



REPORT OF THE

OPERATION

GARIKAI/HLALANI KUHLE

NATIONAL AUDIT



WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

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Chapter

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2005, Zimbabwe celebrated its Silver Jubilee of Independence with the launch of Operation Murambatsvina (clean-up): characterized by indiscriminate destruction of informal shelters, settlements and business units in the name of cleaning up urban areas. Up to 700,000 poor and most vulnerable families lost their homes, sources of livelihood or both. Operation Garikai / Hlalani Kuhle (stay well) was conceived as a successor programme to deliver low-cost and decent housing, adequate vending and factories as well as small and medium business units for the poor and vulnerable, in particular addressing the needs of the victims of Operation Murambatsvina.

Both operations were carried out in heavy top-down approaches by members of armed forces, secret intelligence services, police and local government agencies without any input from concerned people and

civil society. When a member of the research team of this project introduced the national audit project to the Secretariat of Operation Garikai, the latter replied that the Secretariat is not accountable to the civil society but to The Exchequer who provides funding for the project. The Secretariat appears ignorant of the obvious and simple fact that the exchequer administers public funds and that in a health democracy the exchequer is accountable to the public. By extension, the Secretariat is ignorant of the fact that it is accountable to the public! In Zimbabwe, the lack of transparency and accountability is one of the key issues hampering development and democracy in general and the development of human settlement issues in particular.

The human settlement issues are in a state of crisis in Zimbabwe. Housing is inadequate and for the low resourced segments of the society, it is of poor quality. For the majority of the population, living conditions in cities and rural areas are poor; there is lack of access to adequate and quality services such as water, electricity, sanitation, roads, refuse collection and safety. These conditions have been progressively deteriorating over the last twenty or so years. Operation Murambatsvina exacerbated the situation and brought to the fore problems of poor planning, under-investment and coping with rapid urbanization that Zimbabwe has endured over the last 25 years.

Operation Garikai, the successor to Operation Murambatsvina has not lived up to its expectations. From the onset Operation Garikai had no capacity in terms of conception and resources to adequately handle the magnitude of issues and problems in human settlement exposed by Murambatsvina. At its best Operation Garikai is a poor window dressing exercise yet in reality, it is a total failure. It has brought out key problems of funding and inability to deliver targeted housing and informal business units with the necessary services backup for decent living and livelihood of the low resourced communities.

The Parliamentary Portfolio on Local Government and Housing Reports vindicate the recommendations of the United Nations Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe that the state has no capacity, without engaging the international community, to deliver services to meet the magnitude of human settlement needs in the country.

To date, what Operation Garikai has delivered is shrouded in intelligence secret. There is every reason to be skeptical about the success of the programme because with its battered image, success in anything is celebrated as national glory in Zimbabwe. On the contrary, there is evidence that some victims of



Operation Murambatsvina are still holed up in transit camps. These transit camps where people live in tents seem to have assumed the dignity of being permanent settlements. There is also evidence of victims of Operation Murambatsvina living in plastic shacks in slum settlements dotted on the outskirts of major urban areas. Also many have relocated to rural areas and are living in poverty stricken conditions. In addition, the few houses built are too small and have no access to water, electricity, sanitation, roads, schools, clinics and refuse collection. Given the corrupt allocation mechanisms, we can not ascertain precisely what percentage of the victims has benefited from the few small to medium sized business units constructed in the aftermath of Murambatsvina. Also, given the militaristic nature of the operations there is ample evidence that democratic social accountability is not practiced at all in all processes related to the operations.

Operation Murambatsvina violated the very ideals that the Silver Jubilee of Independence was celebrating: freedom from human indignity and violation, freedom from hunger and poverty, freedom from oppression. Operation Garikai / Hlalani Kuhle has not fulfilled and has no capacity to deliver human settlement needs. The operations failed in terms of participatory development and democracy, social dialogue, transparency and accountability.

This report recommends the following:

- Making housing policy and planning realistic, accountable and sensitive to low income groups irrespective of their political orientation
- Engagement and consultation of multiple sectors in the human settlement issues development: multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, private financiers, cooperatives and the State in transparent and socially accountable processes.
- Reviving and regulating the informal sector through participatory policy design and licensing policies and systems that are sensitive to the low income businesses.
- That priority is accorded to victims of Murambatsvina in the allocation of available housing units, vendor marts and factory shells in any new programme. To this effect, we recommend civil society participation in the inter-ministerial task force on operation Garikai.
- Increasing greater cooperation, reciprocity and synergies among civil society to fight for social and economic justice. That civil society takes a more proactive role in advocating for social accountability especially among public office bearers and in public policy. That civil society scales up effort to get international support to provide human settlement issues to the poor and vulnerable.
- Increasing greater dialogue between the State, civil society and international community. To identify windows of opportunity to create dialogue and chart a way out of this malaise. The UN habitat can play a significant role. All players to take seriously the task of dialogue and consensus building on human settlement issues.
- That the international community scale up interventions in human settlement issues from humanitarian effort and move up to medium and longer term efforts. The international community need not go through the government channels but through established local NGOs in the housing sector who are in dire need of resources to support the poor and vulnerable.
- Increasing civil society engagement of rural issues such as rural housing, land policy, land allocation, audit of land usage, agrarian issues, and property rights protection.
- The demilitarization and de-politicization of public service, local authorities and state institutions. The central government must stop interfering in local government operations. For instance, Harare Commission is illegitimate and ZINWA is usurping local authority functions of providing water and sanitation.
- That the government undertakes corrective macro-economic policy and management to revive the economy and reduce poverty, unemployment and other key socio-economic ills.
- This report recommends the implementation of the recommendations of the UNSE report.
- To crown it all, this report recommends up scaling civic education on human rights, good governance, social accountability and participatory policy development and implementation. The report advocates a holistic approach to Zimbabwe's multi-faceted problems interfacing political, constitutional, economic, and social issues of which human settlement is just but one source of grievance.





Chapter 2

INTRODUCTION

Social accountability is an important component or strategic area in good governance and democracy. Anchored on the analysis of Operation Garikai/ Hlalani Khuhle, a successor operation to Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order, this report reviews the government of Zimbabwe initiatives at urban regeneration within the context of principles of national social accountability.

The Government of Zimbabwe launched its urban regeneration programme through demolition of all urban backyard cabins, tuck shops, fowl runs, informal

business units, and isolated housing cooperative units in high density suburbs among others through its Operation Murambatsvina starting on 18th May 2005. The official explanations state that the operation aimed at ridding our cities of filth, illegal housing and illegal businesses. According to the Churches of Zimbabwe, 'these objectives are noble. However, the methods and timing of the operation have left many scars of bitterness calling for healing'.¹

The Operation resulted in over 92,000 structures being destroyed, and between 650,000 and 700,000 families losing their shelter, livelihood or both, and in the process about 2, 4 million people or 18 percent of the total population were affected directly and indirectly.² This episode marked the beginning of government's adoption of the widely condemned militaristic operation approach as part of its crisis management tools and intervention strategies.³

Two years after, thousands of families whose structures and livelihoods were destroyed are still struggling to make ends meet. A significant number of victims are still holed up in transit camps set up by government such as Caledonia in Harare. **Elijah Mutemeri of coordinator at ZCTU**, observed that many others are living in tents and shacks for example in Epworth Hills and Hopley in Harare, Sakubva Hills in Mutare and on the outskirts of Nkulumane residential area in Bulawayo.⁴ **Barbra Kohlo, Regional Housing Advisor of Swedish Cooperative Centre, Southern Africa**, said, 'Operation Murambatsvina was a gross injustice. Victims have had to find means and ways of redressing their situation and no compensation was paid for losses they incurred'.⁵

Thus, Zimbabwe became the first country, not at war or experiencing natural disasters, to initiate internal displacement without proper remedy and to 'build' squatter settlement while forcing massive urban to rural migration.

Operation Murambatsvina and its progeny of operations led to serious human settlement challenges and human rights violations which affected mostly the orphans, widowed, elderly and, HIV and AIDS patients who were receiving ARV drugs in specially designated areas closer to their residential areas. Increasingly, the

¹ Churches of Zimbabwe, *The Zimbabwe we want: towards a national vision for Zimbabwe: a discussion document*, 15 September 2006, p.39

² United Nations Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe (led by Anna K. Tibaijuka), *Report of the fact finding mission to Zimbabwe to assess the scope and impact of Operation Murambatsvina*, 18 July 2005, p. 32-34.

³ See Crisis Group International, *Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina: The tipping point?* Africa Report No. 17, 17 August 2005; Action Aid International, *Zimbabwe demolitions: an Analysis of the demolitions in Zimbabwe*, 2005.

⁴ Interview with Elijah Mutemeri, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions Coordinator, NANGO Offices, Harare, 13 June 2007

⁵ Interview with Barbra Kohlo, Regional Housing Advisor, Swedish Cooperative Centre, Harare, 14 June 2007.



civil society sector found it compelling to initiate processes that draw to attention government's mandate and role in being accountable for its actions. This study forms the basis of raising key pointers that ought to be the rallying call for social accountability within the government in light of Operation Murambatsvina, Operation Garikai/ Hlalani Khuhle and other emerging issues.

Methodology

Operation Murambatsvina generated great concern and worry among the right thinking people, institutions and bodies the world over precipitating a huge but widely scattered catalogue of information. For a project whose fundamental thrust is social accountability, it is befitting that much of the generated information is from civil society. Yet, by the same token the paucity or inaccessibility of official documentation casts a saddening picture on the levels of interaction between the civil society and state. And the biggest problem is the complete lack of documentation jointly done by civil society and government on the operation. Thus, the report recommends greater reciprocity among civil society groups and, between the state and civil society.

NANGO organized regional task forces to strengthen civil society coordinating responses to humanitarian crises caused by Operation Murambatsvina. NANGO has five regional advocacy and taskforce units in the country: Northern Region based at Harare, Western Region based at Bulawayo, Southern Region based at Masvingo, Midlands Region based at Gweru and Eastern Region based at Mutare. On 14 March NANGO held its Northern Region advocacy and taskforce committee meeting on operation Murambatsvina with representatives from 18 civil society groups.⁶ On 17 March 2007, NANGO held the Western Region meeting with 12 committee members; on 29 March 2007 it held the Southern Region meeting with 14 members and on 30 March held the Midlands region meeting with 11 members.⁷ Unfortunately the Eastern Region meeting was not held due to perceived political tensions in the region at the time. This report is built upon the regional position, concerns, views and key outputs of these meetings.

