

# THE ANATOMY OF TERROR<sup>1</sup>

*“There is no better time for elections.”* Morgan Tsvangirai 16.09.10.<sup>2</sup>

*“I will not commit to any election if it is a declaration of war...I will not support a process that is flawed.”* Morgan Tsvangirai 20.09.10.<sup>3</sup>

*“The ZRP is now doing its job.”* Theresa Makone co-Minister of Home Affairs 01.09.10.<sup>4</sup>

*“We’ve got a captive police that is not allowed to do its job which it knows best.”* Theresa Makone co-Minister of Home Affairs 20.09.10.<sup>5</sup>

*If you go round looking for Bases as where people are operating from, many of those are not there -* Sekai Holland co-Minister National Healing and Reconciliation 21.05.10.<sup>6</sup>

## 1. Background

In February, 2000 ZANU PF’s first ever loss at the polls in a nationwide referendum precipitated a political crisis, which has continued to the present. For ZANU PF the most alarming aspect of this loss was that it was apparent that many rural voters, on whom ZANU PF could usually rely, had withdrawn support. A significant proportion of these voters, who were commercial farm workers, were perceived by ZANU PF to be farm labourers in the thrall of their white commercial farmer employers. With a general election pending in June of that year, ZANU PF moved swiftly to re-establish complete control over the country side. Under the guise of land reform, white commercial farms were invaded, farm workers killed, beaten, raped and displaced and militia bases established on the occupied land. These Bases were used as the spring board for a reign of terror in the countryside. Opposition supporters were brought to these Bases by the militia (comprising ZANU PF youth activists, the lumpen-proletariat and veterans of Zimbabwe’s Independence War) and subjected to protracted torture which they often did not survive. The Bases served the same function in subsequent elections.

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<sup>1</sup> The information in this report has been gathered by civic activists and credible researchers who wish to remain anonymous for both their security and the security of those who helped them compile the data. Sokwanele is facilitating dissemination of this information.

<sup>2</sup> Morgan Tsvangirai commenting on the probability of elections in 2011 quoted in *PM Says No Better Time For Elections* The Zimbabwean 18.09.10.

<sup>3</sup> Morgan Tsvangirai commenting on attacks by ZANU PF youths on MDC supporters attending outreach programmes related to Zimbabwe’s constitution making process, quoted in *Tsvangirai Threatens to Boycott Elections Over Violence* at <http://www.monstersandcritics.com/>. 20.09.10.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in *Police Have Turned Over a New Leaf – Makone* The Zimbabwe Independent 03.09.10.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in *Home Affairs Min Makone Says ZANU PF Holding Police Captive* <http://www.swradioafrica.com>. 20.09.10.

<sup>6</sup> SWRadio interview with Violet Gonda 21.05.10.

The impetus for this research arose from claims that the Bases were being re-established and re-activated (notwithstanding the formation a “unity government”) with reports in this regard being received from Manicaland in January 2010.<sup>7</sup> The re-establishment of the Bases was apparently in response to a proposed parliamentary outreach programme (COPAC) to solicit views nationwide on the contents of a new constitution and the referendum and possible general election that would follow. The objective of the research project was to test these claims, to analyse precisely how militia Bases are established and used as an instrument of terror and intimidation, and to identify possible interventions to avoid a repetition of widespread human rights abuses during forthcoming elections.<sup>8</sup>

## **2. Methodology<sup>9</sup>**

Gathering reliable but sensitive information in a hostile rural environment requires, first and foremost, consideration for the safety and anonymity of others. In order to protect the research assistants (RAs), local community leaders, victims of violence and others at risk in Zimbabwe’s low-level internecine conflict, we worked clandestinely. We respected those communities that remain fearful because they are subject to the impunity of others. We viewed our task as gradually building up local organisations and confidence to take action, but only within their own capacity and their willingness to act.

Secondly, the sensitive nature of the project required trust and solidarity with our international and civic partners, as well as with rural communities. We therefore worked with facilitators, local leaders and others who share our non-violent values and goals for peaceful elections to promote democracy and justice. Solidarity implies a mutually supportive relationship where we jointly develop strategies, utilise each others strengths and resources, and work together to organise actions to reduce violence.

### **2.1 Selection of study areas**

Fifteen study areas were selected by comparing incidents of violence recorded on the Sokwanele election violence map published in June 2008<sup>10</sup> with current reports of violence. For logistical and reporting purposes, study areas were divided into 3 groups (Table 1). Group 1 covered selected constituencies in Manicaland and Masvingo Province; Group 2 covered Mashonaland Central, except for Hurungwe in Mashonaland West; and for Group 3, RAs visited Mashonaland East constituencies, except for Epworth in Harare.

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<sup>7</sup> Zanu PF re-establish militia bases in Manicaland Zimdiaspora 29.01.10. and Mugabe Militia Set Up Torture Camps: Group <http://www.zimonline.co.za/> 24.02.10

<sup>8</sup> The interventions will be outlined in a subsequent report.

<sup>9</sup> This section outlines the approach and strategies used by the civic partner organisation in carrying out the research.

<sup>10</sup> *Mapping Terror in Zimbabwe: Political Violence and Elections*, 2008: Sokwanele, 18 June 2008: <http://www.sokwanele.com/map/electionviolence>

**Table 1: Study areas (constituencies)**

| <b>Group 1.</b>                     | <b>Group 2.</b>                                     | <b>Group 3.</b>                        |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| <a href="#"><u>Nyanga North</u></a> | <a href="#"><u>Mazoe North</u></a>                  | <a href="#"><u>Mudzi North</u></a>     |
| <a href="#"><u>Zaka West</u></a>    | <a href="#"><u>Mt Darwin South</u></a>              | <a href="#"><u>Maramba Pfungwe</u></a> |
| <a href="#"><u>Buhera South</u></a> | <a href="#"><u>Muzarabani North &amp; South</u></a> | <a href="#"><u>Uzumba South</u></a>    |
| <a href="#"><u>Mwenezi West</u></a> | <a href="#"><u>Shamva South</u></a>                 | <a href="#"><u>Hwedza South</u></a>    |
| <a href="#"><u>Makoni South</u></a> | <a href="#"><u>Hurungwe North</u></a>               | <a href="#"><u>Epworth</u></a>         |

After the first reconnaissance visits, the study in Chivi was relocated to Mwenezi, which was the prime source of violence in the area. In Chiweshe it was found that most violence was situated in Mazowe North, but included some parts of Mazowe West. In Muzarabani – one of the most difficult areas – the RAs visited both the North and South constituencies.

### ***2.1.1 Appointment of Research Assistants (RAs)***

Interviews were held with over 80 candidates who were initially invited from the participating organisation's membership. The selection criteria used to appoint RAs included their level of education, previous research experience, their active commitment to the ideals of democracy and justice, and sobriety. An attempt was also made to ensure that RAs were familiar both with the area and the local dialect. We also tried to maintain a gender balance.

A supervisor was appointed for each Group, and a principal RA appointed for each constituency. The principal RAs made four visits to a constituency and were responsible for reporting. The remainder of the RAs made one to three visits to the constituencies. Their participation served four purposes: to help collect data, to provide security, to train RAs for an expanded programme, and to test their ability.

In most cases the performance of principal RAs varied from good to excellent. In one constituency (Wedza) where performance was wavering, a replacement RA made commendable progress. In another constituency (Muzarabani), a mismatch was corrected with gratifying results. The gender balance was less successful. Between 25 and 33 percent of RAs were women. Three women were principal RAs. The main reason seemed to be that women are the main care-givers and hence less able to take time out and away from their families for constituency visits.

### ***2.1.2 Engagement of Facilitators***

Detailed planning revealed the risk of exposure of the project to disruption and RAs to threats of violence. In order to allow RAs to move securely within hostile areas, to facilitate their meetings with key local leaders and small groups, and to provide security backup, a facilitation network

was established. A national facilitator, the provincial facilitators, and the district facilitators were paid an honorarium for their assistance.

The fact that RAs were able to penetrate deep into isolated and hostile areas without incidence or threats of violence, and collect reliable and detailed information on organised violence, is a tribute to the vital role played by facilitators.

## **2.2 Questionnaire**

The Project Leader prepared a list of questions for RAs to be answered when gathering information. The list was revised and updated following consultation with key project staff. Further minor amendments were made, but only for security reasons.

