

# **DFID Humanitarian Allocations in Africa 2007/8**



**Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit (ACHU)  
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## **Summary of key findings**

- **Total spend** in 2007/8 was £205m, a decline from £236m in 2006/7. However using adjusted figures the amount is broadly similar for both years. Both these years' spend was less than the exceptional 2005/6, when it peaked at £264m.
- **Year on year trend:** there has been a 10-15 % decline since the peak spend in 2005/6 of £264m.
- **The top five recipient countries** of DFID humanitarian aid are Sudan, DRC, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Somalia. Combined, these 5 countries received over 75% (£158m) of DFID's humanitarian aid. Public Service Agreement countries (PSA) received 80% of allocated funds.
- **Expenditure by emergency type** reveals that Complex Emergencies received 90% of DFID's funding, up from 78% in 2006/7. 10% was spent on natural disasters.
- **Expenditure by sector** is largely unchanged from 2006/7: food, health and water-sanitation were the main sectors, and combined accounted for 50% of DFID's humanitarian funds. Cash transfers grew by 400% relative to 2006/7, although they remain a small proportion of the total spend.
- **Expenditure by agency:** World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF and Pooled Fund Management Agent<sup>1</sup> together accounted for 54% of DFID's spend. Adding the next two biggest agencies, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), these five agencies received almost two thirds (65%) of all humanitarian spend in Africa.
- **Biggest decline in funding:** Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) has seen a huge decline in funding that it has received from DFID: from £7.3m in 2005/6 to £2.5m in 2006/7 down to £1.3m in 2007/8.
- **The Red Cross** family share rose from 7% to 10% of overall spend from £16.6m in 2006/7 to £19.9m 2007/8.
- **DFID spent significantly less** in 2007/8 on bilateral allocations / project allocations to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) - £14.75 million less than in 2006/7, or a reduction of 7% of overall humanitarian spending. This is, at least in part, compensated through allocation by 'management agents'.
- **Spending pattern:** two thirds (£135m) of DFID humanitarian spending for Africa in 2007/8 was spent in just 2 months - January & March 2008. A large part of this was due to front-loading the Pooled funds for DRC and Sudan, a positive indicator for the Good Humanitarian Donor (GHD) initiative.

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<sup>1</sup> See explanatory footnote 10 on page 10 for an explanation of this term.

## **Introduction**

1. This report, covering financial year 2007/8, is the third in a series of reports which examine Africa Division's humanitarian decision-making, taking available internal data as its basis. This 'raw' data on humanitarian allocations is provided by country offices and regional desks during the course of the DFID financial year.
2. The spend analysis is a short, annual exercise and deliberately limited in scope. It is largely a quantitative exercise, looking for patterns and trends in the available data. The data analysis has been supplemented by a literature review and a minimal number of interviews with DFID staff. Its aim, as in previous years, is to provide a breakdown of allocations, combined with analysis and discussion.
3. The report largely is a direct continuation of the analysis from 2005/6 and 2006/7. It presents a straightforward look at how DFID humanitarian funds were allocated across Africa, what the allocations were spent on, through what channels, where and when.
4. The 'Health Warning' applied in the 2005/6 version of this document still applies, as do all subsequent caveats about data quality and the lack of a standard approach to data handling between countries and between years.
5. In order to maintain consistency with previous years, the data includes DFID spend through the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) by proportion<sup>2</sup> but does not include DFID spend through European Commission (EC) channels. As recommended in last years' analysis, consideration should be given to including this data.

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<sup>2</sup> 21% of all CERF spend in Africa was attributed to DFID.