This report also reviews key available reports, and published material particularly newspapers. The Herald, the government-run daily newspaper and also

the most wide read paper has been particularly useful in giving the official view of the state on the operation. The report is also informed by key informant interviews of people from key institutions and non governmental bodies, internet sources, pictorial accounts, videos and observations of the operation.

The most detailed and authoritative account of Operation Murambatsvina is the Report of the fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe to assess the scope and impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the United Nations Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe led by Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka. It was published on 18th July 2005.

Crisis Group International carried out its investigation and research on the operation and produced a report entitled Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina: the tipping point? It was published on 17th August 2005. Action Aid International also carried out and published its investigations entitled Zimbabwe demolitions; an analysis of the demolitions in Zimbabwe published in August 2005.

This report has used government reports on Operation Murambatsvina. The official announcement of the launch of the operation was by Sekesai Makwavarara, chairperson of the government appointed Harare Commission on 19th May 2005. A key official document is the Response by Government of Zimbabwe to the report by the UN special envoy on operation Murambatsvina/ restore order. The report as the name states is a response to the UNSE report.

This report is informed by the Zimbabwe's national housing delivery programme document; Operation Garikai/ Hlalani Kuhle: Shelter to the people published in December 2005. The parliamentary reports on Operation Restore Order provide valuable assessment of the policy targets and realities on the ground. The Second report of the portfolio committee on Local Government on progress made on the operation Garikai/ Hlalani Kuhle programme presented to Parliament of Zimbabwe in June 2006 has been extensively used. At the time of the writing of the report, efforts to get first hand information on the implementation and results of Operation Garikai from The Secretariat on Operation Garikai, a department of the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development, and from the City of Harare were still underway.

⁶New Hope Foundation, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Zimbabwe Association of Microfinance Institute (ZAMI), Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust (ZIMCET), Housing People Zimbabwe, ZNCWC, Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Association (ZIGIEA), National Association for (NASCOH), Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA), MS Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (ZLP), Women and Aids Support Network, Help Age, Community Working Group on Health, Zimbabwe Network of People Living Positively (ZNPP+), ZimRights.

⁷The full list of members of NANGO regional task force is included in the reference section.



Objectives/Terms of Reference of Report

Task 1:

To determine scope of Operation Murambatsvina and Garikai impact between May 2005 and May 2007.

Task 2:

To explore the extent to which UN Recommendations have been applied and not conformed.

Task 3:

To assess the degree to which displaced victims of Operation Murambatsvina have benefited from Operation Garikai.

Task 4:

To present a comparative analysis, trends of social accountability principles violated since the launch of "Operations" and the way forward as the 'National Audit Report of Operation Garikai within the context of promoting national social accountability'.

Outline of the report

Chapter one presents an executive summary of the report highlighting the Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kühle and presenting the key recommendations of this report. Chapter two introduces the goals and purpose of the report. Chapter three examines the concept of social accountability, its indicators and reviews Zimbabwe's record on social accountability giving current and historical perspectives.

Chapter four makes an overview of Operation Murambatsvina; its objectives, the official state

position and other explanation and motives. The chapter also examines the impact of the operation on social, economic and political situation. Chapter five examines the responses to operation Murambatsvina. The key response was by the United Nations and humanitarian bodies. The UNSE report situates the operation within humanitarian situation and the governance, human rights and democracy situation of the country. The chapter also presents responses from the Western countries, the African Union, SADC and African region. It highlights responses by civil society zeroing on the mitigation of the humanitarian crisis and the emerging issues of human rights and governance in Zimbabwe.

Chapter six examines the operation Garikai/Hlalani Kühle. It describes the programme, its objectives, process of reconstruction and its impact. A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges (SWOC) analysis highlights the key problems facing operation and the incapacity and insincerity of the State at offering genuine redress to victims of operation Murambatsvina. The chapter also provides opportunities that arose out of Murambatsvina.

Chapter seven presents operation Garikai within the concept of social accountability. It challenges the State perceptions and reactions to housing settlement issues arising out of the UNSE report. Based on available data and the analysis of the housing settlements issues in the country, this report observes that Operation Garikai fulfills the cliché: too little - too late. It is not pro-poor, gender sensitive and does not meet the basic requirements of social accountability. Finally, chapter eight presents the conclusions and recommendations of the audit report.





Chapter 3

SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY PRIOR TO OPERATION RESTORE ORDER

Concept and Indicators

The World Bank states that, 'conceptually, social accountability is the ability to require that public officials, private employers or service providers answer for their policies, actions, and use of funds. Social accountability is an approach, initiated by civil society or the state, towards building an accountable and responsible government by relying on civic engagement'.⁸

Key indicators:

- Political and democratic accountability;
- Participatory budgeting and public expenditure cycle;
- Public service performance analysis and appraisal.

Why is social accountability important?

First, accountability of public officials is the cornerstone of good governance and it is a requirement for democracy. Secondly, it contributes to increases in development effectiveness through more informed public policy design and public service delivery systems. Thirdly, social accountability leads to empowerment, particularly of the poor and marginalized groups in society such as women and the rural folks who through processes of local self government and civic participation identify and prioritize issues of local and national development. This section briefly makes a SWOC [Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Challenges] analysis of social accountability in Zimbabwe prior to Operation Restore Order in May 2005.

Social Accountability in Zimbabwean History

The colonial period

In April 1980, Zimbabwe gained Independence after 90 years of British colonial rule. Colonialism was a system whereby a minority group of Europeans held political, economic and social control and domination over the country. That colonial rule created social, economic, political, legal and institutional barriers for development, racial discrimination, inequities, and colossal injustices for the majority of African people among other ills is well documented.⁹

Taking the social accountability as an indicator of development, the colonial system fails on all accounts:

- There was no political and democratic accountability to cater for all people: e.g. elections, the media, independent judiciary and policy formulation.
- There was no participatory public expenditure process; e.g. public involvement in budget formulation, budget analysis, expenditure tracking and performance monitoring.

⁸ D. Arroyo, *Summary paper on the stocktaking of social accountability initiatives in Asia and the Pacific*, The World Bank, CESI, December 2004, p.4

⁹ See among others R. Palmer, *Land and racial domination in Southern Rhodesia*, London, Heinemann, 1977; H.V. Moyana, *The political economy of land in Zimbabwe*, Gweru, Mambo, 2002; I.R. Phimister, *An economic and social history of Zimbabwe*, London and New York, Longman, 1988.



- There were no systems of public and private service policy and performance measurement and accountability.

The colonial system was created to serve the needs of a minority racial group of Europeans through the ownership, control and domination of all resources, of which the key were; land and minerals, financial, political and legal instruments, social and African labour resources, among others. While the European dominated rich agricultural plantations and the urban sectors, Africans lived and eked a living out of agro-ecologically poorly endowed and infrastructure-deficit rural areas as poor subsistence farmers. A host of laws such as pass laws, public health laws, the urban registration and accommodation laws, and industrial conciliation regulations restricted the movement, participation and settlement of Africans in the urban areas. In fact, urban areas were considered European areas and Africans were allowed only if they served European purposes as workers.

In short, in terms of social accountability, whatever strengths of the colonial systems were overshadowed by the colossal racial injustices that dehumanized and commoditized the majority of Africans to fit into the political economy nothing more than as a factor of production, i.e. as providers of cheap, unskilled, and menial labour. On the basis of such injustices, the system was rightly destroyed by a liberation movement and process using guerilla tactics entailing the guerillas and the masses in a symbiotic relationship akin to that of fish and water. The guerillas were the fighters and leaders of the movement while the masses: ordinary people, women, girls, young men, old people, workers and students all played their part in the revolution.

The 1980s Socialist Structures

In April 1980, the newly Independent nation of Zimbabwe inherited from the colonial past, in terms of social accountability a problem infested country. The compromise Lancaster House Constitution, legal and institutional structures favoured the old colonial masters. Thus, economic systems; ownership and control of resources, in particular land, minerals and the urban formal sectors, were dominated by a minority of white capitalists. At the social level, the majority of African population had no access to education, health, employment and the urban modern way of life.

At the political level, founding fathers of the nation had strong militaristic and socialist - revolutionary background and the majority of the Africans were used to the paternalistic colonial and African traditional systems. Also, in the early 1980s elements of the civil society such as the labour and women's movements were co-opted into organs of the state resulting in clients-patronage relationship between various elements of civil society and the state. At the regional

level, the country faced the threat of suffocation from the Apartheid South Africa. The above mentioned catalogue of ills was unhealthy for the development of social accountability mechanisms and principles in Zimbabwe. Nonetheless, the country was full of potential and opportunities for economic, social, and political development.

Key opportunities were in the form of translating the high expectations among the majority of the people for freedom and independence into the realities of sustainable socially generated and accountable systems and taking advantage of courtship from the Eastern and the Western blocs during the Cold War. Indeed, the government of the day initiated massive programmes of social engineering and welfare in health, education, food provision, transport, access to urban areas and opportunities. A survey of the budgetary allocation and expenditure of the 1980s reflects spending in three main areas whose order of priority was education, health and the military/defense.

The results of such expenditure are evident. By the end of the 1980s, Zimbabwe had one of the best education and primary health delivery systems in Africa. This was positive for addressing some of the social ills of the colonial era. Nonetheless, the state was the vehicle of social engineering and mechanisms for citizens' participation, measurement and assessment of social progress were lacking. The success of the social engineering was inspite of the lack of participatory civic engagement. The state set the targets, implemented the programmes and claimed ownership of the results of social welfare. Citizens were mere recipients of development agenda, thus creating a clients-patronage relationship between the state and citizens. The positive side was that at the very least, the state was well informed of the choices and priorities at the time. But lack of civic participation was inexcusable and set a bad precedent for the future.

Budgetary allocation and spending for military and defense purposes have always been in the top three of the Zimbabwe's priorities even during peace time. In the 1980s involvement in regional wars, particularly the Mozambique civil war and assistance rendered to South African liberation movements took a huge proportion of national spending. This was, however, justified given the support that regional countries had offered to our liberation movement. Nonetheless, there was no adequate input from the civil society in terms of prioritizing, monitoring and performance assessment of public expenditure on such important initiatives which was inexcusable. The 1980s socialist culture bred a system where the state monopolized setting and implementing development priorities without checks and balances which are prerequisite for social accountability. Part of the problem was that the civil society movements had no capacity to demand what



rightfully belonged to them. One of the key recommendations of this report is for the civil movements to stand up for their rights.

