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Zimbabwe's election: the stakes for Southern Africa
International Crisis Group (ICG)
January 11, 2002

V.  Policy options for South Africa and SADC

South Africa and SADC might pursue an entirely diplomatic approach, with multiple variations; they could ratchet up pressures, in the form of targeted or generalised sanctions or restrictions; and, if the situation spiralled out of control, they might even consider direct intervention to restore stability. None of these courses are easy or can guarantee decisive results.

Diplomatic options

South Africa has pursued four diplomatic tracks with Zimbabwe. First, the ANC has conducted party-to-party talks with ZANU-PF in the spirit of comrades trying to find a way forward together and, until recently, avoiding criticism. As part of this effort, the ANC is also talking with the MDC. This may be the forum through which South Africa will pursue tripartite talks at some point. The ANC has also hosted a meeting of liberation movements from around the region, and plans a follow-up. There have been frank exchanges but some observers believe this track is conceptually flawed.

"The liberation meeting was an indulgence in paranoia", charged one Zimbabwean analyst. "These movements see threats emanating from everywhere. The ANC has simply echoed what Zimbabwe has said about external funding and guidance of the MDC". An influential South African offered: "The ANC must abandon its cautious approach to the region. The perception that the government is reluctant to act must be overcome. South Africa must provide hegemonic stability. This means it must assertively lead and demand certain outcomes, rather than simply employing moral suasion".

Secondly, the governments hold frequent ministerial and office director level meetings, with no significant result. Thirdly, Mbeki has at times pursued direct presidential diplomacy with Mugabe. "Mbeki positioned himself as an interlocutor between Zimbabwe and the international community on land and other issues", pointed out a South African academic. "This was the essence of his quiet diplomacy. It was based on Mbeki’s conviction that Mugabe wanted to resolve the land issue. Now he understands that ZANU-PF is trying to keep power at all costs. The mistake of South African policy was thinking that these discussions were being undertaken in good faith".

This track is perhaps hindered by the deterioration in the relationship of the two leaders, particularly after Mbeki ratcheted up his public criticism at the end of November 2001. His more forceful public diplomacy was undercut by the SADC ministerial mission to Harare. "Someone in South Africa is worried about the devaluation in the rand and is trying to distance the country from Zimbabwe", said a diplomat at the time presciently. "There will have to be more substance before this is taken seriously".

Fourthly, South Africa has positioned itself within SADC to cloak its own objectives within a regional context. Mbeki reportedly considers that what South Africa is doing in the first three tracks is consistent with and feeds into this multilateral track. Although there is much diversity of opinion, the South African and SADC diplomatic priority is to promote dialogue between ZANU-PF and MDC officials. The objective appears to be a coalition government aimed at averting a total train wreck during and after elections. Such a government of national unity, or even a cooperative government based on percentages of votes received, could provide Mugabe an honourable exit after the elections, which South Africa expects him to win, perhaps including some immunity from prosecution. It would provide an opportunity for ZANU-PF to undertake reforms, and give the MDC a stake in governing the country in the runup to what would be expected to be free and fair elections in 2005.

Earlier in 2001 South Africa pressed for a unity government before the elections, and it remains best positioned to put muscle into a diplomatic effort to cobble together such an outcome if there is increased instability and mass protest following this spring’s voting. "The only success of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy to date has been that bridges are still intact", a South African academic says. Advocates call a coalition government a measure of realpolitik since they consider that free and fair elections are not possible in the current environment. Their objective is to reduce violence and avoid a worst case scenario. This approach shifts the emphasis away from election day itself toward the post-election process. A unity government, supporters say, would overcome the fact that neither ZANU-PF nor the MDC can bring stability by going it alone.

Most Zimbabweans consider this scenario at best wishful thinking. One activist called it "unhelpful and unworkable. The ordinary voter would feel his or her aspirations betrayed". Another civil society representative concurred: "This would vitiate the entire electoral process, and the democratic process would be totally subverted". Another activist added: "We’ve been down that road before. ZANU-PF would control the police, army and intelligence. It would be a totally cosmetic exercise. If disagreement arose, there would be no means to force compliance from ZANU. Such an avenue would close discussions on accountability as well". Most believe both ZANU-PF and the MDC would reject a unity government and that any pre-election promise by Mugabe could not be relied upon. "It is too late for a national unity government", concluded one Western diplomat. "The level of mistrust is too high. ZANU has declared war on the MDC and the MDC wouldn’t go down that road now". Morgan Tsvangarai, the opposition MDC leader, declared: "We have no interest in such an outcome. Government is mandated by the people".

