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Zimbabwe
- let's keep focused
South African Communist Party (SACP)
South African Communist Party discussion paper:
Extracted from Umsebenzi Online, Vol. 3, No. 21
November 03, 2004
http://www.sacp.org.za/umsebenzi/online/2004/uol051.htm
The
Zimbabwean crisis and our alliance
The deepening all-round crisis in Zimbabwe is having a devastating
impact on the lives of millions of Zimbabwean workers, peasants,
the youth and middle strata professionals of all kinds - teachers,
nurses, police officers. The crisis has also spilled over into our
country, with an estimated 3 million Zimbabwean economic refugees
now living in South Africa.
Faced with this crisis, it should be admitted that we in the ANC-led
alliance have not always found it easy to effectively position ourselves.
Of course, Zimbabweans themselves must find their own solutions,
but no-one doubts that South Africans - whether in government or
in civil society - also have an important role to play. So why our
difficulty?
In the first place, we in the South African liberation movement
have a long, common history with the ruling party in Harare. In
the late 1960s and through the 70s, the ANC's alliance was rather
more with ZAPU than with the now dominant ZANU component of the
present ruling party. But, after Zimbabwean independence in 1980,
ZANU PF played an absolutely critical role in standing up to apartheid
destabilisation throughout our region. Zimbabweans paid a high price
for their principled position in the fight, for instance, against
Pretoria's Renamo contras in Mozambique. The Zimbabwean CIO was
instrumental in uncovering apartheid hit squad networks directed
against ANC operatives, saving many lives. This history should never
be forgotten.
It should also be remembered that, in the immediate post-independence
period, the Zimbabwean liberation movement led the country on a
significant social redistribution programme, with notable gains
in education and health-care.
However, it is also incontrovertible that much of the present crisis
is centred on ZANU PF itself, including internal stagnation, social
distance from its historic mass base, factionalism, and serious
policy mistakes. For the first decade of independence, the ruling
party accommodated a capitalist growth path in the industrial and
dominant commercial agriculture sectors, encouraging some capitalist
indigenisation, while pursuing progressive welfarist redistributive
policies for the majority: the so-called "two economies" approach
which essentially left the mainstream capitalist economy untouched.
There were successes, as noted above, but by the mid-1990s the redistributive
social programmes could no longer be sustained fiscally within the
constraints of a dominant and largely untransformed capitalist economy.
With a burgeoning debt, Zimbabwe was increasingly vulnerable to
an externally enforced structural adjustment programme.
All of the leading ZANU PF cadres we have spoken to readily admit
that their mid-1990s implementation of a structural adjustment programme
was a disaster. Soaring food prices and mass retrenchments in the
late 1990s resulted in a deepening divide between the party and
the trade union movement. Social hardships also produced a groundswell
of civil society protests in townships and rural villages. These
all resulted in an opposition electoral project that emerged in
2000 and that continues to be grouped around the MDC.
President Mugabe himself has also spoken several times recently
about the grave dangers of corruption, factionalism and the abuse
of state office by leading cadres from within the ruling party.
He himself has raised concerns about illegal land-grabbing by some
of his own senior officials in the recent "land reform" programme.
Opposition politicians in Zimbabwe argue that these critiques are
themselves selective and factional. South African comrades may argue
that this is, or is not, the case - but either way it is obvious
that there are major problems inside of the ruling party.
From an ANC-led alliance perspective, then, ZANU PF presents a complex
challenge. The complexities have not been helped by a wider domestic
setting in which certain opposition parties (notably the DA) have
run a thinly disguised racist campaign. They have sought to use
the Zimbabwean crisis as an example of what happens when "THEY"
(a black majority) take over. This is complemented by a nauseating
barrage of white voices sermonising on Zimbabwe on radio phone-in
programmes, and in this case the racism is even less disguised.
Various opposition forces in our society also eavesdrop on every
internal ANC and alliance debate looking for signs of difference.
Differences get played up by these would-be (and uninvited) mid-wives
of an "MDC" project in South Africa. They don't give a hoot about
Zimbabwean peasants, or about South Africa trade unionists - but
they need our alliance to break so that they can have a shot at
an electoral breakthrough for themselves. At a popular level within
our country and movement, there has often been a knee-jerk back-lash
against these currents: "If Tony Leon insults Robert Mugabe, then
Robert Mugabe must be a super-hero." All of this has muddied the
waters a great deal in South Africa.
We should, of course, not allow any of this to deflect us from a
sober, thoughtful and comradely intra-Alliance analysis and discussion
of Zimbabwe. But it is possible that we have not always succeeded
in doing this. Nor have we given ourselves time to debate the Zimbabwean
situation fully in the alliance and reach a common approach.
Yet another complicating factor has been the role played by external
forces, notably the UK government. Although there have been signs
of a certain toning down of rhetoric from these quarters, earlier
loose talk about a "regime change" agenda from the Blair government
was certainly not helpful. We only have to look at Iraq to understand
that long-distance, externally-imposed regime changes are inevitably
a disaster for the local people and the region in which they are
located.
