



POSTELECTION VIOLENCE REPORT NO.2







ZIMBABWE PEACE PROJECT

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This Report is a follow-up to the ZPP Post Election Violence Report No.1 which had captured post election trends and patterns up to April. In this Report, focus is on new trends and patterns on election violence since the release of presidential election results on 2 May 2008. The Report also seeks to interrogate and explore any possible links between election results and post election violence and on the basis of this, generate tentative recommendations on the way forward.

Since 02 May, there has been a phenomenal escalation of election violence with May recording 6288 cases against April's 4375. By end of May, the record of murder cases had almost doubled to 47 from the April level of 26, with two cases of murder reportedly committed in the first few days of the month. By 20 June, 35 new of murder cases had been recorded. Cases of harassment shot up to 4288, a figure that is almost 4 times the April recording of 1484.

The nature of violence has also visibly changed in terms of scope, profile, pattern, modus operandi and impact. Its profile and pattern have changed with visible shifts to more extreme physical, systematic and retributive acts of violence. Since June there has also been an escalation in retaliatory violence.

In terms of impact, post election violence assumed multiple ripple effects, netting in its wake innocent bystanders such as children, the elderly, the unknown, and in some cases, even livestock. There are reports of innocent children being murdered and traumatized after the burning of their homes, some sustaining severe burns, and others no longer attending schools since their parents have been displaced.

Visibly manifest in patterns of violence is a chilling craving to inflict physical harm, to eliminate, to disenfranchise, to displace, and to starve the political victim and immediate family members by destroying their source of livelihood - features that are reminiscent of

scorched earth war strategies. The consistency and uniformity with which these acts of violence were applied smack of a well coordinated program of violence. Alleged involvement of state actors [soldiers, police and CIOs] also point to the possibility of state organized violence.

Also manifest in post election patterns are inclinations towards criminality and lawlessness characterized by upsurges in cases of theft, looting, public abuse, and torching of homes and granaries - patterns that are consistent with hate politics where opponents are viewed as *enemies* and therefore prime targets for elimination. In urban areas, ruling ZANU PF party youth roam about in the city centre and residential areas intimidating and abusing the public, virtually uncontrolled.

Since mid June, anti- opposition rhetoric has been stepped up as the ruling party presidential candidate reportedly threatens to go back to the bush if the opposition won the 27 June elections. Opposition campaigns have been totally blacked out on ZTV and in Zimpapers, rural areas are virtually sealed off from opposition rallies, the opposition leadership is subjected to sporadic arrests and detentions, their campaign vehicles and buses are reportedly impounded. Reported threats of going back to war in the event of defeat of the ruling party candidate are set to carve the election campaign landscape.

By the end of May, election violence was visibly shifting into urban areas!

Reportedly, mostly targeted were MDC-T activists, agents, suspected and known supporters, human rights NGOs, local election observers and teachers. While cases of MDC involvement in acts of violence have also increased, the main perpetrators are reportedly those from the ruling party with more cases allegedly involving war veterans, ZANU PF youths, militia, ZANU PF councilors and traditional leaders.

POST ELECTION VIOLENCE SINCE THE RELEASE OF PRESIDENTIAL RESULTS

Comparative Analysis

In this section, analysis is based on the two tables below, the aim being to pick on new trends and patterns of violence.

APRIL
ACTS ANALYSIS BY PROVINCE

					TOTO AITA	- IOIO DI	INOVINCE				
ACTS	BULAW AYO	MATABEL ELAND SOUTH	MATABEL ELAND NORTH	MIDLA NDS	MASVI NGO	HAR ARE	MASHON ALAND EAST	MASHON ALAND WEST	MASHO LAND CENTRA	MANICA LAND	TOT AL
Murder	0	0	0	3	1	0	11	3	5	3	26
Rape	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	4
Kidnapping/Abduc tions	0	1	0	9	49	5	14	4	6	61	149
Assault	5	10	3	81	108	141	118	55	30	216	767
Theft/Looting	0	0	0	5	16	8	35	6	0	10	80
Malicious Damage to Property	0	0	0	6	11	5	54	7	11	251	345
Torture	1	0	0	4	11	33	41	0	3	64	157
Unlawful Detention	1	1	4	5	22	14	17	2	2	57	125
Harassment/Intimi dation	47	22	10	125	417	114	188	32	90	439	148 4
Displacement	0	1	2	10	27	7	63	99	187	823	121 9
Discrimination	0	0	0	2	0	1	2	3	11	0	19
Total	54	35	19	252	662	328	543	212	345	1925	437 5

