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Grain producers review the past year - Chairman's Annual Report Summary
Andrew Meikle - Zimbabwe Grain Producers Association
June 20, 2002

Good morning invited guest speaker, members of Grain South Africa, delegates, Zimbabwe Grain Producers Association (ZGPA), Zimbabwe Cereal Producers Association (ZCPA) and Combined Oilseeds Producers Association (COPA) members, ladies and gentlemen welcome to the 34th Annual Congress of
the Zimbabwe Grain Producers Association. (All three AGMs were held concurrently)

Tabled is my detailed Annual Report of the activities of the Association over the past year and I ask you to read through it in your own time. However, there are few points from the report, which I would like to
highlight here this morning.

The 2 years that I have been in office have proved to be possibly the most difficult and frustrating for the maize producer and sadly as a result the country finds itself in a serious food deficit situation. Although our current crisis comes after an extremely difficult rainy season it follows a period of 6 good rainy seasons in a row, which were very favourable for maize production. However due to the lack of leadership, policy and direction the country has fallen on hard times with absolutely no reserves to call on.

It saddens me, as I know this Association has consistently tried to be proactive in trying to resolve a situation, which we have continually warned as a potential disaster for the country's food security. In spite of this our members have been on the receiving end of much bad publicity about how the commercial farmer has tried to sabotage the grain industry.

Therefore I would like to take this opportunity to inform you of the efforts by the Association to communicate with Government in the past year and make proposals, which could have helped sustain producer confidence, maintain production levels and prevent the disastrous situation we find ourselves in
today. Furthermore I would like to highlight facts on the import programme, which is proving to be totally inadequate.

In February 2001, we corresponded with the GMB Chairman, asking what the intentions of the Board were to recompense maize growers for their considerable losses when payments were not forthcoming during the last season. There was no response from the GMB on this matter and I believe this was the beginning of the decline in producer confidence.

In April 2001 we addressed by correspondence the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement recommending a producer price of Zd$11000 per tonne for the 2001/02 marketing year.

A price of Zd$7500 per tonne was announced initially, and was later raised to $8500 per tonne, and subsequently to Zd$15000 per tonne. There is no logic in this pricing mechanism.

As far as the producer is concerned this indicates the level at which the market is distorted and as a result adding to the decline in confidence.

A further factor attributing to the decline in confidence is that of the maize theft issue and that was also addressed to the Minister.

In August 2001 we corresponded once again to the Minister Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, expressing our deep concern relating to the re-control of the local maize market in terms of S.I. 235A of 16 July 2001, and the negative effects on the production base, the market, and the consumer.

At the same time we advised Government of the urgent need to make preparations to begin importing maize as early as beginning September 2001, to overcome the increasing logistical constraints.

Furthermore in the same correspondence recommendations were made that Government and GMB contract producers directly for guaranteed early deliveries during March, April and May 2002. This recommendation was in the face of a deficit of 200,000 tonnes up to the 31st March 2002, and
suggesting the saving of foreign currency by encouraging local production.

Sadly, no response was received.

In September 2001 further correspondence was sent to the Permanent Secretary of Agriculture, making the following recommendations to increase the production of maize by all sectors:

1. Contracting producers for early, guaranteed deliveries to GMB.

2. Allowing users of maize including the livestock industry, to contract directly with producers for their maize requirements during the 2002/03 marketing year.

3. Decontrolling Yellow Maize.

Copies of this proposal were sent to the Ministry of Finance, and to the Chairman of the GMB.

No response from the Ministry of Agriculture nor the GMB and a reply from the Ministry of Finance in January 2002 referring us back to the Ministry of Agriculture.

In October 2001 GMB put out the first tender for the importation of 150,000 tonnes. The tender fails due to unsustainable conditions laid out by GMB.

In December 2001 GMB reported to hold 96,000 tonnes in stock. And yet no imports had landed. ZGPA forecast that GMB will run out of maize before 31st December 2001.