It is against this general background that last week's heavy-handed
expulsion of a COSATU fact-finding delegation to Zimbabwe occurred.
The expulsion, defying a Zimbabwean court order, resulted in various
reverberations back here in SA. All of this has once more underlined
the need for our Alliance to discuss and harmonise perspectives
on Zimbabwe. It is essential we develop complementary analyses,
strategies and programmes of action to ensure that we assist as
best as possible a resolution of the crisis in our neighbouring
country.
This paper is intended as an SACP contribution to this discussion.
The SA Government approach to the Zimbabwean crisis
We believe that the following are the main features of the South
African government approach to the Zimbabwe crisis:
- While the
crisis in Zimbabwe has multiple dimensions, the critical blockage
at present is political in character. A political resolution as
such will not resolve all the other economic, social and moral
problems, but it is the precondition for being able to make any
serious headway. The SACP agrees.
- Based on
the assumption of 1 above, the South African government has, with
the (apparent) concurrence of the two major political protagonists
in Zimbabwe, identified free and fair elections, whose outcome
will be accepted by both major parties, as the key unblocking
mechanism. The assumption is that after such elections, and regardless
of who wins, the political conditions will have been created for
some kind of patriotic, nationally unifying developmental project
that addresses the all-round crisis. The SACP believes that this
MIGHT well be the best hope that Zimbabweans have. Therefore we
believe that every effort must be made to give this option a chance
- without necessarily foregoing other considerations, and certainly
without being over-optimistic about the short-term prospects of
success.
- The South
African government, again with the (apparent) concurrence of ZANU
PF and MDC has identified a three-step process to unblock the
political impasse and to arrive at conditions for free and fair
elections:
- negotiations
between ZANU-PF and MDC to agree on the measures necessary for
the holding of such elections, including agreement on constitutional
reforms to underpin such elections and to ensure stability beyond
elections;
- the phased
implementation of these agreed pre-electoral measures and constitutional
amendments and other confidence building steps;
- the actual
holding of parliamentary elections.
Given our unqualified
agreement on 1 above, the SACP believes that this 3-step process
is absolutely essential if elections as envisaged under 2 are to
be realised. We believe that all progressive South African formations,
and especially our alliance forces, should be very firm, constructive
and focused in supporting attempts to realise this 3-step process.
The SADC protocols
The SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections,
which were agreed upon in Mauritius in August this year, have now
added a very important additional reference point. These are the
basic principles to which SADC governments (including the Zimbabwean
government) have solemnly committed themselves. In warmly welcoming
these protocols, we need to guard against two potential dangers:
- the protocols
must not be seen as "ideal" objectives to be approximated as best
as possible in actual election processes. They are the minimum
requirements for free and fair elections, and paragraph 7.1 commits
SADC governments to implement them "scrupulously".
- the protocols
do not now render unnecessary the country-specific pre-electoral
agreements and measures as envisaged in the 3-step process noted
above. The protocols are an important bench-mark endorsed by all
SADC governments, they are not an implementation programme as
such.
But are
free and fair elections in Zimbabwe actually a realistic short-term
prospect?
The 2000 launch of MDC to contest (successfully) a constitutional
referendum, and then (nearly successfully) parliamentary elections
in 2000, and subsequent presidential elections in 2002, has resulted
in a Zimbabwean political reality that is very (perhaps excessively)
focused on ELECTIONS.
(It should be noted that this electoral focus is now considerably
at variance with the popular mood within Zimbabwe, if the comprehensive
polling conducted by Professor Chavunduka is anything to go by.
According to his recent polliing the great majority of ordinary
Zimbabweans, across the political divide, are thoroughly weary of
and apprehensive about any forthcoming elections.)
On the side of the MDC, the very rapid rise to electoral prominence
has meant that social movement, trade union and other energies have
been considerably focused on an electoral project, on winning elections,
on contesting in court the results of elections, and on preparing
the ground for different elections. Leading MDC MPs are styled as
"shadow ministers", and there has been a palpable sense that everything
will change at the "next elections". In a sense the strategy has
been regime change through the ballot box.
On the side of ZANU PF the electoral rise of the MDC has led to
an ever-narrowing laager mentality. Conspiracies are seen (or constructed)
everywhere. The hastily launched land reform programme was less
about land reform, and more about seeking to consolidate the ZANU
PF apparatus and its electoral base. The unleashing of youth militias
and other violence is also very much based on electoral calculations,
with heightened violence occurring around by-elections, etc. Anti-democratic
steps - tightening up on media laws, outlawing newspapers, the prosecution
of the MDC leadership - are all also driven essentially by electoral
calculations. ZANU PF is less and less a liberation movement confidently
fostering a progressive hegemony in its own country and in the region,
and more and more a repressive machine focused narrowly on holding
on to power.
The trajectory of the MDC and the trajectory of ZANU PF over the
last few years have tended to reproduce each other. The 2002 presidential
election, which our own South African alliance had fervently hoped
would lay the basis for a resolution of the crisis (regardless of
the winner), has itself become fuel to the fire.