ZPP Post Election Report No.1, May 2008

MAY

ACTS ANALYSIS BY PROVINCE

ACT	MIDLA NDS	BULAW AYO	MAT.SO UTH	MAT.N ORTH	MASVIN GO	MANICA LAND	HARAR E	MASH.E AST	MASH. WEST	MASH. CENTR AL	TOTAL
Murder	6	0	0	0	2	4	2	16	2	15	47
Rape	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Kidnapping/Abduc tion	13	1	1	2	7	19	5	10	1	26	85
Assault	84	12	10	29	70	148	53	74	73	151	704
Theft/Looting	5	0	0	1	3	14	3	9	4	25	64

MDP	23	0	4	2	10	30	6	52	9	78	214
Torture	7	0	0	0	6	2	0	19	0	3	60
Unlawful Detention	1	1	2	91	2	5	6	2	1	3	114
Harassment/Intimi dation	79	30	53	104	93	3320	69	56	419	65	4288
DISPLACEMENT	12	0	3	5	8	542	17	18	15	50	670
Discrimination	0	0	0	0	0	19	0	0	12	1	32
Attempted Rape	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	5
Attempted Murder	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	4
TOTAL	231	44	73	234	201	4107	161	256	535	445	6288

ZPP MAY 2008

Trends and patterns of election violence as gleaned from May records show that:

- There was a shift to extreme forms of violence, with murder cases having shot up from their April record of 26 to 47 in May with high incidences in Mashonaland Central [15], Mashonaland East [16] and Midlands [6]. Of the May cases, two were reportedly ZANU PF Officials. Five cases of attempted rape and four cases of attempted murder were also recorded.
- There were 4288 cases of harassment, 704 cases of assault, 670 cases of displacement, 214 cases of malicious damage to property, and 85 cases of kidnappings/abductions recorded, among others a pattern that was largely consistent with April trends.
- Also consistent with earlier trends, Manicaland featured as the lead hot spot zone.
- May experienced a visible change in the hot spot zone category. While in April the hot spot zone line-up comprised Manicaland, Masvingo, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland Central, Harare, and the Midlands, by end of May, the hot zone line-up consisted of Manicaland [4107], Mashonaland West [536], Matabeleland North [234], Midlands [231], Mashonaland Central [445], Masvingo [201], Harare [161], and Mashonaland [East 256]. This suggests that election violence is slowly creeping into urban areas.
- Of the 4288 cases of harassments which reportedly occurred in May, 3320 were committed in Manicaland.
- Besides harassment, Manicaland also has the highest record in cases of abductions, assaults, displacements and discrimination.
- Out of the May total figure of 6288 the bulk [4107] were cases recorded in Manicaland.
- Some provinces experienced modest increases from their April recordings [Mashonaland West, Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South] while other provinces reportedly witnessed noticeable decreases [Mashonaland East, Masvingo, Midlands, Mashonaland Central, Harare, and Bulawayo].

Interpretation of the May Violence Acts Records

By end of May, election violence was no longer confined to the rural areas. It was slowly creeping into urban areas, with manifestations most evident in Harare.

Election violence is fast spreading into the traditional relative calm provinces of the Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South.

While cases of post election violence in May increased to 6288 from the April record of 4375, the expansion was however heavily skewed towards one particular act of violence: harassment which recorded 4107 cases.

When compared with records from other provinces, the Manicaland case is rather abnormal. In fact the Manicaland case had a distortional/ballooning effect on gross May recordings. It created an impression of an escalation in acts of violence when in essence what have actually increased are incidences of harassment!

The impression created by the May records that the traditional hot spot zones of Midlands, Masvingo, Harare, Mashonaland East and Mashonaland Central suddenly experienced decreases in election violence, raise more questions than answers. Are these records reflective of the situation on the ground? Do these records actually reflect decreases in acts of violence or difficulties in accessing information? Have acts of election violence actually dropped in the traditional hot spot zones of Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East and Midlands?

These questions are particularly pertinent given that in both April and May there were widespread reports of displacements, especially of local observers and monitors. Could it be a case of provinces that have been sealed off from local monitors? Could it be a case of incidences going unrecorded? Might it be that the victim-perpetrator table has changed with the former victims now the perpetrators? Yet the *May Victims Table* strongly point to patterns that are consistent with earlier trends showing the MDC traditionally on the receiving end with 917 victims and ZANU PF with 94 victims while the *Perpetrators Table* points to 1490 ZANU PF perpetrators against MDC's 152.

