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Opinion:
Private Voluntary Organisations Act
Pearson
Nherere, Advocates' Chambers
October 08, 2002
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This opinion was commissioned by the National Association of
Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO)
A few days ago,
the ministry of the Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare published
in the Herald newspaper a Notice calling upon all voluntary organisations
whose activities come within the ambit of section 2 of the Private
Voluntary Organisations Act. (Cap. 17:05), who are not registered
with that Ministry urgently to stop their operations until they
have regularized their registration in terms of Section 9 of the
Act. The exhortation "urgently to stop their operations"
is accompanied by the dire warning that "Failure to adhere
to the law will result in arrests being made." Counsel’s opinion
is sought on the legality/constitutionality of this notice.
Counsel is of
the view that focus is being wrongly placed on the Notice. The Notice
does not change the law. The notice simply purports to interpret
the law as laid down in the Private Voluntary Organisations Act
("The Act"). Assuming for a moment, the legality/constitutionality
of all the provisions of the Act (save for Section 21 struck down
in Holland & Ors v Minister of The Public Service, Labour
and Social Welfare 1997 (1) ZLR 186 (S).
It is Counsel’s
view that any organisation that was obliged to register three months
ago is obliged so to do not by virtue of the Notice, but by virtue
of the Act. Similarly any person who is liable to prosecution under
the Act is so liable today not because of the Notice but the Act.
Consequently. such person was liable to prosecution even before
the publication of the Notice and would have been so liable to prosecution
even had the Notice not been published at all. There is nothing
illegal or unconstitutional in the Notice itself. What the Notice
really is is gratuitous legal advice by the Ministry.
If it is proposed
to challenge the legality of anything then it should be the law
itself i.e. the Private Voluntary Organisations Act that requires
registration and imposes criminal sanctions for commencing or continuing
activities without registering. If that law, the Private Voluntary
Organisations Act is constitutional, then, the Notice is good advice
as one would have been liable to prosecution anyway.
Section 6
of the Act provides:
"(1)
No private voluntary organisation shall;
(a) commence
or continue to carry on its activities: or
(b)
seek financial assistance from any source: unless it has been
registered in respect of the particular object or objects in furtherance
of which it is being conducted.
(2) No person
shall collect contributions from the public except in terms of this
Act.
(3) Any person
who in any manner takes part in the management or control of a private
voluntary organisation, knowing that such organisation is contravening
subsection (1), shall be guilty of an offence. (4) No unregistered
private voluntary organisation shall be entitled to receive a grant
from the State."
The term "private
voluntary organisation" is defined in Section (2) of the Act.
Private Voluntary Organisation means any body or association of
persons, corporate or unincorporate, or any institution, the objects
of which include or are one or more of the following–
- the provision
of all or any of the material, mental, physical or social needs
of persons
or families:
- the rendering
of charity to persons or families in distress:
- the prevention
of social distress or destitution of persons or families:
- the provision
of assistance in, or promotion of, activities aimed at uplifting
the standard of living of persons or families:
- the provision
of funds for legal aid:
- the prevention
of cruelty to, or the promotion of the welfare of, animals:
- such other
objects as may be prescribed:
- the collection
of contributions for any of the foregoing: but does not include–
- any institution
or service maintained and controlled by the State or a local
authority: or
- any religious
body in respect of activities confined to religious work: or
- any trust
established directly by any enactment or registered with the
High Court: or
- any educational
trust approved by the Minister: or
- any body
or association of persons, corporate or unincorporate, the benefits
from which are exclusively for its own members: or
- any health
institution registered under the Health Professions Act [Chapter
27:19], in respect of activities for which it is required to
be registered under that Act: or…"
From the definition
of "Private Voluntary Organisation" in section (2) of
the Act, it necessarily follows that where the activities carried
on by a given organisation do not fall within the ambit of section
2, then, such organisation is not required to register in terms
of section 6. Should it come to prosecution or having work interrupted
by the police, the answer would simply be that one is not required
to register in terms of the Act. If an organisation that takes the
view that its activities do not come within the ambit of section
(2) has its work interrupted and/or its assets seized, the remedy
would be to seek an urgent interdict restraining the police from
interfering with its work and/or ordering the police to return the
seized assets.
Where an organisation’s
activities fall within section (2) of the Act, then, that organisation
has the choice of either applying for registration so as to be on
the safe side, or, alternatively, challenging the constitutionality
of Section (6) of the Act.
The most obvious
provision of the Declaration of Rights under which Section (6) of
the Act may be challenged is section 21 of The Constitution. The
section provides:–
"(1) Except
with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person
shall be hindered in his freedom of assembly and association, that
is to say, his right to assemble freely and associate with other
persons and in particular to form or belong to political parties
or trade unions or other associations for the protection of his
interests.
(2) ---
(3) Nothing
contained in or done under the authority of any laws shall be held
to be in contravention of subsection (1) to the extent that the
law in question makes provision
(a) in the
interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality
or public health:
(b) for the
purpose of protecting the rights or freedom of other persons:
(c) for the
registration of companies, partnerships, societies or other associations
of persons, other than political parties, trade unions or employers'
organisations: or
(d) that imposes
restrictions upon public officers: except so far as that provision
or, as the case may be, the thing done under the authority thereof
is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society."
In view of the
wide definition of "private voluntary organisation" in
section (2) of the Act, the requirement in section (6) that a private
voluntary organisation may "commence" or "continue"
its activities only if it is registered constitutes an interference
with the right to freedom of association as contemplated in section
21 (1) of the Constitution. Subsection (1) of s.21 must, however,
be read in the light of subsection (3). According to s.21 (3) [C],
the mere fact that a law makes provision for the registration of
companies, partnerships, societies or other associations of persons,
other than political parties, trade unions or employers’ organisations
does not render that law invalid on the grounds of inconsistency
with subsection (1) of section 21. Further, in terms of S.21 (3)
(B), it is permissible to pass a law which restricts the freedom
of association of some persons if that law is for the purpose of
protecting the rights of freedom of other persons. The State, therefore,
has a very good case for arguing that section (6) of The Act (as
read with sections (2) and (9) thereof) is perfectly constitutional
as it is the type of law contemplated under s.21 (3) [C], or, alternatively,
s.21 (3) (B). To counter this argument, one would have to go a step
further and show that Section (6) of the Act is not reasonably justifiable
in a democratic society.
In Woods
and Others v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs
and Others 1995 (1) SA 703 (ZS) (1995 (1) BCLR 56) the Supreme
Court emphasised that an abridgement of a guaranteed right should
not be arbitrary or excessive.
In Nyambirai
v National Social Security Authority and Another 1996 (1) SA
636 (ZS), at 647, the Supreme Court held that:
In effect the
Court will consider three criteria in determining whether or not
the limitation is permissible in the sense of not being shown to
be arbitrary or excessive. It will ask itself whether:
(i) the legislative
objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental
right:
(ii) the measures
designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected
to it: and
(iii) the
means used impair the right or freedom no more than is necessary
to accomplish the objective.
Also see R
v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 (SCC) at 227 ((1986)
19 CRR 308 at 336-7) (a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada).
In South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence
And Another 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC) (at p481, the South African
Constitutional Court took a similar approach. It observed:
"At the
second stage of the constitutional enquiry, the relevant questions
are:
what
is the purpose of the impugned provision, what is its effect on
constitutional rights and is the provision well tailored to that
purpose?"
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