a programme to resuscitate this country’s collapsing economy. Instead, President Mugabe and his allies within ZANU-PF have used the post-election period to launch further attacks on opponents, both inside an outside of the party, in a series of somewhat chaotic policy decisions, ostensibly in a bid to consolidate their power base.

While the government’s recently launched clean-up campaign – "Operation Murambatsvina" – is paradigmatic of the erratic nature of policy making and implementation in the country (reminiscent of the flawed implementation of the land reform programme) – it is also disturbing in the profound disregard for fundamental human rights of ordinary Zimbabweans, as well as in its heavy handed and violent nature. Observers have questioned the real motivation for this operation, suspecting that the government’s justification of it being necessary as part of a pre-established project, "launched to obviate a potential hazard posed by unregulated and uncontrolled informal urban settlements and activities", could not be further from the truth.² Was this military style operation a form of political retribution, indiscriminately targeted at urban areas perceived to be bastions of opposition support? If so, what does this mean for the future of Zimbabwe?

On 30 August 2005, in yet another clear indication of President Mugabe’s failure to embrace change and embark on positive reforms, the ZANU-PF dominated Parliament adopted the Constitutional Amendment Bill. Notwithstanding strong protest from the MDC and civil society organisations, twenty-six clauses of this controversial bill were promulgated, giving the government the power to, among others:

• Prevent court challenges to government seizures of land as part of the "fasttrack" land reform programme;
• Permit authorities to withdraw passports from individuals suspected of travelling outside the country to conduct "terrorist" activities; and,
• Establish a senate, comprising sixty-six members, fifty who will be voted for; 6 appointed by President Robert Mugabe and the remaining 10 elected by the Chiefs Council, effectively bringing to 26 the total number of legislators directly or indirectly handpicked by Mugabe.

In a situation report written just before the March 2005 elections, entitled "Zimbabwe’s 2005 Elections: Overture or finale?", we had developed three postelection scenarios. It is appropriate to revisit what at the time we considered the most likely scenario one in which ZANU-PF would walk away from the polls with an overwhelming parliamentary majority. On the basis of this scenario was the assumption that ZANU-PF would gain at least a two-third parliamentary majority (100 of the 150 seats in parliament), which would allow it to amend the constitution without recourse to the opposition. We anticipated that should the governing party achieve the two-thirds threshold, it would use its new parliamentary dominance to amend the constitution to create a new post of executive prime minister, with Mugabe retiring to a largely ceremonial presidency and serving out his term in this role until its expiry date of 2008.

The idea of reverting to a largely ceremonial and symbolic presidency has long been mooted. This, and the creation of a prime ministership to handle the important affairs of government has been proposed as a possible avenue by which to accommodate a continuing role for Mugabe as "Father of the Nation", while permitting policy shifts to allow for some accommodation with the international community. This would create the sort of security guarantees that would allow the ageing president to gracefully exit the political scene in 2008. In this scenario, the retirement of Vice-President Msika and his replacement by John Nkomo could signify the incorporation at the highest level of a more moderate and policy-oriented leadership capable of transforming the current situation in a positive way.³

One of our main assumptions in the development of this scenario was that the core Mujuru-Zezuru faction in ZANU-PF would most probably use the postelection period to consolidate its position within the party and stabilize intraparty dissention by incorporating members of rival factions into their camp. One of the possible outcomes of this scenario could see a significantly weakened Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) invited into some sort of power-sharing arrangement or government of national reconciliation. Strengthened by a twothirds majority and a re-committed and united leadership, ZANU-PF would extend an "olive branch" to the MDC thereby proving that, it too, is capable of reconciliation. In this way, a post-election ZANU-PF would mollify its critics under the rubric of "the national interest".

Yet, as we developed this scenario we also warned that there was also the possibility that that the ruling party would decide to go it alone, using its majority to definitively crush all opposition, inside and outside the party.⁴ We warned that "the party that emerged victorious from the March poll may be of little consequence in resolving Zimbabwe’s long standing crisis of governance if both ZANU-PF and the MDC are not committed to entering a new phase in their relationship, one which could foster broader positive interaction and policy formulation geared towards recovery".⁵

ZANU-PF emerged from this election as the outright victor. In fact, the parliamentary poll of March 2005 saw the governing party securing a two-thirds parliamentary majority, winning 78 of the 120 elected seats. The MDC managed to gain only 41 seats, 16 fewer than in the 2000 elections, when it came within three seats of winning a parliamentary majority.⁶ This party has rejected the credibility of these results, claiming that the elections were rigged and that the voters’ roll was in a shambles.⁷ To make matters worse, it has maintained that the electoral playing field was skewed in favour of the ruling party – citing as evidence the fact that the president is authorised to appoint 30 non-constituency members to parliament (making up a total of 150 seats).