Incidentally, some provinces with high records of displacements [traditional hot zones] like Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Masvingo have emerged with low records of election violence while those provinces with a tradition of low records of displacements and intimidation [such as Matabeleland South and Matabeleland North] are the ones that have emerged with high records of election violence! Could it be simply a case of the accessibility to the province?

With respect to Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East and Masvingo, there is temptation to conclude that the May record looks more like a decline in access to hot spot provinces rather than a case of decline in election violence!! The May records may have been heavily affected by displacements which have been recorded since April.

Also at issue is why records from Manicaland appear abnormally high, and in fact incomparable with figures in the other provinces.

Unfolding Scenarios since 3 May 2008

Since 03 May, there were reports of increases in the number of war veterans, army units, police, militia and CIOs roaming and in some cases camped in the rural areas. Perpetrators of violence reportedly approached homes of the target victims, singing liberation war songs and wielding sticks, poles and stones and in some cases, making secretive midnight calls where the victims were reportedly abducted and subjected to torture.

Since the announcement of the election date, there have been sustained attempts to revive the bitter memories of the armed struggle and even equate the run up to the June 27 elections to the legendary second Chimurenga war. Opposition politics is cast as symbolic of the reincarnation of colonial rule. These campaign styles have unfortunately warmed the political temperature to boiling levels - leaving in their wake a highly agitated and polarized environment. Pungwes [liberation-style night meetings] have been revived in rural areas where victims allegedly go through an "orientation process" from which they are expected to emerge as devout born again ZANU PF supporters.

Analysis of snippets from Information Alerts since the release of presidential results glaringly point to visible changes in terms of violence perpetration. Post election violence reportedly assumed more methodical, ferocious and retaliatory features. Incidents in which political victims were allegedly beaten with logs and axes, hard pipes, syjamboks with diamond wires; beaten under the feet [Falanga]; beaten on the buttocks; handcuffed; made to roll in gravel; attacked with bicycle chains on their hands; burnt with hot plastics on the legs, mouth and body; forced to denounce their parties; and assaulted with fists and booted feet while they sleep heads down, are reportedly still on the increase.



Of increasing concern is that the ongoing orgy of violence is netting in the most vulnerable groups of society, with children as young as 3, 8, 12 and 16 years ending up as victims. ZPP reports refer to cases where innocent children have been left dead, traumatized after the burning of their homes, have sustained severe burns, and are no longer attending

school since their parents have been displaced. Some schools in rural communities in Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central, Manicaland and parts of the Midlands have reportedly been disrupted, some already turned into base camps.

Sampled Murder Incidences

ZPP reports point to increases in incidences of murder since 03 May with 47 murder cases having been committed by end of May. In Chiwodza village, Mt Darwin, a man was reportedly murdered on 09 May when youths allegedly fatally attacked him [by stabbing him all over the body] for being a supporter of the opposition. The perpetrators have reportedly been arrested. In Chaparira village, Mt Darwin, a village head was allegedly beaten to death by youths on 10 May for allowing ZESN to hold its workshop in the area. Details about the arrests of perpetrators were not availed when the report was made. In Chinehasha, Mazowe, Mashonaland Central, a pastor of the Salvation Army, was allegedly abducted at midnight, allegedly by war veterans and youths and fatally assaulted with knobkerrie, clenched fists, iron bars and knives on the 07 May. He was allegedly murdered for being anti-government in his preaching. When the wife tried to rescue the injured husband, she was allegedly also assaulted, and was recovering at Howard Hospital.

In Chaona village, Mazowe, Mashonaland Central, an opposition supporter was allegedly handcuffed, blindfolded and then taken to a Pungwe meeting where he was fatally assaulted on 06 May. The body was reportedly taken to Concession hospital where a post mortem was allegedly conducted on 09 May. No arrests had been made when this report was made, investigations were reportedly underway. In Mabvuku-Tafara, Harare an opposition activist, Tonderai Ndira was allegedly kidnapped, tortured and left dead at Goromonzi Turn-Off, 20km away from Chizhanje on 16 May. In the Mutiusinazita Village, Buhera South, Manicaland, an MDC supporter was reportedly murdered on the 17 May. The matter was reported to the police although by the time of the submission of this report, no arrests had been made.

Retaliatory Violence Incidences

Since mid May, there have been increases in reports of retaliatory violence against and murder of ZANU PF activists. Also disturbing was the increasing involvement of traditional chiefs in the perpetration of violence.