# How DFID allocated humanitarian resources in Africa in Financial Year 2007/8<sup>3</sup>

## Where we spend it

6. DFID made allocations to humanitarian aid in Africa totalling £205 million<sup>4</sup> in Africa in 2007/8. At first glance, this is a significant fall from the 2006/7 total of £236 million. The apparent decrease, however, is largely accounted for by two factors related solely to the data and the timing of allocations<sup>5</sup>. Correcting for both of these factors almost removes the 'false' downturn in that it decreases the 2006/7 figure and increases that for 2007/8.
7. In looking at the overall spend figures, as well as all subsequent analysis, it is worth bearing in mind that 2007/8 saw no new 'headline' humanitarian crisis. In crude terms, 2005/6 was the last 'big' emergency year when spend in Sudan and DRC was at its peak. Although 2007 was characterised by high numbers of natural disasters, notably flooding which affected 23 African countries, affected populations were small when compared with previous averages.
8. Humanitarian Allocations were distributed across the following countries in 2007/8:

**Chart 1: DFID 2007/8 Humanitarian allocations across Africa**

| Country    | Allocation  |  | Country (cont.) | Allocation          |
|------------|-------------|--|-----------------|---------------------|
|            |             |  |                 |                     |
| Sudan      | £61,682,032 |  | Zambia          | £1,551,287          |
| DRC        | £39,435,956 |  | Cote d'Ivoire   | £1,325,629          |
| Zimbabwe   | £24,604,622 |  | Lesotho         | £1,041,440          |
| Uganda     | £18,404,278 |  | Ghana           | £955,394            |
| Somalia    | £13,721,164 |  | Burkina Faso    | £660,182            |
| Chad       | £7,095,877  |  | Mali            | £458,245            |
| Ethiopia   | £6,672,344  |  | Djibouti        | £451,630            |
| Kenya      | £6,578,673  |  | Togo            | £413,341            |
| Eritrea    | £3,347,071  |  | Guinea          | £384,091            |
| Niger      | £3,054,914  |  | Rwanda          | £313,000            |
| Swaziland  | £2,990,347  |  | Congo           | £291,861            |
| Burundi    | £2,327,304  |  | Mauritania      | £184,949            |
| Malawi     | £1,946,474  |  | Liberia         | £158,861            |
| Mozambique | £1,781,181  |  | Tanzania        | £130,435            |
| CAR        | £1,744,686  |  | Senegal         | £37,855             |
| Madagascar | £1,726,730  |  |                 |                     |
|            |             |  |                 |                     |
|            |             |  | <b>Total</b>    | <b>£205,471,852</b> |


<sup>3</sup> Hereafter as 2007/8 denotes DFID Financial Year 2007/8 and 2007 refers to the calendar year

<sup>4</sup> This figure is drawn from DFID internal statistics and captures allocations that were 'coded' as humanitarian plus 21% of all CERF allocations in Africa.

<sup>5</sup> It appears that almost £5 million of UN spend in Sudan in 2006/7 was double counted. Also, a substantial allocation for the pooled fund in DRC in UN calendar year 2007 was made during DFID financial year 2006/7. Effectively a double allocation was recorded in 2006/7 and a zero allocation in 2007/8. It is likely that anomalies like these occur throughout the data but in other cases are sufficiently small to be insignificant in the overall trend analysis.

9. The figures from this table are represented graphically in Chart 2 showing the spread of allocations across countries receiving humanitarian allocations in excess of £1.5 million:

**Chart 2: DFID 2007/8 Humanitarian allocations by country (>£1.5m)**




10. As in previous years Sudan and DRC receive a high proportion of the total spend. Although total allocations to Sudan and DRC appear smaller than in 2006/7, spend across calendar years is perfectly consistent. Allowing for these anomalies, the overall spend retains a similar scale and shape to that of 2006/7.
11. A substantially larger allocation has gone to Zimbabwe (+£8.1 million) in response to the ongoing crisis as well as Somalia and Chad. Smaller allocations have gone to a number of countries, notably Kenya (-£11 million) and Liberia (-£5.4 million). Despite the post-election violence in Kenya in early 2008, lower allocations reflect improvement in the food security situation there. The apparent downturn in Liberia represents a 're-coding' of spend i.e. the DFID office covering Liberia no longer classifies the situation, or the allocations, as humanitarian.
12. Allocations in 2007/8 were spread across 31 countries as opposed to 30 in 2006/7 and 23 in 2005/6. This larger spread of countries is, in large part, due to the introduction of the CERF in 2006. In 2007/8, six countries received CERF funding and no other DFID humanitarian allocations: Burkina Faso; Republic of Congo (Brazzaville); Djibouti; Liberia; Mali and Mauritania. Guinea (Conakry) and Madagascar received CERF funds and one other DFID allocation.