At the domestic level heavy expenditure on the military forces, lack of civic participation and absence of checks and balances went awfully wrong, thus facilitating the politicization of armed forces. The Gukurahundi operations of ethnic cleansing, ruthlessly executed by the North Korean trained Fifth Brigade, in Midlands and Matabeleland provinces are a case in point of the consequences of the weaknesses of political and democratic elements of social accountability. The end of the civil war in 1987 entrenched a one party political dictatorship premised around the leadership of a charismatic yet ruthless founding father of the nation, Robert Mugabe. From a political economy perspective, by the end of the 1980s, Zimbabwe had begun to reap the fruits of lack of social accountability systems. The decade which had opened with high hopes of independence ended on an anti climax of corruption scandals in high office¹⁰, students' demonstration and increased state political repression.

At the international level, Zimbabwean socialist rhetoric frightened away investment and commitments made by western countries to support reconstruction and development programmes in the early 1980s, particularly in terms of providing assistance for the purchase of farms from white owners under the willing seller willing buyer formula. Together with constitutional guarantees protecting private property, this was a lost opportunity for peaceful structural changes in the ownership and control of Zimbabwean economy. For its part, indigenous civic societies in rural and farming sectors had no capacity to articulate their interests outside the realm of state policies and were by and large appendages of the state. A key recommendation of this report is strengthening the capacity of civil society in rural areas and the articulation of rural issues particularly the land and agrarian issues.

On the whole, the lack of capacity of civil society to take its role in advocating for social accountability was one of the lost opportunities of the 1980s; it allowed the ZANU PF government to put in place autocratic socialist political and military systems. While acknowledging the benefits of socialist-welfare policies particularly in education and health sectors, these systems were beneficial despite the lack of, and not because of, social accountability systems in place. In other words, the successes of these programmes enabled the state to entrench a clients-patronage relationship with the people; a system in which the state is not accountable to the people.

The 1990s liberalization era

The 1990s decade opened on a note of shrinking economic base due partly to low investment climate and heavy spending on social services. Typical of the lack of social accountability, the state initiated World Bank structural adjustment programmes and successor economic liberalization programmes clandestinely. Although the state had tacit support of some arms of the business sector, it nonetheless did no consult with the people and had no full mandate of the people.

The disastrous consequences of the liberalization programmes in terms of disempowering social and economic systems and peoples are well documented.¹¹ Suffice to say that social delivery systems were the key losers of the programme; government spending on education and health were drastically cut. Yet key global problems such as HIV and AIDS were emerging in the country. In this context the structural adjustment programmes initiated a false start in Zimbabwe's HIV and AIDS intervention strategies. Economically, formal sectors down sized and sent packing thousands of workers in the name of increasing efficiency, privatization and rationalization. Laid off skilled workers found their way into the informal activities and the poor urbanities found homes in the growing urban slums.

From a political and governance angle, the 1990s were highly contradictory. Regular elections were held, a signal of democratic performance and yet the systems of biased referees in the form of electoral supervisory commissions and many institutionalized biases guaranteed the political survival of the founding fathers and made a mockery of the systems as genuine forms of social accountability. Nonetheless, political liberalization opened up room for private print media, and for a while limited freedom of press was enjoyed as non government controlled newspapers such as Daily News, The Independent, The Financial Gazette among others operated relatively freely and a limited television station also operated.

In the 1990s, a most promising element was the rise of the civil movements. Due to the necessities of conditions such as increasing social, economic and political deprivation the decade saw the rise of serious labour, students, women's, environmentalists, human rights, war veterans and faith based movements among others. These mainly urban movements achieved relative successes in calling the state to account for its actions and as watchdogs protecting the rights of their constituencies. The decade also saw the emergence of the most viable political opposition party in 1999, the

¹⁰ See *Report of the second commission of inquiry into the distribution of motor vehicles* under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice W. R. Sandura, August 1989.

¹¹ See among others, A.S. Mlambo, *Economic structural adjustment programmes; the case of Zimbabwe, 1990-95* Harare, UZ, 1997 and M.N. Ncube, 'Epochs of economic structural adjustment in Zimbabwe and their social dimension, 1965-95' in G.W. Sherperd, *Economic justice in Africa, adjustment and sustainable development*, London, Greenwood Press, 1994



Movement for Democratic Change anchored on alliances among the elements of the urban poor and middle classes, labour, constitutional change and human rights movements among other civic movements.

Yet for all their promising achievements, civil society failed to address and effectively articulate the interests of the rural poor, and in particular, the need for structural reform in the land and agrarian issues. The war veteran movement and the indigenous farmer movement were not civic enough to go beyond state objectives on land and agrarian issues. The mainly urban based labour movements and other civil movements also fall short in this regard. In addition, the relative neglect of the rural areas was carried at the international donor level. The late 1990s donor conference on land failed to raise funding for the redress of imbalances in land ownership and control structures. Thus, more than two decades after independence, the land and agrarian issues, cornerstones of the liberation movement, had not been seriously attended to by the state, the civil society and the international community.

In the face of growing scrutiny from the civil society for accountability in the 1990s, the Zimbabwe state showed an extraordinary resilience and immunity to social accountability principles. In the late 1990s the state offered a huge unbudgeted financial hand out to veterans of the liberation war and effectively bought their support to counteract other civic movements. Also in the late 1990s the state got entangled, without the mandate of the citizens, in a protracted and costly war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These two negative economic factors, added to the liberalized and weakened economy destroyed social safety nets in the country. The 1990s decade ended on an uneasy note for the founding fathers-led ZANU-PF regime as it was confronted by mounting crisis due to failure of economic liberalization, disastrous military escapades and rising political opposition.

From a social accountability perspective, the 1990s decade had mixed fortunes. On the positive side, there were critical developments in the emergence of viable civic society movements demanding accountability in a number of spheres. The state on its part instituted legal and institutional framework enabling the operations of such movements, and to some extent there was healthy dialogue between the two. However, the downside was that mounting economic and social pressure increasingly led the state to adopt a larger mentality. For instance, students, workers, women and war veterans became more militant in the expression of their interests. At the end of the decade, the state used

different tactics to react to civic demands. It used a combination of conflictive and harmonic relationship thus creating factions among the civil society by establishing links with some groups such as the war veterans associations while confronting others such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and National Constitutional Assembly, and effectively silencing the students' movement through heavy handed military style security systems, draconian legislation and economic warfare.

Social accountability, 2000-2005

On February 14th 2000, the ZANU PF government received a valentine gift from the people of Zimbabwe that shook its very soul, i.e., the first major defeat at the hands of the people, in a constitutional referendum. The failure of constitutional changes triggered state inspired farms invasions by war veterans, members of security forces and ZANU PF supporters mobilized under the banner of landless people. Action Aid International succinctly observes that 'what followed was an orgy of violence on those farms that spread throughout the country'.¹² From 2000 Zimbabwean economy, political and social situation plunged in free fall with the state disregarding law, human rights, economic logic and social justice.

Concluding remarks

Zimbabwe has historically experienced see-saw fluctuations and is currently on the lowest ebb of social accountability. During the colonial period there was no social accountability at all. In the 1980s, the state mobilized and manipulated civic organizations through nationalistic appeals. It established co-optations and patronage links with labour and women's organizations among other civic movements. This weakened the mechanisms of social accountability.

In the 1990s, there was a combination of conflictive and harmonic relationship between the state and civic movements. By the end of the 1990s, the civic movement had made important inroads engaging the state for social accountability. And in the post 2000 period, Zimbabwe's civil society has weakened relative to the strengthening of state autocratic mechanisms. Civil society is split along ideological lines, poorly coordinated, under resources in terms of funding and human resources capacity, largely urban based and partly co-opted into the ZANU-PF. Due to weakness in accountability mechanisms there is a dictatorship in the country premised on the militarization of most spheres of life.

¹²Action Aid International, *Zimbabwe Demolitions: an analysis of the demolitions in Zimbabwe*, Harare, AA1, 2005





Chapter 4

OPERATION MURAMBATSVINA

Introduction

The growth of human settlement crisis, 1980s-2005

The human settlement crisis was epitomized by a relatively large informal economy and informal housing units lacking and or overstressing basic social amenities such as water, sanitation, roads, electricity, lighting, garbage collection and safety. The UNSE established that at independence, the informal sector accounted for less than 10 percent of the labour force due to restrictive colonial laws prohibiting free movement of Africans from rural to urban areas. Although, by the end of 1980s, the country celebrated great strides in social capacity building, namely health and education, there were growing gaps between the manpower training and capacity of the economy to absorb increasing numbers of skilled people. In

addition, the relaxation of colonial labour and pass laws facilitated the movement of people from rural to urban areas thus further fuelling the informal sector which accounted for 20 percent of the labour force in 1986/87.

The impact of structural adjustment programmes in the early 1990s added to the swelling unemployment levels and the informal sector was the shock absorber of retrenched workers from the formal sector. In 1991, the informal sector accounted for 27 percent of the labour force and by 2004, the figure stood at a staggering 40 percent.¹³ With the shrinking urban formal sector, disruption of farming systems from year 2000 and drought, informal sector in the urban areas and gold panning in rural areas became the mainstay for the majority of the people. In the urban areas, the ZCTU stated that local authorities derived substantial revenue from informal activities.¹⁴ In addition, 3 to 4 million Zimbabweans earned their living through the informal sector and supported about 5 million people, while the formal sector employed only 1.3 million people. From a gender perspective, some activities such as flea markets were dominated by women engaging in cross border trading.

On a national scale, local authorities generally failed to proactively engage and regulate the informal sector into small and medium business units. There were poor and overtly restrictive licensing policies thus pushing many informal vendors, for instance, into underground activities. However, in Bulawayo, for instance, a regulatory framework existed in the informal cum small and medium size businesses. Nonetheless, in other cities, notably Harare, poorly regulated business environment was replicated with poorly designed, poorly funded and unregulated housing in the urban areas.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the influx of people from rural areas to urban areas was not matched with increase in social services such as provision of affordable housing, water, roads, and electricity and sewer systems. Despite various schemes such as the government sponsored Home Ownership Schemes and Housing Upgrading Programmes and multiple private sector housing schemes there was not enough provision of cheap and affordable housing units to meet the demands of the low end of the social scale. There was no forward looking policy providing serviced land in urban areas for putting up decent housing structures with the poor and medium income people in mind. In

¹³ UNSE report, p.17.

¹⁴ Quoted in UNSE, p 17



addition deteriorating macro-economic situations in the 1980s and 1990s meant that there was not enough revenue to facilitate urban expansion. The gap between the number of people on the housing waiting list and housing units delivered was yawning, see table below for selected years, 1999-2004.