In Chirisa village in the Midlands, a traditional leader was reportedly involved in the torching of the homes of nine MDC members on 08 May while a kraal-head was reportedly involved in retaliatory attacks on Chidoma, a ZANU PF base camp on 12 May. In Mashonaland East, 12 houses were allegedly burnt on 14 May in Dombotombo suburb of Marondera Constituency, five allegedly burnt by ZANU PF supporters and war veterans

while seven were reportedly torched by supporters of the MDC in retaliation [ZPP 16 May 2008, Information Alert]. In Gokwe Kana, Midlands, a shop belonging to an MDC-T candidate was allegedly burnt down at around 11 pm on May 14 [16 May Information Alert].

In Makoni, Manicaland, a ZANU PF supporter reportedly had his hut burnt on the 12 May by MDC supporters in retaliation for alleged harassment and torching of houses. The perpetrator was reportedly arrested. In Buhera South, three war veterans were reportedly beaten up on 14 May by MDC supporters after they had allegedly destroyed the crops belonging to these MDC supporters. In Tsengerai village, Nyanga, Manicaland, on 25 May, a woman was allegedly assaulted by an MDC agent after she had called him a sellout. The matter was reported to the police.



In Chaibva village, Buhera, Manicaland, a youth was reportedly severely beaten on 11 May by angry MDC supporters allegedly for calling them Tsvangirai Boys. The matter was reported to the police. In Mhangura, Makonde District, Mashonaland West, on 07 May, MDC youth reportedly revenged an earlier assault by destroying TV and radio sets, windows and any other breakable goods in the house belonging to army colonel. The youth have since been arrested. In Chipadze, Bindura, Mashonaland Central, MDC youth on 10 May in alleged retaliation to earlier victimization, reportedly torched a farm house and tractor belonging to a war veteran.

Displacements

Villagers continued to face politically motivated displacements totaling 607 recorded cases, with high records from Manicaland, Harare, Midlands, Mashonaland West and Mashonaland Central. In Shamva South, seven families were reportedly displaced from their homes from 11 to 13 May after their houses had been burnt down, allegedly by youth militia led by people clad in army combat and armed with guns. In Chipinge East, Manicaland, 50 families were displaced and in the process affecting 64 innocent children.

In Norton, Mashonaland West, an *Operation Misika Ngaivharwe* [Operation Market Closedown] was reportedly conducted since 21 May, allegedly to flush out enemies [non ZANU PF supporters] from the area [ZPP Information Alert, 25 May 2008]. This crackdown, reportedly spearheaded by an outgoing ZANU PF Councilor and the District Chairperson, has since spread to Katanga Shopping Centre where vendors were allegedly forced to pack up their wares and leave the trading place until they provided proof of owning tables they were trading on. Those to remain trading from these market places were reportedly to do so following a vetting process done allegedly through ZANU PF structures.


While both political parties have been involved in acts of violence, the ruling party reportedly remained the main perpetrator with very visible involvement of war veterans, ZANU PF youths, ZANU PF Councilors and traditional leaders, soldiers, war veterans and youth militia, camped at bases that have been established in various constituencies.

May Gender Victims-Perpetrator Analysis

Trends and patterns in terms of victims and perpetrators are generally consistent with earlier recorded trends.

Gender Victims Analysis


- A total of 6112 victims were recorded with high records from Manicaland, Mashonaland Central and Masvingo with least records from Bulawayo. Out of this total:
- 1097 were MDC [816 male, 281 female] while ZANU PF had 122 [88 male, 34 female].
- 2972 were MDC Unknown victims, all from Manicaland while ZANU PF had 0 Unknowns.
- 9 were State victims [6 male, 3 male].
- 1111 [831 male, 280 female] were Unknowns
- 1741 were male victims while were 598 were female victims.



Consistent with past trends, the opposition has the highest incidents of victims on both sexes. Although the majority of these victims are male, the MDC female record of victims is 3 times higher than the ZANU PF male record and also 8 times higher than the ZANU PF female record.

Gender Perpetrator Analysis

- A total of 2420 cases were recorded with high records from Masvingo, Midlands and Manicaland with least perpetrators from Bulawayo. Out of this total:
- 1746 were ZANU PF perpetrators [1535 male, 211 female] while 176 were MDC [148 male, 28 female].
- 93 of the perpetrators were ZANU Unknowns while 24 were MDC Unknowns.
- 171 were state perpetrators [151 male, 20 female]
- 138 were Unknown perpetrators [138 male, 72 female]
- 1972 were male perpetrators while 331 were female.