## **2.3 Training and Evaluation**

Training primarily consisted of a series of in-depth briefing sessions before RAs were sent to the field, while evaluation entailed intensive debriefing sessions where RAs presented and discussed their findings. In general, debriefings sessions after each visit provided us with an invaluable monitoring and evaluation tool, not only to steer the programme towards its objectives, but to evaluate the performance of RAs.

The initial training focused on the objectives, approaches, basic rules of professional behaviour, safety precautions, methods of data collection, and ensuring that RAs were thoroughly conversant with the requirements of the questionnaire. As reports from the field were discussed at debriefing sessions, training focussed on how to structure the data collected and the ways in which fragmented tactics to stop violence could be organised into more cohesive strategies. The final training session concentrated on the presentation of constituency reports.

## **2.4 Field Visits**

RAs were tasked with developing the following components of the programme in order to build the community's confidence and capacity to resist violence:

*Leadership and organisation:* To lay the foundations for strong local organisations by establishing peace committees and their operational units, known as Defenders of the Peace (DoPs), and building safety in numbers by recruiting as many supporters as possible.

*Information:* To enable the continual flow of reliable information on the organisation of violence in order to formulate strategies, plan measures to counter violence, take action to avoid or neutralise it, and reduce perpetrators' confidence to act with impunity.

*Communications and planning:* To assess the needs for a good communication system to enable reliable information to be quickly conveyed to alert communities of impending danger, plan effective strategies, and provide essential data to (proposed) strategy support units.

As indicated, teams of two RAs made four visits to each of the 15 study areas. The first was a reconnaissance visit to engage with the local leaders, assess the security situation, and explain the purpose of the project. RAs trained small groups of recruits to collect information. During the second visit RAs verified the information collected, checking both the accuracy and the validity of the data. Peace committees and their operational units were formed to consider local strategies to mitigate election violence. On the third visit, the RAs began facilitating the building of the committees' own strategies to prevent violence. Assessments were also made of the members' level of confidence, as well as their capacity and willingness to act.

An unplanned but necessary hiatus was called between the third and fourth visits, giving time for the RAs to prepare structured reports for the Project Leader's consideration. By this stage the RAs could fully describe how state and party-sponsored violence was organised, including the names of those directing violence, base commanders, and perpetrators and their victims. On returning to the field on their fourth and final visit, RAs filled in any gaps in the data and verified as much information as possible. Their other task was to refine the local tactics to prevent violence into a more cohesive strategy.

## **2.5 Reporting**

RAs prepared their final constituency reports with the help of their supervisors. Through the continual evaluation of data collected we were able to systematically structure the constituency reports into four sections:

- An overview which consists of a brief description of the project area, a summary of the organisation of violence, and an organisational chart depicting key relationships;
- The organisation of violence which consists of a table of militia Bases, brief descriptions of violence in June 2008 and current threats, as well as detailed descriptions of currently active Bases;
- Local strategic objectives and activities for taking action to prevent violence;
- Support required for strategies and taking action.

The detailed reports from each constituency are attached as [Appendix A](#).<sup>11</sup> What follows is a summary of those reports and consolidation of the key statistics which appear in them.

It must be emphasised that the reports do not claim to have captured all information pertaining to all Bases and it may be assumed that there are Bases elsewhere in some constituencies studied of which the researchers were not informed or about which they failed to gain any information.

## **Findings**

### ***3.1 Introduction.***

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<sup>11</sup> The detailed reports can also be obtained by following the hyperlinks in Table 1.

The field research revealed that rather than the Bases being used as places where torture is carried out or physical injury inflicted, as has been the case in the past, the Bases are now being used primarily as meeting places from where the perpetrators of violence, and those applying other forms of control and terror, plan and co-ordinate operations.

The Bases work in a symbiotic relationship with the deployment of other instruments of power, both formal and informal. In each arena of formal power the local government structures have been subverted and adulterated by ZANU PF in order to establish and maintain party political control. These local and formal government structures in rural areas are extensive and need to be understood in order to complete the picture of the nature of political control and manufacture of fear in the areas which are the subject of this report. [Annexure C](#) (attached) is a paper prepared by a Zimbabwean NGO called the Research and Advocacy Unit (available at [www.Kubatana.net](http://www.Kubatana.net)) and has been included as it helps give a full understanding of the formal structures of power in the rural areas and is useful background to this report.

### ***3.2 Overview of the Bases***

The field research demonstrated that militia Bases are currently active in all except one of the constituencies studied.<sup>12</sup> There is a rough uniformity in who leads and manages the personnel at the Bases and how they are resourced. However, the manner of operation in each is adapted and adjusted in response to local conditions, for example, in the choice of the venue used for a base and resourcing. The purpose of each, however, is identical – to subdue the local population through a combination of the abuse of the formal power structures, intimidation, violence, and the control of resources.

Most Bases are under the control of members of the security sector. For day-to-day operations, the Bases usually receive instructions (and resources) from a sitting ZANU PF MP (or, in two cases, losing parliamentary candidate) either from the Senate or House of Assembly, as is the case in 10 of the 15 constituencies studied.<sup>13</sup> This ZANU PF MP or parliamentary candidate will pay regular visits to the area of control and liaise with a local ZANU PF rural district councillor, senior ZANU PF party official (usually a Chairperson in the hierarchy of ZANU PF structures - see [Appendix B](#) - and most often the District Coordinating Committee) or traditional leader in order to plan and coordinate the activities of the Bases. Traditional leaders use their powers (such as those to convene village and ward meetings) to facilitate the agreed activities, which are then implemented by ZANU PF youth militia. The militia groups are usually resourced by the MP, either directly or through the MP providing or access to the resource (see below).

Conversely, the facilitation of access to resources for some is complemented by the denial of access to others who would ordinarily qualify to benefit from the resource. Traditional leaders are instructed by government officials (such as the District Administrator) to compile lists of those considered to be in need of food aid, frequently resulting in the exclusion of perceived MDC supporters. Similarly, the District Administrators' involvement in the distribution of

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<sup>12</sup> Hwedza South.

<sup>13</sup> In two constituencies, not included in the 10 - Hwedza South and Nyanga North - MPs were nonetheless seen to have some involvement with the activities of the bases, with Hubert Nyanhongo (MP Harare South) seen to be commanding one of the bases in Nyanga North. Nyanhongo is also believed to be in a power struggle with former Minister (of Mines) Midzi for control over bases in Epworth.

vouchers for subsidized agricultural inputs is likewise open to partisanship and abuse.<sup>14</sup> If the denial of access to resources, food aid, and subsidies is insufficient to deter an individual from giving his or her allegiance to the MDC, overt violence is deployed. Village heads will often identify perceived MDC supporters at meetings convened by traditional leaders, with this exposure being one of the purposes of the meeting. The militia then physically abuse those named as MDC supporters. In this way a “carrot and stick” approach is used to control the villagers. The system is dependent upon maintaining the continuing impunity of those engaging in violence. The police play a crucial role in this regard by ensuring that none are arrested or charged as result of the violence.

### ***3.3 The Existence of Bases***

In the 15 constituencies, 147 Bases were identified, and, of these, 64 (44%) are currently active. Nearly all of these Bases (89%) were active in 2008, as almost all Bases are reactivated during election periods. The number of currently active Bases per constituency varies between seven (Buhera) and zero (Hwedza South). Muzarabani North and South, renowned for violence over election periods and combined for purposes of this study, unsurprisingly have a large number (ten) Bases active. Most activity at the Bases takes place at the weekends where as many as 500 people may gather where specific ZANU PF events are taking place. In the absence of such activities, the numbers at the Bases range from eight to 50.

