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Zimbabwe: In Search of a New Strategy
ICG Africa Report N°78, International Crisis Group
Nairobi/Brussels, April 19, 2004

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Executive summary and recommendations
For all the sound and fury of international condemnation and domestic opposition, octogenarian President Robert Mugabe maintains the upper hand in Zimbabwe. He has bludgeoned opposition parties and neutralised mass action strategies, minimised African criticism, maintained South Africa's friendship, and withstood sporadic pressure from the wider international community. It has been a masterful performance. It is also one that has done massive damage to Zimbabwe's economy, which is shrinking at world record speed. It is time to acknowledge the collective failure to date, re-evaluate strategies for resolving the crisis, and concentrate on the opportunity presented by the March 2005 parliamentary elections.

Though it retains some of the trappings of a multi-party democracy, Zimbabwe is de facto a one-party state controlled by a narrow group of ZANU-PF and military officials who have used its resources and institutions for personal enrichment. The ruling party gives its key supporters in the security services, the army and a large patronage network a piece of the action to ensure their commitment to the status quo. So little is left for social requirements that Zimbabwe, which exported food until recently, has the highest percentage in Africa of people being fed by international aid.

Preoccupied as it is with looting the state and with the politics of presidential succession, it is almost inconceivable that ZANU-PF would now negotiate seriously with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Its strategy appears to be to delay any formal process, while South African President Thabo Mbeki talks about talks. Meanwhile, the regime has become more proficient at forestalling resistance to its rule. Demonstrations are usually thwarted before they begin or broken up early. Youth militias terrorise opposition supporters. Detain-and-release cycles are applied to opposition and civic leaders, combined with endless court actions to wear down stamina and resources. At the core is violence, used in both targeted and indiscriminate ways.

There are two possibilities for the parliamentary elections that the government has indicated will be held in less than a year's time. One is that a negotiated inter-party settlement or greatly intensified international pressure - or both - will produce the conditions for a free and fair electoral process; the other is that the ruling party will continue to stall on talks, rig the electoral process, increase state violence, and win a non-credible vote. If the latter happens, Zimbabwe will probably be at the point of no return. Elements of the opposition and civil society, disaffected war veterans and youth militia, and losers in the ZANU-PF factional battle might well fight one another or the state. Democracy promotion in Zimbabwe today is a conflict prevention strategy.

The response to Zimbabwe's tragedy has been inadequate and ineffectual at all levels. The U.S. and EU feed the majority of Zimbabweans, but their policies do not begin to address the roots of the crisis. South Africa and other neighbours have not made the kind of concerted effort to resolve the crisis that states in East Africa and West Africa have attempted when confronted with their own regional problems. On the contrary, their policies have amounted to covering for the regime. The opposition and civil society have made shows of good faith by participating in governing institutions and electoral processes, but that has only given a veneer of legitimacy to a system that is suppressing political freedom and destroying what had been one of Africa's more dynamic economies. All these actors need to change course.

The March 2005 elections are the vital target. Since a broad ZANU-PF/MDC agreement on the country's problems now seems unattainable, the focus of international engagement should be on crafting specific benchmarks and timelines for a free and fair electoral process. The U.S., EU and UN should work closely with each other, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), and the Commonwealth and consult with key stakeholders in Zimbabwe to craft these benchmarks and accompanying timelines. The benchmarks should be based on the SADC Norms and Standards for Free and Fair Elections. There should be an agreed procedure for determining quickly whether the process -- not the voting day itself -- is conducted properly, and to the greatest extent possible agreement on the specific consequences that would flow from violations. The EU and U.S. should start the urgent task of building consensus around this plan of action by appointing envoys to consult throughout the region.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the EU and U.S.:

1. Change policy focus from an inter-party (ZANU-PF/MDC) negotiation, which now appears unachievable, to promotion of a free and fair process for the March 2005 parliamentary election.
   
2. Appoint envoys to travel and work together and in coordination especially with SADC, the AU and Zimbabwean stakeholders, forge a broad international consensus on benchmarks, including minimum conditions and timelines, for that electoral process that would be based on the Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region, adopted by the SADC Parliamentary Forum in 2001, and include:
1. repeal of the Public Order and Security (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy (AIPPA) Acts and amendment of the Electoral Act;
   
2. freeing of the airwaves and permission for independent papers to publish;
   
3. audit of the voters' roll and, if needed, new registration under UN supervision;
   
4. replacement of partisan electoral officials;
   
5. MDC access to rural areas;
   
6. replacement of the Electoral Supervisory Commission by an independent Electoral Commission to oversee administration of the election; and
   
7. unhindered access to the entire process for credible international observers.
   

3. Seek agreement from the states and organisations supporting the above consensus that if the benchmarks are not met and the norms and standards are violated in a systematic way, the March 2005 parliamentary elections will not be free and fair and that the consequences of such a conclusion should be the subject of further urgent diplomatic review.
   
4. Endeavour to send teams as soon as possible to observe the entire electoral process.
   
5. Make preparations to expand the EU and U.S. targeted sanctions list to include the business associates and the family members of key ZANU-PF officials and implement the expansion expeditiously unless ZANU-PF begins quickly to cooperate with the MDC and the international community on a strategy to produce free and fair parliamentary elections based on the SADC norms and standards.

To ZANU-PF:

6. Work with the UN and other bodies to meet the minimum guidelines established in the SADC norms and standards for a free and fair parliamentary election process.
   
7. Enter into immediate negotiations with the MDC at least to establish the conditions for a credible parliamentary election.

To the MDC:

8. Enter into immediate negotiations with ZANU-PF at least to establish the conditions for a credible parliamentary election.
   
9. Reconfirm its acceptance of the SADC norms and standards as the basis for a free and fair election, report regularly on the state of implementation of those norms and standards and be prepared to boycott the election if the government flouts them in the lead up to the election.

To the MDC and Civil Society:

10. Develop strategies to promote a non-violent democratic transition, including more relevant and effective civil disobedience to confront state policies rooted in violence or illegality.

To Zimbabwean Election Observer Groups:

11. Start as quickly as possible a regular publication to assess the degree to which the government is adhering to the SADC Norms and Standards.

To South Africa and SADC:

12. Promote application of the SADC norms and standards for the March 2005 parliamentary elections, increase engagement with the aim of producing negotiations between ZANU-PF and the MDC on conditions for those elections, and otherwise take greater responsibility as a region for brokering a solution to the Zimbabwe crisis.
    
13. Endeavour to send teams, individually or jointly, as soon as possible to observe the entire electoral process.

To the African Union (AU):

14. Support the development and application of agreed benchmarks for the electoral process.

To UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan:

15. Join efforts to produce a free and fair parliamentary elections electoral process in Zimbabwe by supporting and reporting on any benchmarks that are developed to determine whether the process is credible; endeavouring to send a team as soon as possible to observe the entire electoral process; and ensuring that UN personnel on the ground are forceful in their monitoring and humanitarian advocacy.

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