13. It is beyond the scope of this exercise to 'evaluate' allocations to any individual country. The greater geographical spread of funding through the CERF is significant but should **not** be presumed as either a wholly positive **or** wholly negative development without further qualification. We will go on to see that the introduction of the CERF and country level pooled funding instruments mean that DFID allocates money not only in more countries in Africa but that within those countries, allocations are made to a larger number of partners for a larger number projects.

14. Across Africa DFID money was allocated to the following regions<sup>6</sup>:

**Chart 3: DFID 2007/8 Africa Humanitarian Allocations by Region**




15. In comparison to last year the major shift is a decrease in West Africa spend from nearly £18 million in 2006/7 to just over £9 million in 2007/8. CERF spending in West Africa is reasonably consistent, meaning that the decrease in DFID bilateral / project allocations (-£7.8 million) makes up the majority of this total. A large proportion of this decrease is due to the re-coding of spend in Liberia (-£5.4 million, as above)

<sup>6</sup> The following regional definitions are used in this report:

|                  |                                                                                                                                 |
|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Central Africa:  | DRC, Burundi, Congo                                                                                                             |
| Horn of Africa:  | Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia                                                                                         |
| East Africa:     | Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania                                                                                                         |
| Sudan and Chad:  | Sudan and Chad                                                                                                                  |
| West Africa:     | Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Togo, CAR, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, West Africa Regional |
| Southern Africa: | Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Namibia, Lesotho                                                                  |

16. The split between DFID PSA and non PSA countries is represented below:

**Chart 4: DFID 2007/8 Africa Humanitarian Allocations (PSA vs. Non-PSA Countries)**




17. In comparison to 2006/7, there is a slight rise in the proportion of allocations to non-PSA countries (20% from 17.7%). As in previous years this appears to show a bias towards PSA countries. However, according to the available estimates, allocations to PSA and non-PSA countries are approximately in proportion to need.

## What did we spend it on

18. The chart below represents the approximate breakdown of allocations by sector:


Chart 5: DFID 2007/8 Africa Humanitarian spend by sector



19. The 'sectoral' split shows a similar pattern to previous years with food, health and water and sanitation ('watsan') taking the largest proportions. This is in keeping with previous years. The rise in 'multi-sectoral labelling' does not indicate a specific trend in allocation. Rather it indicates again the increase in pooled mechanisms through which the ultimate recipient of funding and the exact purpose for which the money was allocated is difficult to trace. There is a four-fold increase in cash transfers from 2006/7, although the overall figure remains low.

20. The proportion of allocations to 'natural' and 'complex'<sup>7</sup> emergencies is represented in Chart 6:

**Chart 6: DFID 2007/8 Africa Humanitarian Allocations Complex Emergency vs. Natural Disaster**



21. In 2006/7, complex emergencies took an increased proportion of allocations. In 2007/8 this proportion rises again (90% from 78% in 2006/7). Even without compensation for the DRC spend, complex emergency allocations rise in absolute terms (+£11.5 million) as well as in relation to natural disaster allocations. Allocations to natural disasters fell sharply by over £31 million. Within this total CERF allocations remain reasonably consistent. A reduction in DFID bilateral / project allocations to natural disasters of almost £29 million makes up the bulk of this difference.

22. There appear to be two primary reasons for this apparent shift away from natural disasters:

- a difference in the 'coding' of spend compared to 2006/7. Zimbabwe was treated as a natural disaster in 2006/7 and as a complex emergency in 2007/8.
- In 2007/8 there were no large (+ £1 million) bilateral allocations to natural disasters. In 2006/7 several allocations of over £1 million were made in Kenya and Malawi.