**Table 2: Bases by Constituency<sup>15</sup> and Activity Since 2000**

|                        | Currently active  | 2000             | 2005             | 2008              | 2010             |
|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| <b>Buhera</b> [11]     | 6                 | 0                | 0                | 11                | 6                |
| <b>Epworth</b> [14]    | 3                 | 1                | 1                | 14                | 3                |
| <b>Hurungwe</b> [5]    | 2                 | 1                | 2                | 3                 | 2                |
| <b>Hwedza</b> [6]      | 0                 | 0                | 4                | 6                 | 0                |
| <b>Makoni</b> [7]      | 2                 | 7                | 6                | 6                 | 2                |
| <b>Pfungwe</b> [15]    | 4                 | 0                | 9                | 15                | 4                |
| <b>Mazoe</b> [4]       | 3                 | 1                | 2                | 4                 | 3                |
| <b>Mt Darwin</b> [7]   | 4                 | 6                | 6                | 6                 | 4                |
| <b>Mudzi</b> [18]      | 5                 | 1                | 13               | 14                | 6                |
| <b>Muzarabani</b> [16] | 11                | 16               | 16               | 16                | 10               |
| <b>Mwenezi</b> [6]     | 6                 | 5                | 5                | 5                 | 6                |
| <b>Nyanga</b> [6]      | 3                 | 5                | 3                | 5                 | 3                |
| <b>Shamva</b> [9]      | 7                 | 3                | 5                | 5                 | 7                |
| <b>Uzumba</b> [11]     | 4                 | 3                | 3                | 11                | 4                |
| <b>Zaka</b> [12]       | 4                 | 8                | 7                | 9                 | 4                |
| <b>Number:</b>         | <b>64 [43.5%]</b> | <b>57[38.8%]</b> | <b>82[55.8%]</b> | <b>130[88.6%]</b> | <b>64[43.5%]</b> |

<sup>14</sup> See [Appendix C](#).

<sup>15</sup> Constituency names have been abbreviated – see table immediately proceeding for the full description.

Bases are situated at different locations ranging from government buildings to churches. Government buildings, that is, schools, police posts, District Development Fund (DDF) structures and Rural District Council Community Halls, predominate places used as venues for Bases (Table 3).

Seven Bases operate through churches (primarily the Vadzidzi Apostolic Church), or the church (Mazowe North) passively allows its resources to be used for this purpose. Churches are used as Bases in Maramba-Pfungwe, Mazowe North, Makoni North and Mudzi North.

**Table 3: Base Locations by Constituency**

|                        | 1           | 2           | 3          | 4          | 5           | 6           | 7          | 8          | 9          | 10         | 11         | 12         |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| <b>Buhera</b> [11]     | 0           | 1           | 2          | 0          | 4           | 2           | 2          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          |
| <b>Epworth</b> [14]    | 0           | 0           | 0          | 0          | 2           | 10          | 2          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          |
| <b>Hurungwe</b> [5]    | 0           | 0           | 0          | 0          | 2           | 1           | 0          | 1          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          |
| <b>Hwedza</b> [6]      | 1           | 1           | 0          | 0          | 2           | 0           | 0          | 2          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          |
| <b>Makoni</b> [7]      | 0           | 3           | 0          | 0          | 3           | 0           | 0          | 0          | 2          | 1          | 0          | 0          |
| <b>Pfungwe</b> [15]    | 0           | 9           | 0          | 0          | 2           | 0           | 1          | 0          | 2          | 0          | 1          | 0          |
| <b>Mazoe</b> [4]       | 0           | 0           | 0          | 0          | 2           | 1           | 0          | 0          | 1          | 0          | 0          | 0          |
| <b>Mt Darwin</b> [7]   | 4           | 1           | 0          | 0          | 1           | 0           | 0          | 0          | 0          | 1          | 0          | 0          |
| <b>Mudzi</b> [18]      | 4           | 1           | 0          | 0          | 1           | 3           | 4          | 0          | 2          | 0          | 4          | 0          |
| <b>Muzarabani</b> [16] | 1           | 9           | 2          | 1          | 2           | 1           | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          |
| <b>Mwenezi</b> [6]     | 0           | 0           | 0          | 0          | 1           | 1           | 4          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          |
| <b>Nyanga</b> [6]      | 1           | 1           | 0          | 0          | 3           | 0           | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 1          | 0          |
| <b>Shamva</b> [9]      | 0           | 0           | 0          | 0          | 1           | 2           | 1          | 4          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 1          |
| <b>Uzumba</b> [11]     | 0           | 2           | 0          | 0          | 7           | 2           | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          |
| <b>Zaka</b> [12]       | 4           | 1           | 0          | 0          | 6           | 1           | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          | 0          |
| <b>Number:</b>         | <b>15</b>   | <b>29</b>   | <b>4</b>   | <b>1</b>   | <b>39</b>   | <b>24</b>   | <b>14</b>  | <b>7</b>   | <b>7</b>   | <b>2</b>   | <b>6</b>   | <b>1</b>   |
| <b>Percentage:</b>     | <b>10.2</b> | <b>19.7</b> | <b>2.7</b> | <b>0.7</b> | <b>26.5</b> | <b>16.3</b> | <b>9.5</b> | <b>4.8</b> | <b>4.8</b> | <b>1.4</b> | <b>4.1</b> | <b>0.7</b> |

**KEY:** 1=government building; 2=school; 3=bush; 4=graveyard; 5=business centre; 6=homestead; 7=open space; 8=farm; 9=church; 10=police post; 11=crèche; 12=other

The ambit of the Bases varies widely, sometimes being used only to subdue and control the area immediately around the base within a 1km and others operating in a 60km radius.<sup>16</sup> In Mt. Darwin South where the Bases appeared to be coordinated from the ZANU PF District Office, the District Office extends its influence throughout the Province (Mashonaland Central)

The findings above roughly accord with an ongoing study by another reliable Zimbabwean organisation using data relating to violence from nationwide reports (Table 4 over).

<sup>16</sup> Shamva South (Gold Mine Police Post base) and Mudzi North (Kotwa Vadzidzi Church base) respectively.

This data gives the places used as “torture bases” as follows:

**Table 4: Provincial breakdown of places where Bases are found**

| Province           | School       | Clinic       | Police station | Church       | Community hall | Private home | Farm        | Bush         | Business centre | Total      |
|--------------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-----------------|------------|
| Harare             | 0            | 0            | 6              | 0            | 12             | 8            | 2           | 0            | 0               | 28         |
| Manicaland         | 8            | 2            | 2              | 2            | 3              | 24           | 7           | 17           | 10              | 75         |
| Mash Central       | 23           | 2            | 5              | 5            | 4              | 22           | 4           | 25           | 14              | 104        |
| Mash East          | 31           | 2            | 3              | 4            | 6              | 33           | 9           | 28           | 18              | 134        |
| Mash West          | 8            | 0            | 4              | 0            | 2              | 36           | 3           | 26           | 12              | 91         |
| Masvingo           | 10           | 2            | 0              | 1            | 3              | 13           | 4           | 12           | 9               | 54         |
| Mat North          | 0            | 0            | 0              | 0            | 0              | 0            | 1           | 1            | 0               | 2          |
| Mat South          | 0            | 0            | 0              | 0            | 0              | 0            | 0           | 2            | 0               | 2          |
| Midlands           | 6            | 5            | 2              | 2            | 7              | 22           | 8           | 19           | 13              | 84         |
| <b>Total:</b>      | <b>86</b>    | <b>13</b>    | <b>22</b>      | <b>14</b>    | <b>37</b>      | <b>158</b>   | <b>38</b>   | <b>130</b>   | <b>76</b>       | <b>574</b> |
| <b>Percentage:</b> | <b>14.98</b> | <b>2.265</b> | <b>3.833</b>   | <b>2.439</b> | <b>6.446</b>   | <b>27.53</b> | <b>6.62</b> | <b>22.65</b> | <b>13.24</b>    |            |

Pictures of some of the Bases in the constituencies studied are attached as [Appendix D](#).

### **3.4 Personnel**

#### **3.4.1 Constituency Commanders<sup>17</sup>**

In seven instances the Bases within a constituency are under the overall command of a serving military officer operating from a main coordinating base.<sup>18</sup> Of these, the lowest ranking officer is a sergeant<sup>19</sup> and the highest Brigadier-General.<sup>20</sup> Bases in three constituencies are under the control of members of the security sector - two are under the command of CIO operatives,<sup>21</sup> one under the command of the Police Commissioner-General.<sup>22</sup> In only four constituencies do the Bases appear to be outside the overall command of members of the security sector.<sup>23</sup> Two of these are under the command of a losing parliamentary candidate. The losing parliamentary

<sup>17</sup> This information is based upon reports received from villagers and was not possible to confirm directly.

<sup>18</sup> One currently non-active base, Hwedza was previously under the command of a military officer.

<sup>19</sup> Muzarabani.

<sup>20</sup> Uzumba.

<sup>21</sup> Mazoe North and Nyanga North.

<sup>22</sup> Augustine Chihuri.

