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Zimbabwe's election: the stakes for Southern Africa
International Crisis Group (ICG)
January 11, 2002

IV.  Policy considerations for South Africa and the region

While much of the world has tried to push it onto the front line, South Africa has consistently claimed that its influence in Zimbabwe is limited. It has been Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner and provides most of its electrical power. More importantly, South Africa’s capacity to mobilise regional governments represents the greatest potential threat to Mugabe, who has hitherto effectively sheltered behind regional solidarity but may no longer be able to rely on old alliances based on the history of the liberation struggle. South Africa may be in the painful process of reevaluating its quiet diplomacy policy. In developing concrete options, it will need to consider a number of factors that directly impact on its national interests, including the economy, the prospects for extensive violence in the lead-up to the spring elections, and the influence of both on the refugee situation. South Africa also must consider its neighbours’ sensitivities should it seek to assert leadership in forging a new regional policy on Zimbabwe. South Africa will want to weigh with particular care whether any sanctions can be useful. Finally, it would be prudent also to plan for the contingency of a complete breakdown of law and order and a state of emergency in Zimbabwe. Under such circumstances of major instability and even graver human rights violations, a military option under the auspices of SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security might be considered.

Policy-makers will be subject to a number of internal pressures. First is a growing xenophobic reaction to Zimbabwe refugees. If the anticipated increased influx materialises, there will be calls for stronger action. Secondly, cracks are widening between business and government over Zimbabwe. Although the commercial sector has much to lose, it will likely be a force for more aggressive action. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) will also advocate more serious action if the situation deteriorates and labour unions and labour leaders within the MDC suffer increasing repression. Finally, some elements of the ruling ANC party will press for more stringent action.

NEPAD may be the external consideration to which South Africa will be most sensitive. If the G-8 signals it regards the regional response to the Zimbabwe crisis as the test for that initiative’s selfpolicing viability, Mbeki will be more likely to act robustly, particularly if he has the backing of Nigeria’s Obasanjo. However, if it is to adopt a more decisive policy, South Africa will have to overcome a history – and expectation – of inaction. "South Africa will never exercise effective pressure", asserted one long-time analyst of South African politics. "They’ll always be afraid they’ll be the next target". Populist pressures for radical land redistribution within South Africa itself will also introduce caution into Pretoria’s calculations.

A. The multilateral approach - working within SADC

If South Africa does opt for putting more pressure on Mugabe, it almost surely will do so only within a SADC context. It will want to respect historic sensitivities about appearing to be the "big bully" in the region, and it will need to take into account also Mugabe’s resentment at being relegated to junior partner status since South Africa shook off apartheid. If South Africa can build a regional consensus and act through SADC, however, it will be difficult for Mugabe to demonise Mbeki as a neo-colonialist.

It will not be easy to develop a common regional action plan since SADC is divided over Zimbabwe. Angola and Namibia are more supportive, given their Mutual Defence Pact and cooperative involvement in the Congo. A core group – Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Botswana – is willing to explore more expansive actions. SADC has a poor record of enforcing its own rules for members because so many are in violation at any given time. Many governments are hesitant to penalise Mugabe this week for something for which they may be accused next week.

There is increasing recognition, however, of the need for a tougher approach to Zimbabwe. This sentiment appeared to be strong at the meeting with Mugabe on 11 September 2001, just after the Abuja Agreement was signed. The presidential delegation sent a sharp message that it was vital to the region’s stability for Zimbabwe to return to the rule of law. Regional leaders gave Mugabe one month to move toward this objective and insisted on meeting members of the opposition and civil society. After the deadline passed without progress, however, the SADC ministerial team that visited Harare on 10 December 2001 meekly accepted government claims and attempts to cast blame on external forces. Its communiqué "welcomed the improved atmosphere of calm and stability", and "encouraged the Government of Zimbabwe to continue to embark on its positive actions, and called on all stakeholders to support these actions to further reduce tensions". A South African analyst stated: "Everyone is clearly stunned by the SADC’s latest move. It doesn’t make sense and it defies logic". Nor has SADC subsequently set clear benchmarks for what it expects on land reform, the rule of law, and conditions for free and fair elections or established a sustained follow-up mechanism.

On close analysis even what the SADC ministers specifically asked for in December was flawed: 1) positive contact between ZANU-PF and the MDC; 2) contact between Vice-President Joseph Msika and the white farmers, and 3) a multi-party election committee to address issues of poor discipline, intimidation and violence. While these steps would be progressive if implemented, they do not touch on even more serious issues such as the election process itself, freedom of the press, continuing farm invasions and the land redistribution process.

There is a serious question of how well informed some SADC members truly are about events on the ground in Harare. The December communiqué indicated that ministers believed violence had been diminishing, which is clearly not correct. Interviews ICG conducted while preparing this briefing paper revealed major gaps in the information and analysis of some regional governments about such issues as the fast track land program and the degree to which the electoral process is being undermined.

The expectation of inaction referred to above is strong within Zimbabwe regarding both South Africa and SADC. "SADC", charged one Zimbabwean analyst, " … has become useless to the people of Zimbabwe and is the reason why people turn to the EU and U.S. for action". Ultimately, however, SADC’s capacity for effective action is tempered by reticence to intervene in the affairs of a member state, and by the racial and colonial dynamics inherent in the land redistribution issue.

B. Key issues for SADC to address

If SADC is to play a constructive role, it will need to take its Norms and Standards for Elections agreement as the basis for serious discussion of the electoral process with Mugabe. In addition to violations of the commitments Zimbabwe undertook in that document discussed above, further damage to prospects for a free and fair election has been done by executive orders and laws that restrict categories of people from voting.

Citizens without electricity accounts or other proof they live in the country cannot register. City dwellers must produce a title deed, certificate of occupation, or lodger’s permit issued before 19 November 2001. Rural inhabitants need to get confirmation from their village heads, many of whom are ZANU-PF supporters. Suffrage will be denied to hundreds of thousands of youths who live with parents or are lodgers in urban properties without occupation certificates. SADC needs to use both pressure and inducements to secure progress but the first step would be for it to make specific demands for adherence to its electoral norms and standards, linked to credible costs for non-implementation.

SADC should also push Mugabe to transform the land redistribution process. This involves not only criticising the existing fast track program that is blatantly political but also putting expectations on the table and proposing viable alternatives. No one questions the urgent necessity of land redistribution in a country where eight million of the twelve million hectares of land privately farmed are held by a few white commercial farmers. There should be concentration, however, on putting an effective system in place to administer land reform in a non-partisan manner, involving all stakeholders and accompanied by adequate support structures. Once again, for SADC positions not to be viewed by Mugabe as empty rhetoric, they will need to be accompanied by clearly specified repercussions if policies do not change.

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