<sup>7</sup> In simple terms, the term 'complex emergency' refers to protracted crises, usually related to a political situation and / or conflict. 'Natural disaster' is a blanket term for the consequences of weather (floods, droughts, wind / storms, tsunamis), or geological events (earthquakes, volcanoes). The term implies that humanitarian consequences are as a result of a particular instance of one of the above, even if the area is prone to repeated instances.

## Who do we spend through?

23. In 2007/8, DFID's Africa humanitarian allocations were channelled through the following partner agencies:

**Chart 7: DFID 2007/8 Africa Humanitarian Allocations by Agency**

| Agency                                    | Amount      | Agency (continued)   | Amount              |
|-------------------------------------------|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| WFP                                       | £40,650,538 | NGO Consortium       | £747,341            |
| UNICEF                                    | £37,223,928 | Mercy Corp           | £739,449            |
| Pooled Fund Management Agent <sup>8</sup> | £33,519,868 | Tearfund             | £588,506            |
| ICRC                                      | £11,450,000 | MDM                  | £533,580            |
| FAO                                       | £10,868,861 | CRN                  | £513,000            |
| GRM <sup>9</sup>                          | £8,680,332  | UNDSS                | £500,977            |
| UNHCR                                     | £8,551,074  | Islamic Relief       | £500,000            |
| IFRC                                      | £7,166,019  | CARE                 | £472,470            |
| WHO                                       | £5,588,126  | World Vision         | £396,207            |
| IOM                                       | £3,899,585  | UNIFEM               | £329,076            |
| UNOCHA                                    | £3,836,694  | RSCO                 | £320,513            |
| ACF                                       | £3,569,744  | ASI                  | £309,165            |
| Oxfam                                     | £3,346,101  | Mentor               | £263,137            |
| UNFPA                                     | £2,126,477  | CAFOD                | £255,000            |
| Trocaire                                  | £2,106,207  | MSF-B                | £226,650            |
| IRC                                       | £2,002,255  | ILO                  | £194,250            |
| Save the Children                         | £1,779,158  | IA                   | £130,000            |
| Goal                                      | £1,299,977  | ACTED                | £113,630            |
| UNOPS                                     | £1,279,511  | UNAIDS               | £77,700             |
| MSF                                       | £1,269,099  | Relief International | £65,537             |
| BRC                                       | £1,250,000  |                      |                     |
| Solidarites                               | £1,237,190  |                      |                     |
| Concern                                   | £1,035,738  |                      |                     |
| Merlin                                    | £994,426    |                      |                     |
| IMC                                       | £927,879    |                      |                     |
| UNMAS                                     | £893,406    |                      |                     |
| UNDP                                      | £858,419    |                      |                     |
| Medair                                    | £785,052    |                      |                     |
|                                           |             |                      |                     |
|                                           |             | <b>Total</b>         | <b>£205,471,852</b> |

24. A few major shifts in comparison to 2006/7 are brought about by a necessary change in data handling<sup>10</sup> since the 2006/7 exercise. The net result of this

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 10.


<sup>9</sup> GRM remains something of an anomaly. It is a private entity which acts as a conduit for DFID funds in Zimbabwe. These funds are ultimately spent by NGOs and other partners. GRM is not classed as a 'Management Agent' in this exercise as DFID, until now, retains the primary decision making role.

<sup>10</sup> This year, money passed to the UN through all pooled mechanisms is attributed directly to the recipient agency e.g. DFID allocations through the Common Humanitarian Fund in Sudan or the CERF to WFP are attributed to WFP. Where DFID spend is handled by an intermediary agency **and** DFID devolves the primary decision making role **and** it is not possible to disaggregate by the ultimate recipient, allocations are attributed to the generic heading of 'management agent'. This method is designed to remove previous skewing of data towards UNDP and OCHA which 'handle' increasing levels of DFID spend but do not implement. It is possible to state that approximately 99% of

change is the removal of bias towards UNDP and 'NGO consortia', which were listed as two of the major recipients of funds in 2006/7.

25. The figures from this table are represented below, showing the spread of allocations across agents receiving humanitarian allocations in excess of £1.5 million.