<sup>23</sup> Epworth (seemingly the most non-militarised of the base locations) under the command of former Minister Midzi, Mt. Darwin North under the command of Vice-President Mujuru and Minister Saviour Kasukuwere, Hurungwe North under the command of former Provincial Governor, and now MP, Peter Chanetsa and Buhera South.

candidate for Buhera South,<sup>24</sup> Joseph Chinotimba, is a notorious ZANU PF supporter directly involved in two cases of murder<sup>25</sup> and several rapes.<sup>26</sup> He was the leader of many land and urban company invasions after 2000. Chinotimba works closely with two members of the Zimbabwe National Army, Colonel Kenneth Mzilikazi and Tsanana Muzokomba whose rank was not determined.

Three senior ZANU PF members of the country's current Cabinet are named as being involved with the coordination of the operations of the Bases. In addition to the members of Cabinet, some of the most senior members of ZANU PF, including members of the Joint Operations Command (Zimondi, Chihuri, Gono) appear to be directly implicated in the coordination of violence emanating from the Bases.

### **Constituency Commanders:**

|             |                                                                                                                                                                             |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Zaka:       | Colonel Mayoyo.                                                                                                                                                             |
| Uzumba:     | Brigadier-General Nyikayaramba (together with Prisons Commissioner-General Paradzai Zimondi and Colonel Wirisha Mudzimba).                                                  |
| Shamva:     | Police Commissioner-General Augustine Chihuri (together with Nicolas Goche, Minister of Transport).                                                                         |
| Nyanga:     | CIO officer Nyakatawa (possibly working with Gideon Gono, named by researchers as involved in coordinating 2008 violence).                                                  |
| Mwenze:     | Colonel Hungwe.                                                                                                                                                             |
| Muzarabani: | Sergeant George Hamunyari Kamusengezi.                                                                                                                                      |
| Mudzi:      | Brigadiers Milaso and Kamonera.                                                                                                                                             |
| Mt. Darwin: | Vice President Mujuru (MP for Mt. Darwin West) with MP Saviour Kasukuwere.                                                                                                  |
| Mazowe:     | Elias Kudzonga Kanengoni (CIO) with and Major Filbert Kairo Mhandu.                                                                                                         |
| Pfungwe:    | Colonels Mudzimba and Charamba.                                                                                                                                             |
| Makoni:     | Major General George Kafesu.                                                                                                                                                |
| Hurungwe:   | Peter Chanetsa )MP and former Provincial Governor).                                                                                                                         |
| Epworth:    | Amos Midzi, former ZANU PF Minister and losing candidate for the area (Hubert Nyanhongo, MP for Harare South is attempting to wrest control of Bases in Epworth from Midzi) |
| Buhera:     | Joseph Chinotimba, losing parliamentary candidate, working in conjunction with Col. Mzilikazi and Tsanana Muzokomba (of the ZNA rank unknown).                              |

### **3.4.2 Base Commanders and Junior Personnel.**

The command Bases have up to 16 Bases under their authority, with an average of eight sub-Bases to each command base<sup>27</sup>. On occasion, there is a central military officer co-ordinating a three-tier structure of Bases with several sub-Bases each with sub-sub-Bases under the control of

<sup>24</sup> The other is Amos Midzi, Epworth.

<sup>25</sup> See the Buhera South report.

<sup>26</sup> Chinotimba's involvement in multiple rapes, together with a notorious army officer, Major Sosve, has been documented elsewhere, but reported anonymously in order to protect the victims. For other examples of politically motivated rape see RAU (2010), *No Hiding Place: Politically Motivated Rape of Women in Zimbabwe*. Report produced by the Research and Advocacy Unit [RAU] and the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights [ZADHR]. December 2010. HARARE: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT and ZIMBABWE ASSOCIATION OF DOCTORS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

<sup>27</sup> This is calculated from all bases, active and dormant and assumes that no further command bases are activated when the dormant bases are also activated.

their respective commanders.<sup>28</sup> The Bases under the main base are headed by war veterans, senior ZANU PF party officials, serving or former members of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), and ZANU PF rural district councillors. The coordination of day-to-day logistics and operations of all the conglomeration of Bases is usually done by a ZANU PF parliamentarian or war veteran working closely with the military officer in overall charge.

Those implementing operations (see further below) at the Bases comprise senior ZANU PF officials, (in nine constituencies the ZANU PF District Coordinating Committee Chairperson is involved<sup>29</sup>), ZANU PF war veterans, ZANU PF youth, ZANU PF activists, CIO officers, Youth Development Officers (ward officers), and occasionally traditional leaders and educators at the local school.<sup>30</sup>

The most common chain of command is thus as follows: military officer – parliamentarian – senior ZANU PF official or rural district councillor – ZANU PF DCC Chair, war veteran, ZANU PF youth militia.

### **3.4.3 Parliamentarians Involvement in Violence**

Some 63 murders in 40 different incidents took place in the June 2008 violence<sup>31</sup>; these took place in 11 of the 15 constituencies under study. No murders were reported in only four of the constituencies under study.<sup>32</sup> Parliamentarians were reported to have ordered the violence that led to the deaths of 18 people. One parliamentarian<sup>33</sup>, and one losing candidate (Joesph Chinotimba), were each directly involved in acts of murder. The parliamentarians are also implicated in numerous other acts of violence. Here it should be noted that parliamentarians were frequently mentioned in 2000, but less frequently in 2002, which suggests the deployment of parliamentarians is strategic.<sup>34</sup>

Where no parliamentary candidate or sitting MP is involved in giving orders to the Bases, the person carrying out the same function is usually a war veteran.<sup>35</sup>

### **3.4.5 Those Who Perpetrate the Violence**

A list of the perpetrators and base commanders by constituency and base appears as [Appendix E](#).<sup>36</sup> A further list of perpetrators and crimes committed by constituency appears as [Appendix F](#).

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<sup>28</sup> See for example Buhera South which has three command bases and six sub-bases.

<sup>29</sup> Buhera; Epworth; Makoni; Maramba Pfungwe; Mazoe North, Mudzi North; Mwenzi West; Shamva South; Zaka West.

<sup>30</sup> See for example Hwedza South, Muuyu base.

<sup>31</sup> Here it should be noted that there were many people involved in these murders, as can be seen in the table in [Appendix F](#).

<sup>32</sup> Epworth, Makoni South, Nyanga North and Shamva South.

<sup>33</sup> Senator Kambayanjiri.

<sup>34</sup> See Appendix H.

<sup>35</sup> Mwenzi West and Makoni South.

<sup>36</sup> This list is based on only those perpetrators for whom named victims can be given. This was done to ensure reliability of reporting. Many more perpetrators were named by the respondents in the community, but it was felt that there would be greater reliability in reporting only on those perpetrators whose names were known by identified victims.

91% percent of the perpetrators are male. The relatively high percentage (9%) of women that were involved in violence, accords with other studies.<sup>37</sup>

There is a wide age range of perpetrators, from 20 to 80 years. Nearly half the perpetrators (48%) are between the ages of 20 to 40 years, with another 48% are in the 41 - 60 year age group. Two elderly people, 76 and 80 years old respectively, were involved in violent activities in Makoni South. These two are Chiefs, indicating that, on occasion, the role of traditional leaders in violence is sometimes more than merely facilitative. Younger people appear to be enticed to form part of the system of violence through either cash incentives or the access to resources as detailed below.

76% of the perpetrators are members of ZANU PF, 7% part of the Army, and 11% war veterans, supporting the view in other studies<sup>38</sup> that the violence is mostly organized by ZANU PF with the active assistance of the security sector. The numbers of village headmen, chiefs, and councillors should also be noted [see [Appendix C](#) again as well as Section 3.5.3 below].

**Table 6: Perpetrators by Organisation<sup>39</sup>**

| Name of organization | Percentage |
|----------------------|------------|
| Zanu PF              | 77         |
| Zanu PF Youth        | 47         |
| War veteran          | 10         |
| Army                 | 5          |
| CIO                  | 1          |
| ZRP                  | 1          |
| Church leader        | 1          |
| Councillor           | 4          |
| Headman              | 2          |
| Chief                | 4          |
| Other                | 5          |

### 3.4.6 Police Involvement

In several instances police camps and posts are used as Bases;<sup>40</sup> Bases are either supervised by the police support unit<sup>41</sup>, or victims are taken to police camps and assaulted there. In Buhera South (Chikomo), six police officers participated in murder on the instructions of the commander of the Bases. An AK rifle used by militia at a base<sup>42</sup> in Hurungwe North is kept at the local police station, while the base commander is permitted by police to keep a 303 rifle with him at all times. During elections, police camps have supplied police uniforms for those at Bases

<sup>37</sup> See CSVr (2009), *Subliminal Terror? Human rights violations and torture in Zimbabwe during 2008*. June 2009. JOHANNESBURG: CSVr.