Consistent with past election trends, the ruling party still leads the perpetrator race on both sexes. The ZANU PF female perpetrator record is almost double the MDC male perpetrator record and also 8 times higher than that of MDC female perpetrators.

June 2008 Scenario

By early June, post election and pre run-off violence had reportedly transformed into full state sponsored retributive violence with visible involvement of the police, army, prison officers, and CIO operatives. Victims were those who had voted against ZANU PF or were perceived to be advocating for transparency as election observers, agents, officials or monitors. In fact the dragnet has since broadened to target not only MDC supporters and activists but also local human rights NGOs, food aid agencies, election observers, independent press, and diplomats that are viewed to be aligned to opposition politics.

By mid June, food politics had become a big election campaign issue. It instantly assumed international glare when on 04 June government ordered a number of nonprofit food aid agencies [CARE, Save the Children] to suspend distribution of food until after the 27 June 2008 poll, accusing them of using food to undermine the government - a development that

is set to see millions [especially children in schools, orphanages and the elderly in nursing homes] in drought-hit areas starving. This fear is based on the observation that people in rural areas have three main ways of getting maize: through government food for work program, buying it from the GMB and through donor schemes for school pupils and the under fives. These three sources are vulnerable to political manipulation.

Food discrimination practices are reportedly prevalent, as ZPP May records showed an increase from April recording of 310 to 380 by the end of May. People are reportedly denied access to Government Subsidized Food, seeds and fertilizer, tillage support, agricultural credit, food loan and irrigation facilities, among other reasons, for failing to attend political party meetings, producing party cards and failing to denounce one's party. In May, Midlands was the main culprit with 139 cases followed by Manicaland with 56 cases, Harare with 51 cases and Mashonaland East with 49 cases. Interestingly in the drought-prone regions of Matabeleland, food politics is visibly low, a scenario which is however generally consistent with their low post election violence record.

With less than one week to go to the elections, anti-opposition rhetoric has been stepped up with the ruling party presidential candidate threatening to go back to the bush if the opposition won the 27 June elections. Opposition campaigns were totally blacked out on ZTV and in Zimpapers, rural areas were virtually sealed off from opposition rallies, opposition campaigns in the urban areas banned by the police, the opposition leadership subjected to sporadic arrests and detentions, their campaign vehicles and buses reportedly impounded. The threat of post election war has since reverberated across the country, with Major General Engelbert Rugejo reportedly quoted saying "This country came through the bullet, not the pencil. Therefore it will not go by your X [voting mark] of the pencil-----" at the funeral wake of late national hero, Retired Lieutenant General Amoth Chimombe in Zaka East [Financial Gazette, June 10-25 2008].

By 20 June, ZPP had recorded 35 murder cases, two of which were war veterans who had allegedly been fatally assaulted by a gang of MDC supporters on 10 June.

With less than a week to the 27th run-off, election violence has visibly shifted into urban areas with pungwes [night meetings] initially restricted to the rural areas now a common nocturnal urban activity. In Harare ruling party youth roam both city and residential areas, harassing the public with impunity. In Mbare, a virtually no go area for the opposition, there are distressing reports of evictions [displacements] of suspected MDC residents from their Mbare rooms. In most high density areas, residents are now forced to go for ZANU PF party meetings. An MDC rally scheduled to be held in Harare on 22 June 2008 was reportedly disrupted by ruling party supporters, with heavy beating of MDC supporters and local and regional observers, all in full glare of the police!

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTION RESULTS AND ELECTION VIOLENCE

The above scenarios raise questions about the possible link between election results and election violence. While there may be some incidental cases here and there, past precedents and perceived patterns of violence since April suggest a very close link between the two.

First, it is instructive to note that there is a striking similarity between the run up to the 27 June 2008 presidential elections and the run up to the 2002 presidential elections. Both occurred just after ZANU PF had gone through an embarrassing experience at the polls. In the run up to the 2002 presidential elections, the ruling party had just emerged from a "NO VOTE" to the constitutional reform referendum while the run up to the June 2008 presidential run-off came just after the ruling party had for the first time emerged from an electoral defeat at both parliamentary and presidential levels [though the MDC failed to garner the needed 50%+one vote].