As things stand, ZANU-PF finds itself very much in the "pound seats", because its two-thirds majority in parliament now allows it to change the constitution as it sees fit. Unfortunately, the ruling party has shown no inclination to use its resounding – albeit controversial – electoral triumph in a constructive manner

that would have engendered broader political interaction and a policy orientation focused on recovery.⁸ Instead, president Mugabe and ZANU-PF have used the two-thirds majority to entrench the power of the ruling party. By doing this, President Mugabe is clearly strengthening the position of the ‘Zezuru old guard’, who have proved more reliable and certainly more loyal than the so-called ‘young Turks’ in the party, who tried to challenge Mugabe over his appointment of Joyce Mujuru’s as the country’s second Vice President.⁹

In the executive, the appointments made to a now enlarged Cabinet of 30 ministries¹⁰ saw the president returning his trusted lieutenants to key ministries, such as the Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The appointment of ZANU-PF Secretary for Administration Didymus Mutasa as the new State Security Minister, a key and influential post in Mugabe’s government is an example of this. Zimbabwe’s former ambassador to Britain, Simbarashe Mumbengegwi, another trusted lieutenant of Mugabe, took over as Foreign Affairs Minister from Stan Mudenge (demoted to the less influential Higher and Tertiary Education Ministry).¹¹ Zimbabwe’s representative to the United Nations, Tichaona Jokonya, has replaced Moyo as the Minister of Information and Publicity. The ever-loyal Sydney Sekeramayi was retained as Defence Minister, as was Kembo Mohadi at Home Affairs and Herbert Murerwa as Finance Minister. Patrick Chinamasa, who led the purging of independent judges from Zimbabwe’s bench, was retained at the Justice Ministry.¹²

Perhaps more ominously, a number of recent appointments have highlighted an increasing "securitisation" of government and the civil service. Mugabe has assigned key posts to members or allies of the Zezuru-led faction of powerful former army general Solomon Mujuru, and placed members of the security establishment in strategic civil service positions. A glaring example of this is the fact that Mugabe has given Mutasa (Minister for State Security) the responsibility to manage a new government taskforce that oversees the import and distribution of food in the country.

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1. Chris Maroleng is a Senior Researcher at the African Security Analysis Programme, Institute for Security Studies.
2 Operation Restore Order: A positive and corrective campaign. ZANU-PF Official website. http://www.zanupfpub.co.zw/.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 The results showed the same patterns as in 2000. The MDC won virtually all the seats in the main cities, Harare and Bulawayo, where civil society organisations are relatively strong and able to prevent electoral manipulation. The MDC also won a majority of seats in the southern region of Matabeleland, where the Ndebele people, once supporters of the late Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU, continue to oppose the Shonadominated ZANU-PF. But in rural Mashonaland, in central and northern Zimbabwe, where the majority of the population lives, ZANU-PF won all but one seat. http://www.answers.com/topic/zimbabwe-parliamentary-elections-2005.
7 As the results were published, the MDC denounced what it called "the sham elections", which it said had been marked by massive electoral fraud. "The elections cannot be judged to be free and fair," an MDC statement said. "The distorted nature of the pre-election playing field and the failure to address core democratic deficits preclude a free and fair election." The MDC claimed that it would have won 90 seats if the election had been conducted correctly. See Zimbabwe parliamentary elections, 2005.
http://www.answers.com/topic/zimbabwe-parliamentary-elections-2005.
8 For example, the governing party could have: (1) entered into a formal dialogue with the opposition and civil society aimed at finding a resolution to the political crisis and aimed at economic recovery; (2) invited the MDC into some sort of power-sharing arrangement in the interim, up until constitutional, electoral and security sector reforms were in place, which would allow for joint parliamentary and presidential elections to be held in 2010; (3) repealed legislation like the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Non-Governmental Originsations Act (NGOA) which would have allowed for a return to the full and unconditional rule of law, under an independent judiciary and the creation of a freer and more inclusive political environment; (4) amended the constitution following a transparent and broad-based consultation with all stakeholders, thereby guaranteeing civil liberties,restoring the rule of law and entrenching democratic values; (5) consolidated the ruling party by resolving the succession question and factionalism through the incorporation of progressive members of rival factions; (6) instituting measures geared towards the stabilisation of the economic situation and encouraging sound economic management, focussed on development, economic recovery and mitigation of the food security and energy crisis; (7) initiated steps directed at thawing the cold relationship with the "West".
9 In this regard see C. Maroleng. Zimbabwe’s 2005 Election: Overture or Finale? Situation Report, African Security Analysis Programme, Institute for Security Studies, 10 May 2005. At a meeting in Tsholotsho the younger elements in the party came together to frame what became known as the Tsholotsho Declaration, expressing their criticism of Mugabe’s choice by demanding that a younger candidate replace Vice-President Msika. In fact, observers noted that the Tsholotsho meeting was nothing less than an attempted "palace coup" – one in which all positions would be filled by Mnangagwa and his supporters. Their temerity was rewarded by the loss of party positions at politburo, central committee and provincial levels, in what may yet prove to be fatal to their political careers. A number of these "rebels" were also subsequently charged with providing confidential information to foreign powers, and others found themselves excluded and sidelined at the primaries for ZANU-PF’s parliamentary candidates. A number of Mnangagwa’s associates also fell victim to an anticorruption purge in which Solomon Mujuru played a key role at Mugabe’s behest.
10 Paradoxically described as a "development cabinet".
11 Mudenge supported former government propaganda chief Jonathan Moyo in a plot to block the elevation of Joyce Mujuru to second vice-president of ZANU PF. His downgrading is in line with the demotions of nearly all the key figures that tried to block the rise of Mujuru.
12 Chinamasa’s previous record in this ministry must have been impressive enough to move President Mugabe to overlook his apparent disloyalty, having joined Moyo in trying to block Mujuru’s rise.

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