Housing waiting list and houses built

Year	Housing list	Houses built
1999	104 627	1 564
2000	110 174	854
2001	115 549	555
2002	67 909	725
2003	79 900	569
2004	96 099	220

Source: Adapted from Toriro, Town planning in Zimbabwe.

The National Housing Programme of 2003 acknowledged the inability of the government to provide decent and affordable housing. For instance, the annual target of 162,000 housing units went only as far as 15,000 to 20,000 units per year,¹⁵ meeting about 13 percent of the target annually. The cumulative deficit is astounding.

Given the real demand for housing, poverty and the low income nature of the majority of the informal sector workers backyard cabins and shacks was the only housing option open to the low income groups. In addition, the relaxation in enforcing compliance with strict by-laws of the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act (Chapter 29: 12/ 1976) and related laws concerning housing extensions and buildings allowed the majority of people to build unregulated structures notably in the high density suburbs. Furthermore, war veterans and ordinary people took advantage of the chaos of the fast track land reform programme to occupy to occupy and develop stands in the outlying areas of major cities. In 2000, 61,000 housing stands were created by the chaotic land reform programme.¹⁶ Thus, by 2005 slums became a common eyesore in all urban areas.

Barbra Kohlo argues that the problem was not housing issue per se but a progressive decline in human settlement issues over years.¹⁷ Local governments had no resources to cope with demands of increasing urban

population. There was no plan for urban expansion to cater for rapid urban growth since the 1980s. Also there was no forward thinking financial and land plan to cater for urban expansion. There was no bulk infrastructure put in place or renovations or upgrading of existing water, sewer, roads and other infrastructure to cater for urban expansion. The informal housing and business sector covered for the weaknesses in the system. The informal sector were not the root of the human settlement problems in the country but were symptoms of larger problems of poor planning, poor allocation of resources and governance inefficiencies of local and central authorities.

Overview of operation Murambatsvina

In May, June and July 2005 the state ruthlessly descended and destroyed informal housing and business units starting in Harare and spreading to all the urban areas in the country.

Chronology of Key Events¹⁸

31 March 2005

Parliamentary elections results announced. MDC took 26 of the 30 parliamentary seats in major towns and cities. ZANU PF won the election taking almost all the rural vote and only 4 out of 30 urban votes.

Comment: Thus, there is a sense that ZANU PF is a rural party and MDC is an urban party.

18 May 2005

Gideon Gono, the Governor of Reserve Bank called for reorientation of law and enforcement bodies to fight widespread corruption and and indiscipline that he blamed for the country's economic and financial problems.

Comment: The UNSE wrote that 'there has been speculation as to the timing of the speech and the Governor's role in triggering the operation'.¹⁹

19 May 2005

Sekesai Makwavarara, Chairperson of Harare Commission launched Operation Murambatsvina 'to enforce by-laws to stop all forms of illegal activities'.

¹⁵ Quoted in UNSE report, p. 24.

¹⁶ P. Toriro, 'Town planning in Zimbabwe: history, challenges and the urban renewal operation Murambatsvina' in F. Maphosa, K. Kujinga and S. Chingarande, (eds), *Zimbabwe's development experiences since 1980: challenge and prospects for the future*, Harare, OSREA, (forthcoming).

¹⁷ Interview June 14, 2007

¹⁸ Chronology of events is based on reports from *The Herald*, the state-run and main daily newspaper.

¹⁹ Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, *Order out of chaos, chaos out of order? A ordinary report on operation Murambatsvina* (Harare, June 2005) quoted in UNSE, *Report of fact finding mission to Zimbabwe*, p13.



23 May 2005

Ignatius Chombo, Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development said government was aware that many people were making a living through roadside and street vending, and at flea markets. He said, 'illegal vending points had become havens for criminals; black market trading of basic commodities and foreign currency'.

Sekesai Makwavarara said 'SEDCO will finance the construction of market stalls and malls' after the demolition of illegal structures.

24 May 2005

The Herald carried a headline story, 'Blitz targets tuck shops, shacks, and owners given 3 months ultimatum'. **Nomutsa Chideya, Harare City Town Clerk** said, 'council had written to property owners giving them **3 months notices** to residents whose properties have shacks or illegal structures to bring them down or apply for regularization'.

Comment: the 3 months notice period was not adhered, demolitions started the following day.

26 May 2005

Informal traders and police clash in Glen View as police press ahead with the clean up operation, property worth millions of dollars was destroyed; police torch illegal structures, makeshift furniture manufacturing units and furniture worth millions of dollars. Informal traders said that they were not given enough time to remove their furniture and goods for safe keeping.

David Karimanzira, Harare Metropolitan Resident Minister said all illegal structures will be destroyed in order to restore the status of the city and that all work on the peri-urban development has been stopped to ensure proper peri-urban development procedures were followed. He said, 'residents have built structures, which include wooden structures around their homes. All structures will be Removed No one should settle anywhere in Harare, particularly on peri-urban farms without authority'. He further stated that council would within two weeks provide alternative land for those displaced people, while street kids and vagrants would be taken into homes and centers.

Comment: most of the structures in peri-urban areas were built on farms occupied by war veterans, ZANU PF supporters, and generally landless urban dwellers during the fast track land reform process of 2000. There was encouragement during 2000 to occupy farms as part of election campaigns.

28 May 2005

President Robert Mugabe backs clean up as police razed to the ground Harare's biggest illegal settlement –Tongogara Park at Whitecliff farm along the Harare-Bulawayo road. While addressing the ZANU PF Central Committee session he said, 'our cities and towns had deteriorated to the level that were a real cause for concern. Apart from failing reticulation systems and broken roads, our cities and towns, including Harare, the capital, had become havens of illicit and criminal practices and activities which just could not be allowed to go on'.

Comment: the UNSE wrote that 'The government of Zimbabwe is collectively responsible for what has happened... it appears that there was no collective decision-making with respect to both the conception and implementation of Operation Restore Order'... the people and government of Zimbabwe should hold to account those responsible for the injury caused by the Operation. However, lack of evidence is not evidence for lack of decision making at the highest level.

31 May 2005

Siya-so and Mupedzanhamo destroyed. There were heaps of belongings strewn all over Mbare Musika bus terminal with people hoping they would get transport to transport their property to rural areas. The operation had actually caused disharmony among families as The Herald team reported that it witnessed an incident in which a dejected woman burnt her belongings that it witnessed an incident in which a **dejected woman burnt her belongings that included a bed, small chairs and other personal goods and items.**

17 June 2005

Government announces a rebuilding programme to accommodate victims of Operation Murambatsvina and homeless civil servants.

26 June 2005

Arrival of UNSE on Human Settlement Issues

28 July 2005

Vice President Joyce Teurairopa Muzuru reportedly made an appeal noting that Operation Murambatsvina had officially ended, 'We welcome any help we can get from the International community, including the United Nations Organizations which we cooperate in so many other humanitarian endeavors. I appeal to the International community to stop stone throwing, but to join us in this noble effort to promote the good of our people'. (IRIN)



30 June 2005

Operation Garikai officially launched at Whitecliff in the presence of UNSE with Vice President Joseph Msika and Minister of Local Government, National Housing and Urban Development, Ignatius Chombo.

Comment: there is skepticism that this was a window dressing exercise meant to paint a picture that Operation Murambatsvina was part of a bigger picture which Operation Garikai was fulfilling.

9 July 2005

Departure of UNSE

Objectives of operation Murambatsvina

The objectives of Operation Murambatsvina rest in a combination of technical and political arguments. The official position advanced by the state and local government put emphasis on the technical, legal, economic and health reasons while civil society and humanitarian forces add a political dimension to the objectives of the operation.

The official position

Sekesai Makwavarara announced that Operation Murambatsvina was “a programme to enforce by laws to stop all forms of illegal activities. These violations of the by-laws are in areas of vending, traffic control, illegal structures, touting/ abuse of commuters by rank marshals, street life/ prostitution, vandalism of property infrastructure, stock theft, and illegal cultivation, among others have led to the deterioration of standards thus negatively affecting the image of the City. The...City of Harare has lost its glow. We are determined to bring it back”.²⁰

Responding to the UNSE report, the Government of Zimbabwe post rationalized the objectives of Operation Murambatsvina as inter alia:

- Stem disorderly or chaotic urbanization that hinder the Government and local authority by law and providing service delivery e.g. water, electricity, sewage and refuse removal;
- minimize the threat of major diseases outbreaks due to overcrowding and squalor stop economic crimes especially black market in foreign currency;

- eliminate parallel market and fight economic sabotage;
- reorganize Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSSMEs);
- arrest social ills among them prostitution which promotes the spread of HIV/ AIDS and other communicable diseases;
- stop the hoarding of consumer commodities, and other commodities in short supply, and
- Reverse environmental damage and threat to water resources caused by inappropriate and unlawful settlements.²¹

The government pointed out that the operation was a follow-up to the anti-corruption campaign started in early 2004 to cleanse the financial services sector, which had become the centre of speculative activities.²² The local and central governments presented the operation as an attempt to implement internationally agreed goals and objectives. For instance, the purposes to ‘clean up the city’, to ‘have cities without slums’ and ‘to secure people’s long term interests’ resonate with the goals of Habitat Agenda of the MDGs 7, target 10 on water and sanitation, and target 11 on slum upgrading.²³

The official position thus puts strong emphasis on the ‘legality’ of the process. However, the manner in which the operation was carried out raised a lot of concern, in particular the indifference to human suffering points to other explanations behind the operations.

Other Explanations

Political motives:

- Retribution against the urban electoral base of opposition party, the MDC.
- Checking the power and influence of war veterans
- Pre-emptive strike to prevent popular uprising in the face of deepening economic and social problems. Similar uprisings had taken place in Eastern European states- Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan.
- The reversal of rural-urban migration
- Diverting the attention of the president from concerns over the underutilization of invaded farms.

The Impacts

Operation Murambatsvina had significant negative impact on the economy, social, political and institutional factors of the country.²⁴

²⁰ *The Herald*, 28 May 2005

²¹ GoZ, *Response by Government of Zimbabwe to the report by the UN special envoy on Operation Murambatsvina / Restore Order*, (Harare, Government Printer, August 2005), p. 5-6.

²² Response to UNSE, Aug 2005, p.2.

²³ UNSE, Report, p.71.

²⁴ Data from this section is borrowed mainly from the UNSE Report and Action Aid International.