If what followed the release of the referendum results in 2000 is anything to go by, the run up to the June 2008 elections is set for a replay of the volatile scenes of the run up to the 2002 presidential elections. Following the release of the referendum result, there was resurgence in farm occupations, setting up of base camps, training of the youth militia and their subsequent integration into the election campaign process. Similarly since the announcement of presidential results of the 29 March harmonized elections, there were reports of soldiers camped in the mountains in most rural constituencies, reports of the resuscitation of the youth militia training program and their integration into the election campaign structure. Past precedents have demonstrated that where war veterans and youth militia have spearheaded election campaigns, election violence has not only escalated but has also tended to be heavily skewed towards gross cases.

Also, following the announcements of the results of the 2005 March parliamentary elections in which it was apparent that the majority of urban residents had voted for the main opposition MDC, an Operation Murambatsvina was adopted whose execution left 750 000 people homeless, according to the UN Report.

Analysis of the parliamentary results of the March 2008 harmonized elections point to visible inroads by the opposition into traditional rural strongholds of the ruling party with ZANU PF losing almost 30% of its rural vote to the MDC while the opposition maintained its urban vote - developments that are likely to have generated a feeling of *insecurity* within the ruling party. In such traditional rural ZANU PF strongholds as Midlands, Mashonaland East and Mashonaland Central, Masvingo, Manicaland and Mashonaland West, where the ruling party won the majority seats, closer analysis of votes cast reflect thin *margin* scenarios - indicating *stiff challenge* from the opposition. These thin margin scenarios

suggest that ZANU PF has a tall order in its bid to reverse a 13%-plus vote deficit to the MDC and independent candidate and win the run-off.

Matabeleland Region

In Bulawayo Metropolitan Province, all the 11 contested parliamentary seats went to the opposition, MDC-T - a vote outturn that is generally consistent with its past performance in the presidential elections where Robert Gabriel Mugabe got 11 118 votes while Morgan Tsvangirai had 49 685 votes. The relative calm that has since 2002 been experienced in this province may be because the ruling party appears to have resigned this urban province to the opposition, which incidentally is also in control of local authority structures.

In Matabeleland North Province, out of the 13 contested parliamentary seats, only the 4 rural constituencies of Umguza, Bubi, Lupane East, and Lupane West were retained by ZANU PF while 9 fell to the opposition: the Tsholotsho seat going to an Independent and the 8 remaining seats being shared between the two MDC factions. This consistency was evident in presidential results where Mugabe emerged with 42 825 votes while Tsvangirai got 70 611 votes. As was the case in the other Matabeleland provinces, voter apathy was visibly evident in this province. However, while the opposition is in the majority, ZANU PF presence is still visible in some parts of the province. Implied here is that the province is still a contested zone – which probably accounts for some sporadic acts of violence in the province. Tsholotsho remains a fiercely contested constituency as the ruling party is yet to come to terms with the painful reality of it falling into the hands of an independent, for that matter, a rebel from the ruling party.

In Matabeleland South Province, out of the 12 contested parliamentary seats, ZANU PF retained its hold, again in the largely rural and drought prone five districts of Beitbridge East, Beitbridge West, Gwanda Central, Insiza North, and Bulima West while seven went to the MDC factions. There will be a by-election in Gwanda South. As in Matabeleland North, ZANU PF is still politically present. This visibility is also evident in presidential results where Mugabe won 46 156 votes against Tsvangirai's 34 885. The impression is that the presidential vote in this region can go either way; however the re-union of the MDC factions is likely to swing the presidential vote to the opposition. Matabeleland South, just like Matabeleland North, is a highly contested province.

Midlands Region

In the Midlands, out of the 27 contested parliamentary seats, 19 were retained by ZANU PF while 8 went to the MDC. However, presidential results reflect a scenario of tight contest where Mugabe won 166 831 votes while Tsvangirai had 153 288 votes. A byelection will be conducted in Redcliff. In remote, drought-prone, and rural Mberengwa [incidentally a hot spot zone], ZANU PF won with very huge margins. In fact, since independence Mberengwa has consistently remained a ZANU PF stronghold. It is however instructive to note that while ZANU PF won all seats in the nine Gokwe constituencies,

most seats were tightly contested, small margin wins. These small margin scenarios [especially in presidential elections] may account for the volatility that has been experienced in various parts of Gokwe. The impression is that people who may have voted for their party candidates at parliamentary level may have switched to the MDC presidential candidate - a likely reason for the ferocity with which retributive violence was conducted even in areas that are still ZANU PF strongholds. The impression is that while the province is a ZANU PF stronghold at parliamentary level, the case is not necessarily assured at the presidential level. The presidential vote reflects fissures and divisions within the ruling party which if not well managed could tilt the presidential vote to the opposition.

