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What
history for which Zimbabwe?
A
report on the Britain Zimbabwe Society Research Days, June 12th and 13th
2004
Britain Zimbabwe Society (BZS)
July 2004
http://www.britain-zimbabwe.org.uk/RDreport04.htm
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Introduction
The Research
Days began with an introduction by Terence Ranger. He drew on his November
2003 paper - posted on the Society's website - 'Nationalist Historiography,
Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: the struggle over the
past in Zimbabwe'. (This is appearing in the June 2004 issue of the Journal
of Southern African Studies). To this he added a recent lecture delivered
in Uppsala, 'The Uses and Abuses of History in Zimbabwe', which covered
developments between November and May. What emerged from both papers was
a determined effort by the Zimbabwean state to ensure that its version
of the past, which it calls either 'patriotic history' or 'Mugabeism',
is imposed at every level. It is hammered home by television, radio and
the state press. It is taught in the militia camps from Mugabe's Inside
the Third Chimurenga; in schools with textbooks written by the Minister
of Education; in colleges and polytechnics in the form of a compulsory
'Strategic and National Studies' course.
Patriotic history
is a much narrowed down version of nationalist history. It focuses on
the three 'revolutions' - 1896, the guerrilla war and the 'third chimurenga'
of land redistribution. It divides the nation into 'patriots' and 'sell-outs'.
(An examination question in the Strategic and National Studies course
asked which Zimbabwean political party is an agent of imperialism and
how it should be regarded). Mugabe's proclamation in the 1970s that Zimbabwe
would carry out a socialist and modernist revolution alongside the progressive
nations of the world has been abandoned. White socialists and support
groups are seen as having betrayed Zimbabwe and Africa. Today 'authenticity'
is the watchword and Zimbabwe seeks support only among the 'indigenous
peoples' of the world. With its doctrine of 'permanent revolution', patriotic
history glorifies violence and omits other forms of popular action, marginalising
in particular the cities and the trade unions.
Its relationship to
Zimbabwean intellectuals is complicated. On the one hand, universities
are attacked as 'alien' institutions teaching a history influenced by
non-Zimbabwean ideas. On the other hand, regime intellectuals - Jonathan
Moyo, Stanislaus Mudenge, Aeneas Chigwedere - are crucial to the formulation
and propagation of patriotic history. The problem for those academic historians
who desire a more complex and plural history is how to make an entry into
public debate. Spokesmen of the Crisis Coalition call for an 'alternative
narrative'. But what should this be? And how can it be expressed?
Ranger said that the
Research Days sought to answer these questions. We needed to confront
how far our previous historical writing has been complicit with patriotic
history. We needed to ask how best to draw on what we already knew so
as to re-assert a more plural history. We need to explore the gaps in
the present historiography - what we needed to know, but did not - in
order to understand the present Zimbabwe crisis. We needed to determine
what new questions that crisis posed.
Because patriotic
history challenged other interpretations in so many fields the Research
Days would cover much ground. Jonathan Moyo has launched a project to
recover oral history and Robert Mugabe is increasingly making use of Great
Zimbabwe as a ceremonial centre so the Research Days would begin with
statements of alternative oral narratives and of plural 'history-scapes'
around Great Zimbabwe.
Patriotic history
was unequivocally patriarchal so there would be papers on women in Zimbabwean
history: its key figures were warriors so there would be discussion of
children and how they related to war. Patriotic history expresses itself
in tv and radio jingles specially written by Jonathan Moyo so we would
discuss music and history. As Zimbabwe's best writers went into exile
we would explore fiction and history. Robert Mugabe has appealed to the
Vapostori, who are seen dancing at Heroes Acre in their white robes, so
we would explore the historical consciousness of the prophets. Patriotic
history emphasises the role of spirit-mediums in the first and second
chimurengas so we would look at their role since independence. Land is
the key theme of patriotic history so we would explore what we know and
what we don't know about the history of land and look at the neglected
history of land in white Rhodesian politics. Cities and trade unions are
marginalised in patriotic history so we would look at the contemporary
problems of cities and ask what historians can contribute to their resolution.
And at the end Brian Raftopoulos, the very model of the committed intellectual,
has the task of drawing all this together.
Conclusion
Brian Raftopolous
said that it had been the most worthwhile two days since the two days
he had spent in prison, which had also been spent in discussing history
though there it was the history of football! He returned to the organising
questions of the Research Days - what discourses alternative to patriotic
history exist or could exist? Were we historiographically prepared for
the crisis? Where do we go now?
He drew on the discussions
to emphasise several points. The first was the argument made by Tim Scarnecchia
on the need to distinguish between several 'nationalisms'. If one looked
at citizenship there was both national and civic citizenship. Mzingeli
was suspicious of the young nationalists because he felt they did not
take seriously enough the project of urban citizenship. If one looked
at rights it was necessary to re-iterate the point made by Ranka Primorac
that rights to ownership and residence only made sense if there were also
the rights to come and go. The papers on religion had raised the question
of alternative and parallel narratives to that of nationalism. All these
possibilities had to be explored. Zanu PF would never undertake this because
it was 'so afraid to look into its own past'. Nationalism had been in
many way an urban growth. The idea of urban dwellers as a totemless people
was in itself merely a re-iteration of colonial concepts.
Nevertheless, even
if one worked on the towns and on labour it was hard to avoid one's work
becoming complicit. Even his own work on labour avoids questions that
now come back to haunt us - who really did the ZCFTU represent?
His second point was
that the existing historiography was very full but that it nevertheless
had major gaps. The greatest was that there is no study of the construction
of race in Zimbabwe, an extraordinary fact given that Rhodesian rule depended
upon it. The absence of such studies has allowed all ambiguities and contradictions
to be eroded so that today 'whites' are spoken of a single category. 'The
race issue is on the table'. As Terri Barnes shows in her recent analysis
of school history texts whites are presented as monolithic oppressors.
The left focuses on class rather than on race. Yet the end of the white
commercial farms did not mean the end of race as an issue in Zimbabwe.
Looking to the future
the great need was to study the reception of ideas. Did the repetition
of the slogans of patriotic history and its teaching in schools and colleges
mean that it had already become hegemonic? There were enough jokes in
circulation about it to encourage him to think this was not yet so. Nevertheless
it is very important to counter it. We need a general history of Zimbabwe
which synthesises what we know about religion, land, the towns. We must
go beyond political economy to include culture and consciousness. The
battle to record the past is now a political struggle. 'If you are a historian
you have political accountability'.
Above all, as Jocelyn Alexander insisted, we need to understand the state.
It was not adequate merely to describe it as authoritarian. Bulding a
state was a process of creating constituencies. The colonial state co-opted
Africans in the past in way which we do not yet fully recognise or understand.
The Mugabe state co-opts interests now. It rules by satisfying those interests
and not just by propaganda or terror. We need to study this process.
In short there was
more than enough to keep historians busy for a long time yet.
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