<sup>38</sup> See [Appendix H](#).

<sup>39</sup> It should be noted that the respondents identified perpetrators by more than one identity and hence the percentages overall do not sum to 100%. For example, Church leaders and councillors were identified both by their role and their affiliation to ZANU PF, as was the case for many other categories of perpetrator.

<sup>40</sup> See Buhera South, Muzokomba Police Station; Makoni South, Nyazura Police Station; Mt Darwin South, Chipa 3; Shamva South Goldmine Police Post

<sup>41</sup> Mudzi North, Musau base.

<sup>42</sup> Kazangarare base.

allowing them to masquerade as police officers.<sup>43</sup> One base maintains contact with the police with a two way radio, using this means of communication to confirm perpetrators of violence as ZANU PF supporters and thus secure their release.<sup>44</sup> Many senior police officers in the districts are war veterans and work closely with those at the Bases. Police also stand idly by while crimes are perpetrated in their presence by ZANU PF supporters.<sup>45</sup>

The police in all the constituencies studied openly show support for the personnel at the Bases or those connected with the structure of violence, and ensure that criminal dockets are either not opened against those who perpetrate violence and other crimes, or, if a docket is opened, that the matter is not pursued. Victims reporting crimes by ZANU PF supporters are simply turned away from the police station, sometimes with the comment that the matter is “political” and that there is nothing that the police can do, even where the crime reported is murder.<sup>46</sup> On the few occasions where the police have arrested perpetrators, they have been released shortly thereafter after intervention by those coordinating the Bases or ZANU PF politicians.<sup>47</sup> As a result, in all constituencies there are instances where victims of crime simply do not report the incident as they are aware that nothing will be done. There are also numerous press reports of those seeking to file complaints being themselves arrested as perpetrators, supporting similar information from the field researchers.<sup>48</sup>

Documentation leaked detailing a meeting of members of the security sector in Matabeleland North prior to the 2008 presidential run-off election, suggests that this behaviour by the police was specific police policy, coordinated and arranged at a national level.<sup>49</sup>

In all constituencies where murders had taken place in 2008, most perpetrators are still in the area where the crime was committed, and none have been charged with an offence, let alone taken to trial. With those involved in extreme violence, including murder, still living freely in the areas where the crime was committed, their presence and brazen boasts of the ability to carry out acts of violence with impunity, has an extremely intimidating effect on villagers. All field researchers remarked on the impunity of perpetrators as being one of the key components of the anatomy of terror in the constituencies studied.

One positive story of police engagement with violence in Nyanga North demonstrates what can be accomplished where there is the political will to do so. In a ward in that constituency, police, at the instigation of the MP, wrote a formal letter authorizing villagers to recover livestock stolen by ZANUPF activists in 2008. As a result 150 families recovered their animals.

### 3.5 Base Resources

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<sup>43</sup> Mt. Darwin South, Chipa 3. It is an offence to pose as a police officer – section 179 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act Chapter 9:23.

<sup>44</sup> Mt. Darwin South, Nyakasikana Primary School base.

<sup>45</sup> See the Epworth and Mudzi North Report

<sup>46</sup> Muzarabani.

<sup>47</sup> See Epworth, Mazoe North, Muzarabani and Mt Darwin South Reports.

<sup>48</sup> See *Makone Sparks Discord in MDC-T* Newsday 08.08.10 <http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2010-09-08-makone-sparks-discord-in-mdct> and Nyanga North and Shamva South Reports.

<sup>49</sup> While the authenticity and accuracy of the document cannot be confirmed, the subsequent behaviour of the police in the constituencies studied is consistent with its content.

Personnel at the Bases are sustained in a wide variety of ways, that is, by:

- a) being allowed to engage in illegal gold panning in the area;<sup>50</sup>
- b) profit from the operations of a grinding mill,<sup>51</sup> bottle store or bar;<sup>52</sup>
- c) being given access to market stands;<sup>53</sup>
- d) being provided with provisions from an occupied farm in the constituency;<sup>54</sup>
- e) being given cash and provisions by the MP or person managing the Bases;<sup>55</sup>
- f) being given employment at GMB depots (for the significance of this see [Appendix C](#)) or the local store;<sup>56</sup>
- g) being given soft loans or credit by those managing the Bases;<sup>57</sup>
- h) the extortion of money from villagers by traditional leaders;<sup>58</sup>
- i) the provision of state subsidies;<sup>59</sup>
- j) diverting NGO or CSO aid;<sup>60</sup>
- k) looting, taking “fines” from individuals for supporting the MDC, or extorting cash, produce and livestock from neighbouring farms or villagers perceived to be MDC supporters.<sup>61</sup>

In addition, some of those active at the Bases are receiving monthly payments of \$100 from the government.<sup>62</sup> Many of those found by the field researchers to be recipients of these monthly payments are ostensibly Youth Development Officers or “ward officers”, but have no obvious duties other than those at the Bases.<sup>63</sup> The government Comptroller and Auditor-General’s report of 2009 revealed that 10 077 “ward officers” were added to the government payroll between May and June 2008 (that is, in the build up to the violent 2008 presidential run-off) without such posts being in the Ministry of Youth establishment. The Minister responsible for adding these youths to the government payroll is Saviour Kasukuwere.<sup>64</sup> This Minister is personally active in currently organizing activities at Bases in Mt. Darwin South. Kasukuwere is regarded as the first to set up a torture base (in Mashonaland Central) and to have established the modus operandi of torture Bases generally. He reportedly funded 27 war veterans and ZANU PF youths to set up a torture base at a building owned by his campaign manager in the run up to the 2000

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<sup>50</sup> Maramba Pfungwe, Shamva South.

<sup>51</sup> Mt Darwin South, Muzarabani.

<sup>52</sup> Mazowe North.

<sup>53</sup> Shamva South, Epworth. In Epworth ZANU PF youth at the bases have been given stands at the Mupedzanhamo Market in Mbare.

<sup>54</sup> Mazowe North, Mt Darwin South, Shamva South.

<sup>55</sup> Epworth, Buhera South, Hurungwe North, Makoni South, Mazowe North, Mt Darwin South, Mudzi North.

<sup>56</sup> Maramba Pfungwe.

<sup>57</sup> Mt. Darwin South.

<sup>58</sup> Hurungwe North, Mt Darwin South.

<sup>59</sup> Mazowe North, Mt. Darwin South, Shamva South.

<sup>60</sup> Maramba Pfungwe, Mt Darwin South, Mudzi North.

<sup>43</sup> Uzumba South<sup>61</sup> Maramba Pfungwe, Mazowe North, Mt Darwin South, Mudzi North, Muzarabani, Shamva South, Zaka West. See also *Sibanda Vows To Continue Terror Campaign* <http://www.zimeye.org/?p=22819> 02.10.10 where “war veteran” leader Sibanda used Chiefs to instruct villagers that they would be fined \$10 if they did not attend his rallies and a beast if they did not mobilise people for his campaign for ZANU PF.

<sup>62</sup> Mazowe North, Mt Darwin South, Mwenzi West, Nyanga North, Uzumba South

<sup>63</sup> Mazowe North, Muzarabani, Mwenzi West

<sup>64</sup> Then Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment and now Minister of Indigenisation and Empowerment.

parliamentary elections. Many victims have suffered at the hands of this group. Kasukuwere was involved in ferrying the 300 youths to Mazowe who participated in the 2008 Chawona<sup>65</sup> atrocity in which six people were murdered.<sup>66</sup> Several reports link Kasukuwere with some of the most gruesome acts of violence since 2000 in which he has been actively and personally involved.<sup>67</sup>

80,000 youths (aged between 10 and 30 years old) have been trained through the National Youth Training Programme<sup>68</sup> since the programme's inception in August 2001. 13, 950 are employed as ward officers right across the country and are on the government payroll.<sup>69</sup> The annual cost of maintaining this militia programme to support ZANU (PF) is \$6 million.<sup>70</sup> Their involvement in political violence against MDC supporters is well documented.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> The Zimbabwe Mail report refers to Chaona, (which is in Muzarabani) rather than Chawona which is in Mazowe. The facts indicated that Chawona is intended.