Social and humanitarian impacts

The UNSE noted that Operation Murambatsvina rendered people homeless and destitute, and created humanitarian and developmental needs that required significant investment and assistance over many years.²⁵

The Numbers' Game

Precise figures of the population affected by the operation cannot be determined. However, the UNSE Report remains the most thorough analysis of population directly and indirectly affected by the Operation Murambatsvina. It puts the total figure of people directly affected by the operation ranging from 650,000 to 700,000 having lost their houses, sources of livelihood or both. And the total figure of people indirectly affected by the Operation ranged between 2.1 million and 2.56 million, about 10 percent of the population. Based on the above estimates the total figure of population directly and indirectly affected by the operation was put at 2.4 million or 18 percent of the population.²⁶

On the contrary the State disputes the figures of provided by the UNSE report. On its part the State points out that at the time of the UNSE visit there were 1,077 households, 892 households and 726 households in transit camps in Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare respectively. It also argues that 'the average family size of tenants in out-buildings could only range between 1 to 2 people per household'.²⁷ The figures released by the government are a poor case of damage limitation exercise. They are not worth considering in this report.

Meanings of the numbers game

The scale of the humanitarian consequences of the Operation was unprecedented for a country not at war or under natural disaster. It took place against a backdrop of deepening vulnerability due to a combination of factors; food insecurity, HIV and AIDS pandemic, high levels of poverty, limited capacity in basic services and low level of social accountability. Tens of thousands of victims were holed up in transit camps, Caledonia being the biggest with 5,000 people without shelter and adequate food, poor water and sanitation, and without schools and other social facilities.

In 2005, estimates put the adult population with HIV and AIDS at 24, 6 percent in Zimbabwe. On that basis

the UNSE estimated that 79,500 HIV and AIDS infected persons were displaced. This disrupted HIV and AIDS services such as ARV treatment, home-based care and prevention services.

Highly vulnerable children were also displaced.

- An estimated 83,530 children under 5 years were displaced by the operation.
- An estimated 113,000 children between 5 and 11, and 109,000 aged 12-18 were directly affected by the Operation, thus disrupting school attendance and education.
- The UNSE pointed out that of the 1, 3 million Zimbabwe's orphans and street children, a large number were also affected.

Unconfirmed numbers of teachers were displaced and in some cases schools were closed. At transit camps such as Caledonia in Harare and Sports Oval in Mutare, there are no school facilities.

Women and girls

An estimated 40,800 women headed families were directly affected by the operation. Most lost their homes and sources of livelihood. The report noted that there is a risk that displaced women and girls could be forced into transactional sex, because of economic destitution.²⁸

Other vulnerable groups affected by the operation included an estimated 26,600 people aged 60 and above. At Caledonia transit camp about 50 physically and mentally challenged persons were identified.

Economic Impacts

Countrywide the informal sector was reduced to a shadow of its former self, rendering individuals and households destitute, and significantly slowing down national economic progress. Urban municipalities lost revenue from taxes previously collected from the informal sector. Also substantial housing stock was destroyed. The operation destroyed and disrupted livelihoods of about 2, 56 million people who were coping, however, poorly with prolonged economic crisis.²⁹

Political Impacts

The Operation exacerbated an already tense and polarized climate characterized by mistrust and fear. It

²⁵ UNSE, p. 31

²⁶ UNSE Report, p.32-34

²⁷ Govt Response, p.29.

²⁸ UNSE Report, P.44.

²⁹ UNSE Report, P.71.



entrenched the breakdown in dialogue between the government and civil society. Thus, it has catastrophic effect on the social accountability processes and there is greater need to build bridges of dialogue and cooperation between the State and the civil society.

UNSE wrote that the operation was efficiently executed in a militaristic style. It showed that the government has the capacity to implement policies 'at lightning speed when it has the political will'. It sent strong signals to any potential dissenting voices of the capacity of the state to employ violence as a ruthless tactic to implement policy and laws, however flawed.

Institutional Impacts

The Operation was conducted by the Central Government authorities, including the police, military and intelligence forces, in an area that legally falls under the purview of the local government. The operation manifested the governance crisis, lack of respect of law in the manner in which the operation was carried out and indifference to human suffering. It was a continuation of the disregard for law and other due processes that were witnessed in 2000 land invasions.

The built environment

The impacts of the operation on the built environment were huge. Some described the operation as 'tsunami' referring to the flattening effect it had on residential and business units. In a flash all backyard, squatter settlements and informal business units were leveled and burnt. It appeared as if a huge earthquake or a tsunami had hit the major urban areas with rubble strewn all over the place. When the dust had settled, for perhaps the first time in the living memory, rows of small core houses became

visible in major residential areas such as Mbare, Makokoba and Sakubva. In the central business districts, the visible pictures of buildings and office are also unmistakable. The disappearance of huge heaps of garbage, and plastic shelters in the name of flea markets from the city centers are also clear.

Concluding remarks

Operation Murambatsvina was one of the most cataclysmic processes in the history of Zimbabwe since 1980. The motives, planning and execution of the operation by the state are highly contentious issues. The operation led to the one of the worst humanitarian crisis any country has experienced outside war or natural disaster situations.

The operation had negative impacts on the governance, human rights and democratization processes in the country. To argue that the process had positive effect on the built environment is cynical given that the same effect could have been achieved through much more humane means and participatory strategies. What makes Operation Murambatsvina the more painful is that it hit hardest at the most vulnerable and poorest sections of our society. Their crime was poverty, poverty that was not of their making. The operation further victimized victims of our disfigured history, politics and socio-economic circumstances and lack of social accountability.





Chapter 5

RESPONSES TO OPERATION RESTORE ORDER

The United Nations

Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary General sent the UNSE led by Anna K. Tibaijuka on a fact finding mission to Zimbabwe to report on the operation. The UNSE report brought to the attention of the international community the humanitarian crisis unleashed by the operation.

Objectives of the mission were to:

- assess the scope and extent of the mass evictions, the humanitarian needs and the impact on the affected population;
- assess the adequacy of the Government's arrangements for the displaced people and its

capacity to address the basic needs of the affected population;

- assess the capacity of the humanitarian community to respond; and
- Prepare a comprehensive report to the Secretary General on the situation with recommendations on how the conditions of those affected may be addressed.

Kofi Annan described UNSE Report on Operation Murambatsvina as 'profoundly distressing' and that the operation 'has done a catastrophic injustice to as many as 700,000 of Zimbabwe's poorest citizens through indiscriminate actions, carried out with disquieting indifference to human suffering'.³⁰

UNSE Recommendations

1. to facilitate humanitarian within a pro-poor, gender sensitive policy framework that provides security of tenure, affordable housing, water and sanitation, and create a regulated and enabling environment for the pursuit of small scale income generation activities
 - establish alternative housing and structures for SMEs
 - establish effective trade licensing systems.
2. Review the outdated Regional, Town and Country Planning Act and other Acts to align the substance and procedures of these Acts with the social, economic and cultural realities facing the majority of the people.
 - Establish a shelter forum to spearhead changes in legislation
 - Establish a compensation trust fund to assist those affected by the operations.
3. The UN to work with government of Zimbabwe to mobilize resources to assist and avert further suffering, given that Zimbabwe has limited capacity for the urban renewal programme.
4. Restore climate of trust and dialogue between different spheres of government and civil society starting with broad-based consultation among Zimbabwean stakeholder.
5. Macroeconomic policy reforms focusing on providing secure land tenure in urban and rural areas
 - Accommodate former farm workers
 - Compensate former white commercial farmers

³⁰ Quoted in Crisis



6. Accountability, good governance and issue of human rights
 - The government of Zimbabwe is collectively responsible for Operation Murambatsvina. The people and Government should hold to account those responsible for the injury caused by the Operation.

The West

The European Union and the United States criticized Operation Murambatsvina and maintained targeted sanctions in place. However, support for humanitarian aid was maintained.

SADC and regional

The Southern Africa Development Community, African Union and other regional bodies have not reacted to Operation Murambatsvina. South Africa, the regional giant maintained its policy of quite diplomacy when it comes to Zimbabwe issues.

Civil Society

Responses by NGOs and Civil Society varied reflecting their different goals and objectives in Zimbabwe. Civil society can be divided into roughly two groups. The first consists of humanitarian bodies with examples such as UNICEF, Christian Care, Zimbabwe Red Cross Society, Save the Children, Inter Country People's Aid, World Vision, Desert International, and World Food Programme among others. This category of NGOs provided humanitarian assistance and dealt with the immediate requirements of the victims of the Operation Murambatsvina.

The second group of NGOs consists of human rights activists. This group was concerned with the long term measures for dealing with fundamental problems of governance and economic development in the country. For example Zimbabwe Human Rights Lawyers sought legal measures to challenge Operation Murambatsvina. Crisis Zimbabwe, Amnesty International, Action Aid, the Catholic Church, and some church leaders such as Archbishop Pius Ncube also stood up against the violation of human rights and poor governance. The South African Council of Churches supported human rights activists in Zimbabwe. Yet there were church

leaders, notably Bishop Obadiah Msindo of Africa Destiny Church and Bishop Kunonga of the Anglican Church who supported government's Operation Murambatsvina.



Concluding remarks

The United Nations set the precedent in reacting to Operation Murambatsvina. It touched on both immediate humanitarian requirements to mitigate the impacts of the operation on the most vulnerable groups. Also it dealt with the longer range of issues relating to structural problems of governance, human rights and economic development.

The civil society and NGOs response can be roughly divided into the same pattern. Western countries viewed the operation as a manifestation of the problems of governance and human rights abuses under the legal and technical smokescreens. Nonetheless, they supported humanitarian efforts to the victims. The African Union, SADC and other regional institutions remained numb on the operation following the attitude of 'big brother' South Africa's quite diplomacy.





Chapter 6

OPERATION GARIKAI/ HLALANI KUHLE

Description

Operation Garikai/ Hlalani Kuhle was announced by the government as a logical follow up to Operation Murambatsvina. However, others are skeptical about the timing and scope of Operation Garikai arguing that it was a government ploy to influence of the outcome the UNSE report.

Writing in December 2005, about six months after the official launch of the programme, the official position is that it: 'is being implemented in the context of the National Housing Programme and is aimed at providing decent, functional and affordable accommodation as well as creating an enabling and conducive

environment that promotes micro, small and medium sized business enterprises, in line with Habitat Agenda'.³¹

According to the Report of the Parliament Portfolio Committee on Local Government Operation Garikai was originally planned in two phases.³² Phase one targeted building 5,000 housing units nationwide by the end of the year 2005. Under phase two the government planned to construct 10,000 housing units. However, in September 2005 the strategy was changed; phases one and two were combined into one. In the context of the changes, the new phase two became 'aided self-help schemes where developers, employers, cooperatives and individuals were allocated unserviced land to build their own houses. The role of the government under phase two was to identify land, provide technical assistance, direct local authorities to allocate stands and monitor developments on land in liaison with local authorities.