Mashonaland Region

In Harare Metropolitan Province, ZANU PF retained only the Harare South constituency. This trend was also manifested in the presidential results where Tsvangirai scooped 227 166 votes while Mugabe 61 215 votes, almost close to the new presidential candidate Simba Makoni who had 25 234 votes. Interestingly, while the province which incidentally is home to the ruling party headquarters and the State House has since 2005 fallen to MDC, this reality appears to have been too bitter a pill to swallow for the ruling party. ZANU PF appears to have resorted to *politics* of *frustration* - hence the volatility that has been experienced in the province at both local and constituency levels.

In Manicaland Province, out of the 26 contested parliamentary seats, 19 were wrestled by the MDC while ZANU PF retained the seven rural constituencies of Buhera North, Chimanimani East, Chipinge Central, Chipinge East, Headlands, Mutare South, and Nyanga South-areas that incidentally are leading hot spot zones. It is however instructive to note that even in these seven constituencies, ZANU PF won by very thin margins. Equally important is to note that in the presidential results Tsvangirai was in the lead with 212 029 votes while Mugabe had 141 592 votes. Why Manicaland has the highest record of election violence may be adduced to stiff competition and growing restlessness and political insecurity within the ruling party. A sustained campaign of fear, retribution, displacements, disenfranchisement and fencing off the province seems to be the only available route for the ruling party to reclaim its stronghold on the province!

In Mashonaland Central Province, out of the 17 parliamentary seats contested, 14 were retained by ZANU PF while 3 seats [Bindura South, Mazowe Central and Mazowe South] went to the MDC. This performance is generally manifested in presidential results where Mugabe led with 157 626 votes while Tsvangirai had 75 722 votes, almost half of what the ruling party presidential candidate got. Given that this province has for years been viewed as a self declared one party province, the idea of three constituencies falling to the opposition must have come as a big political slap to the ruling party. Also instructive is to note the high visibility of small margin scenarios even in those constituencies where the ruling party emerged in the majority. Thus as in Manicaland, it would appear that the 29 March harmonized election results induced a feeling of political insecurity within ZANU PF

structures - hence the intensity of retribution in this province. Election violence appears to be targeted at sniffing out MDC supporters and totally fencing off the province from any forms of opposition infiltration.

In Mashonaland East Province, out of the 34 contested parliamentary seats, seven went to the MDC while 27 were retained by the ruling party. In the presidential elections, Mugabe was in the lead with 160 965 votes while Tsvangirai had 119 661 votes. But while the province remains a ZANU PF stronghold, as was experienced in other ZANU PF rural strongholds, the thin margin scenario is visibly evident - indicating that even this province is gradually opening up to opposition politics. However, in Uzumba, Mutoko South and Mudzi are incidentally no go areas for the opposition, ZANU PF won big - developments which may have signaled to the ruling party that fear-inducing tactics buttressed with fencing off strategies, when the stakes are low, are the best route to take, though of course there are associated trade-offs. This route is particularly tempting because in the past most no-go areas such as Uzumba parliamentary seats have gone uncontested.

Mashonaland West

Election results in Mashonaland West, the home area of the ruling party presidential candidate, are generally consistent with scenarios observed in other provinces-a thin margin scenario. While out of the 255 161 total valid vote cast in the presidential elections, Robert Gabriel Mugabe won 134 750 [52.8 %] against Morgan Tsvangirai' s 107 345 [42.1 %], the visibility of the opposition is very high. In fact out of the 22 constituencies in the province, the opposition has majority votes in 9 constituencies, These are Chegutu West, Chinhoyi, Hurungwe West, Kadoma Central, Kariba, Magunje, Mhondoro-Mubaiwa, Mhangura, and Norton. While in all the 4 Zvimba constituencies, the ruling party candidate emerged with the majority, competition is also visibly manifest, especially in Zvimba West and Zvimba East. Opposition challenge in rural constituencies is also evident in Parliamentary results where ZANU PF emerged with 80 428 votes against MDC Tsvangirai's 68 247 votes.

In Masvingo Province, out of the 26 contested parliamentary seats, 14 were wrestled by the MDC while ZANU PF retained 12- again, a big upset for the ruling party given the history of this province as a ZANU PF stronghold. The opposition challenge was even more visible in the presidential results where Tsvangirai emerged with 145 198 votes against Mugabe with 156 672 votes.