<sup>66</sup> See the Mazowe North constituency report.

<sup>67</sup> On May 13 2008 the same large group of ZANU PF militia led by Kasukuwere killed F.C., B. M. and S. K. in Mount Darwin and On May 19 2009 the Kasukuwere led gang abducted and killed P. M. On March 18, 2007, Kasukuwere accompanied by a gang of CIO agents followed an MDC MP, Nelson Chamisa to the Harare Airport and savagely attacked him with an iron bar. On March 25 2000, Kasukuwere then a Zanu PF candidate for the Mount Darwin Constituency organised a 200 strong gang of Zanu PF youths and war veterans at Madondo Hotel, Mount Darwin Centre. This group had a list of addresses of known MDC supporters which they used to follow up and assault all the people who were found staying at these houses. Many victims showed lacerated wounds, bruises on the face and all over the body after this raid. Kasukuwere was assisted by Jacob Juma a war veteran to command this attack on the residents of Mount Darwin. On April 8, 2000 Kasukuwere hatched a plan to eliminate an MDC chairman in Mount Darwin. A group of ZANU PF youths was then dispatched by Kasukuwere under the cover of darkness to the MDC chairman's homestead. They surrounded his homestead and set the homestead on fire on trying to escape from the fire, he fell into the hands of the arsonists who used an axe to hack him all over the body. They left him for dead, but he was saved by his neighbour who took him to hospital. On the same day, April 8, 2000, Kasukuwere leading a large group of youths he had ferried into Mount Darwin from Chitungwiza attacked another MDC chairman only known as T., so severely lacerating him that he had to be rushed to hospital. The following day on the 9th of April the same gang destroyed T.'s home burning his car to ashes. The case was reported but the police noted that they could not do anything since Kasukuwere was involved. On 13 April 2000 a convoy of MDC supporters coming from Bindura to Mount Darwin to attend a rally, were ambushed by Kasukuwere just after "Shashe pass" along the road to mount Darwin. The MDC supporters were first attacked by a large group of stone-throwing ZANU PF supporters. Running battles between the two groups erupted and the police moved in to quell the violence. The MDC convoy proceeded only to fall into another ambush mounted by Kasukuwere himself and a band of gun totting CIO operatives. This armed gang used vehicles to block the road and moved on to the MDC supporters using iron bars to smash vehicle windscreens and pounding people in the process. Kasukuwere armed with an iron bar pounced on "A." a well known MDC activist in Bindura and with a single blow took out A's left eye. It could not be saved and he now has only one eye. Many MDC supporters were injured though there were no deaths reported many came out of the melee with broken bones and lacerated faces. Source: <http://zimbabweonlinepress.com/index.php?news=2823>.

<sup>68</sup> At what is sometimes referred to as the "Border Gezi Camps" after the ZANU PF Minister who established them.

<sup>69</sup> *10 000 Youths Illegally Hired* <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/> 22.10.10.

<sup>70</sup> Source Elliot Pfebve *GNU's Decision on Youth Militia Programme a Fallacy* <http://newzimsituation.com/gnu-s-decision-on-youth-militia-programme-a-fallacy-20162.htm>.

<sup>71</sup> Having previously called for this programme to be disbanded due to the violence of the graduates, the MDC specifically conceded to its continuance in the Interparty Political Agreement signed on 15.09.10 which established Zimbabwe's "Government of National Unity (see article 15 thereof).

<sup>72</sup> See Solidarity Peace Trust 2003 *National Youth Service Training - "Shaping Youths in a Truly Zimbabwean Manner"*.

These youths are also sometimes rewarded for their participation in base activities with beer and drugs (usually cannabis).<sup>73</sup>

29 schools are used as Bases - nearly 20% of all Bases. As indicated in [Appendix H](#)<sup>74</sup>, schools were used with increasing frequency as Bases after 2000 and this large number indicates that the trend has continued. Brick and mortar buildings are in short supply in the rural areas and for this reason schools often become the focal point for community activities. The research shows that many schools have been taken over by ZANU PF activists and used as Bases to the exclusion of other non-ZANU PF community activities. It is obviously an abuse of state resources that schools should be used for party political activities, let alone as militia Bases. Similar comments could be made about the offices of the District Development Fund (DDF) which were used as ZANU PF Bases in two instances in the 15 constituencies studied.<sup>75</sup> DDF vehicles were also evident in assisting with logistics at the Bases<sup>76</sup>, and fuel from DDF depots were obtained for Bases in Mt Darwin South and Nyanga North, seemingly free of charge.

Press reports indicating that the Governor of the Reserve Bank had purchased and distributed vehicles to ZANU PF supporters, and possibly the party directly, has led to the hypothesis that many of these vehicles would have been used as a resource for the Bases.<sup>77</sup> The field research showed this not to be the case. Most of the vehicles observed at the Bases and by persons visiting the Bases are earlier (late 90s or 2000) models, which precede the supply of vehicles by the Governor.

### 3.5.1 Access to Community Resources

Many rural villagers rely on food handouts to survive (particularly between harvests) while others survive partly on food handouts and partly on live stock.<sup>78</sup>

Traditional leaders are often tasked with identifying those who should qualify for food assistance and farming subsidies. The broad powers given to traditional leaders and the fact that oversight of the manner in which they carry out their responsibilities lies with a ZANU PF controlled Ministry ([see Appendix C](#)) means that distribution of these resources is open to abuse, with distribution being confined to those prepared to declare their loyalty to ZANU PF -<sup>79</sup> usually through the purchase of party membership cards. District Administrators are often involved in the distribution of these resources and work in collaboration with traditional leaders in this regard.

Similarly, the Grain Marketing Board has wide-ranging powers to control the distribution and sale of food staples and farm inputs. Once commodities are gazetted as “controlled”, the distribution and movement of the product, and sale and purchase of the product, is strictly regulated. With the GMB depots under the control of ZANU PF supporters, access to the commodities on a politically partisan basis ensures the exclusion of many perceived MDC

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<sup>73</sup> Epworth, Hwedza South.

<sup>74</sup> See footnote 33.

<sup>75</sup> Mudzi North and Nyanga North.

<sup>76</sup> Mt Darwin South and Nyanga North.

<sup>77</sup> *75 Cars Held in RBZ Probe* The Standard 22.05.10.

<sup>78</sup> See for example Buhera South.

<sup>79</sup> Mazoe North.

supporters in the distribution of food and fertiliser. Bias in this manner was reported in eight constituencies.<sup>80</sup>

While no products are currently listed as controlled, the GMB is still used a distribution point to implement schemes providing agricultural inputs to villagers at subsidised prices. As indicated above, many ZANU PF youth are given jobs at the GMB<sup>81</sup> as a means of ensuring their support and controlling the distribution of agricultural products and inputs. In Hurungwe North, a GMB building itself is used as a base<sup>82</sup>, and the entire infrastructure, facilities and supplies have been taken over and used for purposes of running the base and rewarding ZANU PF supporters.

In several constituencies, the operations of international aid organisations were judged to have been compromised in that they were carrying out their operations on a politically partisan basis. In some, this went to the extent where the NGO was judged to be entirely ZANU PF run, such as Environment Africa in Mudzi North and Mercy Corps in Buhera South. Other compromised international NGOs are World Food Programme (Mt Darwin South); GOAL in Hurungwe North, Mt. Darwin South and Makoni South; the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) in Maramba Pfungwe; Oxfam GB in Mt. Darwin South; Christian Care in Maramba Pfungwe and the Southern African Distribution of Commodities (Mazowe North).

International NGOs which are operating without interference in the constituencies studied include: NAC Global Fund; CRS;<sup>83</sup> AICAST; Care International; SAT; MSF; the Red Cross; and PLWHA.