Objectives

Official statements say operation Garikai aimed at promoting large scale delivery of low-cost housing, vending and marketing, as well as small and medium business sites.³³ Thus, it aimed at providing housing, and business units and sites to largely victims of Operation Murambatsvina. By the same token it aimed at providing business sites and housing units meeting properly laid out legal and municipal development by-laws such as the provision of adequate services such as water, electricity, and sewage and refuse removal. Also, the operation aimed at creating an environment that promoted micro, small and medium size business enterprise.

The process

During the first phase the government aimed at building housing units, vendor marts and factory shells. During the second phase the government and local authorities provided unserviced land for self help housing development units. 'At every construction site', wrote the Portfolio Committee on Housing, 'there were two site managers, one from the Zimbabwe National Army and one from City Architecture Department'.³⁴

In terms of funding the government announced Z\$3 trillion as seed money and released another Z\$3 trillion under the National Housing Facility disbursed through

³¹ Zimbabwe, *Operation Garikai/ Hlalani Kuhle: Shelter for the people*, Harare, Government Printer, December 2005.

³² Parliament of Zimbabwe, *Second report of the portfolio committee on local government on progress made on operation Garikai/ Hlalani Kuhle programme* First Session, Sixth Parliament, June 2006

³³ Govt response to UNSE, p.15.

³⁴ Ibid, p.10



building societies to help individuals in the construction of the homes.³⁵ However, at the practical level there were many irregularities in the funding schemes. For instance, the initial budget was Z\$3 trillion was to be disbursed in tranches of Z\$206 billion per week, however, the disbursements averaged \$40 billion per week.³⁶ This demoralized workers. It is also reported that funds set aside for construction of vendor marts and factory shells were disbursed through SEDCO instead of provincial construction committees through the national housing fund. This slowed down the take off these categories of construction under the programme.³⁷

There seem to be no rational system of beneficiary selection for the occupation of houses built under Operation Garikai. In Bulawayo all houses under Operation Garikai were allocated to victims of Operation Murambatsvina, civil servants, and those on the housing list. In Kadoma for instance 20 percent of houses were allocated to civil servants and there is no indication of how the rest were allocated.³⁸ However, in Gweru 14 houses built under operation Garikai were occupied by victims of Operation Murambatsvina and people who had been on the housing waiting list. The condition was proof of source of income.

Elijah Mutemeri, a coordinator at ZCTU expressed the views that expectation was that victims of Operation Murambatsvina would get first preference in the allocation of houses, vendor shelters and factory shells under operation Garikai. However, the army, police and civil servants are getting first preference.³⁹

Mrs. B. Mugijima, president of Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy, said patronage and corruption are the allocation criteria for operation Garikai houses, stands, vendor stalls and factory shells. These units, according to her are allocated to known ZANU PF supporters, members of the armed forces and civil servant. Housing cooperatives and victims of operation Murambatsvina have been left out in the allocation.⁴⁰

The results

There is sketchy data on housing units, vendor marts and factory shells that operation Garikai has produced to date.⁴¹ Appendix three indicates that 31,897

housing units, 284,565 SMEs units, 78 peoples markets and unspecified number of stands were required nationwide to nominally redress the immediate impact of operation Murambatsvina. Available data indicates that as of June 2006, ten months after the operation, only 3,311 housing units had been delivered. Of these a negligible number had actually been occupied because most of the housing units lacked water and sanitation facilities. (See appendix 4) Also there were 17 factory shells, 41 vendor marts, and unspecified number of people's markets that had been completed. (See appendix 5). There seems to be a huge number of serviced stands made available, but again there are no figures to confirm the suggestion.

Impact on different sectors

The impact Operation Garikai/ Hlalani Kuhle on different sectors and segments of society is yet to be fully determined. However, preliminary surveys show great imbalances between need and target, and realities on the ground. Provision of housing and regulated informal business units, i.e. factory shells, vendor marts, and peoples markets are falling short of expectations.

Observations indicate that Operation Garikai houses are not better than what was destroyed by operation Murambatsvina. For example, the ZCTU carries out weekly surveys on the operation among its six regional offices based at Chinohoyi- Mashonaland West region; Harare- greater Harare area including Chitungwiza; Masvingo- Southern region; Gweru- midlands region; Mutare- eastern region and Bulawayo – Matabeleland region. In most cases, the illegal houses destroyed were far much better than the legal units that have been put up.⁴² The houses have no electricity, any water and sanitation facilities.⁴³ In fact, the so called houses under the operation are tiny two roomed units whose dimensions can hardly fit medium sized beds, most of the units do not have any window pens, and they have no cement floors.

Operation Murambatsvina destroyed the informal vendors and operation Garikai sought to put in order the vending and informal business. A good example of well built business unit is the Gulf Complex opposite market square bus station in Harare.⁴⁴ The complex was built jointly by the Harare City Council and private business. The main beneficiaries of the development are Chinese and Nigerian merchants and retailers. On

³⁵ Govt response to UNSE report, p.16.

³⁶ *Second Report of portfolio committee on local government*, p.6

³⁷ *Ibid*, p.6.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p.6.

³⁹ Interview on 13 June 2007.

⁴⁰ Interview on June 14, 2007.

⁴¹ Data on outputs of operation Garikai is sketchy and the relevant government department is not too keen to release statistics on the programme or allow civil society to visit the operation Garikai sites. Had more resources been available for this research, we could have tried some satellite imaging. One of the recommendations of this project is that civil society needs more resources- financial and technical to keep the fire burning.

⁴² E. Mutemeri interview.

⁴³ These views were collaborated separately by E. Mutemeri, B. Kohlo and B. Mugijima

⁴⁴ Interview with Elijah Mutemeri, 13 June 2007.



average out of ten downtown shops in Harare: six are run by Chinese, two by Nigerians and two by Zimbabwean medium size business people.⁴⁵

A poor example of business units are the Glenview factory shells. Although the total capacity of the warehouse can accommodate up to 700 people, the individual workspace is demarcated into very small workspace that can hardly accommodate any decent workstation.⁴⁶ In addition, the unit has no electricity making it difficult to operate necessary machine. In addition, there is very little storage facility for particular workstations and units. In other areas, factory shells and vendor units built by operation Garikai are lying idle because they are too small and lack any supporting infrastructure.⁴⁷

Mrs. B. Mugijima observed that the operational environment for informal business has not been regulated to be sensitive to the needs of women, the poor and other vulnerable groups on which they depend for livelihood. In addition, Operation Garikai vendor units are controlled by government officials who sub let to poor vendors at exorbitant rates. The Chitungwiza informal sector association, for example, has not benefited at all as the allocation procedure is done through ZANU PF party structures.⁴⁸ However, factory shells and vendor units built by Africare are more accessible to informal traders and provide good operational environment. In addition, she said the licensing system for vendors is cumbersome and chaotic. To register as a vendor, one is vetted at the local authority offices manned by ZANU PF officials and thus only proven ZANU PF supporters' benefit. The impact of Operation Garikai on the humanitarian crisis resulting from operation Murambatsvina thus falls short of requirements.

A SWOC analysis

Strengths of Operation Garikai

1. Technically operation Garikai was a government initiative and commanded support of the State and local government by way of providing technical assistance and the operating environment.
2. Technically, Local government involvement assured that no unforeseen problems of irregularities in terms of following procedures to meet hygiene and by law regulations

Weaknesses of Operation Garikai

1. **A slow take off of the programme to meet the demands of housing units, factory shells and vendor marts:** Operation Garikai was far too small to meet the magnitude of the housing crisis exposed by Operation Murambatsvina in spite of the numbers game. For example, Bulawayo municipal council established a figure of 10,000 properties destroyed by Murambatsvina yet police put the figure at 5,100, i.e. about 50 percent less. From these two figures 600 people were on the council's housing list. Nonetheless the total beneficiaries under Hlalani Kuhle were only 43 victims of Murambatsvina.⁴⁹
2. **Problems of onsite and off-site infrastructure such as lack of water and sewerage systems made completed houses inhabitable.** For example the 47 completed housing units in Kadoma required sewer and water reticulation infrastructure of a total cost of \$7.4 million before beneficiaries could occupy the houses.⁵⁰ By June 2006, ten months after the completion of Murambatsvina, none of the beneficiaries had moved into the 47 completed housing units. The magnitude of the problem water and sewer reticulation was much higher in the larger cities. In Harare, for instance, occupants of houses at Whitecliffe used Blair toilets while awaiting connection of water and sewer reticulation.
3. **Inadequate finances** The programme was not budgeted in the financial year. There is no clarity as to how the funds were raised. The Reserve Bank Governor, Gideon Gono, who normally comments on anything to do with money and national policies, has never spoken publicly on the programme. The parliamentary portfolio committee on housing pointed out that inadequate financial resources and poor disbursement procedures discouraged labour and slowed down work progress on the Garikai programmes.
4. **Poor consultation with users** Nationwide, there was no consultation with concerned users on the design, sitting and construction of housing, vendor marts and factory shells. For example in Gweru, vendor marts were situated nearby to a wholesale market and vendors

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Mrs. Mugijima, interview June 14 2007.

⁴⁸ B. Mugijima interview.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p.9

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.7.



found it difficult to compete. There was no consultation to determine how to appropriately situate houses in close proximity to employment opportunities and with access to social amenities. Allocation criteria of Operation Garikai houses was questionable as some people registered on the waiting list as late as December 2005 benefited from the operation ahead of people who had been on the list since the 1970s.

5. No poverty reduction thrust in Operation Garikai

Barbra Kohlo reasons that through operation Garikai, the State conceived housing as a product and not housing provision as process that impact on poverty reduction.⁵¹ The house units are too small and incomplete. There are no services to go with the housing units such as water, sanitation. And impacts negatively on the HIV and AIDS patients. The houses are accessed through corruption and thus victims of operation Murambatsvina, i.e. the urban poor have not benefited from houses and the market stalls. The politicization of the markets stalls and housing has nothing to do with poverty reduction but patronage. In addition, the consortium to develop stands is pushing prices of urban land out of the reach of the urban poor. Thus, the local authorities have abrogated their responsibility to provide affordable housing and informal business units to the poor to eradicate poverty.

6. No property rights

There is no security of tenure in the Operation Garikai houses beyond ZANU PF patronage.

Opportunities of Operation Garikai

Operation Garikai/ Hlalani Kuhle had the opportunity of creating integrated communities whereby the colonial demons of spatial planning could be reversed. Had Operation Garikai widely consulted on available options for urban regeneration it would have benefited immensely from public consensus rather take limited and often myopic views of a few in commanding military and intelligence positions. Frankly, human settlement issues are not state/ military intelligence matters.