GMB re-issue Tender for the supply of 150,000 tonnes, again the tender fails, with a deadlock in discussions relating to conditions of delivery set out by GMB.

At this time the GMB Chairman approached the Association to enquire about surplus stocks and mechanisms to attract surplus maize. ZGPA recommended that a price review from $8500 to $15000 may attract surpluses but assured GMB of not more than 20,000 - 30,000 tonnes believed to be held on-farm at this time. Some of these stocks would be destined to sustain livestock and labour on farms, as producers were aware of the pending shortage.

On 20th December 2001 GMB reviewed the price from Zd$8500/tonne to Zd$15000/tonne, and on the 28th December introduced SI 387 compelling the delivery of all maize to GMB.

This has lead to further decline in confidence and will have a long-term negative effect on production if it is not lifted.

In January 2002 ZGPA see SI 387 as a contradiction to the Act, which allows producers to retain maize for their on-farm consumption. However, GMB advise that in terms of the Act, the Powers of the Board allows for any decision or action to be taken that is believed to be conducive to the country.

This was the beginning of the maize seizures from commercial farmers who have now reached a stage where they would rather not produce maize than be subject to this humiliating legislation.

GMB stocks reported to be 30,000 tonnes, and this comprises of the reported 36,000 tonnes of maize seized from commercial farmers. No imported maize landed to-date.

In mid-February 2002 Imported maize starts landing in the country.

In March 2002 ZGPA meets with the GMB on 14th March 2002. GMB reported landed to date 50,000 tonnes of maize.

ZGPA request the opportunity to meet with Government, together with other representatives of maize producers, to discuss the principles of the new season's producer price.

To-date no Agricultural Marketing Policy has been released, although this should be out prior to the new marketing year on 1st April. Producers have been forced to deliver maize to the GMB at last years' price of $15000 awaiting the announcement of a new price. The cost of this to the producers ' account once again.

It was at this meeting with the GMB, that we highlighted the potential for a winter maize crop, with 2 potential planting dates, namely June and September. With encouragement from Government and Grain Marketing Board, we believed a potential 80,000 - 120,000 tonnes could be produced to supplement
the current crop. However, producers will require commitment on the part of Government to ensure the safe harvest and delivery of this crop. To-date no response.

By 20th March 2002, GMB issues a further tender for the supply of 200,000 tonnes; again delivery terms are unrealistic, with required delivery of 200,000 tonnes within 5 weeks.

In April 2002 GMB report 92,000 tonnes of maize landed to date. This would indicate 45,000 tonnes per month landing, or 11,000 tonnes per week.

In May 2002 GMB/Government have contracted 400,000 tonnes of maize, of which over 150,000 tonnes has landed as of 21st May 2002.

Within the time frame this amount of imported maize is totally inadequate to meet the requirements of Zimbabwe's people and unless something is urgently done this country faces serious starvation.

So at the end of the day, can one honestly say that it is the commercial farmer that has sabotaged food security and is responsible for the food crisis we find ourselves in today?

Food security is a lot more complex than Land Reform, and it is the responsibility of the Government to put in place an enabling environment to return confidence to the maize producer of Zimbabwe, both small scale and large scale alike.

In order to achieve an enabling environment the following support measures should be restored to the grain industry:

• The Land Reform programme must be resolved;
• The return of timely Agricultural Policy Statements;
• The removal of all legislation to enable a free and transparent marketing system where the price is dictated by supply and demand;
• The management of the Grain Marketing Board should be transparent and accountable, and at the same time maintain the Strategic Grain Reserve to safeguard the nation's food security, but not to be used to interfere with the market;
• The maize theft issue is a serious deterrent to commercial maize production, which has supplied between 50% - 70% of the total maize to the country's market, and it is urgently required of the judicial system to recognise this threat to Zimbabwe's food security;
• Adequate financial and technical support must be well placed to assist all farmers to achieve levels of production to support food security.

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