### 3.5.2 Churches

In four constituencies<sup>84</sup>, apostolic churches (the Vadzidzi – “Disciples” – church and Johane WeChisanu church) have been taken over by ZANU PF “preachers” who openly use church gatherings to promote ZANU PF policies and threaten villagers. Those attending these services are required to chant ZANU PF slogans and denounce the “opposition” MDC. Disciplinary action is taken against those who refuse to do so.<sup>85</sup> Often these “preachers” are war veterans and the “sermons” are characterised by extreme anti-MDC and anti-white invective. The anti-white invective is sometimes presented as pseudo-mystical religious doctrine combined with references to an exclusivist pan-Africanist philosophy. A transcript of one such “sermon” appears as Appendix I. ([for video click here](#)) The ZANU PF church leaders sometimes wear ZANU PF regalia while preaching<sup>86</sup>, and, at Vhombozi base, Mudzi North<sup>87</sup>, those attending the services are required to wear ZANU PF ‘T’ shirts beneath their religious robes. The MP for the constituency uses his vehicle to ferry youth from church services in the area to Vhombozi base (situated near his residence) to undergo military style drills on Friday evenings.

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<sup>80</sup> Buhera South, Hurungwe North, Makoni South, Mazowe North, Mt Darwin South, Mwenezi West, Uzumba South, and Zaka West.

<sup>81</sup> Hurungwe North.

<sup>82</sup> Kazangare.

<sup>83</sup> In Mudzi North. Its operations are compromised in Maramba Pfungwe.

<sup>84</sup> Makoni South, Maramba Pfungwe, Mazowe North and Mudzi North.

<sup>85</sup> Mudzi North.

<sup>86</sup> Makoni South.

<sup>87</sup> Vhombozi base.

The policy of ZANU PF towards those attending these churches initially appears contradictory. At Vhombozi, in Mudzi North, villagers must be in possession of a letter from a ZANU PF official in the area before they are allowed to join the church congregation<sup>88</sup>, yet are victimised if they attempt to leave the congregation. It appears that attending the Vadzidzi church has become a mark of loyalty to ZANU PF, and anyone seen not to do so thus is seen as sympathetic to the MDC. Villagers thus seek to join the church so as not to be seen as an outsider and vulnerable to attack. In the same constituency, Mudzi North, Grace Ablaze Ministries was forced to stop holding services after being overrun by ZANU PF members of the Vadzidzi church, which accused the church of being pro-MDC and pro-white

### 3.5.3 Traditional Leadership

As shown in [Appendix C](#), traditional leaders are required by law to be politically impartial in carrying out their duties. The statutory provisions in this regard have been blatantly flouted, and, in most constituencies, Chiefs are seen as working closely with the Bases and facilitating their operations. Chiefs have convened meetings at which they have ordered village heads to warn their communities of violent repercussions or the loss of land<sup>89</sup> if they do not support the ZANU PF line in regard to the constitutional making process, COPAC<sup>90</sup>. They have also been involved in identifying MDC members in their communities for victimisation.<sup>91</sup> In one instance, a base is actually located at the Chiefs home<sup>92</sup>, and, in another instance, a Chief is regarded as commanding a base.<sup>93</sup> The extensive powers given to chiefs and traditional leaders detailed in Appendix C mean that villagers have a very real fear that the traditional leaders will carry out these threats.

Two Chiefs in Makoni South were directly involved in incidents of violence, as indicated above, and, in some instances, traditional leaders are reported to have compelled villagers to give money in order to support the personnel at the Bases (see above). In one instance, village heads were reported as receiving \$20 per month distributed by the District Administrator to participate in base activities.<sup>94</sup> A Chief in Buhera South chairs a committee set up by Joseph Chinotimba (see above) to control and determine the entry of NGOs into the constituency.

Traditional leaders subordinate to Chiefs who refuse to cooperate with these strategies have been threatened with removal from their positions<sup>95</sup>, and, in one instance, uncooperative headmen were reported to have been removed from their positions by a Chief and replaced with ZANU PF officials.<sup>96</sup>

The Traditional leaders have a statutory duty to report crimes and deaths in the area under their jurisdiction to the police. Rather than carrying out these duties, it is apparent that during the

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<sup>88</sup> Kagonda, Maramba Pfungwe.

<sup>89</sup> Chief Gandanzara, Makoni South

<sup>90</sup> Chief Changara (Muzarabani) Chief Maranda (Mwenzi West) and Chief Saungyama (Nyanga North) are most notable in this regard.

<sup>91</sup> See for example Mudzi North, Mwenzi West.

<sup>92</sup> Mwenzi West (Chief Maranda).

<sup>93</sup> Chief Changara, Hoya base, Muzarabani.

<sup>94</sup> Makoni South

<sup>95</sup> For example, in Mudzi North.

<sup>96</sup> Muzarabani.

violence preceding the June 2008 election traditional leaders connived with police to ignore crimes of violence perpetrated in their areas including murder and rape. Theft of livestock by ZANU PF militia from perceived MDC supporters was also ignored by the traditional leaders. Community courts presided over by the Chiefs have not been used by those affected by the abuses due to the manifest bias of the traditional leaders towards the perpetrators. Where these courts have been used it has been to the detriment of MDC supporters.<sup>97</sup> In one instance the court itself has been used as a venue to perpetrate violence.<sup>98</sup>

**Table 7: Party affiliations of traditional leaders and involvement in political activities [percentages]<sup>99</sup>**

| CONSTITUENCY    | ZANU PF | MDC | Neutral | Weak affiliation | Strong affiliation | Politically active |
|-----------------|---------|-----|---------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Buhera South    | 67      | 29  | 29      | 21               | 33                 | 13                 |
| Hurungwe North  | 100     | 0   | 7       | 36               | 21                 | 50                 |
| Makoni South    | 35      | 65  | 65      | 10               | 20                 | 5                  |
| Maramba Pfungwe | 91      | 0   | 0       | 11               | 20                 | 59                 |
| Mazoe North     | 44      | 33  | 28      | 0                | 33                 | 44                 |
| Mt Darwin South | 86      | 21  | 21      | 0                | 0                  | 86                 |
| Mudzi North     | 77      | 27  | 4       | 42               | 8                  | 50                 |
| Muzarabani      | 100     | 0   | 10      | 0                | 0                  | 90                 |
| Mwenezi West    | 100     | 0   | 6       | 18               | 64                 | 15                 |
| Nyanga North    | 94      | 0   | 6       | 6                | 33                 | 56                 |
| Shamva South    | 86      | 0   | 0       | 7                | 7                  | 86                 |
| Uzumba          | 106     | 0   | 0       | 0                | 63                 | 44                 |
| Hwedza West     | 91      | 10  | 41      | 1                | 50                 | 9                  |
| Zaka West       | 68      | 0   | 32      | 5                | 32                 | 32                 |

As can be seen from Table 7 above, eight of the constituencies had no traditional leaders seen as affiliated to MDC-T, and in the remainder ZANU PF was massively dominant in the affiliations of traditional leaders. More importantly, and given the requirement for traditional leaders to be politically neutral, there were very significant percentages of ZANU PF-affiliated traditional

<sup>97</sup> See Muzarabani report where the Community court was used to impose unjustified fines on MDC supporters.

<sup>98</sup> Mt Darwin South.

<sup>99</sup> Field researchers were asked to identify the political allegiances of traditional leaders, and to record their findings as follows.

Record if they are **neutral**, if not, estimate their degree of affiliation to a political party on a 5-point scale:

1. Cooperates with a political party under duress (e.g. attending party meetings when summoned.)
2. Cooperates with a political party (attends meetings and follows instructions willingly).
3. Supports a political party (i.e. is a member of a political party).
4. Participates actively in political party activities, such as supporting rallies, but is not involved in political violence.
5. Full collaboration with political party, including perpetrating acts of political violence.

leaders actively involved in political party activities and even in politically motivated violence [see Table 8 over].

When traditional leaders affiliated to the two parties were contrasted, the differences were highly significant. Traditional leaders from the MDC-T were mostly likely to be seen as neutral, with very few showing strong affiliation and none being politically active. On the other hand, traditional leaders supporting ZANU PF were mostly seen as showing strong affiliation and, of great concern, being involved in political violence<sup>100</sup>.

| CONSTITUENCY | Neutral | Weak affiliation | Strong affiliation | Politically active |
|--------------|---------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| ZANU PF      | 12      | 10               | 39                 | 39                 |
| MDC-T        | 72      | 15               | 13                 | 0                  |

The names, positions, affiliations, and involvement of the traditional leaders identified in the companion survey are given in [Appendix G](#). A detailed report covering the constituencies researched is provided in [Appendix K](#).

### 3.6 Patterns of violence

Patterns of violence are described below. Table 7 table shows those wards in each constituency where violence has been most prevalent, and the number of wards overall in each constituency. As can be seen, there is variability from constituency to constituency, where some constituencies have Bases in every single ward, whilst others have only a few wards with Bases. At This suggests ththere are wards in which ZANU PF does not have much support.