Clearly evident from these election results is that while the opposition urban support base is relatively secure, this is no longer the case for the ruling party in its traditional rural strongholds. The opposition challenge which in the past was largely confined to the urban areas and had given the impression that rural areas were the unchallenged political enclaves of the ruling party has since been busted. The contestation that was initially confined to urban areas has since shifted to rural areas.

What makes the 27 June run-off a highly contested race and therefore highly prone to violence is that except in isolated cases, both political contestants won by very small margins. With the results of the harmonized elections, the issue of stronghold has been rendered elusive as a political party's dominance in parliamentary elections does not reflect dominance at presidential election level! The independent presidential candidate had a significant percentage of votes at both parliamentary and presidential levels. Winning this vote is therefore critical to both political parties. In a number of cases both parties lost because of factional politics and the resultant fielding of two candidates. The Matabeleland South and Matabeleland North votes are still highly contested.

In fact, the link between election results and election violence is summed up in the program, *Operation Makavhotera Papi* [literally, where did you put your vote?]- a program that has allegedly seen war veterans, soldiers, militia, and ruling party youths making retributive attacks on suspected supporters of the opposition, in both rural and urban areas.

POST JUNE 27 SCENARIOS

Against this background, the 27 June 2008 run-off looks far from being free and fair as most rural areas are reportedly sealed off from opposition election campaigns. With less than one week to go to the elections, anti-opposition rhetoric has been stepped up as the ruling party presidential candidate reportedly threatens to go to war if the opposition won the 27 June elections. Opposition campaigns are totally blacked out on ZTV and in Zimpapers, rural areas virtually sealed off from opposition rallies, the opposition leadership is subjected to sporadic arrests and detentions, their campaign vehicles and buses are reportedly impounded.

By 20 June, 35 murder cases had been reported, a significant pointer that the May record will be surpassed.

A significant percentage of people are set to have been disenfranchised by the time of the 27 June 2008 runoff presidential elections. Most likely to be affected are those who have been physically attacked and have fled from their homes, those who had homes and property torched as well as those who have been displaced from their rural villages. There are increasing reports of villagers that have been displaced from their villages as punishment for having voted for the main opposition.

With cases of torture, harassment, displacement, abduction, and torching of homesteads that are reportedly going on unabated, the rural voter is most likely to vote under duress - scenarios that may lead to a deformed electoral result.

Fear-inducing tactics have in the past created voter apathy or cases where rural people vote in fear of retribution or of being denied access to subsidized food, or opposition candidates withdrawing their candidatures

The resort to liberation war election campaign strategies characterized by the setting up of liberation-war style bases, use of war language, fist pointing, swearing at election rallies, hate speech and hate politics is set to leave a legacy of intense polarization within society in both the pre and post election eras.

The retribution that has reportedly been targeted at local observers is set to weaken the monitoring of the 27 June run-off as some may recoil from the exercise citing fear of future harassment. Such developments are most unfortunate as they in turn have a peeling effect on transparency of the electoral process. The post 29 March harmonized election in Zimbabwe has witnessed a flagrant disregard of SADC Guidelines and Principles for Democratic Elections and an almost total denial of space to the main political contestant - a practice that has fuelled post election violence as most unethical practices committed by state apparatus, ruling party supporters, war veterans etc, are blocked from public eye.

Reports of electoral malpractices in the run up and the post election era will receive a further blow from the heavy restrictions that are currently applied on accreditation.

Given the scenarios highlighted in this paper, the remaining days to the 27 June run-off look uncertain with the post election era even more uncertain. If the run-off is cancelled as some suggest, are there feasible and sustainable solution strategies afoot? By short-circuiting the election process, is the nation not creating a precedent that is unlikely to be sustainable in the future? Is the Government of National Unity (GNU) the feasible model for Zimbabwe? Is there visible political energy among the contending political leaders to cope with the challenges that go with the GNU route? What concrete plans are afoot to stop the problem of election violence that has gripped the nation?

Recommendations

ZPP would like to make the following recommendations in effort to resolve the election violence crisis currently engulfing the country.

- Convene a no-holds-barred conference attended by the MDC and ZANU PF to discuss the political situation and how it can be contained. The police, the military and CIO should attend such a conference.
- Disband all ZANU PF base camps countrywide to allow freedom of movement, association and campaigning.

- Postpone the election run-off to a date to be agreed by both parties to allow national heeling and a clean campaign.
- Desist from using hate language during campaigns, which incite supporters to resort to violence.
- Concede that violence was perpetrated by supporters resulting in many deaths, injuries, displacements, agony.
- Allow NGOs to provide essential goods and services to the needy in rural areas.