For all of these reasons, the SACP believes that while pushing firmly
for democratic elections in Zimbabwe, we must be sober in our expectations.
There is very little to suggest that ZANU PF, in particular, is
seriously and confidently preparing to lay the foundations for a
democratic process. Almost all of the indicators (including the
expulsion of Cosatu) are pointing in the opposite direction for
the moment.
In these conditions, the worst possible option we could take as
the Alliance in South Africa would be a "pragmatic" acceptance of
ZANU PF's unilaterally-declared March 2005 election date, and a
"pragmatic" making the best of a bad deal in the hope that somehow,
after a flawed election, a victorious ZANU PF would be more magnanimous
and a reduced MDC would be more realistic. In a way, this would
be to re-play the illusions of the 2002 presidential election. Such
an election would not lay the basis for any sustainable resolution
of the crisis. It would nullify the progress made within SADC on
democratisation principles, and it would also contribute to an ongoing
stagnation of progressive analysis and debate on Zimbabwe in our
own country.
ZANU PF
In the view of the SACP, the crisis in Zimbabwe is considerably
rooted in the social reality of the class force dominant in the
leadership echelons of the ruling party. This class force is a bureaucratic
capitalist class reliant on its monopoly of the state machinery
for its own social reproduction. This class force, dominant in ZANU
PF ruling circles, is unable to provide a coherent and hegemonic
strategic leadership capable of beginning to address Zimbabwe's
political, moral, economic and social crisis.
Indeed, in many respects, it thrives (at least over the short-term)
in conditions of crisis, using its access to state power for land
grabs, and currency and other speculative activities. It is also
able to use state power as an insulation against the terrible impact
the crisis is having on most other strata. But, unlike other fractions
of the bourgeoisie, it is also incapable of surrendering direct
control over state power. This double-bind, an inability to constructively
and strategically use political leadership on the one hand, and
an inability to cede some bureaucratic dominance, on the other,
lies at the heart of the present blockage.
There are, from time to time, signs that there are more far-sighted
groupings within ZANU-PF leadership, who are prepared, for instance,
to explore the possibility of some kind of patriotic power-sharing
deal with the MDC. But, at least for the moment, these elements
are easily outflanked within the leadership dynamics of the ruling
party - it is hard to sell the idea of ceding some power, when that
means that some in the ruling party will have to do the ceding.
Having said this, the SACP believes that there is no solution to
the Zimbabwe crisis, at least within any foreseeable future, without
ZANU-PF…(or, for that matter, without the MDC). This means that
there needs to be ongoing honest, robust engagement with ZANU-PF
from the side of South Africa, and particularly by those forces
most capable of exerting a positive influence. Challenges that arise
include:
- what can
be done to limit and indeed reverse the economic advantages to
a bureaucratic bourgeoisie of the ongoing crisis?
- how can significant
sectors of the ZANU-PF leadership be weaned away from the unsustainable
(in the medium-term) laager into which they are increasingly retreating?
- ZANU-PF might
actually have lost its hegemony and therefore have to negotiate
with all those forces that disillusioned with its rule. The cosatu
EXPULSION might as well have closed people-to-people contact between
Zimbabwean mass formations and South African progressive forces
thus running the danger of isolating our government in seeking
our solution to the impasse.
The role
of the SA government and the Alliance
Progressive South African formations need to premise their engagement
on the basic principle that Zimbabweans have the prime responsibility
for finding their own solutions. There are also no easy solutions.
However, we do have a responsibility to Zimbabwe, and we do have
a responsibility to our own national democratic struggle. Our solidarity
towards Zimbabwe needs to be multi-pronged. Government to government,
party to party, and people to people engagements are all part of
what is required. We also have a responsibility for the estimated
3 million Zimbabweans living in our country, many as a direct result
of the present crisis. In developing our solidarity, we must guard
against expecting our government to behave like a trade union movement…or
COSATU to behave like a government. We must also ensure that we
do not allow tactical differences within our Alliance, for instance,
to cloud and confuse us, and to become the main issue to the detriment
of pursuing a converging strategic objective in Zimbabwe. The crisis
is not in differences of tactic within our Alliance. The crisis
is in Zimbabwe. We should agree:
- to pursue
and support as a priority the SA government's 3-step approach
to securing free and fair elections in Zimbabwe;
- that success
in this regard will require engagement but also pressure on the
relevant formations within Zimbabwe;
- that in engaging
with all formations within Zimbabwe, different components of our
alliance will have better prospects in different directions. We
should appreciate this, while not allowing the differences in
Zimbabwe to become strategic differences amongst us back at home.
- that, while
free and fair elections in Zimbabwe are probably the most likely
breakthrough possibility, solidarity and engagement must not be
narrowly confined to an electoral objective. Which is to say,
amongst other things…
- anti-democratic
measures and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe - regardless of the
source - must be clearly condemned by our entire alliance. We
need to send a clear signal, not just to Zimbabwe, but to our
own mass base about the moral and democratic foundations of our
own revolution.
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