The operation created potential opportunities to redress the ills of Operation Murambatsvina by way of providing housing of acceptable quality to meet human needs and city by-laws.

It created potential opportunity for government, private sector and civil society to engage in the reconstruction process of physically housing needs and building bridges of partnership. Indeed the UNSE report indicated that the UN was willing to assist the State in providing adequate and decent shelter to the poor and vulnerable members of society.

Housing cooperatives e.g. in Bulawayo, i.e. Bulawayo Home Seekers' Consortium Trust emerged to mobilize funds for servicing of stands and provision of housing units. These are community based projects and empower the community.

Challenges of Operation Garikai

The major challenge of the operation was to de-operationalize it, i.e. to make it accountable to the people and to make the system pro-poor. The provision of adequate financial resources for the programme is another key challenge, especially funding for water and sewer reticulation systems, and to facilitate speedy and proper servicing of stands. Inadequate funds resulting in irregular and erratic payment of labour.

Slow progress at completion of housing units meant that victims of Operation Murambatsvina were still vulnerable to lack of guaranteed shelter. Slow progress of vendor marts and factory shells meant that traders and SMEs were denied means to enable them to earn a living. Poor rate of acceptance of housing offer for people affected by Operation Murambatsvina for example in Bulawayo, only 43 out of 130 affected by the operation took up housing offer.⁵² This means that the victims of operations are still without shelter and means of earning livelihoods.

Concluding Remarks

In assessing the results of Operation Garikai we must keep in mind that a significant number of people are still locked up in poverty and squalor of transit camps two years after Operation Murambatsvina and away from the gaze of the media.

Operation Garikai took off at a slow pace in all areas affected by Operation Murambatsvina. By June 2006 none of the beneficiaries of operation Garikai had moved into their houses in Kadoma. This means that the victims of Operation Murambatsvina had not yet benefited from the housing units under operation Garikai/ Hlalani Kuhle. In some cases, such as Bulawayo and Gweru only a handful of victims took up

⁵¹ Interview with B. Kohlo.

⁵² Ibid, p.9.



offer of houses under the scheme because the majority could not raise the required deposit for the schemes. In Harare, people moved into houses without water and sanitary facilities thus raising potential health problems. Ironically, these were the same problems the State gave as an excuse to destroy the people shelter under operation Murambatsvina.

Also vendor marts and factory shells were inadequate to meet the demands of the vendors and informal traders. This reduced the scale of available opportunity to conduct business in the formalized and regularized manner according to city bylaws and other regulations.

Inadequate financial resources meant the fewer housing units were built than those required to meet the demands of victims of OM. This confirms the observations by the UNSE that the government on its own has no capacity to deliver adequate housing provisions. Of the few units completed many did not have water and sewer reticulation systems thus further hindering the beneficial occupation and use of the housing units, given limitations in meeting health standards by the majority of the housing units. The net effect was that the housing crisis opened up and exposed by Operation Murambatsvina was not met by Operation Garikai.


The recommendation of the Parliament Portfolio committee on housing, that 'in the future, proper planning (should) be done before government embarks on national construction programmes'⁵³ speaks volumes of the ad hoc nature of the Operation Garikai and its lack of seriousness in terms of commitment to addressing the problems of Murambatsvina and national housing crisis.

It is indeed contrary to the government to the post rationalization that Operation Restore Order 'was conceived not as an end in itself but as a precursor to OG/HK whose object is to provide decent and affordable accommodation as well as to create an enabling environment that promotes small and medium scale business enterprise'.⁵⁴

Elijah Mutemeri, coordinator at ZCTU succinctly pointed out that 'the operations worsened the situation of the citizen of this country: citizens of this country: citizens are poorer than before. There has been some urban to rural migration. But people are coming back. In as far as labour is concerned the government has

worsened poverty nekutambura kevanhu (i.e., and the peoples' suffering).'⁵⁵

Barbra Kohlo said that it is difficult to single out any UNSE recommendation that has been adhered to under Operation Garikai.⁵⁶ The UNSE recommendations indicate what the government and international community must do respectively under the UN Habitat Agenda and conventions for economic, social and cultural rights. Sadly neither of the two has done much to address human settlement issues in the medium and long term perspectives. On the one hand, the official government documents, for example November 2006 Report paint Garikai as a success but in actual fact this is a public relations exercise production. And on the other, international assistance has not been coming to address the human settlement issues among the poor and vulnerable communities in Zimbabwe.



In assessing the impact of operation Garikai we look at two factors. From a statistical point of view, the percentage of the 700,000 directly affected by operation Murambatsvina that has benefited is negligible. From a qualitative point of view the housing and informal business units that have been up also fall short of expectation and requirements. Also at the broad framework of assessing the response to the human settlement crisis situation in Zimbabwe, the international community is found wanting. The net effect is that the poverty of the poor and vulnerable groups in society has not been addressed. The victims of operation Murambatsvina have found ways and means of moving and surviving against all odds.

⁵³ Ibid, p15.

⁵⁴ Govt response to UNSE, p.6.

⁵⁵ Interview, 13 June 2007

⁵⁶ Interview, 14 June 2007





Chapter 7

OPERATION GARIKAI WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

In this chapter we examine Operation Garikai within the context of social accountability. Briefly, principles of social accountability require that public officials, private employers and service providers to answer for:

- Their policies
- Their actions
- And use of funds

Social accountability is premised on building accountable and responsible governance systems

through engagement between the civil society and the government.

Policy issues

The legality of the operation Murambatsvina has been widely debated.⁵⁷ The government of Zimbabwe has maintained that it acted within confines of domestic law and indeed violated no law - domestic or international.

However, equating informal with illegal and criminal activities is highly questionable. We concede that from a planning point of view, **some** informal settlements, informal shelter and informal business were not above board. However, there is evidence that **some** were also legal and paid taxes to local government authorities. Yet under operation Murambatsvina was indiscriminate; all informal settlements and business were destroyed, all were labeled criminal. Although the informal economy has been destroyed there is no evidence that this contributed to raising the economic profile of the country, such as reducing inflation and illegal foreign currency dealings. On the contrary the scale of economic decline has progressively worsened since May 2005. The informal sectors were symptoms of serious underlying problems in the country which were not addressed by operation restore order. Operation Murambatsvina tackled symptoms of the housing and human settlement issues whose fundamental structures operation Garikai has failed and has no capacity to address.

The UNSE points out that there is no documentary evidence that the operation was discussed and authorized at any level, and that it had no clear objectives and operational plan. The government states that the operation was planned and was a follow up of the financial sector shakeups of 2004, that it was part of ZANU PF 2005 election manifesto. Indeed, the local and central government give technical reasons to support the objectives and conduct of the operation. We beg to question whether there is, in Zimbabwe, a difference between the Government of Zimbabwe and ZANU PF political party? Are ZANU PF party policies necessarily government of Zimbabwe policies and vice versa. These are important governance questions. There is no evidence that ZANU PF and or government policy considered housing and livelihood issues in a broad frame human settlement issues. Also there is no evidence that the policy are pro-poor and that the people were consulted in the policy formulation and implementation processes.

⁵⁷ Action Aid, Chapter 5, Toriro, Govt, Govt Response to UNSE



Conduct of operations

The term operation conjures military style activity, and indeed Operation Murambatsvina and Garikai had military, security, and police enforcing agents in the demolitions and reconstruction phases. The UNSE describes Murambatsvina as being 'efficiently executed in a militaristic manner'. If indeed the operations were military operations as the names and actions suggest, then serious questions arise: where do we draw the line between military and civil policy and activities in Zimbabwe?

If we grant the questionable legality of operations, what mandate does the military and state security agents have in conducting local government duties? While there may not be immediate answers to these questions, we can infer from the militarization of public service from a multiplicity of key institutions headed by ex-servicemen that indeed the military and related security arms of the state had a big hand in the operations. If we grant this, the military and state security agents are by their very nature not accountable to the people and are not in the good habit of answering questions but giving orders! All indicators also point to the political and security impetus of the operations, thus it is foolhardy to expect a realistic realization of human settlement issues under the programmes.

Also it must be recorded the state did not follow the laid out procedure, for instance, give adequate notice period for owners of informal business units and housing structures to regularize or demolish their structures. Tied to this is the question of compensation: Operation Garikai offers no blueprint for compensating owners of property destroyed or lost during the process.

Accounting for the use of funds

The UNSE pointed out that the Government of Zimbabwe has no capacity to embark on an urban regeneration programme without serious international assistance. Launching Operation Garikai, the government announced US\$300 million for the exercise. Our review of the progress and impact of Operation Garikai showed that the programme was ill-conceived and under-funded. It was not budgeted in the 2005 budget. Just a recap, budgets are a fiscal expression of policy. In this case the operations were not in the budget, in other words they were not planned, they were not debated to establish consensus

over their objectives, planning and execution, and i.e. the operations were not policy.

Building governance bridges through social accountability

Social accountability builds accountable and responsible governance systems through engagement between the civil society and governments. How then did operation Murambatsvina and its successor operation Garikai build such governance bridges? In mitigating the humanitarian crisis resulting from Operation Murambatsvina, a number of NGOs in the humanitarian fields worked hand in glove with the governments. This can be taken as indicator of the possible conduits for building rapport between state and the civil society.

However, in the past there has been reports of disagreements between the government and NGOs over the control and distribution of humanitarian aid. This report has no evidence to confirm or deny that there were cases of politicization of humanitarian aid during operation Murambatsvina and Garikai. However, we can confirm that there were no bridges of accountability between human right activists and government during the operations.

Concluding Remarks

In concluding this chapter we reiterate that operation Garikai was an opportunity to build synergies among various stakeholders in the area of human settlement issues in the country. Yet sadly, it seems that the opportunity is passing away unnoticed. The government was ill-advised on both operation Murambatsvina and Garikai and judging on the basis of who implemented the programme we feel that the military and security forces have bitten more than they can chew. They have moved into a sphere which normally falls under the purview of local government. In addition, in the case of the City of Harare, there is no local government to talk about in the first place; the government appointed Commission running the affairs of the city is illegitimate in the eyes of the majority of the city's residents.

The government, short of financial resources, not willing to engage international financiers and not willing to be held accountable for its policy and Actions has gone into a defensive mood. The key losers in the process are the people and in particular the victims of Murambatsvina, some of whom have not yet moved out of the transit camps.