Regardless, it is positive that South Africa will continue to work for dialogue between the parties, as long as it is not the exclusive track. South Africa’s position on a unity or coalition government stems in part from its assessment that the MDC is not necessarily a viable alternative, no matter how problematic ZANU-PF might be. One official from the region commented: "We are still of the view that there are no good guys and no bad guys".

Another available diplomatic tool is the possibility of suspending Zimbabwe from the African Union (formerly Organisation of African Unity). This could respond to an unconstitutional seizure of power, should the elections be stolen or too blatantly fraudulent. African governments – most effectively SADC ones – could also recall ambassadors for consultations in response to egregious actions. An African Union context might engage Libya, which is supplying arms, credit and fuel to Zimbabwe in return for assets at fire-sale rates. Libya’s role worries South Africa. The cooperation of Nigeria’s Obasanjo and Algeria’s Bouteflika will be needed to put Libya before a choice between the African Union’s good governance principles and the relationship that is providing Mugabe a lifeline when other sources of aid and investment have dried up.

The most important – and realistic – SADC or even unilateral South African purely diplomatic initiative might be to step up the public criticism. "SADC doesn’t need to send more delegations; they need to make clear statements", advised one diplomat. "African leaders saying that things are not right is the most important leverage on Mugabe". A Zimbabwean analyst agreed: "When Africans come criticizing Mugabe, this makes him very nervous". Indeed, much southern African leverage lies in the importance legitimacy has for Mugabe. It matters whether Africa endorses this election; Mugabe would find it hard to countenance total rejection by the continent’s leaders. "Mugabe does not want to be seen as a pariah or as illegitimate", said another diplomat.

That suggests that SADC and the African Union might usefully work out common understandings of minimum conditions for acknowledging the legitimacy of a government in Harare after the elections, presumably based on the existing SADC agreement on electoral norms and standards. Visits from regional groupings such as the SADC Electoral Commissioners Forum, the Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa, the Southern African Trade Union Council could maintain some pressure on the Mugabe government. Such public activity might be supplemented by quiet contacts between professional soldiers from SADC countries and their counterparts in Zimbabwe to emphasise the importance of impartial armed forces in a democracy.

Moreover, South Africa has standing to assert additional leverage through less conventional means. For example, dialogue with certain Zimbabwe officials, and not others, could conceivably cause divisions within ZANU-PF and isolate hard-line elements. South Africa might also talk both privately and through the media about the possible relevance for Zimbabwe of its own recently completed Truth and Reconciliation Commission process, with the implication that ZANU-PF could face more stringent accountability measures if it clings to power undemocratically. Another topic to explore conceivably would be Mugabe’s historical legacy and how best to preserve it.

Sanctions option

However much SADC admonishes Mugabe, it is likely that the only language to which he will respond is that of credible and tangible pressure. A number of sanctions frameworks available to South Africa and the region, therefore, need to be considered. Many in Zimbabwe note that it was South African economic pressure – border closure – that drove Ian Smith and his Rhodesian government to the negotiating table in the late 1970s.

Were SADC to impose targeted sanctions (personal assets and travel) against specific ZANU-PF leaders such as those being advocated by the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament, some policy divisions might emerge within ZANU-PF over conduct of the election process and other important issues. Mugabe and other ZANUPF leaders are believed to have significant money and property in South Africa. It is likely that the EU, the Commonwealth and the U.S. would follow suit if SADC were to implement such a sanctions regime. "South Africa is uniquely positioned to implement smart sanctions", claimed one Zimbabwe analyst. "South Africa has a singular opportunity because of the tentacles between the Zimbabwean and South African elite".

SADC member states have the economic leverage to exact punishing official sanctions, including a trade embargo, but no one is advocating such drastic action at this time. The opposition in Zimbabwe has repeatedly said that broad economic sanctions would hurt the people without producing change in government policy. There are additional targeted actions, however, that could conceivably be used. For example, South Africa, with Zambia and Mozambique, might temporarily close the electricity corridors to Zimbabwe that the three countries control. South Africa is extremely overextended in credit guarantees to Zimbabwe for the latter’s payment for electricity. "There is a limit to which we can underwrite them", stated one South African official. If all three countries collectively chose to close down the electricity corridors, even temporarily, Zimbabwe would be left with the south bank of Kariba and the Hwhangi power station to supply its populace.