**Table 7: Wards and Bases in selected constituencies**

| Constituency | No of Wards with Bases | No of wards overall | Percentage of wards with Bases |
|--------------|------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| Buhera       | 6                      | 8                   | 75                             |
| Epworth      | 7                      | 7                   | 100                            |
| Hurungwe     | 2                      | 4                   | 50                             |
| Hwedza       | 5                      | 8                   | 63                             |
| Makoni       | 10                     | 10                  | 100                            |
| Pfungwe      | 6                      | 9                   | 67                             |
| Mazarabani   | 17                     | 29                  | 59                             |
| Mazowe       | 4                      | 8                   | 50                             |
| Mt Darwin    | 6                      | 12                  | 50                             |
| Mudzi        | 7                      | 7                   | 100                            |

<sup>100</sup> The involvement of traditional leaders and local government officials is detailed in a separate report.

|        |    |    |    |
|--------|----|----|----|
| Mwenzi | 5  | 15 | 33 |
| Nyanga | 11 | 13 | 85 |
| Shamva | 9  | 15 | 60 |
| Uzumba | 7  | 8  | 88 |
| Zaka   | 7  | 8  | 88 |

Table 8 shows the constituencies, the number of Bases established in the run-up to elections since 2002, and also sets out the type of ‘punishments’ and violence perpetrated within the areas under consideration here.

**Table 8: Incidents of violence emanating from Bases within selected constituencies**

| Constituency | Active Bases by Year |      |      |      | Violations in 2008 <sup>101</sup> |       |       |     |      |        |         |
|--------------|----------------------|------|------|------|-----------------------------------|-------|-------|-----|------|--------|---------|
|              | 2000                 | 2005 | 2008 | 2010 | Denial of food                    | Theft | Arson | GBH | Rape | Murder | Threats |
| Buhera       | 1                    | 1    | 17   | 2    | 1                                 | 1     | 1     | 1   | 1    | 1      | 1       |
| Epworth      | 1                    | 1    | 14   | 4    |                                   |       | 1     | 1   | 1    | 0      | 1       |
| Hurungwe     | 1                    | 2    | 3    | 11   | 1                                 | 1     | 1     | 1   | 1    | 1      | 1       |
| Hwedza       | 0                    | 4    | 6    | 4    | 1                                 | 1     | 1     | 1   | 1    | 1      | 1       |
| Makoni       | 6                    | 6    | 6    | 2    |                                   |       |       | 1   |      |        | 1       |
| Pfungwe      | 0                    | 9    | 12   | 3    | 1                                 | 1     | 1     | 1   | 0    | 1      | 1       |
| Mazarabani   | 16                   | 16   | 16   | 4    | 1                                 | 1     | 1     | 1   | 1    | 1      | 1       |
| Mazowe       | 1                    | 2    | 4    | 4    | 1                                 | 1     | 1     | 1   | 0    | 1      | 1       |
| Mt Darwin    | 6                    | 6    | 6    | 3    | 1                                 | 1     | 1     | 1   | 0    | 1      | 1       |

<sup>101</sup> Since the violations are covered in detail elsewhere – Appendices [E](#) and [F](#) – the table merely shows whether the violations, irrespective of quantity, were reported in 2008 or not.

|                    |           |           |            |           |           |           |           |            |           |           |           |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Mudzi              | 1         | 13        | 14         | 6         | 1         | 1         | 1         | 1          | 1         | 1         | 1         |
| Mwenzi             | 5         | 5         | 5          | 0         | 1         | 1         | 1         | 1          | 1         | 1         | 1         |
| Nyanga             | 6         | 3         | 6          | 6         | 1         | 1         | 1         | 1          | 0         | 0         | 1         |
| Shamva             | 3         | 5         | 4          | 5         |           |           | 1         | 1          | 0         | 0         | 1         |
| Uzumba             | 3         | 3         | 11         | 7         | 1         | 1         | 1         | 1          | 0         | 1         | 0         |
| Zaka               | 8         | 7         | 9          | 3         | 1         | 1         | 1         | 1          | 0         | 1         | 1         |
| <b>Totals:</b>     | <b>58</b> | <b>83</b> | <b>133</b> | <b>64</b> | <b>12</b> | <b>12</b> | <b>14</b> | <b>15</b>  | <b>7</b>  | <b>11</b> | <b>14</b> |
| <b>Percentage:</b> | <b>40</b> | <b>57</b> | <b>91</b>  | <b>44</b> | <b>80</b> | <b>80</b> | <b>93</b> | <b>100</b> | <b>47</b> | <b>73</b> | <b>93</b> |

As can be seen, with the exception of Makoni South, all types of violation were seen in virtually all constituencies during 2008. Attention needs to be paid to denial of food, theft, and arson, since these are violations not generally classified as gross human rights violations – such as rape, murder, etc – but have been well-reported in all human rights violations in respect of elections. These three violations frequently have the consequence of leading to displacement of the victims from the community, and hence have a direct effect upon voting.<sup>102</sup>

In 31 incidents of violence detailed in nine constituencies,<sup>103</sup> “logs” have been used as the means to administer beatings. This requires some explanation as the unwieldy nature of logs seems to render them inappropriate for this purpose. The use of logs to inflict injury or effect punishment has symbolic value in traditional Zimbabwean society. In rural communities logs have been used to punish those seen as disrupting or undermining a community from within. This form of punishment was traditionally used against those accused of being witches in a community. During the “Second Chimurenga”, during the 1970s mainly, the method of inflicting injury was used extensively against those perceived to be “sell outs”. ZANU PF’s propaganda has constructed a “patriotic history” centred on issues of race, sovereignty and land. In this narrative ZANU PF’s struggle to retain political power is presented as the “Third Chimurenga” implying continuity with the fight against settler-colonialism of the Second Chimurenga. Those opposed to ZANU PF are thus cast as aligned with western (neo) colonial endeavours, and thus “sell-outs” to the ZANU PF nationalist project. The use of logs to inflict injury thus forms a specific role in ZANU PF’s propaganda campaign against the opposition, both to reinforce the narrative and as praxis.<sup>104</sup>

### 3 Conclusion

<sup>102</sup> One early set of reports talked about these violations as forms of psychological torture since their aim was to place the victims in situations of extreme duress. See IRCT (2000), Organised Violence and Torture in Zimbabwe, 6th June 2000, Copenhagen and Harare, COPENHAGEN & HARARE: IRCT & AMANI TRUST; IRCT (2001) Organised Violence and Torture in Zimbabwe, 24th May 2001, Copenhagen and Harare, COPENHAGEN & HARARE: IRCT & AMANI TRUST.

<sup>103</sup> Epworth, Hweda South, Mt. Darwin South, Mudzi North, Muzarabnai North and South, Mwenzi West, Nyanga North, Shamva South and Uzumba South.

<sup>104</sup> On this and a historiographic analysis of “Patriotic History” see Blessing-MilesTendi *Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe* Peter Lang 2010.

ZANU PF has clearly developed a comprehensive strategy for dealing with other parties competing in elections that strongly draws on its control of the structures and processes operating in the rural areas. Each aspect of a villager's life, from the very ability to occupy land within the area, access to food, agricultural inputs, and, in some instances, access to his or her church, may be subject to the control of ZANU PF. This is accomplished through the control over formal governmental structures as provided by statute, the adulteration of these structures and legislated procedures, through traditional authorities, and through ZANU PF party structures and personnel in the area in question.

Any person attempting to evade this control can be swiftly dealt with by restricting the access to resources, and, in the event of the individual having some degree of independence or autonomy, through overt violence. The degree of pressure exerted appears to be adjusted according to the support or lack of support that ZANU PF has in each ward. For the purposes of elections then, ZANU PF is able, for example, to determine whether subtle pressures, using the control of resources can be used in some areas or whether overt violence is required. This is graphically illustrated if one compares the strategies adopted by ZANU PF in the elections of 2000, 2002 and 2008 with 2005. In the latter instance, ZANU PF clearly utilized the more subtle forms of coercion, which this report has intended to show are available, rather than outright violence.

What is remarkable that, given the power ZANU PF can exercise over villagers, any person living in the rural areas should admit to being an MDC supporter, let alone an activist. That many people still do so is a testimony to their courage and resilience.

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