Chapter 8

RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSIONS

Increasing greater co-operation, reciprocity and synergies among civil society

Operation Murambatsvina pointed to the greater necessity of building bridges of dialogue and cooperation to fight for social and economic justice.

The report recommends strengthening networking and collaboration among civil society working in humanitarian field and on human rights and governance issues to proactively influence course of national processes.

That civil society takes a more proactive role in advocating for social accountability especially among public office bearers and in public policy.

That civil society scales up effort to get international support to provide human settlement issues to the poor and vulnerable. There exist grassroots NGOs in the country tackling human settlement issues with meager financial and technical resources, efforts must be put to empower and increase capacity of such organizations.

Civil society to engage and advocate rural issues

Increase civil society representation of rural issues and dialogue with the rural people. This is one area where networking can be useful since there groups that have already established links with the rural areas and the rest of the civil society can build on such contacts. The report recommends increasing civil society engagement of rural issues such as rural housing, land policy, land allocation processes, audit of land usage, agrarian issues, and property rights protection.

Social accountability

Operation Murambatsvina and Garikai brought forward the lack of social accountability. Civil society should take the lead in addressing the issues by calling for national civil society conferences on social accountability with a focus on special groups:

- Social accountability within civil society groups
- Social accountability within the private sector
- Social accountability within the public sector starting with a discussion of the role of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe

Civil society to take a more proactive role in social accountability

If history is anything to go by; then we will recall that it is the oppressed that stand to challenge the system and not the masters giving up anything without a fight. The civil society must stand up to be counted.

The civil society must demand a stake in national issues. For example, the recently signed social contract is without much value; it does not genuinely represent the interests of labour and also it is a shame that civil society did not participate in it.

This report urges civic groups to demand space in the formulation of national issues and not to be left behind as a spectator. Another area where civil society must demand to be counted is in the Mbeki led mediation between ZANU PF and MDC. Civil groups can continue utilizing existing systems such as courts, the parliament where ever it is possible to lobby and advocate for greater space and greater social accountability. For instance civil groups in the housing and human settlement issues may engage the Parliamentary Portfolio committee on Housing and international communities simultaneously to demand for greater social accountability in the sector.

Redefine the Role of State

The state plays a central role in policy, governance and enforcement of rules. The role of the State in Zimbabwe needs to be refined and redirected towards



the common good of the people. First, we recommend the demilitarization and de-politicization of public service, local authorities and state institutions. The central government must stop interfering in local government operations. For instance, Harare Commission is illegitimate and ZINWA is usurping local authority functions of providing water and sanitation.

We recommend that the government undertakes corrective macro-economic policy and management to revive the economy and reduce poverty, unemployment and other key socio-economic ills. We recommend that the state start by stopping the lip service approach of the central bank.

This report recommends the implementation of the recommendations of the UNSE report.

Increasing greater dialogue between the civil society and state

This is definitely one of the gray areas exposed by Operation Murambatsvina and its successor operation Garikai/ Hlalani Kuhle. Civil society must continue engaging the State and demanding space in governance issues.

Increasing greater dialogue between the State, civil society and international community. To identify windows of opportunity to create dialogue and chart a way out of this malaise. The UN habitat can play a significant role. The report recommends building trust among all players for dialogue and consensus building on human settlement issues.

Making housing policy and planning realistic, accountable and sensitive to Low-Income Groups

Operation Murambatsvina followed high standards, 'first world standards' of housing and negatively affected low resourced socio-economic groups e.g. the informal sector.

There is need to making housing policy and planning realistic, accountable and sensitive to low income groups. Engagement and consultation of multiple sectors in the human settlement issues development: multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, private financiers, cooperatives and the State in transparent and socially accountable processes.

Reviving and regulating the informal sector through participatory policy design and licensing policies and systems that are sensitive to the low income businesses.

That priority is accorded to victims of Murambatsvina in the allocation of available housing units, vendor marts

and factory shells in any new programme. To this effect, we recommend civil society participation in the inter-ministerial task force on operation Garikai.

Civil society to remain civil

This report advocates the policy of engagement and adoption of a live and let live attitudes without necessarily losing sight of the key issues of democratization and governance, humanitarian and environmental issues facing our country. Given the highly polarized environment in which civil society is operating there is great danger of cooptation into party politics, either ZANU PF or MDC. The pitfalls of partisan approaches are that civil society becomes embroiled in partisan issues and this clouds objectivity.

Scale up international support

This report accepts the observation by the UNSE Report that the state has no capacity, without the assistance of international community to address the problems of human settlement issues. Thus, we recommend that the international community scale up interventions in human settlement issues from humanitarian effort and move up to medium and longer term efforts. The international community can go through the government channels and or through established local NGOs in the housing sector who are in dire need of resources to support the poor and vulnerable.

Governance and democratisation issues

To crown it all, this report recommends up scaling civic education on human rights, good governance, social accountability and participatory policy development and implementation. The report advocates a holistic approach to Zimbabwe's multi-faceted problems interfacing political, constitutional, economic, and social issues of which human settlement is just but one source of grievance.

Conclusion

There can not be a final word on Operation Murambatsvina and Operation Garikai. These issues remain of great concern to humanitarian, governance and democratization advocates. The operations and emerging issues are symptomatic of the larger ills that are facing our country and society. Civil society must keep the fire burning and speak and act for what we believe is right. We can not afford to shut our eyes, ears and mouths to the issues that the operations unleashed and wounds that were opened among the poorest segments of our society.

Thank you.





Appendix 1

Terms of reference

Objectives and Scope of Report

The study will involve the following specific tasks:

Task 1: Determine scope of Operation Murambatsvina and Garikai impact between May 2005 and May 2007

The consultant shall carry out an in-depth introductory focusing on key organizations whose intervention strategies mitigated the suffering of the victims of Operation Murambatsvina and Garikai. To this extent, NANGO has already carried out preliminary surveys among the civil society organizations countrywide which will be available to the consultant as a basis to start with. Upon completion of this task, the consultant should have a clear understanding of the rights that have been violated and build up a strategy of social accountability as an appropriate

trajectory of solving the current social, political and economic problems.

Task 2: To explore the extent to which UN Recommendations have been applied and not conformed

Having completed Task 1, the consultant is expected to juxtapose and interrogate the Operation Garikai and National Housing Policy together with UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements' recommendations. The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Housing and Local Government's Report on Operation Garikai/ Hlalani Kuhle is also another document that has already been identified as important for this study.

Task 3: To assess the degree to which displaced victims of Operation Murambatsvina have benefited from Operation Garikai In collaboration with Task 1 and 2 or independently, the consultant shall also collect statistics and present them schematically from key institutions such as the government ministries, councils and civil society organization on the number of Operation Murambatsvina victims who have benefited from Operation Garikai and how those not benefiting are surviving. Upon completion of this task, the consultant should have all the statistics to support the allocation criteria applied by government based on gender, employment status and other key dimensions.

Task 4: To present a comparative analysis, trends of social accountability principles violated since the launch of "Operations" and the way forward as the 'National Audit Report of Operation Garikai within the context of promoting national social accountability'

The consultant is expected to draft a report detailing the gaps within Operation Garikai and emerging issues that hinders the people's enjoyment of social, political and economic rights. The report should outline as its way forward a scaleable sound and applicable accountability mechanism that will be receptive to possible future dynamics. It should proffer possible implementation strategies and national points of departure.

The final report should reflect the current levels of accountability within the government and public institutions and gaps thereof. The recommendations and way forward should dovetail with acceptable solutions to prevailing challenges in the context of nurturing social accountability systems.





Appendix 2-6

Appendix 2: Population displacements, 2005

Population directly affected by Operation Murambatsvina July 8 2005

	Structures Destroyed	Households affected	Population affected*
Housing structures	92 460	133 534	569 685
Informal business	32 538	No data	97 614
Unaccounted	No data	17 512	No data

Sources: Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development, 8 July, 2005

* UNSE Report

Appendix 3: Housing and SMEs Needs, Operation Garikai

	Units Required	Stands serviced	Stands unserviced
Houses	31 897	319	3 668
ME business units	284 565	4 799	262 291
People's markets	78		

Source: Min of Local Govt, Public Works and Urban Development, July 8, 2005

Appendix 4: Houses built under Garikai model, 2006

Housing Projects under operation Garikai, June 2006

Area	Target	Completed*		Not completed		Occupied	
		Figure	% of target	Figure	% of target	Figure	% of target
National	15 000	3 311					
Mash West Pro	400						
Specific areas							
Harare Metropolitan	2 010						
Bulawayo	700	450		250			
Gweru	100	14	14%	92		14	
Kadoma	60	47		3		0	0

Completed* means that houses have roofs but there are no sewer and water reticulation systems, thus effectively units are not ready for occupation.

Appendix 5: Factory Shells and Vendor Marts, June 2006

National		17		41	
Mash West Pro	12		32		
Harare Metropolitan	54		17		
Kadoma			4	3	2

Appendix 6: Serviced stands under Operation Garikai phase 2

Place	Target	Actual Serviced	Allocated
National			
Harare			
Bulawayo			
Gweru		997	
Mutare		8 000	528
The rest			

In Bulawayo 8 000 stands serviced of which 528 had been allocated to cooperatives and company groups.





Appendix

7

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Association of Micro Finance institute Zimbabwe
Congress of Trade Unions
ZIMCET,
Housing People of Zimbabwe,
ZNCWC

Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy
NASCOH
Combined Harare Residents Association
MS Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Liberators Platform
Women and Aids Support Network
Help Age
Community Working Group on Health
ZNPP+
ZimRights

Western Region, meeting at Bulawayo Rainbow, 17 March 2007

Zimrights,
MS Zimbabwe
ZICEA
Zimbabwe National Students Association
Housing Cooperatives of Zimbabwe in Bulawayo
Bulawayo Traders Association,
YWCA,
Hlekweni Friends Rural Services
Adventist Development and Relief Agency
Zimbabwe,
Evangelical Churches of Zimbabwe

Southern Region, meeting at Chevron Hotel, Masvingo, 29 March 2007

Zimbabwe Congress of TRADE Unions
Vashandi Housing Cooperative
Zimrights
Zimbabwe Youth Movement,
ZDAWU,
Women's Association
Dachicare,
Crisis Coalition,
ZIMCET,
Zimbabwe Liberators' Platform,
CADEC,
RUDO/CRS,
ZICIEA,
GAPUZ

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Gweru Publicity Association,
Gweru Agenda,
Zimbabwe Peace Project,
ZIMCET,
Musasa Project,
GWAPA
Community Working Group on Health
National Council for the Disabled People of Zimbabwe,
Zimrights,
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OneDev



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