Should such measures be adopted, they would probably best be undertaken on a calibrated or incremental basis intended to deliver specific messages to the leadership while mostly limiting impact on the general population, for example: the occasional brown-out or localised cut-offs of specific electric grids, such as those including key ZANU-PF offices or the police headquarters; demanding payment for electricity; slow-downs in fuel resupply from South Africa and via the Beira pipeline from Mozambique; temporary slow-downs in broader crossborder traffic; slow-downs in the granting of visas, particularly for commercial activities; and, closure of diplomatic missions or recall of envoys.

President Mbeki’s brother, South African Institute for International Affairs Deputy Chairperson Moeletsi Mbeki, spoke out forcefully in December 2001, saying it was time South Africa began to look at pulling Zimbabwe’s economic plug. "South Africa is the one country that is going to be hurt the most by the Zimbabwe crisis, so it is the country that has to take most of the action", he said. Rather than dealing responsibly with the electricity debt, Mbeki charged that Pretoria has dragged the issue out, leaving a perception that "the South African government is weak…Most of Zimbabwe’s trade goes through South Africa….We can stop the Zimbabwean economy tomorrow if we wanted to. We have the muscle" Another influential South African added: "It is important for Zimbabwe’s ruling elite to understand that there are alternative voices within South Africa that are calling for increased pressures. This gives more leverage to South Africa". Opponents claim such actions would destroy what is left of a functioning economy and impact on the survival of ordinary people, and South Africa would bear the consequences of more refugees. Yet others urge immediate action by South Africa and SADC, foregoing incremental steps. "South Africa needs to throw the kitchen sink at Zimbabwe now", said one regional analyst. "It should cut the electricity and trade routes, and end the lines of credits from public enterprises. South Africa should try to get Botswana and Mozambique to join in, but may have to act unilaterally. It’s time to show some muscle".

How far South Africa and SADC members might realistically go in such a direction would probably depend upon whether the Zimbabwe opposition and general population express more readiness than they yet have for stringent external actions. Many observers, however, do not believe that SADC would undertake such measures in any conceivable circumstances due both to domestic politics and to concerns about which country would be next on the list. "There are violations like this throughout the entire region", observed one South African analyst. "The situation in Zimbabwe is blown out of proportion because of the violence against whites". South Africa has unique reasons of its own for caution. In addition to ties of gratitude with ZANU-PF from the days of the libertation struggle, its policy-makers do not want to foreclose prematurely options on their issues of race and land that mirror in some ways those in Zimbabwe.

Civil society institutions provide some measure of influence on governments throughout the SADC region to take more significant action on Zimbabwe. Trade unions may be out front in advocating specific pressures on ZANU-PF. The Southern Africa Trade Union Coordinating Council (SATUCC) and South Africa’s COSATU may well become more active in response to events on the ground. COSATU has been active in highlighting the Zimbabwean crisis in international forums and providing information and support to Zimbabwe’s trade unions, but it denies government charges that it financially supports the MDC. Its General Secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, however, has asked rhetorically: "How do we save Zimbabwe? ….We should be doing more than sending a memorandum, though, as this will probably be ignored [referring to a letter SATUCC is writing to urge Mugabe to uphold the rule of law]. We should be mobilising workers to defend democracy actively".

The military option

It is possible that no amount or mix of sanctions, public denouncements, or incentives will change Mugabe’s determination to stay in power. He may intensify violation of human rights, steal the election outright or cancel it, and plunge the country into anarchy. Such a situation, with its devastating consequences for regional stability and economic health, could force consideration of a military intervention that is still virtually unthinkable. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security was precluded from action during the years when Mugabe was its Chair, but it may now be a mechanism to which the region needs to give contingency thought. The greatest difficulty in a SADC military intervention, however, would be that Zimbabwe would most likely invoke its Mutual Defence Pact with Angola and Namibia. This, like the intervention in the Congo, could split SADC into opposing armed camps.

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