**Chart 8: DFID 2007/8 Africa Humanitarian Allocations (Partners > £1.5m, non pooled funds only)**



26. WFP, UNICEF and ICRC are the largest recipients with approximately similar proportions to those in 2006/7. Allocations to the two largest NGO partners in 2006/7 as well as 2007/8 are down by approximately £1 million each (or approximately 25%). It is *likely* that allocations to these agencies through management agents go some way to compensating for this difference.

'management agent' funds are ultimately allocated to NGOs (even though the management agents remain legally accountable for the money) so this spend is attributed to NGOs.

27. For the first time, the MSF family does not appear on the '>£1.5 million' chart and its allocation total declines for the third year running (£7.3 million in 2005/6; £2.5 million in 2006/7 and £1.3 million in 2007/8.) There is no possible compensation for this drop in funding through country level pools, as MSF do not accept support from this source. MSF takes this specific stance because they do not view UN led funds as impartial or neutral, believing that the UN system cannot separate its humanitarian and political objectives.


28. A number of possibilities exist for the reduction in allocations to MSF:

- that MSF is applying for DFID funds less often (MSF will not accept DFID funds in Somalia, parts of Ethiopia and in DRC (except MSF Belgium).
- that DFID has less flexibility to fund independent agencies outside of pooled arrangements.
- that in fragile states, DFID is placing less emphasis on independent humanitarian action and more emphasis on Government-partnered work.

MSF's comparative advantage in delivering independent humanitarian assistance in difficult environments makes them a key humanitarian partner for DFID. Therefore, all three of these possibilities warrant further investigation.

29. The changes in data handling noted above also impact on Chart 9 when compared with 2006/7 (see Annex 2, Chart I for 2006/7 chart)


**Chart 9: DFID 2007/8 Humanitarian Allocations by Partner Type (all funds)**



30. The difference in this graph as compared to 2006/7 is due to the data handling changes mentioned above. The attribution of funds which pass through management agents to NGOs rather than the UN gives a more realistic proportional split. That said, a caveat presented every year remains valid: until now, and for the foreseeable future it remains impossible to track the quantity of allocations attributed to UN agencies which is ultimately handled by NGOs through co-operating partner agreements. This means that NGO figures remain artificially low in absolute and relative terms.

31. When we strip out all 'pooled funding' channels, including the CERF, the breakdown changes as follows:

**Chart 10: DFID 2007/8 Humanitarian Allocations by Partner Type (direct project funding only, non pooled funds)**




32. In comparison to previous years, proportions remain reasonably consistent. In absolute terms, there is a significant decrease in bilateral / project allocation to NGOs (-£14.75 million). Declining direct NGO contributions are, at least in part, compensated through allocation by management agents. As above, however, no direct comparison can be drawn with 2006/7 as the data has been handled inconsistently across years. As with the specific case of MSF, any overall decrease in the level of NGO allocations (project + country pools through management agents) would run counter to commitments to support all pillars of the humanitarian system.

33. There is an increase in the proportion of allocations to the combined Red Cross family and an increase in absolute terms (+ £3.2 million.) The Red Cross family is a key partner and, having a similar stance to MSF on impartiality, does not take money from any of the pooled funds. Allocations to the Red Cross are relatively 'easy' spend, given that large allocations to large appeals are the norm and that they are administratively lighter than accountable grants.

34. Within the UN share of the pie, the breakdown between agencies is as follows:

**Chart 11: DFID 2007/8 Africa Humanitarian Allocations between UN agencies (pooled, CERF and direct funding)**




35. WFP and UNICEF continue to dominate. Comparison with 2006/7 and 2005/6, (see Annex 2), shows that, as with the geographical split described in section 1, CERF and pooled funds tend to increase the 'range' of dispersal of allocations. Allocations were made to 15 agencies this year as opposed to 9 in 2006/7 and 8 in 2005/6.

36. Although small in absolute terms, allocations to non-traditional humanitarian partners such as International Labour Organisation (ILO), UNAIDS and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) begin to appear through CERF and country level pools. Allocations to 'marginal' humanitarian partners such as FAO (+£9 million to £10 million) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (+£1.6 million to £2.1 million) have also increased since 2006/7. Whilst significant, it is worth noting that these are single year variations and, as such, do not represent trends. As with the geographical spread, it is not possible from the data alone to evaluate whether this greater spread of funding is a positive or negative shift.

37. When all pooled funding streams are removed, the agency split can be represented as follows:

**Chart 12: DFID 2007/8 Africa Humanitarian Allocations to the UN (direct funding only)**




38. The range of agencies reduces to 9 and is again dominated by WFP and UNICEF. Of relevance here is the decrease in direct funding to the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNOCHA (-£667K to £500K). Although small in absolute terms, this is significant in terms of DFID overall support for OCHA.

### When we spend it

39. The following chart tracks spending levels throughout 2007/8:

**Chart 13: DFID 2007/8 Africa Humanitarian Allocation Trends for Complex Emergencies**




40. In 2007/8 complex emergency allocations are very clearly concentrated into the last quarter of the financial year. In 2005/6 the study set out specifically to look for potential bias towards times of year when administrative pressure to spend was higher, i.e. the beginning and end of the financial year. This probably remains a factor but it is impossible to gauge the extent. A positive factor is also at work in this case: early allocation (in calendar year terms) to country level pooled funds is a key element in their ability to provide predictable funding to UN workplans<sup>11</sup> and other appeals.

<sup>11</sup> 'Front-loading' of funds within the calendar year is a positive indicator in Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative.

41. Adding the spread of funding for natural disasters gives the combined chart below:

**Chart 14: DFID 2007/8 Africa Humanitarian Allocation Trends for Complex Emergencies and Natural Disasters**



42. The inclusion of natural disaster allocations changes this picture only marginally, despite there being a spread of natural disasters throughout the year. However, allocations to these disasters were small in comparison and not sufficient to reduce the very significant spikes at the financial year-end.

## **Annex 1: References / Background Documents**

- 1) *Allocating humanitarian funding according to need: towards analytical frameworks for donors* (Willitts-King, March 2007)
- 2) *Annual Disaster Statistical Review: The numbers and Trends 2006* (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED))
- 3) *Annual Disaster Statistical Review: The numbers and Trends 2007* (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED))
- 4) *Assessment of humanitarian needs and identification of 'forgotten crises'* (ECHO 'Technical Note' 2006)
- 5) *Beyond Entebbe* (DFID internal meeting note, Jan 2007)
- 6) *Development Assistance Committee Peer Review of the United Kingdom* (OECD 2006)
- 7) *DFID – ACHU Humanitarian Allocations in Africa 2005-6*
- 8) *DFID – ACHU Humanitarian Allocations in Africa 2006-7*
- 9) *DFID Humanitarian Funding Guidelines for NGOs* (DFID, Oct 2007)
- 10) *DFID Statistics on International Development 2002/3 – 2006/7* (National Statistics 2007)
- 11) *DFID Responding to Humanitarian Emergencies* (National Audit Office (NAO), 2003)
- 12) *DFID White Paper – Making governance work for the poor* (DFID, 2006)
- 13) *DG for Humanitarian AID – ECHO. Financial Report 2007* (ECHO, 2008)
- 14) *External Review of the CAP: OCHA Evaluation* (Toby Porter, April 2002)
- 15) *Financing Humanitarian action: A vision for reform – Discussion paper* (Macrae, Ahmed, 2007)
- 16) *Global Humanitarian Assistance 2006* (Development Initiatives, 2007)
- 17) *Global Humanitarian Assistance 2007/8* (Development Initiatives, 2008)
- 18) *Good Humanitarian Donorship and the European Union: a study of good practice and recent initiatives* (Barnaby Willets-King, September 2004)
- 19) *Revised Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Indicators 2007* (Development Initiatives, 2007)
- 20) *Saving Lives, relieving suffering, protecting dignity: DFID's Humanitarian Policy* (DFID, 2006)

## Annex 2: 2006/7 charts

Chart I




Chart II

**DFID 2006/7 Africa Humanitarian Allocations between UN agencies**  
(pooled, CERF and project funding)

